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ABSTRACT
THE WARS OF YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION AND BRITAIN’S ROLE IN 
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY, 1991-1995 
Emel G. OSMAN^AVUSOGLU 
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal
This study is a chronological examination of British politics and diplomacy 
concerning the Former Yugoslavia from the explosion of war in 1991 right up to the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. As such, it serves as a 
case study of British diplomacy during that period. All in all, British policy towards 
the Yugoslav dissolution wars was evaluated as unsuccessful both in terms of 
achieving a stable peace in the region and containing the conflict. The major aim o f 
this study is to analyse the basic considerations and main motives behind the British 
policy in dealing with the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. The study attempts to look at 
the question whether or not any particular responsibility for the inadequate 
international response to the Yugoslav crisis can be attributed to Britain. The study 
argues that Britain’s Conservative government, rather than attempting to lead 
international community to take more robust stance against Serbian genocidal war in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, used its diplomatic skills to subdue discussion of using 
force whenever the issue arose and severely hampered a collective response to the 
crisis. As a result, it is argued that Major government’s unwillingness to go beyond 
humanitarian intervention, despite pressure from the US, from the media and public 
and from two main opposition parties, reinforced its image of weakness and 
incompetence and thus did have important political implications both at home and 
abroad.
Key Words: Former Yugoslavia, Dissolution, British Foreign Policy
ÖZET
YUGOSLAVYA’NIN DAĞILMA SAVAŞLARI VE ULUSLARARASI 
POLİTİKANIN OLUŞTURULMASINDA İNGİLTERE’NİN ROLÜ, 1991-1995
Emel G. OSMANÇAVUSOĞLU 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Haşan Ünal
Bu çalışma, Yugoslavya’da savaşın 1991 yılında patlak vermesinden, Aralık 1995 
tarihinde Dayton Anlaşmasının imzalanmasına kadar geçen dönem içerisinde İngiliz 
Dış Politikasını incelemektedir. Bu dönem zarfında, temel olarak, Yugoslavya’nın 
dağılma savaşlarına karşı İngiliz politikası, hem bölgede istikran sağlama hem de 
krizi çevreleyebilme açısından, başansız olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Çalışmanın 
temel amacı Yugoslavya’nın dağılma savaşlan sırasında, özellikle de Bosna- 
Hersek’teki savaşta, İngiliz politikasının temelindeki düşünce ve faktörleri analiz 
edebilmektir. Uluslararası camianın bu krizdeki politikasının yetersizliğinde 
İngiltere’nin herhangi bir rolünün bulunup bulunmadığı, böyle bir rol oynanmış ise 
bu rolün niteliğini ne olduğu çalışmanın temelini oluşturmaktadır. Adı geçen ülkenin 
Muhafazakar Hükümeti’nin, savaşta saldırgan taraf olarak nitelenen Sırbistan’a karşı 
uluslararası alanda çok daha etkili önlemlerin alınmasında öncülük etmekten ziyade, 
diplomatik yeteneklerini kullanarak Yugoslavya’da adaletli bir barışın 
oluşturulmasını sağlayacak ortamın oluşmasını engellediği sonucuna varılmıştır. 
Böyle bir politika hem İngiltere’nin imajını zedelemiş, hem de Bosna-Hersek’in 
toprak bütünlüğünün korunması açısından son derece olumsuz sonuçlara sebep 
olmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yugoslavya, İngiliz Dış Politikası
u
First o f all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Asst. Prof. 
Dr. Hasan Ünal for his excellent support and encouragement throughout my doctoral 
studies. His illuminatingly guiding insights into the Balkan History and politics, all 
the inspiring discussions he has generously offered me throughout without no sign of 
tiredness have contributed considerably to the completion o f this thesis. Indeed, He 
was always more than a supervisor; he and his wonderful wife, Eugenia, opened their 
home and hearts to me.
I also would like to thank Professor Norman Stone who had made useful suggestions 
that have led to the improvement of the final text.
I want to thank the members of my defence committee Prof. Dr. Hasan Koni, Assist. 
Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Assist. Prof. Dr. Gülgün Tuna and Assist. Prof. Dr. 
Hakan Kırımlı who offered for their insights and useful comments.
I would like to thank the British Council for Chevening Scholarship that gave me the 
opportunity to study in King’s College, London and complete my research in 
distinguished libraries in London. And, at King’s college, I would like to thank Dr. 
James Gow, and Ms. Jane M. O. Sharp of the Centre for Defence Studies for their 
guidance. I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of Chatham House 
librarians; Ms. Susan Boyde, Ms. Mary Bone, Mr. Malcolm Madden, Ms. Sue Franks 
and Ms. Linda Bedford.
My friends in the department were constant source of joy and support throughout my 
dissertation. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my friends Ms. Müge 
Kınacıoğlu, Ms. Ayşe Artun, Ms. Müge Keller, Ms. Meryem Kırımlı and Ms. Dilek 
Eryilmaz.
Last but not the least, I am thankful to my parents and sisters; Özlem and Atanur, for 
their excellent support and love.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract i
Özet ii
Acknowledgements iii
Table Of Contents iv
List Of Maps v
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER H: DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 16
2.1. The National Question in Yugoslavia 18
2.1.1. First Yugoslavia 18
2.1.2. Tito’s Yugoslavia and the National Question 20
2.2. The Rise o f Serbian Nationalism and Its Repercussions 26
2.2.1. The Serbian Memorandum 26
2.2.2. Milosevic’s Irresistable Rise 29
2.3. Slovenian Resentment and Assertion of Political Sovereignty 31
2.4. Croatian Resentment and Revival of Croatian Nationalism 33
2.4.1. The Serbian Minority in Croatia 35
2.5. The Fast Slide into War 37
CHAPTER HI: ERUPTION OF THE WAR AND SHAPING OF 
INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE
3.1. Slovenian and Croatian Declarations o f Independence and
the War in Yugoslavia 41
3.1.1. Slovenia’s Phoney War 41
3.1.2. Initial International Responses to the Crisis 42
3.1.3. The Evaluation of EC’s Enthusiasm 54
3.2. The JNA Attack and the War in Croatia 60
L 3.3. The EC Conference: Lord Carrington’s Plan oo
3.4. Recognition o f Slovenia and Croatia 74
3.4.1. Debates on the Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 74
IV
3.4.2. Badinter Commission, Sovereignty and Self-Determination:
The Case of Yugoslavia 79
3.4.3. Germany’s Early Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia
and Britain’s Reaction 82
CHAPTER IV: THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 
AND INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
4.1. Before the Deluge: Preparations for the Carve-up of Bosnia 86
4.1.1. Land o f Three Peoples: The National Composition and
Political Situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina 86
4.1.2. Bosnia and Hercegovina in Search of Recognition 93
4.2. Before the Deluge: The Lisbon Conference and
Plans for ‘Cantonisation’ 95
4.3. The Outbreak o f War in Bosnia-Hercegovina 100
4.3.1. Bosnians and Croats Fighting Together 106
4.4. Western Misperceptions About the Nature of the War
in Bosnia and Hercegovina 108
4.4.1. The EC and the UN 109
4.5. Ethnic Cleansing in Summer 1992 111
4.5.1. Opening of the Sarajevo Airport 115
4.5.2. The Friction Between the EC and the UN 116
CHAPTER V: BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN 
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
5.1. Britain’s Perception o f the War in Bosnia and Hercegovina 119
5.1.1. Historical Dimensions of Pro-Serbian
Sentiment in Britain 123
5.1.2. British Actions in the War 134
5.2. “Everyone is a Loser”: The London Conference 143
5.2.1. Establishment of the Permanent Conference 148
CHAPTER VI: BOSNIAN PEACE PROCESS: ANGLO-AMERICAN RIFTS:
6.1. International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)
and the Vance-Owen Plan 156
6 .2 . The US Opposition to Vance-Owen Plan 166
6.3. The Breaking o f the Muslim-Croat Alliance 171
6.4. The Fall o f the Vance-Owen Plan 173
6.5. Creation of the UN ‘Safe Areas’ 180
6.6. The ‘Joint Action Group’ and the ‘Joint Action Plan’ 183
6.7. Debating Partition and British Attitude 185
6.7.1. Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (Invincible Plan) -187
6.7.2. The EU Action Plan 194
CHAPTER VH: CHANGING OF THE TIDE IN WAR IN 1994
AND BRITISH POLICY
7.1. Situation at the Beginning of 1994 197
7.2. The Market Square Bomb 202
7.3. The Washington Accords 210
7.4. The Gorazde Debacle 215
7.5. Britain, Russia, the US and the Contact Group 224
7.5.1. The Contact Group Plan 227
7.6. “Lift and Strike”: Confrontation between the US and Britain 231
7.6.1. US Opposition to the Arms Embargo 233
7.6.2. British Opposition to NATO Air-Strikes 237
7.7. Converging Different Approaches to Peace 241
CHAPTER VIE: TOWARDS THE ENDGAME: BRITISH POLICY 
ON THE ROAD TO DAYTON
8.1. Reversal o f the Tide: Bosnia and Croatia on the Offensive 248
8.1.1. Tudjman’s Decision to Expel UNPROFOR 249
8.1.2. The Zagreb-4 Project 251
8.1.3. Croatia’s Recapture of Western Slavonia 254
8.1.4. End o f the Carter Cease-Fire 257
8.2. The Changing Phase of International Involvement 259
8.2.1. General Rupert Smith and the Rapid Reaction Force 259
VI
8.3. The Fall o f the UN ‘Safe Areas’: Srebrenica Massacre 270
8.4. The Fall o f Serb Krajina 277
8.5. US Diplomatic Engagement and the ‘Holbrooke Plan’ 280
8.6. The Endgame and the Beginning of the Peace Process 285
' 8.7. The Proximity Talks and the Dayton Peace Agreement 289
8.7.1. Tensions in the Dayton Agreement
and British Position 292
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 299
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309
vii
LIST OF MAPS
MAP 1. The Constituent Territories of Yugoslavia, 1918 
MAP 2. Yugoslavia Between 1941-1989
MAP 3. Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Winning Parties by Municipality
MAP 4. The Vance-Owen Plan
MAP 5. The Owen-Stoltenberg Proposal
MAP 6. The Contact Group Plan
MAP 7. The Dayton Accords
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Yugoslavia presented the post-Cold War world, and Europe in 
particular with a critical challenge. Bloody dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ran against the spirit of integration and co-operation 
which prevailed in the international community following the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989. When the heads of state or government of the member states of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Paris in November 1990 to 
mark the end of Cold War, they expressed pride and confidence in the broad array of 
institutions and agreements designed to keep the peace in Europe and prevent renewal 
of conflicts that had shattered the continent in two world wars. Yet, the underlying 
weaknesses of all these institutions and agreements; The European Community (EC- 
later European Union [EU] in November 1992), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE- 
later Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] in January 1995), 
the Western European Union (WEU) and United Nations (UN) had become apparent 
as none of these institutions or agreements were designed to cope with such a conflict 
as the one in Former Yugoslavia.
Indeed the main reason of the failure of these institutions in coping with this first post- 
Cold War crisis in Europe can be given as the overall lack of coherence in the 
international approaches which was mainly due to the differences of perspective and 
opinion between the major players. Especially, London’s interpretation of the conflict 
as ethnic and historical put the British leadership totally at odds with Washington
1
which was reluctant to back British proposals since it considered the war as an act of 
aggression and looked for more just peace.
Britain played a central role in the international handling of the crisis in Yugoslavia in 
general and war in Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular. However, that role was 
severely criticised throughout from different quarters. The officials and academics in 
the US, Germany, several Muslim countries, and, of course, the Bosnian leadership 
accused Britain of pursuing pro-Serbian line of policy, and of conducting a policy of 
appeasement. According to these critics, it was, at best, a policy of indifference. 
Indeed, as a British MP put it, ‘Britain was described as the leader of ‘don't let's do 
anythings’ and there was increasing concern and anger throughout all the Muslim 
communities in the world at Britain’s craven conduct in these matters.1 As early as 
December 1992, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic asserted that the British were ‘the 
biggest brake on any progress’ towards peace in Bosnia.2 There was not any consensus 
on government’s policies inside Britain either. The clash between British public and 
media and the majority of political and military establishment came to a head over 
Bosnia in 1992 and 1993. On British TV, ex-Tory leader and former Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher accused the British politicians of behaving ‘little like accomplices to 
massacre’.3
1 Andrew Faulds, MP of Warley. House of Commons Debates, HansarcL 7 February 1994, vol. 237, 
col. 22.
2 Quoted in Jane M. O. Sharp, Bankrupt in the Balkans: British Policy in Bosnia. Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) (London, 1993), 1.
3 Baroness Thacher’s views on Bosnia were expressed in a BBC interview with Peter Sissons. The 
edited version appeared in The Times. “Europe Has Been Like an Accomplice to Massacre,” 14 April 
1993.
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Although at every circle British politicians stress that NATO and the transatlantic link 
remain fundamental to Britain’s future security, as is the parallel development of the 
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the WEU,4 Britain’s policy in 
Yugoslavia put in jeopardy, first, the feasibility of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and second the credibility of NATO and thus future transatlantic partnership. 
In fact, it was during the Bosnian war that the US-British relations reached the lowest 
ebb since the Suez crisis of 1956.
Why did a civilised country such as Britain fail to oppose an act of aggression reaching 
the levels of ethnic cleansing? Why did it prefer to follow a line of policy that would, 
on the one hand, eventually lead to the destruction of a UN member state and put it at 
odds both with its own public and allies on the other? Hence, the major aim of this 
study is to analyse the basic considerations and main motives behind the British policy 
in dealing with the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. The study attempts to look at the 
question whether or not any particular responsibility for the inadequate international 
response to the Yugoslav crisis can be attributed to Britain.
One of the reasons of being so assertive and consistent in challenging the whole world 
in Yugoslav crisis can be explained by the fact that whatever Britain’s theoretically 
acceptable place in the hierarchy of international actors; in matters of security and the 
so called high policy of power and prestige, the British political establishment has an 
instinctive taste for a ‘big’ foreign policy.5 This tradition of action might have been
4 See. for example, Chief of the Defence Staff Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge’s address to the 
Conference held at Chatham House, Britain in the World, on 29 March 1995. Conference 
Proceedings, p. 36.
5 Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st 
Century (London: Cassell/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 6.
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due to its former imperial role, and a military capability of great competence and high 
reputation. Although, Douglas Hurd warned several times that ‘we can not be 
everywhere and we can not do everything’,6 with an effectively wide and effective 
range of foreign policy instruments - its armed forces, its diplomatic experience, its 
membership in international organisations - his famous metaphor ‘punching above its 
weight’ still remains the motto of the Foreign Office. That meant the country playing a 
prominent role within each of the bodies of which it was a member.
For Britain ‘multilateral diplomacy’ provides valuable opportunities to exercise 
disproportionate power and influence. For years now, British has long recognised that 
‘most of what we want done has to be done in concert with the others and that it pays 
to harness the multilateral machinery that has been created to that task’.7 Britain, 
belonging to some 120 international bodies as diverse as NATO, the EU and the UN, 
where it has a permanent seat on the Security Council, is well-placed to exploit the 
potential of the new multilateral diplomacy. It was in the field of international 
diplomacy, especially in the UN Security Council, that Britain most skilfully exploited 
its comparative advantage in the post-Cold war era to maintain a leadership position 
within the international response to the war in former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the 
British government, rather than attempting to lead international community to take 
more robust stance against Serbian genocidal war in Bosnia, used its diplomatic skills 
to subdue discussion of using force whenever the issue arose and severely hampered a 
collective response to the crisis. In the end, Major government’s unwillingness to go 
beyond humanitarian intervention, despite pressure from the US, from the media and
6 Douglas Hurd, Address to Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) at Chatham House, 27 
January 1993.
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public and from two main opposition parties, reinforced its image of weakness and 
incompetence and thus did have important political implications both at home and 
abroad.
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
Before turning to provide an account of how this study was conducted, it will be useful 
to summarise the ways in which British foreign policy has been studied up to now. 
Broadly speaking there are four ways in which the British foreign policy has been 
studied so far.
First of them is what can be called ‘the historical approach’, by which is meant the 
analysis of British Foreign Policy from a historical perspective, stressing the centrality 
of providing a narrative that makes sense of events. Such a narrative concentrates on 
the thoughts of those who made decisions, and avoids any explicit concern with the 
theory; accordingly the account is judged against rival accounts in terms of the extent 
of evidence cited and the coherence of the explanations of the decision-makers 
offered.7 8 Above all, this work moves from evidence to an explanation, seeing such 
explanations as logically entailed by the evidence offered; it does not construct pre­
theories or hypotheses to be tested, nor does it start with a theory which is then 
applied to the specific cases to be explained. This kind of approach is inductive,
7 Sir David Hannav. “The Growth of Multilateral Diplomacy,” the 1996 FCO Annual Lacture. FCO 
Historians Occasional Papers No. 13, September 1996, 13.
8 Particularly good examples of this type of approach can be found in M. Gilbert, Winston Churchill, 
vols. 3-7 (London: Heinemann, 1971-86); W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 
1919-1963 (London: Methuen, 1968) and J. W. Young, Britain, France and Unity of Europe 
(Leicester: Leicester, 1984).
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constructing explanations from evidence, and using as evidence the explanations of 
behaviour offered by those who made the decisions.
A second approach is a subset of the first; it, too, is historical, but is written in concert 
with social science generally and with either international relations theory or foreign 
policy analysis specifically. Such accounts analyse British foreign policy by examining 
historical evidence, but do so with an explicit consideration of theories developed 
within social science. Thus, such accounts will look at the impact of psychological 
processes, or bureaucratic politics or the domestic inputs to British Foreign policy, and 
will use these approaches to structure their treatment of the historical evidence. As 
such, they seek to explain specific historical events as examples of more widely 
acceptable psychological or political phenomena. For these writers, there is an explicit 
concern with patterns and regularities, and this is well-illustrated by their citation of, 
and reliance upon, theories of decision-making and psychology.9
A third approach is that which treats British Foreign Policy from an international 
relations perspective. This is to say it locates explanations of British foreign policy 
within explanations of international relations. This type of studies stresses the role of 
British foreign policy as a way of balancing the requirements of the British state and 
society with the changing nature of international system. These accounts, although 
focused on explaining the foreign policy of Britain, do so by discussing the ways in 
which Britain makes foreign policy according to the dual imperatives of domestic and
9 Some good examples of these type of approach are given as Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and 
Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Christopher Thome, The 
Limits o f Foreign Policy (London: Hamilton, 1971), Allies o f a Kind (London: Hamilton, 1978); and 
Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London: Allan & Unwin, 1981).
6
international constraints and demands.10 Britain is considered as, above all, a state 
existing within the international society of states, and this location imposes demands 
and limitations on British foreign policy that are reflected both in the ways in which 
foreign policy is made.
Finally, there are those approaches that explain British foreign policy from a domestic 
institutional perspective. These accounts develop their explanations of British foreign 
policy by stressing the institutional setting in which it is made. Accordingly, they stress 
the role of constitutional and political factors within Britain as accounting for the 
content of, and machinery for, making British foreign policy.11
Whereas it was easy in the past to define foreign policy, in the sense that it referred to 
Britain’s diplomatic relations, it is now much more difficult. Foreign policy involves a 
massively increased range of factors, and these, the sum total of external relations, 
involves a very different and much wider set of individuals and groups in the making of 
foreign policy. Given this rather complex and confusing empirical picture, it is not 
surprising that general and historical account have found it difficult to explain British 
foreign policy, not that any attempt to develop theory in this area has proven very 
problematic. This is so because the study of British Foreign Policy has to deal with 
four sets of changes: the changing nature of the theoretical work on foreign policy; the 
impact of interdependence and transnationalism on the context of foreign and domestic
10 Examples are Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973 (London: Oxford University 
Press. 1975); William Wallace. Britain’s Bilateral Link’s With Western Europe (London: Routledge/ 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984); Christopher Tugendhat and William Wallace, Options 
For British Foreign Policy in the 1990s (London: Routledge/ Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1988)
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policy; the changing international and domestic environments that result; and the 
effects of these factors on the ways in which policy is made and implemented.
APPROACH ADOPTED IN THIS STUDY
The approach adopted in this study, to analyse the British foreign policy towards 
Yugoslav dissolution wars, does not exactly fit in any of these categories. Although it 
has some common characteristics, it does not correspond to any one to one. The main 
concern in this study is to analyse pattern of the British involvement into a ‘specific 
case,’ the Yugoslav dissolution wars. It should be kept in mind, however, that the case 
under examination had not been static; any kind of international involvement altered 
the course of the conflict and catalysed developments on the ground.
Another prevailing assumption in this study is that, although Britain was in a type of 
international system during the Yugoslav crisis, it was not directed or constrained by 
the limitations of the international system. On the contrary, Britain itself manipulated 
the international environment. Despite the fact that Britain had lost much of its power 
and does not rank among the first class powers in the world any more, it still has the 
taste and ability for ‘big’ foreign policy; as Douglas Hurd pointed out in his famous 
metaphor; Britain should ‘punch above its weight’.12
Foreign policy, today, is a hybrid; its empirical content varies from state to state and 
from issue to issue. This study tries to prove that there are no regular patterns in the 1
11 See, for example, A. Shlaim, P. Jones and K. Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945 
(Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1977); and Christopher Coker, Nation in Retreat? (Oxford:
8
making of British foreign policy. For example, although Britain is part of an 
interdependent world economy, the involvement which necessitates the acceptance of a 
certain loss of autonomy, at the same time Britain always stresses the notions of 
national interest and sovereignty, which imply that the government has much more 
control over the events than is the case. This contradictory stance is clearly indicated 
in the British attitude to the European Union. A similar contradiction occurs in 
defence policy. British acceptance of the common defence, as reflected in the 
commitment to NATO, is matched by a perception of a wider defence role (the Gulf 
and the Falklands). Finally, one can point to the tensions between sovereignty and the 
fact of interdependence in the British-American relationship, especially resurfaced 
during the course of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
The location of Britain in the international political system is accepted as another 
challenge to the thorough analysis of British foreign policy, since Britain appears to be 
at a crucial intersection in the political, military and economic cleavages in the world. 
In one light, Britain is very much a part of Europe and therefore offers a paradigmatic 
example of how a country makes its foreign policy within a complex international 
setting. Additionally, Britain plays a central role in the international financial and 
economic system, and this results in evident intersections between government and 
economic institutions that point up to the inadequacies of simple models of 
international relations. Yet, Britain also enjoys a ‘special relationship’ with the US, at 
the same time it possesses an independent nuclear deterrent. Taken together these 
pose a formidable agenda for any theory of foreign policy. There is simply no evident 12
Pergamon, 1986).
12 Douglas Hurd, “Making the World A Safer Place,” Daily Telegraph, 1 January 1992.
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classification within which Britain fits; it is not a superpower, nor a middle power; it 
has aspects of a great power, but is caught up in very complex set of 
interdependencies; it has to be involved in bargaining within defence and economic 
alliances and organisations, yet it is not a small power. No other country has quite this 
profile. Yet, exactly because Britain slips between conceptual categories, it offers a 
very real challenge to international relations theory.
Britain is actually a particularly interesting state for students of foreign policy as it 
constitutes a unique case in the international system (a former great power, highly 
interdependent, especially with the EC, having a special relationship with the US and 
possessing an independent nuclear deterrent). Therefore, the most important task 
facing foreign policy analysts, given the lack of cumulative work generally, and virtual 
absence in the case of Britain, is the use of ‘case studies’ which would provide some 
answers to the enduring question of whether or not there are regularities in British 
foreign policy. Hence, this study attempts to contribute to the understanding of main 
motives and constraints behind the British foreign policy decision-making by taking the 
Yugoslav wars of dissolution as a test case.
PLAN OF THE STUDY
To understand the evolution and the outcome of Western and in particular, British 
involvement in the Yugoslav crisis with which the remainder of this thesis is 
concerned, it is necessary first to understand the context in which those developments 
occurred: the internal and external dynamics which precipitated the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. This is the concern of Chapter n.
10
The term used either in the form of ‘wars of Yugoslav dissolution’ or ‘Yugoslav 
dissolution wars’ requires brief explanation for terminological clarification. The term 
‘wars’ denotes the armed conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia and finally in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. The plural form is considered as appropriate since, although closely 
intermingled, each of these wars has its own characteristics and distinct outcomes. 
The term ‘Yugoslav dissolution’ is chosen carefully to describe a bloody and painful 
process, however, not without external involvement. ‘Dissolution’ is the preferred 
option when compared to the other terms like ‘secession’, ‘succession’ or ‘civil war’. 
Slovenia and Croatia never considered themselves as ‘secessionist’ states since their 
declarations of independence was merely because the Yugoslav federal state structure 
had ceased effectively to function. Neither were they waging the wars of Yugoslav 
‘succession’, since the term implies that the purpose of the war was to establish control 
over the remnants of the old Yugoslav state in either ideological, political or economic 
terms. Finally, although the wars in Yugoslavia were for borders, statehood, identity 
and ideology, they can not be described as a ‘civil’ war. Despite the fact that, 
particularly in Bosnia and Hercegovina, it was evidently a complex conflict, containing 
a number of issues and parties, still it has been aimed, planned and directed from 
Belgrade as a deliberate act of aggression against a UN member country. Moreover, 
although at the beginning of 1990s, disintegration of Yugoslavia seemed inevitable, 
that did not necessarily mean war, even if, as in the Yugoslav case, it contained evident 
characteristics of violent social unrest.
The body of analysis in the subsequent chapter, Chapter m , is concerned with the 
wars in Slovenia and Croatia which surrounded disintegration process; with the
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interpretation of initial international involvement in these wars. This chapter covers 
the growing involvement of the EC (later EU) and the UN, as well as background role 
of other organisations, during the first year of war and primarily traces the involvement 
of the EC from the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia to the ending 
of the armed hostilities in Croatia and the EC decision to recognise the independence 
of these two republics. It argues that the role of Britain in this initial involvement as 
head of the EC Presidency determined the nature of future international involvement.
The outbreak of War in Bosnia and Hercegovina was dealt with separately in C hapter 
TV. This chapter argues that, although a framework was established for recognition of 
Yugoslav republics, this was neither clearly understood, nor clearly implemented and 
supported. With Serbian attack, the focus shifted to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The 
inability to understand the real nature of war in this country led the international 
community into a chaos even standing still and watching the ethnic cleansing of the 
Bosnian Muslims by the Serbs. There was also increasing friction between the EC and 
the UN over Bosnia as violence forced the commitment of UN peace-keepers.
C hap ter V basically deals with the British response to the war in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. British perception of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina were described 
as the primary factor in determining the British position in the later stages of the war. 
The debate between the advocates of military intervention and critics of it was 
extensively analysed in this chapter.
C hapter VI is about the Anglo-American rifts which occurred as a result of diverging 
views considering the use of air power and the US failure to comply with the Vance-
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Owen Peace Plan which was presented to the international community as the only 
viable solution at that time. Consequences of the Vance-Owen plan and the 
subsequent Croat-Muslim war were also discussed as important factors determining 
the outcome of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. This chapter presents that the 
outcome of the overall lack of coherence in international approaches, was due to the 
differences of perspective and opinion between Britain and the US. It concludes that 
Anglo-American rifts had to be remedied first to provide peace in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.
Chapter VII focuses on the developments on the ground and British policy towards 
Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1994. Throughout the year 1994, the big line of 
confrontation between the US and Britain remained the issue of ‘lift and strike’; the 
US pressure to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and to use 
NATO air power to pressure the Serbs to the negotiating table. Moreover, the refusal 
of Clinton Administration to deploy ground troops in Bosnia was the biggest bone of 
contention as the Alliance relations deteriorated steadily through the war. The chapter 
analyses the events in 1994 by arguing that British objections to take any action saving 
Bosnia and Hercegovina grossly affected the outcome of the war in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.
Chapter VIH deals with the changing phase of the international involvement and 
initiatives towards the ‘Endgame’. The chapter argues that, in the year 1995, 
especially after the fall of safe areas and consequently UNPROFOR’s position 
becoming untenable, the US position became central to international policy leaving the 
British and French behind, and that, it was the US efforts which brought the peace
13
finally to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The US position was clearly assisted by radical 
changes on the ground which eventually helped to bring the Serbs to the negotiation 
table.
Finally, the Chapter IX, Conclusion provides an assessment of the British policy 
towards the ‘Yugoslavia Dissolution Wars’ in general, and, Bosnia and Hercegovina in 
particular and its implications for Britain, both at home and abroad..
Given the intention to provide a full account of British involvement in the war of 
Yugoslav dissolution, the attempt is to cover the details of the situation on the ground, 
international and British diplomatic activity thoroughly. This degree of detail is 
necessary for an accurate interpretation rather than the more usual approach to the 
analysis of the Yugoslav conflict, which relies less on analysis of particulars and more 
on opinion, based on incomplete information and understanding. Thus, this thesis 
titled “The Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution and Britain’s Role in the Making of 
International Policy, 1991-1995” is a chronological examination of British politics 
and diplomacy concerning the Former Yugoslavia from the explosion of war in 1991 
right up to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. As such, it 
serves as a case study of British diplomacy during that period. All in all, British policy
L
towards the Yugoslav dissolution wars was evaluated as unsuccessful both in terms of 
achieving a stable peace in the region and containing the conflict, as the latest events in 
Kosovo/a have shown.
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This study makes extensive use of existing literature on the history and politics of 
Former Yugoslavia, the House of Commons Debates (Hansard), journals, as well as 
serious newspapers and news magazines published both in Britain and in the US.
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CHAPTER II: DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
Although there had been no shortage of warning signals since the late 1980s about the 
coming turmoil in Yugoslavia and the country’s slow motion dissolution was in 
progress for even a longer time, when the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska 
Narodna Armija- JNA) tanks rolled into Slovenia in June 1991, the international 
community appeared to have been caught napping.13
In the 1960s, Yugoslavia was a stable federation, respected by the East and the West 
alike for its independent foreign policy. Under President Tito’s leadership, it had come 
to play an influential role on the world stage that was out of all proportion to its size 
and its economic and military power.14 Within a decade, however, all the cohesive 
factors holding the country together were gone. Despite the strenuous efforts to keep 
Tito alive on the most expensive life-supporting systems, charismatic leader and 
spiritual father of Yugoslavia died in 1980.15 During the Cold War years, his challenge 
to Stalinist cult within the Soviet Bloc16 and his idea of different ways to socialism had
13 In November 1990 a report by the CIA leaked to the press, warning that a war in Yugoslavia 
leading to the country’s disintegration, was likely within 18 months. David Binder, “Yugoslavia Seen 
Breaking Up Soon,” New York Times, 28 November 1990.
14 Christopher Cviic, ‘T he Background and Implications of the Domestic Scene in Yugoslavia,” in 
Problems o f Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, ed. Paul S. Shoup and George 
Hoffman (Washington D.C.: 1990), 89.
15 For some biographies of Tito see, Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (London: 
Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994); Jasper Ridley, Tito: A Biography (London: Constable, 1994); Stevan K. 
Pavlowitch, Tito: A Reassessment (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1993). For older biographies, see 
Milovan Djilas, Tito (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1981); Phyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); and the original biography; Vladimir Dedijer. Tito Speaks (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953).
16 For Tito-Stalin split and Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform, see Ivo Banac Wish Stalin Against 
Tito: Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); A. Ross Johnson, 
The Transformation of Communist Ideology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972); Milovan Djilas, 
Conversations with Stalin (Harmondsworth: 1967); G. W. Hofftnan and F. W. Neal, Yugoslavia and 
the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962); Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant 
Heretic: Tito’s Struggle Against Stalin (London: Heinemann, 1958); A. B. Ulam, Titoism and the
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helped him to act as the credit card for the country, and the western world had 
extended to Yugoslavia a high degree of preferential treatment in both political and 
economic matters. He had successfully exploited Yugoslavia’s position in the Cold 
War, playing one side off against the other with various benefits in terms of trade and 
both financial and military assistance.17 But his death put an abrupt end to this 
relationship Yugoslavia had developed for over four decades with the West.18
There was also a crucial external dimension in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The end 
of the Cold War represented the removal of a corset which had contained many of the 
straining bulges in the Yugoslav body politic.19 The fear of falling under Soviet 
domination which created a strong bond and helped to maintain a sort of national unity 
among its constituent nations since 1948 had disappeared within a night with the 
collapse of the Berlin wall. Moreover, the events in Central and Eastern Europe 
accelerated to some extent the slide into chaos in Yugoslavia. Especially Slovenes and 
Croats, long used to be in the forefront in liberal modifications to the Communist 
model, suddenly felt that they had lagged behind. Finally, by the end of the Cold War 
Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance, reducing international concern for its future.
Cominform (Cambridge, Mass.: 1952); Hamilton Fisher Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York: 
Golllancz, 1951).
17 See Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974 (London: Hurst for the RIIA, 1977); 
Duncan Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
18 Although the Yugoslav economy seemed to function successfully during the last two decades, it was 
through uncontrolled borrowing from the Western bloc. Within a very short period after Tito’s death, 
all the loans dried up and Yugoslavia had to begin repaying national debt. It coincided with the 
recession in Western Europe stemming from the second oil shock of 1979, while the debt burden was 
aggravated by high interest rates and exceptionally strong dollar. Living standards began to slide as 
the government moved to cut imports and inflation took off. Between 1982 and 1989, the standard of 
living fell nearly ¿o per cent and in December 1989 inflation peaked at more than 2000 per cent 
Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London: C. 
Hurst & Co., 1995), 67-70.
19 See James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War 
(London: Hurst & Co., 1997), 20. The corset image is mentioned by Christopher Cviic, Remaking the 
Balkanst Chatham House Papers (London: Pinter for the RIIA, 1991), 29.
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By the beginning of the 1990s, the country had more or less ceased to exist and a year 
later a devastating war was being waged among its constituent nations.
It is not easy to comprehend why Yugoslavia, for whose future the West extended so 
much material aid and political support with the hope that it would eventually evolve 
into a pluralistic society with a market economy, had stayed much behind the other 
countries of eastern and central Europe and finally destroyed itself in a bloody way. In 
fact, there are important structural reasons why Yugoslavia always preferred to follow 
its own complex and often mutually contradictory sets of priorities rather than the 
expected agenda in the wake of transformation in all Eastern Europe which started as 
soon as Soviet Union ceased to exist. Exploring these priorities will enable us to come 
to an understanding of Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse at the beginning of the 1990s.
2.1. The National Question in Yugoslavia
2.1.1. First Yugoslavia
From the very beginning, Yugoslavia was neither a homogeneous state nor a truly 
multinational country, but the political union of several South Slav or Yugoslav ethnic 
groups.20 In 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed 
which was halfway between a nation-state and a multinational community consisting of 
Slovenia and Dalmatia - former territories of Austria; Croatia and Slavonia - formerly a 
quasi autonomous province of Hungary; the Vojvodina - formerly an integral portion 
of Hungary; Bosnia-Hercegovina - formerly an Austro-Hungarian condominium
20 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918-1988 (London: 
C. Hurst & Company, 1988), 2.
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administered by their joint ministry of finance; and finally Montenegro and Serbia- 
former independent Kingdoms. In addition, Serbia and Montenegro included portions 
of Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, which had been Ottoman territories until 
1912 (Map l).21
First Yugoslavia was a product of circumstances at the end of the First World War and 
two ideas developed on either side of the historical divide between the traditions of the 
Western, Roman Catholic Church on the one side, and the traditions of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church and Ottoman Islamic belief on the other: Croats and Slovenes were 
Roman Catholic, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians were eastern Orthodox, and 
in areas of Bosnia and Serbia, many Slavs had converted to Islam during the Ottoman 
period. On the western side of the divide, in the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire, 
the “Yugoslav idea” emerged, in which a common state could provide the framework 
for self-determination of all the South Slavs. On the other side “narrow Serbia” 
(without Kosovo/a and Vojvodina) gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 
1878, and the idea of creating a “Greater Serbia” in which all Serbs would live inside 
had taken roots. First Yugoslavia was established on the principle of self- 
determination implemented more or less and expression of the demand to free 
themselves from foreign domination. It also served the interests of the Entente powers 
as a block against Germany, and the revolutionary appeal of the Soviet Union.22
21 L. S. Stavrianos, History of the Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1965), 616.
22 On the First World War and formation of Yugoslav state, see Stephen Clissold ed., A Short History 
of Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia 
(London: Ernst Benn, 1971); Alex N. Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pasic and Yugoslavia (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers U. P., 1974) and Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav 
People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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Unification would have been a difficult process under any other circumstances, but 
after four year-orgy of carnage known as the First World War, the task proved well 
beyond the capability of new country’s political leaders. Three different approaches to 
governing the country were tried between the adoption of the country’s first 
constitution in 1921 and the German invasion of 1941. Unfortunately, in the end, the 
first Yugoslav incarnation failed to win over its many peoples or to develop any 
framework for a kind of national coexistence.23
Given the separate traditions and identities of Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples, a 
highly centralised state was probably the least appropriate form of government.24 Yet, 
it was the preferred option as far as most Serb politicians, whether from the Kingdom 
of Serbia or the Habsburg lands, were concerned. Serbia’s pre-war leaders aimed to 
rebuild their own war-shattered country and to continue to guide the destiny of the 
new state, while the leaders from the Habsburg lands hoped to integrate themselves 
into the new ruling elite.25
2.1.2. Tito’s Yugoslavia and the National Question
The troubled history of the First Yugoslavia ended with German and Italian invasion 
on 6 April 1941.26 The Axis Powers broke the country into different parts; making
23 Stavrianos, The Balkans, 617-43.
24 For the history and origin of national problems in Yugoslavia, see Ivo Banac, The National 
Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1984).
25 For the Serbs’ historical claims to dominance in First Yugoslavia, and this population in 
Yugoslavia’s overall population, see, Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 34.
26 About Royal Yugoslavia and Axis invasion, see Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between 
the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); J. R. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in 
Crisis, 1938-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Paul S. Shoup, Communism and the
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Serbia a German protectorate, annexing parts of Slovenia and Istria to Italy, and 
creating a so-called Independent State of Croatia on the territory of Croatia and 
Bosnia. There followed a many sided war which was in part a civil war, in part a 
communist revolution, and in part a war of liberation from the Axis occupiers. The 
main elements were the Germans and Italians; Serbian Chetniks loyal to the Serbian 
monarch and to Royal Yugoslavia; the Ustasha, a fascist group, nurtured in 
Mussolini’s Italy and installed to run the Independent State of Croatia - they launched 
a campaign of terror and massacre against the Serbs within their domain; and the 
Partisans, a communist-led guerrilla movement under Tito’s command.27
In the end it was Tito’s Partisans who won the war. A key factor in the communist 
victory was the West’s assistance during the war. But, their programme of 
‘brotherhood and unity’ also played an important role in bringing the war-tom 
Yugoslav communities together. The partisans could offer those dissatisfied with the 
first Yugoslavia the prospect of a second version of the country in which their 
aspirations would be accommodated by a federation.28 New Yugoslavia was restored 
as a multinational state of related nations, thus taking advantage of the monarchy’s 
failure to weld together the separate identities of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a
Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Joseph Roucek, Balkan 
Politics: International Relations in No-Man’s Land (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971); Hugh 
Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London: Methuen, 1950); Hugh Seton-Watson, 
Eastern Europe Between the Wars: 1918-1941, 2d.ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1946); Joso Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1955L
~7 For a detailed account of the German and Italian occupation of Yugoslavia and the subsequent war, 
see Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
262-73 and Stavrianos, The Balkans, 771-84.
28 For an account of the Yugoslav communists and the national question, see Aleksa Djilas, The 
Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991).
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single national consciousness by means of a centralised state structure and an official 
ideology of ‘Yugoslavism’.29
In the second Yugoslavia, the new federal entities added to the three original groups. 
The Macedonians were acknowledged as a distinct national group, and Macedonia was 
set up as a separate constituent republic. The same status was granted to Montenegro, 
whose inhabitants were encouraged to identify with the territory’s historic identity. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina was kept undivided. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia became the six constituent republics of the 
Communist federation of Yugoslavia. Later, in 1974 two autonomous regions were 
carved out of Serbia - Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo/a in the south, because of 
their mixed ethnic composition (Map 2). As Pavlowitch describes:
The Communist Party put into practice a policy which aimed at 
balancing out the nationalities - to a certain extent against each other. 
It looked to the peripheral groups to weaken the central ones, 
particularly the Serbs and the Croats, whom it wanted to equalise. It 
substituted the ideological integration for ethnic integration, capping 
federalism with a unitarism of power and ideology. Ethnic pluralism 
and federal forms were meant as lightning conductors for national 
emotions until communism had managed to do away with them.30
In the overall Yugoslav federal structure, Yugoslavia’s peoples were split into nations 
and national minorities. Initially, nations corresponded to those peoples who had a 
home republic, that is. Slovenes. Croats. Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. In 
1971, the status of Muslim Slavs was elevated to that of a constituent nation.
■9 Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, 70.
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Meanwhile, the Hungarians and Albanians, as well as all other peoples living in 
Yugoslavia, were classified as national minorities. Each republican and provincial 
constitution listed the nations and national minorities living there and officially both 
nations and national minorities had the same rights and duties. For example, in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina Serbs, Croats and Muslims were listed as the republic’s constituent 
nations. In Croatia and Vojvodina Croats and Serbs were listed as constituent nations. 
Hungarians who lived in both Croatia and Vojvodina were listed as national minorities 
even though they outnumbered Croats in Vojvodina. Albanians were classified as a 
national minority in Kosovo/a, even though they formed the majority there and despite 
the fact that by the 1980s there were more Albanians in Yugoslavia than 
Montenegrins, Macedonians and Slovenes.31
Tito tried to create a balance between federal republics on the one hand, and he was 
determined against any upsurge of nationalism, on the other. In the early 1960s, a 
reform movement that demanded greater decentralisation emerged, particularly in 
Slovenia and Croatia. This movement objected to Belgrade’s domination and 
preponderance in federal bureaucracies. Decentralisation would pacify this and would 
mean greater realisation of the principle of self-management. Throughout 1960s, 
power passed increasingly from Belgrade to the republics. However, the dissipation of 
power was so extensive that, in 1971, Tito intervened to pre-empt what he considered 
a potentially dangerous upsurge in nationalism and purged Croatia’s League of 
Communists which had demonstrated the most prominent separatist tendencies. This 
was to be followed by major constitutional amendments made at the time and later 30
30 Ibid., 71.
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confirmed by the introduction of a new constitution in 1974 devolving more authority 
from the federal to the republican level.
The 1974 constitution, which was Yugoslavia’s sixth and the last, created a federation 
of six republics and two autonomous provinces. Kosovo/a with 80 per cent Albanian 
majority, and Vojvodina, with a Serb majority but also a considerably large Hungarian 
and a smaller Croatian minority were granted in the 1974 constitution a status just 
below that of a full republic, which meant that each had its own courts, police and 
territorial defence, and even more important, an independent vote in Yugoslavia’s 
collective presidency alongside the other six republics.31 2 The 1974 constitution was an 
intricate series of checks and balances designed to prevent any individual from 
acquiring as much power as Tito himself had held and to prevent any of Yugoslavia’s 
peoples dominating the federation.
Consequently, the devolution process which began in the early 1950s following the 
break with Stalin had, by the 1970s, turned Yugoslavia into a de facto confederation.33 
According to the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia became a nine-party system; in 
addition to the eight republican and provincial organisations, the army-party 
organisation was formally placed on the Central Committee of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The Army, having backed Tito and being the only 
true Yugoslav institution was also given the role of preserving the federation’s
31 According to the constitutional arrangements, it was impossible for each minority to unite with 
their co-nationals within the territories of the same state, and national minorities could not have their 
own republics, the right to form a republic was only given to the peoples recognised as nations.
32 However, the Constitution’s framers bowed to Serbian susceptibilities by allowing Serbia to retain 
ultimate sovereignty over these two provinces, See James Gow, “Deconstructing Yugoslavia,” 
Survival 33, no. 4 (July/August 1991), 294.
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territorial integrity.3 4 Away from the Central Committee, each of the nine parties acted 
autonomously. In addition, a ‘collective federal presidency’ was established. It was 
composed of representatives from each of the republics as well as the two autonomous 
regions, Kosovo/a and Vojvodina, the Minister of Defence (who did not have voting 
rights) and Tito, who was designated ‘President for Life’. A constitutional provision 
addressed the problem of Tito succession by creating a system in which the title of 
President would pass annually in a pre-set sequence from one member of the collective 
body to the next.
The mechanisms of the 1974 Constitution appeared to work while Tito was alive, 
mostly because his personal authority enabled him to intervene and settle disputes. 
Problems began to emerge, however, after his death in 1980 and Yugoslavia slid 
gradually into a crisis. The main problem was the absence of a real political authority 
at the centre. This political crisis was compounded by economic problems, which 
sharpened internal tensions.35 The poorer parts of Yugoslavia experienced economic 
and financial difficulties , which quickly fuelled growing social, political and ethnic 
tensions. In 1981, for example, demonstrations in Kosovo/a included demands for full 
republican status, and resulted in the imposition of martial law.36
33 Marko Milivojevic, “Descent Into Chaos: Yugoslavia’s Worsening Crisis,” The South Slav Journal 
12, no. 1-2 (43-44) (Spring Summer 1989), 5.
34 See James Gow, “Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some 
Implications for Defence,” in i'ugosluvia \> Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence and 
Foreign Policy, eds. M. Milivojevic et. al. (Oxford: Berg, 1988).
35 For die Yugoslav self-management experiment in running the economy and its gradual impact on 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, see Harrold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
36 See Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 (London: 
Verso, 1993).
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As the 1980s developed, Yugoslavia was surrounded by social, economic, political and 
constitutional crisis which could not be resolved, and indeed, aggravated by the 
division of power in the present administrative system. Although the six republics 
were in reality integrated through the power of the League of Yugoslav Communists, 
in practice, the day-to-day operation of the component parts of Yugoslavia was based 
on local centralism. With the decay of Communist discipline since Tito’s death, it had 
been increasingly left to the individual republics’ Communist parties to sort out their 
own affairs. This approach worked up to the point at which it became clear that the 
very different approaches adopted to political liberalisation and economic policy by 
especially Slovenia and Croatia were moving in almost the opposite direction to 
Serbia.37 These relatively richer northern republics did not want to be ‘exploited’ by 
underdeveloped regions and the federal exchequer, especially when nationalistic 
feelings were taking over in Serbia.
2.2. The Rise of Serbian Nationalism and Its Repercussions
2.2.1. The Serbian ‘Memorandum’
It turned out that 1974 Constitution dissatisfied everyone. It left Serbia with a sense of 
injury - as was made clear in the ‘Memorandum’ drafted by the Serbian Academy of 
Arts and Sciences in 1986.38 The document, which was a reinterpretation of 
Yugoslavia’s recent past viewed through a Serb nationalist prism, severely criticised
" Mark Almond. Blundering in the Balkans: The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis. 
School of European Studies (Oxford, London: 1991), 7-8.
38 This draft document was not published, although its impact was considerable. A further draft was 
completed the following year, but was not published, either. Although it was circulated unofficially, it 
was not openly available until 1988. It was first published in Nose Teme 33, nos. 1-2, Zagreb, in 
1989.
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TheTito’s Yugoslavia for being inherently and systematically anti-Serb.39 
Memorandum would have been derided had it not been prepared by a highly respected 
body and supported by many of the most celebrated intellectuals in Serbia, including 
such renowned dissidents as Mihailo Markovic and Ljubomir Tadic as well as Dobrica 
Cosic.40
The draft Memorandum deals with a number of issues affecting the whole of 
Yugoslavia, but its most telling parts are those that concentrate on the position of 
Serbia and the Serbs within Yugoslavia. It alleged that Tito’s communists had 
imposed an alien, that is, federal model of Yugoslavia onto a reluctant Serb nation and 
had since then systematically discriminated against the Serbs. These discriminatory 
policies dated back to the 1930s and stemmed from an alleged anti-Serb bias in the 
Comintern, based on the mistaken conviction that the Serbs had oppressed other 
nations in the first Yugoslavia. By 1941 this anti-Serb bias had supposedly become 
engrained in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which had accordingly pursued a 
policy of “strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia”. According to the authors of the 
Memorandum, Croats, in the person of Josip Broz Tito, and Slovenes, in the person of 
Edvard Kardelj, had deliberately constructed federal Yugoslavia in such a way as to 
exploit Serbia economically. Moreover, Tito had ensured that Serbs would remain
39 Magas, The Destruction, 199-200.
40 The ‘Greater Serbia’ agenda for the late 20th century grew out of the thinking and writings of 
Dobrica Cosic, one of Serbia’s most distinguished novelists. Cosic was renowned as a writer of 
popular, historic epics, mostly set during the wars and overflowing with references to Serb mythology. 
He had been a Partisan during the Second World War and a friend of Tito’s for more than twenty 
years, yet he could not come to terms with Albanian emancipation and was purged from the LCY for 
nationalism in 1968. In his frustration, after his fall from grace. Cosic dreamed up a complex and 
paradoxical theory of Serb national persecution under communism which over two decades evolved 
into a Greater Serbian programme. Increasingly, Cosic’s ideas permeated the Serbian Association of 
Writers and fuelled an acrimonious dialogue between Serb and Slovene intellectuals within the 
Yugoslav Association of Writers. As early as 1986, five years before Yugoslavia’s bloody war began,
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weak and exploited by dividing them between several federal units and, in particular, 
by carving the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo/a out of Serbia in the 
1974 constitution. Serbs faced discrimination throughout Yugoslavia, the 
Memorandum alleged, while in Kosovo they were being subjected to ‘genocide’ at the 
hands of the irredentist and separatist Albanians.41
The Serb conviction was that ‘Yugoslavia, in its present form, was no longer an 
adequate solution to the Serbs’ nationalist aspirations. The Memorandum argued that 
the country was disintegrating and that the forty per cent of Serbs had been left 
languishing beyond the frontiers of the motherland.42 In a sense, the ‘Memorandum’ 
was a modernised version of earlier plans for a ‘Greater Serbia’. As an expert puts it;
During the 19th century the raison d ’etre o f the Serbian state had 
been to unite all Serbs living in the Balkans. In pursuing this aim 
Serbia had been remarkably successful. By 1918, through wars and 
great power alliances, the goal o f  national unity had been achieved, 
though Serb unity had com e largely at the expense o f many o f the 
other peoples living in the Kingdom o f  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
Royal Yugoslavia satisfied Serb nationalists in a way that Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, which aimed to keep all Yugoslavia’s citizens happy, 
never could. The second Yugoslavia was no Serb tyranny. Indeed, 
that was precisely what Serb nationalists found most objectionable 
about T ito’s state. For, to twisted nationalist minds, Tito had robbed
this Association became the first all Yugoslav institution to break up, as its non-Serb members feared 
that the popularity of Cosic’s ideas heralded a return to Serb hegemony in Yugoslavia.
“1 ' - ' f  d > a  C a r b i p n  A / 'p H o r v i i '  r x f  A n n r l
L KSL UİV UlUli Awuuvuij KJL AVl CO Uİ1M
Silber and Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books (Harmondsworth: 1996), 31-36.
42 According to 1981 census, carried out a year after Tito’s death, Serbs made up about 36 per cent of 
Yugoslavia’s population. Of these, close to 2 million lived outside the republic of Serbia while 
another 1.3 million lived in Serbia’s autonomous provinces, in addition to the 4.9 million Serbs of 
inner Serbia, see Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, p. 80.
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Serbs o f  their Yugoslav Empire and now devolution appeared to be 
threatening their very national existence.43
Despite the obvious absurdity of most of the Memorandum’s allegations, it was not an 
isolated analysis of Yugoslavia’s dilemma and recent past. It was the most influential 
of several blatantly propagandist and nationalist polemics published in Serbia in the 
mid-1980s. Fringe groups with extreme and often racist views exist in all societies but 
rarely have any chance of winning power. Had the opinions expressed in the 
Memorandum remained those of a tiny faction of largely frustrated, though celebrated, 
intellectuals, they would have done nobody any harm. But, in the hands of a 
Machiavellian politician they posed a serious threat to the Yugoslav federation, since 
the Memorandum’s xenophobia and simplistic analysis struck a chord among many 
Serbs at a time of declining living standards and severely diminished expectations.44
2.2.2. Milosevic’s Irresistible Rise and His Stirring-up of Kosovo/a
As a well known British expert on Yugoslavia put it: “If the Memorandum provided a 
theoretical basis for Serbian nationalist reassertion in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito 
period, action was provided by Slobodan Milosevic, who became Serbia’s Party leader 
in 1986.”45 Milosevic, a hardline communist but also a brilliant populist politician 
found the starting point for his campaign of Serb reassertion among the Serb minority
43 Ibid., 80-1.
44 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 
2nd. ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 51-5.
45 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, 66.
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J  in Kosovo/a.46 It is argued that despite the Serbs’ growing frustration and Albanians’ 
unrest, the stalemate over Kosovo/a might have dragged on had Milosevic not skilfully 
exploited the allegations about the Albanian terror against the Serbs of Kosovo/a to 
build a new and aggressive populist movement. Soon after, his election as party 
president in Serbia, in April 1987 he visited Kosovo/a to address a mass meeting of 
local Serbs and he promised them that “nobody would ever beat them again”.47 Before 
Milosevic’s speech at Kosovo Polje, no communist politician had overtly appealed to 
the nationalist sentiments of one of Yugoslavia’s peoples. Milosevic became the first 
politician to drop the Titoist jargon and with it all the commitment to national 
equality.48
In the autumn of the same year, he attacked the previous leadership in Serbia, 
including Serbia’s President and his own mentor Ivan Stambolic for Having been too 
weak on Kosovo/a.49 Later on, Milosevic carried out a thorough purge in the Serbian 
Communist Party to consolidate his position. Within a year he became to be seen as 
the right man to lead what soon came to be known among the Serbs as treci Sirpski 
ustanak (the third Serbian uprising).50
Milosevic’s promise to Serbian people was to make Serbia ‘whole’ again by repairing 
damage done by the 1974 Constitution and ending autonomy for the provinces. In 
1988-89, he brought Kosovo/a, by the use of the Federal Army tanks, and Vojvodina,
46 For the history and current conflict in Kosovo/a, see, Noel Malcolm, Kosova: A Short History 
(London, 1998). See, also, Stevan K. Pavlowitch and E'.ez Biberaj, ‘The .Albanian Problem in 
Yugoslavia: Two Views,” Conflict Studies, No. 137/8, Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: 
1982).
47 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 37.
48 For a detailed account o f Milosevic’s rise to power, see Ibid., 37-47.
49. Ibid.
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mostly by political pressure and intimidation, under Belgrade’s rule. At a huge rally on 
28 June 1989 held in Kosovo Polje, the scene of the 1389 battle whose 600 
anniversary was being marked, Milosevic told his fellow Serbs that the province, for 
long severed from mother Serbia, had been restored.50 1 His popularity reached a peak 
when, in January 1989, Serbia extended its control over the tiny republic of 
Montenegro by means of a political coup. At the end, Milosevic’s manoeuvres for the 
reassertion of ‘Greater Serbia’ alarmed Yugoslavia’s non-Serb populations, since he 
gained three more extra seats -those of Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina - in 
addition to its own on the eight member collective presidency of Yugoslavia.
2.3. Slovenian Resentment and Assertion of Political Sovereignty
Slovenia had initially made some attempts to defend the Albanians in Kosovo/a, partly 
because, as a tiny republic, Slovenia itself felt threatened. If 2 million ethnic Albanians 
could be placed under direct Belgrade rule, why not 2 million Slovenes? In fact, 
Slovenian disillusionment with Yugoslavia had started much earlier. Since the 1970s, 
the Slovenes wanted to get closer to their two peaceful and highly prosperous 
neighbours, Austria and Italy.52 Since Slovenia had more or less achieved a western 
standard of living and become economically more prosperous than other Republics of 
Yugoslavia, it wanted to get rid of the heavy burden of supporting underdeveloped
50 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, 67.
31 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Papermac, 1996), 213.
52 Since 1978, Slovenia (together with Croatia) had been participating in the activities of an informal 
organisation called Alpen-Adria (Alpe-Jadran in Croat and Slovene) whose purpose was to co-operate 
in the fields of culture, energy, environment, sport, transport and etc. Through this co-operation the 
Slovenes and Croats had discovered how much they still had in common with these former regions of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Christopher Cviic, “The Background,” 95-6.
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regions of Yugoslavia financially. The Serbian occupation of Kosovo/a, the huge costs 
of which were borne by the whole of Yugoslavia but with only Serbia having any say in 
the handling of Kosovo/a affairs; the growing Serbian obstruction on the economic 
front from the mid-1980s onwards, including trade boycotts against Slovenia, special 
tariffs on Slovene goods, and the monetary ‘coup’ in December 1990, in which a 
financially desperate Serbian government, using its own National Bank ‘helped itself 
to 1.7 billion worth of money from the Yugoslav National Bank; and most important, 
the threat of the imposition of a new strongly Serbian centralist regime under 
Milosevic that would curtail Kosovo/a’s autonomy forced Slovenia to make 
arrangements to protect itself from the next stages of Milosevic’s slow-moving 
constitutional coup.
In September and October 1989 it drafted and passed a new Slovenian constitution, 
giving itself legislative sovereignty (its own laws would take precedence over those of 
the federal state) and explicitly declaring its right to secede.53 Although the formation 
of opposition parties began in Slovenia in late 1989, the Communist Party’s monopoly 
on power was not broken until the early 1990. In January 1990, the Slovenian 
delegation walked out of an emergency congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY) when several of their reform projects were rejected. In February, 
the Slovene party renamed itself the party of Democratic Renewal and arranged for 
democratic elections to be held at the end of March, thereby breaking the communists 
grip on power.
53 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed., (Bloomington, 
Indiana, 1992), 240-2; Magas, The Destruction, 224-6; Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The 
Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter, 1992), 78-94.
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2.4. Croatian Resentment and Revival of Croatian Nationalism
The Croatian nationalist feelings which had been simmering discontentedly ever since 
the suppression of the ‘Croatian Spring’ in the early 1970s had been stung into action 
by the revival of Serbian nationalism in the mid-1980s. Milosevic encouraged the anti- 
Croat rhetoric and the official Serbian media started commonly referring to the head of 
the Croatian Communists, Ivica Racan, as an Ustasha.54 All the old Croatian 
grievances came to the surface again and the result was an upsurge of Croatian 
nationalists, such as the former partisan and Yugoslav army general, Franjo Tudjman, 
who wanted to distinguish the long-standing national aspirations of Croatia for 
independence of Belgrade. Apart from all the historical debates, there were real fears 
for the future too, such as those sparked off by Dobrica Cosic in July 1989 when he 
told an interviewer that large parts of Croatia should be reassigned to another 
republic.55
In March and April of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held their first multi-party elections 
in almost fifty years. In Slovenia, Milan Kucan was elected President and forced to 
work with a government formed by a liberal-nationalist coalition. In Croatia, the 
‘Croatian Democratic Union’ (HDZ), a more overtly nationalist party, and its 
presidential candidate Franjo Tudjman, won decisive victories.56
54 As Branka Magas points out, Racan’s family had in fact been murdered by the Ustasha during the 
War, See Magas, The Destruction, 241.
55 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 244.
55 For a more detailed account of this period, see James Gow, “Deconstructing Yugoslavia,” Survival 
33, no. 4 (July/August 1991), and James Gow, Yugoslav Endgames: Civil Strife and Inter-state 
Conflict, London Defence Studies, No. 5, (London: Brassey’s, 1991); see also Lenard J. Cohen, 
Broken Bonds, 79-113.
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In Bosnia-Hercegovina, an area where the delicate balance between Muslims, Serbs 
and Croats often led to co-operation, voting followed national lines, but it produced a 
promising all-party, all-nationality government. Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, was 
chosen as President. In Macedonia, a nationalist government was elected as well. In 
Serbia and Montenegro, former hard line Communists, managed to win by playing on 
ultra nationalist themes and making use of their control of the mass media and the state 
apparatus. Even under the new circumstances, Milosevic and the federal military 
leadership rejected joint Croatian and Slovenian proposals for a Yugoslav 
confederation as well as the Bosnian and Macedonian compromise proposals for a 
looser federation or union of sovereign Yugoslav states. Once again the constitutional 
discussions revolved around two concepts for the future of Yugoslavia: federalism and 
confederalism. These reflected the old debate about the Yugoslav idea. A new 
federation proposed by Serbia which was to continue as a single state run from 
Belgrade. On the other hand, Slovenia and Croatia wanted Yugoslavia to become a 
loose association of independent, sovereign states, similar to the European 
Community. The only firm feature of this proposal was the independence of sovereign 
states. From this basic point, anything else involving the transfer of measures of 
sovereignty to confederal bodies was open to negotiation. Montenegro backed the 
Serbian plan; Bosnia and Macedonia were caught in the middle, although they tended 
to prefer confederal option.57
57 For all the discussions about the future of Yugoslavia, see Alan FogelquisL Handbook of Facts on: 
The Break-up of Yugoslavia, International Policy and the War in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Los Angeles: 
AEIOU, 1993), 5-8.
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A final phase of the constitutional talks, began in early 1991, was deadlocked as the 
divide between Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and Serbia and Montenegro, on 
the other, was further intensified by the ideological differences of the governments in 
those republics. In the meantime, Milosevic had changed his strategy. Until the 
second half of 1990, Milosevic had pursued his first preference, which was to gain 
control over Yugoslavia through the existing structures of the Communist Party and 
the federal government. But this option had slipped from his grasp with the 
disintegration of the Communist Party and the vertical division of the Yugoslav politics 
into a set of national parties in various republics. That left him with his second option: 
if Yugoslavia could not be controlled as a single entity, he would carve out of it a new 
entity, an extended Serbian territory embracing all the Serbs living in Yugoslav 
territories.58
2.4.1. Dissolution in Full Swing: Serbian Minority in Croatia
The first clear sign of Milosevic’s new strategy came about in the Knin region of 
Croatia - part of the old Military Frontier or “Krajina” zone on Bosnia’s north-western 
border which had a majority population of Serbs.59 For the Croatian elections in April 
1990, these Serbs had organised themselves into a ‘Serbian Democratic Party’ (SDS); 
Milosevic had probably taken an interest from the start in this development, but it 
seems to have been essentially a local initiative expressing fears of the local Serbs 
driven by the memories of atrocities committed by the Croat Ustasha regime during the
58 This was exactly what the advocates of Greater Serbia wanted to achieve; ‘extending the territories 
where a Serb lay buried’. Vojislav Seselj, one such prominent advocate who appeared on the political 
scene in late 1980s, argued that Serbia’s territory covered the territory from the ‘sanctuaries of the 
east to the tombs of west’, namely from Kosovo to Croatia. See Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard 
War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heinemann, 1994), 4.
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Second World War, and were galvanised by the coming to power of a nationalist party 
in Croatia.59 60 In the summer of 1990, however, the Knin SDS was taken over by an 
extremist leader who seems to have been in close contact with Milosevic.
A local referendum was held in August on autonomy of the Serbs, in defiance of the 
Croatian government, which declared it illegal. They formed paramilitary units around 
police units staffed by Serbs (apparently aided by officers of the federal army garrison 
whose commander officer was General Ratko Mladic) and effectively cut off 
predominantly Serb-populated areas of Croatia form the rest of the republic. These 
areas, in which one of two adjacent villages could be Serb and the other Croat, 
possessed about one third of the 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia.61 By January 1991 
the local Serb leaders were describing the area as the ‘Serb Autonomous Region of the 
Krajina’, and they were busy forming their own parliament. By March 1991, Krajina 
Serbs had already proclaimed themselves a part of Serbia.62
The events in Krajina showed that, neither Croatia, nor Bosnia, where Serbs accounted 
for about 30 per cent of the inhabitants, could be independent without trouble. During 
the first half of 1991, the Serb challenge spread. Armed Serbs in other areas, too, such 
as Slavonia in northern Croatia, created ‘no-go-Serb-only’ zones. Each time Croatian 
police were sent in, the Yugoslav Army moved in as well, claiming it was stopping 
ethnic clashes. Although a conscript army drawn from all the nations and national
59 For the history of the ‘Krajina’ region, see, Malcolm, Bosnia, 77.
Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds, 126-55.
61 See, for details, Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, 134-5.
62 See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: 1991), 24-27; Magas, 
Destruction o f Yugoslavia, 293-313; Misha Glenny, The Fall o f Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 
(London: 1992), 13-19, Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 215-217, Cviic, Remaking the 
Balkans, 74.
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minorities of Yugoslavia, an estimated 70 % of the officers in the Yugoslav Army were 
Serbs.63
2.5. The Fast Slide into War
The events of spring 1991 were a watershed. Milosevic secretly met Croatian 
president Tudjman at Karadjordjevo on 25 March and both leaders had agreed that 
should Yugoslavia disintegrate, Bosnia and Hercegovina would be divided between 
their two republics.64 Where Serb and Croat leaders differed was on the question of 
which territories would fall to each side. Croatia’s war of independence was not about 
Croatia’s right to secede; that had already been acknowledged by Milosevic. It was 
about which territories Croatia would be allowed to take out of Yugoslavia. 
Apparently, both presidents played a double game, saying one thing for the public, and 
especially international consumption, and doing the opposite. Tudjman repeatedly 
stressed the inviolability of the republican borders, demanding recognition of Croatian 
sovereignty within its existing frontiers; he secretly conspired throughout to deny the 
same right to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Milosevic, similarly, argued that his republic 
sought to defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as a whole; but he was already 
pursuing a plan to let the Croatians and Slovenes go, but to keep Croatia’s Serb 
majority areas inside remaining Yugoslavia by force if necessary. By March 1991, 
Milosevic was no longer for Yugoslavia; he was for Greater Serbia. But he seems to
63 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, 74.
64 Milan Andrejevich, “Retreating From the Brink of Collapse,” Report on Eastern Europe (April 12, 
1991), 29. See the repercussions of this meeting and the subsequent meetings between Milosevic and 
Tudjman in Chapter VI.
37
have entertained a belief that Bosnia, Macedonia and parts of Croatia would remain 
under his control.65
During the discussions of spring and summer of 1991, Milosevic’s message was clearer 
than ever; he did not dispute the right of the Croats and Slovenes to secede. But in 
line with his aim to unify all Serbs in a single state, he insisted that, in return, the Serbs 
of Croatia had the same right to secede from Croatia, and that the break-up of 
Yugoslavia would necessitate a redrawing of borders which had been drawn in 1945. 
The obvious issue, at this stage, was the reflection of the stark contradiction between 
two central articles of the Helsinki Final Act; the commitment to self-determination of 
nations and the principle of the inviolability of borders.
Break-up was the easiest for the Slovenes since they had no Serb population, and 
Milosevic had already made it plain that Serbia would not fight to keep the Slovenes in 
Yugoslavia. However, in a speech to the Serbian Assembly on 30 May 1991, 
Milosevic clearly warned that if Croatia wanted independence, it would be allowed to 
do so only if it left behind part of its territory inhabited by ethnic Serbs.66 However, 
for President Tudjman, the Serbs of Croatia were simply a minority living in a 
sovereign state and, therefore, would have to cohabit peacefully with the Croatian 
majority, whether or not Croatia were inside or outside the Yugoslav Federation.
Although Croatian politicians publicly maintained that the ‘Croatian Serb’ question 
was an internal issue, the problem had in fact much broader repercussions and was
65 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 144.
66 FBIS-EEU-91-105 (31 May 1991), 22-26.
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likely to create enormous pressure about the future of Croatia. It was apparent that 
unless the Croatian leaders would be able to reach a negotiated accommodation with 
Milosevic concerning the Krajina Serbs, Croatia would have to fight its way out of the 
Yugoslav Federation. Tudjman decided that if Slovenia disassociated itself from 
Yugoslavia, Croatia would immediately take the same course of action, hoping that 
intervention by the US and the international community would preserve the peace in 
the region. In April 1990, Slovenia and Croatia had signed a joint defence agreement, 
promising mutual assistance and the sharing of intelligence.67 The two sides also 
agreed to co-ordinate their declarations of independence but it later became apparent 
that, at that time, Croatia did not have any preparation for the statehood and lost most 
of the precious time with inter-republican talks.68
The Croat and Slovene leaders were finally convinced that there could be no 
accommodation with the present Serbian leadership, when, on 15 May 1991, the Serbs 
and Montenegrins, with the bogus representatives of no longer existent Kosovo and 
Vojvodina, blocked the automatic rotation of the office of the Chairman of Federal 
Presidency (nominal head of the SFRY) to the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic.69 
The Serbian bloc did so to create conditions for a ‘state of emergency’ in which the 
Army would declare a martial law.70 From that point on, the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had ceased de facto to function. Slovenia, closely 
followed by Croatia, started independence preparations. The referendums, in
67 See Silber and Little, The Death o f Yugoslavia, 149-150.
68 Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds, 212-3.
69 Fogelquist, Handbook of Facts, 6-7.
70 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 20.
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December 1990 in Slovenia and May 19, 1991 in Croatia had produced an
overwhelming vote for independence.71
71 Krajina Serbs had, meanwhile, boycotted Croatia’s referendum. Ninety-three percent of those 
voting supported Croatia's independence, which guaranteed cultural autonomy for “the Serbs and 
members of other nationalities in Croatia.” To second question in the referendum, asking whether 
Croatia should remain part of a federal Yugoslavia, 92 per cent voted ‘No.’ The turn out was 82 per 
cent. In August 1990, the Krajina Serbs had held their referendum of their own in which more than 
ninety-nine percent, according to organisers, voted to stay in Yugoslavia. See Silber and Little, Death 
of Yugoslavia, 153.
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CHAPTER III: ERUPTION OF THE WAR AND
SHAPING OF INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE
3.1. Slovenian and Croatian Declarations of Independence and War in 
Yugoslavia
3.1.1. Slovenia’s Phoney War
On June 25, both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence by near a unanimous 
vote of their parliaments. The next day, the JNA began the operations which the 
Slovenes were later to characterise as an invasion and occupation of their newly 
independent country by a foreign country.
The JNA Generals assumed that a show of force would be enough to deter Slovenian 
independence. When it began operations in Slovenia, the JNA was not going to war 
but was attempting to carry out a limited instruction from the federal government in 
Belgrade to take control of border posts in conjunction with the units of federal police. 
The second assumption was that, had Slovenia shown any resistance, the JNA would 
have the possibility to escalate the war waged for the preservation of the integrity of 
Yugoslavia against the ‘secessionists’, something which would essentially, be backed 
by the outside world.72
However, both of these assumptions proved to be ill founded. First of all, Slovenia 
engaged the JNA in a series of armed clashes. JNA officers did not expect the Slovene
72 See James Gow, “One Year of War in Bosnia-Hercegovina,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 23 (4 
June 1993), 1-7.
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territorial defence to put up an armed resistance of a serious nature; and they were not 
sufficiently armed to fight a war against the Slovenes.73 When the JNA found itself 
engaged in battle, the second possibility -escalation of the conflict- also turned out to 
be ill-founded, since, on the second day of the conflict, the international community, in 
the form of the EC’s presidential Troika, intervened, offering to mediate. As a result, 
although the JNA began to escalate the conflict, it was confused and put under 
constraint by international community.74
3.1.2. Initial International Responses to the Crisis:
From the very beginning of the crisis of Yugoslav dissolution, international response 
was firm and clear; keeping Yugoslav unity and territorial integrity intact and trying to 
prevent dissolution lest it serves as a bad example for Soviet Union’s restless republics.
As early as November 1990, the CIA warned the Bush Administration: ‘The Yugoslav 
experiment has failed. The country will fall apart. That will probably be accompanied 
by acts of violence and unrest that could lead to a civil war’.75 However, not many 
politicians paid attention. Instead, Bush and Baker relied on what Eagleburger called 
‘a well-tested working relationship’ with Milosevic.76 The British and Germans 
thought that the CIA was overreacting: they could not accept that the horrors of the 
sort going on in other parts of the world could occur in their own backyard.77
73 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 154-8.
'* Gow, “One Year o f War,” 5.
75 David Binder, “Yugoslavia Seen Breaking-Up Soon,” New York Times, 28 November 1990.
76 Quoted in Roger Boyes, ‘America Gets Tough with Serbs in Policy Switch’, The Times, 23 April, 
1992.
77 British officials said that they did not agree with the assessment made by the CIA that the 
international community ‘should roll with the punch’ and accept that it might soon have to deal with
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President Bush wrote in March 1991 to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, 
warning that the US ‘would not reward’ those who split off from Yugoslavia without 
the agreement of other parties.78 It seems that, at this stage, President Bush had a kind 
of doctrine which can be summed up as ‘states may neither be destroyed, nor 
created.’79 80 In line with this doctrine, the public statement, published by the State 
Department at the end of May 1991, made it clear that the US government supported 
the ‘territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders’. It opposed changing
status of inner borders, i.e. making them international boundaries and declared that
80‘the US shall not encourage or reward secession’.
At this stage, the West did not seem to know what to do with possibilities of some 
communist federations breaking up. The belief that the ‘continued existence of all 
states is the great prize of diplomacy’ was the essence of Western diplomacy for 
decades. Both the EC statesmen and the US leaders remained committed in sprit as 
well as deed to the Helsinki Agreement made with Brezhnev’s Soviet Union and its 
satellites during the Cold War. Signing an agreement, banning territorial changes in 
1975, when no-one could envisage the peaceful disappearance of communist systems 
in the East was considered as a triumph of diplomacy. However, after the bloodless 
revolutions of 1989, still trying to hold with that agreement was obviously not easy. It
new sovereign entities in Europe. Reported by Hella Pick, ‘Hurd Urges EC Act on Yugoslavia’, The 
Guardian, 10 May 1991.
78 Christopher Cviic, An Awful Warning: The War in Ex-Yugoslavia. Centre for Policy Studies, No. 39 
(London: 1994).
79 See Marc Almond, Blundering in the Balkans: The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis, 
2nd ed. School o f European Studies (Oxford & London: 1991).
80 In fact, the statement’s conclusion was a threatening forecast; ‘we believe that the 
heterogeneousness of most of die Yugoslav republics means that any dismanding of Yugoslavia is 
likely to aggravate rather than solve edinic tensions’. However, as Mark Almond points out ‘the
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put the democratic countries in the West in a position of being the defenders of the old 
communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia without a democratic 
legitimacy:81
The cult o f  stability and hostility to boundary changes were not just 
features o f  post-Napoleonic Empire. In the late twentieth century, 
Metternich had his disciples, too. The H oly Alliance which he helped 
to forge in 1815 as a rock o f stability against change o f any kind was 
the model for Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe...Fear o f  break-up o f the Soviet Union was as strong in 
Washington as M oscow .82
In line with these considerations, on June 21, four days before Croatia and Slovenia 
were to declare their independence, James Baker, passing through Belgrade declared 
that, in common with the governments of Western Europe, the US policy was that ‘the 
unity and integrity of Yugoslavia should be preserved, and that the US would not 
recognise any unilateral declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia’.83 
During his visit, he warned Slovene President Milan Kucan that the “Helsinki Final Act 
recognised only peaceful self-determination, and not secession by force”. When he 
met the Serb leadership, he told them that the US would continue to press the 
Slovenes and Croats not to go ahead with independence, but that, equally, the US 
would not countenance the use of force to prevent declarations of independence.
author of the statement, Lawrence Eagleburger, did not elucidate the roots of those escalating tension 
and as why violence was likely’. Almond, Europe's Backyard War, 40.
81 Almond, Blundering in the Balkans, 4.
82 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 35.
83 Thomas Friedman, “Appeal for Yugoslav Unity is Unheeded, Baker Says,” International Herald 
Tribune, 22-23 June 1991.
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These were the same mixed signals that the US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren 
Zimmermann, had been issuing for months.84
The implications of a possible collapse of Yugoslavia for the Soviet Union were clearly 
on the minds of European and American officials. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 
James Dobbin, told the Senate Committee, “an outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia, or 
indeed anywhere in the Baltics, would set back our hopes for a new era of peace, 
stability and co-operation in Europe.”85 A State Department official told a 
congressional aide concerned with the human rights situation in Yugoslavia on the eve 
of the Slovene and Croat declarations of independence not to get too worried about 
what was happening:
D on’t make a big deal about them. The Serbs are trying to hold the 
country together...D on’t break-up Yugoslavia because people in the 
Soviet Union would use it as a model. The consequences o f a Soviet 
break-up could be ‘nuclear’.86
At that time, certainly there was consensus on both sides of the Atlantic about the need 
to preserve Yugoslavia. Influential elements in the Western media also supported the 
US-EC consensus on the matter. In early May 1991, the Financial Times was 
dismissive of the Croat view that the JNA essentially served Serbian interests. It 
assured its readers that “the army’s role, however, is more complicated.” According 
to Almond’s view “the Financial Times reflected the tone o f post-Thatcher
84 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 150-51.
85 Quoted in Paula Franklin Lytle, “US Policy Toward the Demise of Yugoslavia,” East European 
Politics and Societies 6 (Fall 1992), 309-10.
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Conservative government opinion, having a chorus of pro-Major commentators on 
everything from ERM to foreign policy.”86 7
In the EC, the general tone was in favour of the preservation of the Soviet Union with 
Gorbachev at its head. Earlier opponents of this view such as Mrs. Thatcher and the 
Danes had been defeated. The feeling that the disappearance of Soviet Union would 
be a disaster was shared by Mrs. Thatcher’s Chancellor of Exchequer and the imminent 
successor, John Major. This line of argument was to remain John Major’s main 
analysis in the years to come. For instance, two years after the conflict erupted into 
violence, he was telling the House of Commons: ‘the biggest single cause of what 
happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the 
discipline that that exerted over ancient hatreds in the former Yugoslavia...that 
collapse was by far the greatest cause of the current tragedy.’88
Knowing that the republics of Federal Yugoslavia were very keen on integrating 
themselves in the Community of European states after declaring their independence; 
the EC, with the aim of discouraging the ‘secessionists’, issued a declaration on 26 
March stating that “according to the views of the Twelve, a united and democratic 
Yugoslavia has the best chance to harmonically integrate into the new Europe.”89 To 
add injury to the insult, Italy’s Gianni de Michelis warned neighbouring Slovenia that 
‘it could expect to wait for 50 years before being admitted to the EC’.90 Obviously, all
86 See Patrick Glynn, “Yugoblundcr,” The New Republic, 24 February 1992, 16.
87 However, whether the Financial Times’ views influenced or reflected government thinking is 
immaterial. Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War, 41.
88 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 23 June 1993, col. 324.
89 John Palmer, “EC to Press for Unity in Belgrade,” The Guardian, 14 May 1991.
90 David Buchan, “EC Takes Cautious Line on Yugoslavia,” The Financial Times, 29 May 1991.
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these comments were carefully evaluated by the Federal officials in Belgrade before 
deciding to attack Slovenia.
Unfortunately, the EC, like the US, overlooked an inconvenient reality; unity and 
democracy were logically incompatible in Yugoslavia by then. Only, Austria’s Foreign 
Minister Alois Mock asserted that, should the Yugoslav republics demand 
independence, this request must be considered urgently and seriously. Although 
Austria pledged to continue dealing with the central authorities in Belgrade, Mock also 
made it clear that the main task was to ‘prevent a civil war and the use of force’ even if 
this entailed the recognition of the right to self-determination.91 Within days, the 
Greens’ group in Austria’s legislature presented to the Foreign Relations Committee of 
the Parliament in Vienna a resolution calling for the full recognition of Slovenia. Most 
of other West European governments dismissed this attitude as worst dangerous or 
best irrelevant, a nostalgia for meddling, according to the traditions of the old Austro- 
Hungarian Empire.92
In Early May 1991, when Tudjman had visited London and appealed to Western 
governments to drop support for ‘the Yugoslav state which is historically ill- 
conceived’,93 John Major had turned down his request to be received at Downing 
Street for even an informal discussion.94 The Times of London had asserted in a 
characteristically booming “No to Balkanisation” leading article, saying that Tudjman 
was plainly wrong since ‘the majority (of the Yugoslav people) would still prefer loose
91 See interview with Alois Mock on ORF television network , Vienna, 13 March 1991, in FBIS- 
WEU-91-050 (14 March 1991), 2.
92 A feeling heightened by discussions about a possible ‘confederation’ between Slovenia and Austria. 
Fore details, see, FBIS-WEU-91-057 (25 March 1991), 5.
93 Hella Pick, “Hurd Urges EC to Act on Yugoslavia,” The Guardian, 10 May 1991.
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confederation to a total split’.94 5 Even after the fighting in Slovenia had started, the 
Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for the Balkans still saw an active role for 
the JNA. Mark Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons that though the 
government “would deplore the use of force... I must add, however, that the Yugoslav 
federal army might have under the constitution a role in restoring order”.96 Lennox- 
Boyd added, as the fighter bombers swooped over Ljubljana and attacked a convoy of 
commercial vehicles including British trucks, “we and our Western partners have a 
clear preference for the continuation of a single Yugoslav political entity.”97 These 
carefully chosen words had, of course, the desired effect on the Serbian nationalists led 
by Milosevic.
Oddly enough, it was the British newspapers and the British analysts who foresaw the 
approaching crisis. For instance, The Guardian, The Economist and most of the 
leading Balkan analysts in Britain took up an opposite view by advocating the 
acceptance of independence for all Yugoslav republics. For example, one of the 
prominent British academics, Lawrence Freedman argued that ‘by stressing the 
unrealistic concept of national unity, the international community has made the civil 
war more likely in Yugoslavia’.98 A month before Slovenian and Croatian declarations 
of independence, the leading Yugoslav expert and a fellow at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) Christopher Cviic had pointed out that ‘the 
federation has come to an end and that the West must begin to work with a new
94 Ibid.
95 “No To Balkanisation,” Editorial, The Times, 8 May 1991.
96 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 27 June 1991, col. 1137.
97 Ibid.
98 Lawrence Freedman, “When Hindering a Divorce Hastens Domestic Violence,” The Independent, 
26 June 1991.
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Balkans reality’.99 Clearly putting out the current reasons for the break-up as ‘far from 
being a mindless orgy of rampant ethnicity’, but as ‘Serbia’s attempt to hold on to 
Yugoslavia with the JNA’s help, possibly in the form of Greater Serbia’, he warned the 
West of dangers of ‘encouraging the hard liners in Belgrade’.100 Clearly, from the 
beginning of the conflict, there was no shortage of sound foreign policy advice for the 
Foreign Office, considering the incomprehensible situation in Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, it was Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, who decided to put 
the issue of Yugoslavia on the agenda of the 13 May 1991 meeting of the EC 
ministerial council in Luxembourg. Slightly modified with the recent developments in 
Yugoslavia, the British proposal was that Yugoslavia’s transformation into a ‘loose 
confederation’ should be supported, but that outright independence for Croatia and 
Slovenia was still unacceptable.101 The weekend before the Luxembourg ministerial 
meeting appeared to confirm the Foreign Office view that much could still be saved 
from the old Yugoslavia: a report from the region of Knin suggested that barricades 
erected by various parties were being removed, and that an agreement negotiated in 
Belgrade between republican leaders was holding. In the event, the EC decided to 
continue with the line already adopted, by warning the ‘Yugoslavs’ that they could not 
negotiate any association treaty with the EC, should they resort to violence. In order 
to underline their concern, the EC foreign ministers also decided to send a delegation 
headed by the Luxembourg prime minister, Jacques Santer, and the president of the 
European Commission, Jacques Delors. Before the EC meeting began, Austria’s 
Foreign Minister Alois Mock proposed the establishment of a group of experts with
99 Christopher Cviic, “Don’t Cry for Yugoslavia,” The Independent, 13 May 1991.
100 Ibid.
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the explicit task of helping Yugoslav republics to settle their affairs. His Italian 
counterpart, Gianni de Michelis, who received the Austrian proposal first and 
considered it as just another attempt to steal the EC’s show replied that the EC was 
‘monitoring events closely’. And, as to Willy Brandt’s suggestion for a European 
peace-keeping force for Yugoslavia, the British view prevailed; such matters were best 
left to the CSCE.
At their meeting in Dresden on 3 June, the EC foreign ministers, after listening to 
Commission’s president Jacques Delors who spoke of his ‘dismay’ about Yugoslav 
politicians who ignored their country’s problems because of their ‘obsession’ with 
ethnic disputes, issued another stem warning that Yugoslavia would encounter ‘serious 
difficulties’ with any foreign financial aid if it broke up’.10 02 The British Foreign 
Secretary summed up the proceedings in Dresden by saying that the EC had struck a 
balance between its ‘desire not to see disintegration... and the inadmissibility of the use 
of force’.103 In early June, the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia met to discuss 
the future constitutional settlement for Yugoslavia. In fact, they were assessing each 
other’s positions in a war that all three knew was coming.104 Indeed, Croatia and 
Slovenia soon announced that they were continuing their preparations for 
independence.105
101 Hella Pick, “Hurd Urges EC Act on Yugoslavia,” The Guardian, 10 May 1991.
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By then, most EC governments had realised that appeals for good behaviour, coupled 
with threat of economic sanctions, were not producing any results. The CSCE had 
already debated the possibility of establishing a peace-keeping operation in November 
1990 in Paris. Nevertheless, it remained hampered by the rule of unanimity, which in 
the case of Yugoslavia meant that no action could be taken, since its federal 
government was adamantly opposed to any such measures.
This was the background to the Berlin meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in June 
1991, the ‘pan-European Congress’ as Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd called it. The 
conference first heard an account of the Yugoslav crisis from Budomir Loncar, the 
Foreign Minister of the rapidly fading Federal government in Belgrade. All 
governments were determined to impress upon individual Yugoslav republics with the 
fact that their possible independence would not be easy. Behind the scenes, however, 
a compromise had been reached. Most member states wanted to discuss the creation 
of an emergency procedure which could deal with crises despite the rules of unanimity 
which governed all CSCE actions. The Soviet Union remained reluctant to 
contemplate such arrangements but after a private discussion between Secretary of 
State, Baker, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Alexander Bessmemtnykh, an 
acceptable formula was found; a group of states could collectively invoke the 
emergency procedures which envisaged the investigation of a crisis even if the state 
concerned did not express its clear assent to such a move.
The Soviet Union accepted the compromise precisely because it contained an explicit 
commitment to the maintenance of united Yugoslavia, something which Moscow 
thought might serve as a good precedent to handle the Soviet Union’s own
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secessionist movements. Britain, the US and Germany all hailed the CSCE’s new 
procedures as a major departure, despite the fact that the CSCE stopped short of 
sending a fact-finding mission to Yugoslavia or proposing a mediation effort. 
Germany’s and Austria’s appeals for a recognition of Balkan realities were swept 
aside. Instead, the organisation adopted a resolution which called for the ‘democratic 
development, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia’ and a continued dialogue 
between all parties. Yugoslavia’s foreign minister went back to Belgrade, assured that 
the CSCE would tolerate no other outcome in Yugoslavia.106
Loncar had good reasons for confidence for, in his relatively long meeting with the US 
Secretary of State in Berlin, the Americans repeated the message that they ‘would not 
grant diplomatic recognition to Slovenia, should it declare independence.107 On the 
basis of this information, Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic quickly unveiled his 
government’s own programme, promising a ‘rejuvenation’ of Yugoslavia, and offering 
a panacea to all ills.108 The Yugoslav military understood the message; while Baker 
had been in Belgrade, General Veljko Kadijevic, the Defence Minister of Yugoslavia, 
told the Slovenes to ‘drop the illusion that they can terminate Yugoslavia and break-up 
her territorial integrity. General Kadijevic’s sentiments were shared by almost all 
Western governments. A day before the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was 
proclaimed, Abel Matutes, the EC’s commissioner in charge of relations with 
Mediterranean countries, signed a five-year aid agreement promising 807 million ECU 
in loans for the federation.109
106 FBIS-EEU-91-120 (21 June 1991), 23.
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The declarations of independence by two republics, when they came, were not to 
budge the western governments, under these circumstances. The first reaction in the 
West was to try to persuade them to take back their declarations. The Foreign Office 
in London asserted that both republics were, apparently, ready to continue discussions 
with other Yugoslavs about a new Yugoslavia.110 France’s Foreign Minister Roland 
Dumas sounded more conciliatory, claiming to understand the Croat and Slovene 
aspirations for ‘liberty’; nevertheless, he reminded them that they were constrained by 
‘international order’ which clearly rejected ‘secessionist movements’.111 
Spokeswoman of the US Department of State, Margaret Tutwiler, announced that 
Croatia’s and Slovenia’s ‘unilateral steps... will not alter the way the US deals with the 
two republics as constituent parts of Yugoslavia’.112
The British media were still playing the same tune: The Times of London opined in an 
editorial that ‘complete independence may be the aim of the ultra-nationalists; but it is 
impractical’.113 The day after fighting erupted in Slovenia, John Major, reiterated the 
view: ‘the first prize is to hold the federation together in Yugoslavia’.114 The EC then 
issued a second draft statement, calling for the restoration of constitutional order and 
respect for the territorial integrity of the country. Those were precisely the arguments 
of the JNA, and it had sent its tanks to achieve these objectives.
110 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO Spokesman Notes, London: 26 June 1991.
111 David Binder, “US to Ignore Yugoslav Secession Moves,” International Herald Tribune, 27 June 
1991.
112 US Embassy, London, European Wireless File, 27 June 1991.
113 “Breaking with Belgrade,” Editorial, The Times, 26 June 1991.
114 David Gardner, “EC Dashes into Its Own Backyard,” Financial Times, 1 July 1991.
53
3 . 1 . 3 . The Evaluation of EC’s Enthusiasm
Soon afterwards the US made it clear that it regarded Yugoslavia as a European 
problem, and the EC, anxious to prove that it was a foreign and security policy actor, 
happily embarked on a mission of crisis management. The year 1991 was a bright 
confident year; the twelve countries of the EC were soon to become the European 
Union. The single European market was due to come into effect the following year 
and ardent supporters of a united Europe were talking enthusiastically about a 
common foreign policy. Margaret Thatcher, Former British Prime Minister, the most 
celebrated opponent of further European integration, had been deposed less than a 
year earlier.
In fact, Yugoslavia, the first armed conflict of the post-Cold War age, presented the 
historic challenge that Europe needed to prove its identity.115 Indeed, according to 
Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, speaking as chair of the EC Foreign 
Affairs Council of Foreign Ministers, “the hour of Europe has dawned.”116 He stated 
that ‘if one problem can be solved by Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a 
European country and it’s not up to the Americans and not up to anybody else’.117 To 
this extent Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, who was a leading advocate of 
federalism, declared that Washington and Moscow had been ‘informed’, not consulted 
about the mission of the EC troika of Foreign Ministers.
115 Catherine Guicherd, “The Hour of Europe: Lessons from the Yugoslav Conflict,” The Fletcher
Forum o f World Affairs 17, no. 2 (Summer 1993). '
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News of the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia coincided with one of the twice yearly 
summits of the EC’s heads of governments. The EC immediately dispatched a 
mediation mission of three foreign ministers to stop the war in Slovenia. The Troika 
was composed of the past, present and coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of 
the European Council of Ministers. In June 1991, its members were Gianni de 
Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) and Hans van den Broek (the 
Netherlands) respectively. When the Troika arrived in Belgrade on June 28, they 
brought with them a four-point plan and three urgent tactical objectives to stop the 
fighting; to withdraw the Federal Army to its barracks; and to persuade the two 
northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia to accept a three-month moratorium on 
their newly declared independence.118
Initially, they managed to broker a deal, however, it was not implemented. More 
bargaining led to the other; in fact, the JNA’s action strengthened Slovenia in its 
determination to free itself from the rest of Yugoslavia. At the same time, international 
public opinion was going through a new turn in favour of the breakaway republic. The 
television pictures were showing Slovenia, little nation, like Czechoslovakia - 
democratically inclined, westward leaning struggling to liberate itself from 
Communism, two years after the fall of the Berlin war.
At the same time, in Belgrade, seeing the direction of international involvement and 
JNA’s initial humiliation in Slovenia, Milosevic decided that the time had come to tie 
down the JNA and put it under his control. On June 30, on the third day of Slovenia’s 
ten days war, Serbia finally withdrew its support for the JNA’s attempt to hold federal
118 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia together. Since Kadijevic’s initial plan (a limited action to recover the 
border crossings) had failed, he was left with two options; withdrawal and recognition 
of Slovene secession or full-scale invasion and the crushing of the Slovene rebellion. 
However, Serbian representative to the Federal Assembly vetoed his plan to escalate 
the war, and Kadijevic was left with no option but to accept the defeat. Suddenly, 
Slovenia’s war appeared as a Slovene-Serbian pact to facilitate the secession of 
Slovenia, humiliate the JNA, and destroy whatever was left of Markovic’s Federal 
Government.119
The JNA emerged from the ten day conflict with Slovenia humiliated at home and 
abroad and went into a period of reassessment about its prospects. Written off 
Slovenia, the JNA realised that it was no longer in a position of preserving the integrity 
of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Many non-Serbian officers and 
conscripts had already left the army during the ten days war with Slovenia, and the 
JNA was left with the sole option of fighting for the borders of a ‘new Yugoslavia’ 
composed of those peoples who wanted to live together in it. In effect, this meant a 
state exclusively for Serbs, as, by this stage, the majority of non-Serbs had 
demonstrated their preference not to continue as part of Yugoslavia they considered to 
be Serbian-dominated, while in many areas Serbian political activists were making it 
clear that, in spite of the rhetoric to the contrary, they were not in a mood to accept a 
continued equal co-existence.120 Consequently, When the JNA went to war with 
Croatia in the weeks that followed, it was no longer defending Yugoslavia’s territorial 
integrity. The JNA had then become the army of Serbia.
119 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 50-52.
120 IbicL, 32-33.
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The Netherlands assumed the Presidency of the EC on 1 July 1991. At that moment, 
the Troika was, essentially, trying to bully the Yugoslavia into a ceasefire.121 Finally, 
on 7 July, the Troika succeeded in establishing peace in Slovenia. On the island of 
Brioni, the EC mission got all the parties to the dispute to accept its plan.122 All 
parties agreed that a ‘new situation’ had arisen in Yugoslavia, requiring .further 
negotiations between the parties. Negotiations were to begin no later than 1 August, 
and were to include all aspects of Yugoslavia’s future. On the whole, the cease-fire 
held because the JNA, in the absence of Serbian backing, conceded Slovenia. On 18 
July, federal authorities agreed to withdraw all JNA units from Slovenia within a three 
months period. Annex II of the Brioni Agreement gave the European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) a mandate to deploy the EC monitors to patrol the 
Slovenian borders, but initially, at least, Milosevic would not extend the mandate to 
Croatia.123
Although, the Community seemed to be enjoying its first diplomatic ‘triumph’ with the 
‘Brioni Settlement’ which promised stopping the war in that republic and was 
considered as ‘the beginning’ of a much wider process of bringing peace to the region, 
the result of the war in Slovenia was a serious blow to the confident policies of 
Europe. Two weeks after declaring its support for the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia, and warning that the use of force would bring no reward, it confirmed
121 « £ £  j rojj.a works t0 Salvage Peace Plan,” The Guardian, 1 July 1991.
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Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia.124 It is hardly surprising that, under these 
circumstances, the consensus on the need to preserve Yugoslavia began to dissolve 
very quickly. German public opinion pressured Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister 
Genscher to moderate their policy. The German press had been filled with criticisms 
of Genscher’s policy of preserving Yugoslavia for months. In early July, for instance, 
Volker Ruhe, then the chairman of Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats,. started 
appealing for international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.125 Germany’s 
Chancellor Kohl finally asked that the right of self-determination should be recognised, 
in the same way as it was recognised for all the Germans the year before.
In fact, behind the scenes a political battle was being waged.126 French and German 
politicians pointed out that the EC’s involvement in Yugoslavia was the best indication 
that the community needed a new foreign policy and military dimension. However, the 
French began to suspect that the Germans might be wavering in their support for 
Community policy which was still to keep Yugoslavia together. The British, who 
opposed such arguments, claimed nevertheless that the ‘success’ of the Community in 
bringing all the sides to the negotiating table and brokering cease-fire was, in itself, 
proof that the Community already had the instruments it needed in order to handle 
regional crises such as those in the Balkans.127 In public, everything went very well 
and the EC picked up the mission now officially passed on by the CSCE.
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At the CSCE meeting in early July, every member state repeated worn-out generalities 
about the sanctity of frontiers and the need for a ‘new basis for unity in Yugoslavia’.128 
The British remained firm expressing far less sympathy for the secessionist republics 
compared to other EC countries; they had no time for the ‘donnish attitude that 
nationalism must be allowed to have its way in Yugoslavia... to support independence 
for the republics is to sanction continuous civil war’.129 The CSCE meeting concluded 
with nothing more than an appeal for peace in Yugoslavia, and a decision on the need 
to send observers to the Balkans.130
The EC sent its first advance team of observers to Slovenia during the second week of 
July 1991. It was the highest point in the EC involvement in Yugoslavia. The new 
Dutch presidency was very eager to be seen to be solving Europe’s first security crisis 
since the end of the Cold War.131 Everyone believed in the EC efforts: Americans, 
following the EC, also imposed embargo on weapon sales to Yugoslavia. However, 
within days, it was apparent that the Brioni agreement was breaking up everywhere. 
The EC put all its faith on the observers on the ground. At the end, the EC proposals 
about a ‘moratorium’ was never accepted by the warring parties and that the 
‘settlement’ the Troika presented proudly was, in fact, never achieved in reality. In the 
meantime, nobody appeared to notice that the first serious clashes were beginning in 
Croatia.
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3.2. The JNA Attack and the War in Croatia
From the beginning of the war in Slovenia, Croatian President Tudjman’s calculation 
was that Croatia was not in a position to take on the JNA militarily. He believed that 
Croatia could win its independence not through military victory over the JNA but only 
through international recognition. Throughout the summer 1991, while one 
municipality after another fell to the territorial defence forces of the Serbs’ Krajina 
Republic, Tudjman did everything to avoid all-out war. On each of these occasions, 
the JNA stood behind the Serb para-militaries ready to step in and ostensibly ‘separate 
the warring factions’. The JNA began a series of troop movements through Bosnia- 
Hercegovina in preparation for an assault on those territories which the Serbian 
leadership in Belgrade considered as belonging to Serbian people.
Coincidental with the Moscow coup attempt of 18-19 August against Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the JNA intensified the war in Croatia. The low-level conflict since the 
declaration of independence by Croatia was stepped up in the second half of August, 
with the siege of Vukovar by JNA artillery units beginning on 19 August 1991.132 At 
the end of August 1991, the JNA began to besiege the old Adriatic port, Dubrovnik, 
from land and sea. Naval vessels moved up the coast, destroying one house after 
another. This had a clear purpose; to drive out an unwanted, potentially hostile 
population- to ‘cleanse’ the territory. Had the aim been to capture the town, the army 
could do it in one afternoon. By comparison, Vukovar, which was under siege at the 
same time, was a large town with some defensive capability and thus difficult to 
capture. However, in both cases, the aim was not to capture, but to drive out the
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population to ensure that there would be no potential opposition that might resort to 
political disruption, terrorism or guerrilla tactics. While the Serbian campaign was not 
apparent at the time of Dubrovnik and Vukovar campaigns, it later became evident 
through the continued expulsion of non-Serb populations from the occupied territories 
in Croatia and during the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina.132 33
By the fall of 1991, the political military elite in Belgrade had abandoned the idea of 
persuading Croatia to remain within Yugoslav federation. Certainly, the JNA’s 
engagement in the war markedly changed, adopting a new goal of establishment of the 
borders of a ‘mini Yugoslavia’, comprising the key strategic infrastructure of the old 
Yugoslav state and areas with ‘reliable’ populations, that is, Serbian dominated 
communities. By September 14, Serb forces, together with the JNA were in control of 
between a quarter and a third of Croatia’s territory. They acquired three disparate 
blocks of territory, linked to each other only by territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina; the 
first and most established of these was the territory around Knin; the second was in 
central Croatia around the town of Glina, from which the Croats had been driven in 
July and August; and the third was in eastern Slavonia, and Baranja, which shares a 
frontier with Serbia.134
As village to village fighting intensified in Croatia, the cracks on the European unity 
were becoming more visible. French President Francois Mitterrand, after a meeting 
with Chancellor Kohl about the co-ordination of policies towards Yugoslavia, uttered
132 See, Gow, “One Year of War,” 1-7.
133 For the full account o f war in Croatia, see Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 169-189.
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that he had convinced Kohl not to push for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.135 
However, by the end of July, an estimated 15 Croatians were being killed by the 
federal troops every day and German pressure for recognition resumed.136 London’s 
Financial Times identified the Croat problem as one of inadequate ‘de-nazification’, 
an apparently incurable historic disease, which also incidentally, made the supposed 
German-Croat connection particularly sinister.137
Aware that appearances could no longer be maintained and with the aim to silence 
German demands for recognition, the French proposed military intervention to stop the 
war. An inter-positional force to be created from several EC countries, with a task of 
acting as a ‘buffer’ between the warring parties was to be placed under the control of 
Western European Union (WEU). WEU had been dormant since its inception in 1948, 
but had become more important in the late 1980s as a possible defence arms for the 
EC. France always wanted to create a distinctive European defence organisation out 
of WEU, whereas the ‘Atlanticists’, Britain, Holland and Portugal, wanted to keep it 
as a handy ‘European pillar’ of the Atlantic Alliance.138 The battle within the 
European Community on future defence and foreign policy co-operation was the hot 
issue of the day. The French who wanted the WEU to become the military wing of a 
tighter Community saw the Yugoslav war as an opportunity. Realistically, however, 
the French proposal could never have worked since the WEU did not have any means 
to provide logistical support and co-ordination that such a force would have required.
135 “Kohl Says Time not Ripe for Recognition,” Financial Times, 24 July 1991.
136 See FBIS-EEU-91-145 (29 July 1990, 57-8.
137 The Editorial, Financial Times, 17 July 1991. Franjo Tudjman was the first senior Yugoslav 
leader received by Chancellor Kohl after the beginning of the war, and this did not go unnoticed by 
Germany’s other EC partners.
138 Sarah Helm, “Yugoslavia’s Divisions Expose Conflict and Confusion within the EC,” The 
independent, 6 August 1991.
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Germany’s Hans Dietrich Genscher and the Christian Democrat’s leader expressed an 
interest in a WEU involvement but London vehemently opposed any such initiative in 
the Balkans.
At any rate, Britain, at that time, was ready to block any attempt to send European 
troops to Yugoslavia while the hostilities continued for fear of becoming embroiled in 
a Lebanon-type civil war.139 Without a peace between the parties, the British 
Government expressed the reluctance to send forces into a situation which a senior 
official from Whitehall described as ‘a situation where they would face pot-shots from 
both sides’.140 The condition to participate into a peace-keeping force based on the 
WEU was described as ‘the situation where there is a clear mandate and a clear role 
for a European force to play’. Immediately, Hurd demanded clarification about the 
status of its observers, in order to underline the fact that the Community could only 
send people into the conflict with the agreement of the all warring parties, rather than 
according to Brussels’ whims. The debate for military intervention was going to come 
out from time to time especially during the bloody war in Bosnia and was going to be a 
major source of contention among the EC members.
When the suspicions increased about each other’s intentions, the vicious circle began in 
the EC; any proposal trying to tackle with the conflict was first analysed in every 
Western capital, not according to whether it could actually contribute to the solution 
of the war in Yugoslavia, but according to its implications for what was still termed
139 Philip Johnston, “Britain Rejects Military Role in Yugoslavia,” Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1991.
140 Ibid.
63
Western Europe’s ‘architecture’.141 In fact, in this diplomatic battle, Yugoslavia 
mattered for little. Two weeks after the Croat war began, unable to do anything but 
negotiating cease-fires to be breached, Mr. Van den Broek admitted that ‘there is 
nothing more we can do’.142
At an emergency meeting in The Hague on 6 August 1991, there were as many 
opinions about what needed to be done as there were foreign ministers around the 
table. The British favoured a meeting of CSCE at the ministerial level;143 the French 
suggested a UN meeting in order to discuss a possible peace-keeping force; the Dutch 
suggested further mediation through an enlarged Troika; the smaller states suggested 
‘military intervention’ to which they were not likely to contribute; the Germans 
suggested recognising Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence. The result amounted to 
nothing, since everyone found some flaws in other’s argument. Referral to UN could 
incur opposition from the Soviet Union and China to any action; unless Yugoslavia 
agrees to measures against itself, the use of force was premature, and, could not be 
discussed in the WEU where the Germans considered by the Serbs as impartial were in 
the chair; and recognition of republics would only fuel a bigger war.144 Although 
nothing concrete was achieved to halt the war, the EC was still happy that all least 
there were still some projects under consideration, and that the world media still
141 Eyai, Europe and Yugoslavia, 33.
142 Laura Silber, “Yugoslavia ‘Faces Tragedy’ After Peace Talks Fail,” Financial Times, 5 August 
1991.
143 In London, Douglas Hogg, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office said that ‘implementing a 
cease fire, but not imposing peace, remained the priority of the British government. Our purpose is to 
get the republics within Yugoslavia to agree to a cease fire. Unless they do that we can’t carry the 
matter further forward. We are in the business of maximising the pressure on the republics’. Judy 
Dempsey, “Yugoslav Cease-fire is Broken As West’s Peace Moves Fail,” Financial Times, 8 August 
1991.
144 Sarah Helm, “Yugoslavia’s Divisions Expose Conflict and Confusion within the EC,” The 
Independent, 6 August 1991.
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believed the Community to be at the centre of events.145 The fact that the Community 
decided at The Hague meeting not to recognise any territorial change achieved by use 
of force was considered highly significant. In a sense, although there was a lot of talk 
in the EC circles about the dangers of fragmentation in the Balkans, the EC member 
states’ policy suggestions appeared to reflect real fragmentation, if not ‘Balkanisation’.
Not surprisingly, therefore, it was just before the meeting in The Hague that the US 
Administration began taking a more direct interest in the Yugoslav crisis. A small but 
growing group of officials within the State Department believed that Secretary of State 
James Baker’s tactic of letting the Europeans ‘sort out’ the crisis in Yugoslavia had 
gone far enough. It was obvious that, despite all the talk about unity, the Europeans 
could not get their act together. Meanwhile, all the American Embassies in the region 
were reporting disturbing developments which simply could not be ignored. Turkey, 
for instance, informed Washington in August 1991 that it was worried about the fate 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina; the US Embassy in Athens reported that the Greeks were far 
too close to the Serbian leadership; a long drawn-out Balkan war could undermine the 
already fragile security of all post-Communist governments. The Dutch Presidency 
and the British were quite keen on getting US support, especially if that meant some 
co-ordination between the efforts undertaken in Brussels and those which could be 
undertaken at the UN in New York. Yet, the French still considered any US 
involvement as an explicit slur on Europe’s ability to handle its own crisis.
145 Financial Times argued on 8 August 1991 that ‘even UK officials recognise that the Community 
has in practice started operating a common foreign policy’.
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Meanwhile, things on the ground were getting out of hand. For instance, by mid- 
August, Bosnia’s President Alija Izetbegovic announced his decision to hold a 
referendum on his republic’s independence. Yet, the Community persisted in its 
original policies; next project was to convene an international conference on the ‘future 
of Yugoslavia’.146 Events in Moscow were influencing the situation in Yugoslavia. 
On August 19, 1991, with the news of the anti-Gorbachev coup in Moscow, the Serbs, 
believing that turmoil in Soviet Union could save them from the West’s attention had 
launched an all-out military offensive in Croatia. However, Gorbachev’s return to 
Moscow at the end of the week encouraged the Croats and Slovenes into believing 
that their recognition was near, since the West had already recognised the 
independence of the Baltic republics.147
3.3. The EC Conference: Lord Carrington’s Plan
Realising that it had run out of policy option, the EC decided to act. On 28 August 
1991, the EC issued an ultimatum: either republics complied with a demand for a 
cease-fire and negotiations by 1 September, or the EC would discuss additional 
measures ‘including international action’.148 The Community still wanted to be 
impartial; refrained from identifying Serbia as the aggressor, it accused only ‘parts of 
the Serbian irregular forces and parts of the Yugoslav army’. Nevertheless, the threat 
appeared very explicit; not only would the EC ask the UN Security Council for 
authority for ‘further action’, but Germany’s Hans Dietrich Genscher also warned
146 David Gardner, “Democratic Weapons in Fight for Statehood,” Financial Times, 15 August 1991.
147 Judy Dempsey, “Soviet Coup’s Collapse Seen As Set Back For Milosevic,” Financial Times, 23 
August 1991.
148 Marcus Tanner, “EC Ultimatum to Serbia on Peace Talks,” The Independent, 28 August 1991.
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Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic that Germany would push for the 
immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia if the fighting continued.149
The Serbian response was to accept most of the conditions put forward by the EC and, 
on 2 September 1991, Hans van den Broek, the Dutch President of the Community, 
signed a new cease-fire in Belgrade, including agreement to begin talks on the future of 
Yugoslavia, to be held in The Hague.150 A day later, it was announced that the 
European Community Conference on Yugoslavia would be convened on 7 September 
in the Hague, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington.151 The British Foreign 
Office spokesman was quick to see the agreement and the forthcoming conference as a 
‘window of opportunity’. The British, had indeed, every reason to feel pleased. The 
appointment of Lord Carrington as the Chairman of the peace conference allowed 
London to claim that it was in the forefront of diplomatic activity.152
At the ceremonial opening of the Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC member states 
solemnly declared that they would do ‘everything in our power’ to help in finding a 
‘peace to all in Yugoslavia’.153 But, the problem was that it had no powers to do 
anything in particular. At the very first day, the cease-fire was violated by the Serbs 
and the heavy fighting resumed in Croatia. Although, initially, an end to hostilities was 
a prerequisite for the Conference to proceed, Lord Carrington continued his work in
149 International Weekly (31 August 1991), 1-2.
150 For the text of the memorandum, see FBIS-EEU-91-170 (3 September 1991), 33-36.
151 David Gardner and Laura Silber, “Carrington to Lead Yugoslav Peace Move,” Financial Times, 4 
September 1991.
152 Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 37. Also, see, Jane M. O. Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious 
Albion?: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia, Institute for Public Policy Research (London: 1997), 
12.
153 See FBIS-EEU-91-174 (9 September 1991), 28-35 for the opening proceedings of the conference in 
the Hague.
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spite of the unstoppable violence. And so, the first condition of Carrington’s mission 
was blown away.154 After the opening session, the conference became closed and 
Carrington began a series of private meetings with all the Yugoslav leaders and foreign 
ministers in an attempt to mediate.155
On 17 September in Igalo, Montenegro, Carrington managed to get all the parties to 
sign a cease-fire agreement.156 However, since the leaders could only pledge that 
‘everyone within our control and under our political and military influence should 
cease-fire immediately’, there was no guarantee that the fighting would stop. As it 
proved several times before, the conviction that ‘signing a piece of paper was never a 
problem for the parties to the conflict’ and the perception that ‘a lasting cease-fire was 
not a realistic possibility’ gained wider recognition. In these circumstances, Carrington 
had to forget his early statements that there could be no peace talks without a cease­
fire and proceed with the conference anyway. His evaluation was that: ‘by making 
progress -if we can make progress- we think that it will be more likely that the cease­
fire will hold, and that we can get a solution that is acceptable to all the parties to the 
dispute.157
At the beginning of October, the EC talked on the possibility of removing recognition 
from Yugoslavia, putting it into a ‘diplomatic quarantine’. Although this did not
154 Carrington announced that negotiations would depend on three conditions;
• that a real cease-fire continued throughout Yugoslavia
• that none o f the republics be recognised as independent except as part of an overall settlement
•  that borders could not be changed without the agreement o f all parties.
Lord Carrington, "Turmoil in the Balkans: Developments and Prospects," RUSI Journal 137, no. 5, 
(October 1992), 1-4.
155 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 53-54.
156 Ibid., 54.
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necessarily imply recognition of republics, it was a clear signal that things might go 
that way. A day after this was discussed and after the Serbian-J/VA forces had received 
setbacks for the first time, on October 4, Carrington achieved what he considered as a 
‘breakthrough’. He brought Tudjman and Milosevic together, along with the Federal 
Defence Minister Kadijevic. They agreed to seek a political solution ‘on the basis of 
independence of those wishing it’ and three points of principle were set.157 58 These 
were;
• a loose association or alliance of sovereign or independent republics.
» adequate arrangements for the protection of communities, including human rights 
guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas.
» no unilateral changes in borders.
It seemed, Milosevic had, at last, under international pressure, agreed that the 
republics, not the nations, were the legitimate constituent units of federal Yugoslavia. 
In Carrington’s words:
“This is the first time that Serbia has recognised the right of other 
republics to self-determination -subject to respect for minority rights.
By discussing issues such as the autonomy and special status for 
minorities we are going to the heart of the political problem. I hope 
this will speed up the political process for a cease-fire”.159
157 Ronald von de Krol, “Carrington Hopeful of Yugoslav Cease-Fire,” Financial Times, 27 
September 1991.
158 David Gardner, “Serbia Accepts Croatian Independence,” Financial Times, 5-6 October 1991.
159 Ibid.
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Finally, that agreement provided the basis for the negotiators in The Hague and the EC 
officials to work towards a proposal for a political settlement. However, within two 
days the fighting intensified. The 90-day moratorium, imposed on the declarations of 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia at Brioni, was due to expire on 8 October. 
Croatia’s president Franjo Tudjman, after a period of considerable pressure from the 
opposition, ordered full mobilisation; the JNA responded with renewed vigour across 
Croatia, including bombardment of the historic port of Dubrovnik. Carrington, with a 
threat of suspending Yugoslavia’s all trade agreements and imposition of sanctions, set 
a new deadline effective from midnight 7 October. With the assistance of EC 
monitors, both the JNA blockade of Croatia’s ports and the Croatian National Guard’s 
siege of federal barracks throughout Croatia were lifted. The Dutch presidency 
quickly sent a senior diplomat to strengthen the peace process, only to find that 
realities were quite different: the Yugoslav forces were only regrouping for a greater 
offensive and Belgrade promptly denied any intention of abandoning the fight in that 
republic.
As clashes grew again, Carrington was under growing criticism for his eagerness to 
find a common ground with those who had ordered what was plainly going to be the 
destruction of Vukovar and the siege and bombardment of Dubrovnik. On October 
16, Carrington distributed to the republic’s leaders a detailed seven-page proposal 
entitled ‘Arrangements for a General Settlement’.160 The plan guaranteed a wide range 
of individual, cultural and political rights to the Serbs outside Serbia. In areas of 
Croatia and Bosnia where they formed a majority, the Serbs were entitled to use their
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national emblems and flags of their, the right to a second nationality, and an education 
system which ‘respect the values and needs’ of the Serbs. Finally, they were granted 
the right to their own parliament, their own administrative structure, including a 
regional police force, and their own judiciary.160 61 Serbia was given an ultimatum to 
accept the EC plan in one week, from 28 October. Otherwise, it would face 
comprehensive economic sanctions, and, as Hans Van den Broek warned, ‘the 
Community will continue its patient negotiations with the five republics who are 
willing. This would be in the perspective of their right to independence’.162 
Recognition was now on the agenda. Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis said that the 
EC’s aim was to wind up the peace conference by mid-December by which time the 
‘treaty will be signed with the individual republics, and will represent official EC 
recognition of their independence’.163
However, Milosevic rejected the EC plan. His chief objection was the proposed 
position of the Serb communities outside Serbia. Having been classified as part of a 
‘nation’ in the old Yugoslavia, these would now become national minorities.164 
According to the minutes recorded during the negotiations the Serbian position was as 
follows:
Serbia could not accept the working groups continuing on the basis 
o f the lowest common denominator o f  identified interests and 
institutional arrangements. The conference should try to identify 
genuine common interests which could be defended in a common
160 David Usbome, “EC Draws Up Plan For New Yugoslavia,” The Independent, 18 October 1991.
161 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 192-3.
162 Leonard Doyle and Sarah Lambert, “EC Tells Serbs to Stop War or Face Sanctions,” The 
Independent, 29 October 1991.
163 Quoted in The Guardian, 1 November 1991.
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state. It was essential for all the Serbs to live in one state, not in a 
number o f independent republics bound by little more than interstate 
relations. If this was not accepted by the other republics, the right 
course would be to recognise those republics wishing it, after having 
settled the question o f the succession o f  Y ugoslavia and after having 
agreed on border changes.* 165
In other words, Serbia not only wanted to annex those parts of Croatia (and, by 
implication, Bosnia-Hercegovina) but also wanted to be considered sole legitimate 
successor state to the old federal republic. In addition to Serbia’s leadership, its 
partner in the war, the JNA also refused the EC plan. Realising that the plan would 
mean the end of the JNA, Defence Secretary Kadijevic argued that the Carrington’s 
plan was in effect ‘Germany very openly... attacking Yugoslavia for the third time in 
this century.’166
On October 30, Serbia and Montenegro sent their amendment to The Hague, insisting 
that a clause be inserted in the Paragraph One, declaring that the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia continued to exist for those who did not wish to secede.167 
Carrington declared that the amendment was ‘totally unacceptable’. Milosevic’s 
ambition to carve up a new territorial entity, comprised of Serb-populated areas in 
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina was obvious. The peace process never got 
beyond that fundamental stumbling block. On 5 November, Serbia refused to accept
104 Yugofax, No. 6 (31 October 1991).
165 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, p. 192.
166 Ian Traynor and John Palmer, “Serbia and EC Square Up to Fight Over Plans for a Mini- 
Yugoslavia,” The Guardian, 23 October 1991.
167 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 58-9.
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the revised terras of the EC’s proposed solution.168 Gradually, as the bombardments in 
eastern Slavonia and full-scale assault on the historic port of Dubrovnik continued, 
international public opinion turned against Serbia. Though Milosevic was not yet 
widely seen as the instigator of, and guiding hand in, the war, he was now identified as 
the main obstacle to peace. On 8 November, the EC imposed economic sanctions 
against Yugoslavia and suspended all trade relations.169
By November, international dissatisfaction with Lord Carrington’s process had 
produced a multi-track peace process; Cyrus Vance entered the scene as the UN 
sponsored peace-maker, appointed by outgoing Secretary General Javier Perez de 
Cuellar. Officially, Vance’s task was to ascertain on the best deployment and 
requirements for the UN peace-keeping operations. The UN was careful to point out 
that the decision to send in a peace-keeping force was to maintain cease-fire, once this 
was agreed and proven durable.
Croatia had appealed for international troops to be deployed along its borders with 
Serbia and Bosnia almost from the beginning. And, now they needed the forces as 
temporary expedient, pending the recognition of their republic and the reorganisation 
of their armed forces. Serbia, as always, played a double game. In public, Milosevic 
rejected out of hand the very idea of foreign intervention in what they insisted was an 
internal Yugoslav matter. In private, they saw that foreign deployment could be 
turned to their advantage because most of what they desired to occupy in Croatia had
168 David Gardner and Laura Silber, “Serbia Rejects EC Peace Proposal,” Financial Times, 6 
November 1991.
169 Robert Mauthner and Laura Silber, “EC Imposes Sanctions on Yugoslavia,” Financial Times, 9-10 
November 1991.
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been accomplished. They, therefore, welcomed Cyrus Vance to Belgrade and the 
centre of gravity in the international peace process shifted from the EC to the UN.
3.4. Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
3.4.1. Debates on the Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
In the meantime, Germany had been pushing for recognition of Croatian and Slovenian 
declarations of independence for months. By the end of November, the destruction of 
Vukovar, the displacement of half a million Croats and 230,000 Serbs from their 
homes, the occupation of almost a third of the Croatian territory by Serb irregulars and 
the JNA, and the siege and bombardment of Dubrovnik, pushed the German public 
opinion over the edge.170
By early December, Tudjman visited Bonn and met both Kohl and Germany’s Foreign 
Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. On his way back, Tudjman told Croatian television 
that Germany ‘has no hesitation about its decision to recognise Croatian 
independence’.171 Genscher was convinced that the only way to halt Belgrade’s 
military advance through Croatia was immediate recognition, and that Milosevic only 
seemed like taking part in the peace process to buy time to complete his military 
task.172 To Bonn, Lord Carrington’s peace efforts began to look like a smoke-screen 
for inaction. In early December 1991, Germany also obtained the support of the 
Italians.
170 The Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU), the ally of the ruling Christian Democrartc Union 
of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, accused Kohl of supporting the ‘Communists from Serbia’ through the 
non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 167.
171 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 198.
172 Ibid., 198-9.
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But, Britain and the US argued that any recognition before a UN force was deployed 
in Croatia and before the greater debate over the Maastricht summit was out of the 
way would be premature and would have harmful consequences for the peace- 
process.173 However, forced with German pressure, the Community started 
discriminating between the various republics. Economic sanctions were lifted in case 
of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia, but remained in force against Serbia and 
Montenegro.174 The US, on the other hand, cut off all trade agreements with 
Yugoslavia in December 1991, refusing to single out only Serbia and Montenegro. 
The US, taking a firm stance against Chancellor Helmut Kohl, said it was strongly 
opposed to recognising the secessionist Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia.175
Despite all the American and British criticism, Germany was resolved to force the issue 
at the forthcoming EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels on December 15-16. 
Genscher had made it clear that if the EC did not move towards recognition, then 
Germany would recognise unilaterally. It was a bitter blow to the sprit of Maastricht. 
Britain vehemently opposed the recognition. Considering ‘unbridled nationalism’ as 
having the most destructive force at the end of the twentieth century, Hurd wrote in 
The Times:
“Recognition will not stop the fighting. Nor will the West send 
troops to fight on Croatia’s behalf. If w e recognise the republics too
173 Ian Traynor, “Croatia and Slovenia Put Case to Bonn,” The Guardian, 4 December 1991.
174 Charles Goldsmith, “EC Partially Lifts Yugoslav Sanctions,” International Herald Tribune, 3 
December 1991.
175 “US Says It Opposes Yugoslav Break-Up,” The International Herald Tribune, 6 December 1991.
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soon, w e risk detonating the fragile peace in Macedonia and Bosnia; 
since they will come under great pressure to seek independence, too. 
Recognition o f a series o f small Balkan countries, without a 
framework allowing for protection o f  minorities, would not be a 
recipe for future stability.” 176
Lord Carrington had also struck a similar pessimistic tone, writing to the President of 
the Council of Ministers, Hans van den Broek, and saying that premature recognition 
would damage the peace conference he chaired, then the only mechanism to stop the 
war:
“As early recognition o f  Croatia would undoubtedly mean the break­
up o f  the Conference... There is also a real danger, perhaps, even a 
probability, that Bosnia-Hercegovina would also ask for 
independence and recognition, which would be wholly unacceptable 
to the Serbs in that Republic...This might well be the spark that sets 
Bosnia-Hercegovina alight.” 177
The UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar was also of the same opinion: he 
wrote to van den Broek, on 10 December, to say that he was deeply worried that any 
early selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive 
situation, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia.178
176 Douglas Hurd, “Averting a Balkan Tragedy,” The Times, 3 December 1991.
177 Carrington’s Letter to the President o f the Council of Ministers. John Sweeney, The Observer, 3.
178 UNDOC S/23280 (11 December 1991).
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Contrary to the views of European and international officials, the British and German 
newspapers had written many volumes on condemning the Serbian attack on 
Dubrovnik and urging for the recognition of Croatia, arguing that ‘recogniton of 
Croatia might strengthen the Croats in their struggle to regain what they have lost’179. 
It was considered as an error for the EC ‘not to recognise both Slovenia and Croatia 
after they had declared their independence in the summer.180 It was argued in The 
Guardian that “the recognition at that stage obviously might have a deterrent effect on 
the Serbs that ‘they could not hang on to the fruits of their aggression’.”181
However, despite protestations, neither Britain nor the Netherlands was prepared to 
put the Yugoslav peace process before the EC unity. To oppose Germany would be to 
destroy the delicate situation that the EC created to build a common security, defence 
and foreign policy structure. It the end, Britain did not even send its senior Foreign 
Minister Douglas Hurd to the summit. His deputy, Douglas Hogg, went in his place. 
It was interpreted as a signal that Britain decided not to put up more than a token 
fight. There were also allegations that there had been a deal between Germany and 
Britain. Britain’s sudden U-turn; agreement to recognise Slovenia and Croatia was 
considered as part of a secret trade off over the opt out of the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht.182 One of the sources quoted in BBC reporter Martin Bell’s book, ‘In 
Harm’s Way’, says ‘it would require a great deal of naivety not to see linkage between
179 “Dubrovnik Under Attack,” Editorial, Daily Telegraph, 4  October 1991.
180 “Last Hopes at the Hague?,” Editorial, The Independent, 5 November 1991.
181 Ibid.
182 See John Sweeney’s article “How Bosnia Paid Price of Major’s Maastricht Opt-Out Coup,” in The 
Observer, 17 September 1995, 3 and “Heard in the House,” The Guardian, 8 May 1995, 13. See also 
Jane M. O. Sharp, Honest Broker, 13.
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the two’.183 Britain won the right to opt out of the Social Chapter on 10 December 
1991. Six days later, Germany won its diplomatic battle for the EC’s agreement to 
recognise Slovenia and Croatia. However, a top official in the European Commission 
said that ‘great pressure was put on Britain by Germany to shift its position on 
recognising Croatia. Nothing would have been done in the presence of UN officials. 
It would have all bilateral.’184 185
The EC ministers signed the Maastricht Treaty, creating the European Union on 11 
December and within a few days held a special ministerial meeting on European 
Political Consultation. At the meeting, Germany ‘bulldozed’ the other eleven members 
towards recognition. In the end, compromise was reached that swept away what was 
left of Lord Carrington’s peace conference and the carefully laid legalistic plans that 
the EC had been drawing up to consider applications for independence. From a policy 
which promised not to recognise ‘secessionist’ republics, the EC turned full circle and 
agreed to invite all Yugoslav republics who wanted to apply for recognition to submit 
their applications by December 24. These would then be considered by a five-member 
Arbitration Commission, under the chairmanship of a highly respected French 
constitutional lawyer, Judge Robert Badinter. The Badinter Commission, as it became 
known, had been appointed in November to draw a set of conditions which each 
republic would have to satisfy before being granted EC recognition. The Commission 
was to report its findings on January 15 and the Council of Foreign Ministers would
1R5then act in light of Commissions recommendations.
183 See Martin Bell, In Harm’s Way: Reflections o f a War Zone Thug, Penguin Books 
(Harmondsworth: 1996), 35-9.
184 John Sweeney, “How Bosnia Paid Price of Major’s Maastricht Opt-Out Coup,” The Observer, 17 
September 1995.
185 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 198-201.
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3.4.2 Badinter Commission, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Case 
of Yugoslavia
The Yugoslav Dissolution created many questions about statehood, sovereignty, self- 
determination and the meaning of ‘nation’, as well as the identity and future of 
particular nations. These were the issues at the heart of the Yugoslav conflict, and it 
was the fall-out from them which provided the greatest repercussions for international 
security. It was, therefore, the understanding of these issues which defined the
i  O i;
international perspective on the war in ex-Yugoslavia.
In the two years leading up to the declaration of independence by Slovenia and 
Croatia, and in the wake of those declarations, different understandings on the 
question of right-holders with reference to the rights to sovereignty and self- 
determination were in conflict. These conflicting conceptions were tried to be clarified 
by international community during the various meetings and through Commissions set 
up as advisory bodies to these meetings. In particular, they were considered by 
Badinter Commission which was a legal advisory and arbitration commission. It was 
their interpretation of constitutional and international legal matters which provided the 
framework for the Council of the European Community to act politically to settle these 
questions.186 87
186 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 67-8.
187 See, James Gow, “Serbian Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the International Order: 
Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?,” The Slavonic and East European Review (SEER) 72, no. 3 
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In the break-up of Yugoslavia, the two different interpretations of the ‘nation’ - as all 
the people living within the territorial boundaries of a given political community in 
which they have citizenship rights188 and as all the members of a particular ethno- 
national group - led to the bloody conflict where the two senses of nation did not 
coincide. The declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, based on claims 
to sovereignty and the inalienable right to national self-determination of the republics 
as state-formations189 were directly opposed by a Serb claim to sovereignty of the 
Serbs as an ethno-national people, wherever they were to be found, with the 
fundamental and inalienable right to national self-determination. Both claims were 
made on the basis of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.
The SFRY Constitution considers that each republic was a ‘nation-state’ formation 
endowed with sovereignty.190 The right to national self-determination, including the 
right to secession, was granted in the preamble to the SFRY Constitution. The 
republics were intended to be repositories of national self-determination for each of the 
Yugoslav peoples (naroda), that is state-forming nations. These were contrasted with 
national minorities (narodnosti) which were members of an ethnic group which, in
188 In this sense, for example, US Presidents often address ‘the Nation’, referring to all the 
(American) people bom within the territorial boundaries of a political community (United States of 
America) in which they have citizenship rights. See Gow, “Serbian Nationalism,” 465.
189 The Basic Constitutional Charter on the Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia 
and the Declaration of Independence adopted by the Slovenian Assembly of 25 June 1991, 
‘proceeding from the will of the Slovenian people and the citizens of Slovenia as expressed at the 
plebiscite on the autonomy and independence of the Republic of Slovenia, held on 23 December 
1990’, noted that ‘under the hitherto effective constitutional order, the Republic of Slovenia had the 
status of a sovereign state which exercised part of its sovereign rights in the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia’, but continued that ‘considering the SFRY does not function as a legally regulated 
state... The Republic of Slovenia is an autonomous and independent state and the Constitution of 
SFRY is no longer in force in the Republic of Slovenia and The Republic of Slovenia takes over all 
the rights and obligations which under the Constitution of Republic of Slovenia and the Constitution 
of SFRY were transferred to the agencies of the SFRY’. Footnoted in Gow, “Serbian Nationalism,” 
465.
190 ‘The Socialist Republic is a state, founded on the sovereignty of the nation...’. SFRY 
Constitution, Art. 3, p. 23. See, Gow, “Serbian Nationalism,” 464.
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general, constituted a state-forming nation (mother state) elsewhere- for example, the 
Albanians in Yugoslavia were a national minority because the place where they were a 
state-forming nation was Albania. Similarly, Hungarians in Vojvodina were 
narodnosti, because their mother state was Hungary.
The Yugoslav constitution, by referring to the sovereignty of the republics and 
peoples, glossed over a complication which came to be important when the state 
broke-up: within Yugoslavia each of the state-forming nations had its sovereign state 
to look to, despite the fact that the Serbs outside Serbia were minorities in Croatia and 
Bosnia, but they were still members of a state-forming people. Thus, the ethnic 
peoples in Yugoslavia had a constitutional role as ‘founders of the member states of 
the Federation’. So long as Yugoslavia remained a federation, it was possible to 
ignore the technicality that, if the republics were states founded on a particular ethnic 
people, then the logic which considered Albanians, for example, to be a national 
minority in Yugoslavia, rendered Serbs outside Serbia and Croats outside Croatia as 
national minorities, too.191
The opinions of the Badinter Advisory Commission, based on the general 
understanding received from previous periods, effectively rejected the Serbian claim to 
sovereignty for the ethno-nation, deeming that sovereignty rested with the republics. 
However, in response to a Serbian request for clarification on the right of the Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina to self-determination, the Commission refrained from 
saying that the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina did not have the right to
191 One striking feature of the Serb people in other republics, however, they always disproportionally 
represented in the administrative and military positions.
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self-determination. Self-determination might apply to other national (that is self­
defining ethnic, religious, genetic, cultural, linguistic and so forth) groups as an 
expression of their members’ human rights, but this did not include the right to form a 
state; it did, however, entail the right to levels of autonomy - that is, to political and 
cultural prerogatives and powers, perhaps, of self-governance, operable within the 
boundaries of a state.192
In addition, in Yugoslav case, Badinter made clear that the principle of uti posseditis 
(i.e. in the absence of peaceful agreement to alter frontiers which were changing status, 
‘the former boundaries acquire the character of boundaries protected by international 
law’) was applicable. This view was supported by references to a number of non­
binding international documents, including the Helsinki Final Act. Most importantly, it 
was backed by reference to the Article 2 of the UN Charter concerning the territorial 
integrity and political independence of states.193
3.4.3. Germany’s Early Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and Britain’s 
Reaction
Despite all the advises for restraint considering a common action in the Community, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was under fierce domestic pressure to act immediately on
192 Gow, “Serbian Nationalism,” 467 and 469.
193 Ibid.. 468. Whereas in theory ‘self-determination’ is the right granted to ‘all peoples’ (it might 
even be applied at the lowest level to individuals), as the UN Charter and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stated as ‘the people were given the right ‘freely’ to ‘determine’ 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, in practice its 
application is much more limited. In Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping, Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned that unrestricted application of the principle could lead 
to unending fragmentation if every ‘national’ group claimed the right to form a state. UN DOC. 
S/24111, 1992. Quoted in Gow, Ibid., 464.
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1 Croatia and Slovenia. Even before Badinter Advisory Commission gave its opinion 
about the applications, German Government spokesman already pronounced them 
satisfactory from Bonn’s point of view.194 On 23 December, Bonn announced that the 
German Cabinet decided to recognise Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas, but 
implement the decision on 15 January, together with other Community states.195 This 
left other Community members without a choice, whatever the outcome of the 
Badinter Commission’s evaluations of applications, Slovenia and Croatia was to be 
recognised.
Britain and Germany were the main protagonists in the battle for recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia and the clash over Yugoslavia was considered as a serious blow 
for Anglo-German friendship at that time.196 The Germans believed that Lord 
Carrington was acting in collusion with Britain, and was using antiquated methods of 
diplomacy to secure an impossible peace accord. The British countered by accusing 
Bonn of impatience and of misunderstanding the Carrington peace conference, and of 
loosing touch with the classic British patient diplomacy. In fact, the rift between 
Britain and Germany over the Yugoslav crisis had actually started in September 1991, 
when Douglas Hurd effectively killed a German-Italian initiative to deploy a WEU 
force to separate the Croatian and Yugoslav fighters. Britain, arguing from its 
experience in Northern Ireland, claimed that WEU intervention would require 
extensive manpower, was bound to lead to loss of life and would almost certainly 
become open-ended and long-lasting.197 Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Genscher, on
194 “Germany Sets Fast Pace on Recognition,” International Herald Tribune, 18 December 1991.
195 It is argued that this was a de facto recognition and de jure recognition would not take place before 
the agreed date o f 15 January, 1992.
196 Hella Pick, “A Ride on a Bulldozer,” The Guardian, 18 December 1991.
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the other hand, claimed that the West Europeans shirked their responsibility to end the 
bloodshed in Yugoslavia and had a duty to support the principle of self-determination. 
They blamed Britain for failing to appreciate the strength of German public opinion. 
According to Edward Mortimer ‘German media coverage of the war had been more 
extensive than British and no doubt more uncritically pro-Croat’.198 Linking British 
gains at Maastricht to the German posture on Yugoslavia, Kohl and Genscher argued 
that John Major should have given way on Yugoslavia in return for the services 
rendered by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at Maastricht.199
Although, initially, Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons on 19 December 1991, 
‘there is no prospect of British influence for good in Yugoslavia if it is in rivalry with 
other EC powers,’ later on, Britain and France argued that Germany’s premature 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had provoked the war. But, this claim by London 
does not seem to be borne out by the sequence of events. Basically, the war had 
already started sue months ago, and what left the situation insoluble was the 
Community’s insistence on inflexible policy of preserving Yugoslavia’s unity at all 
costs. Both British and French leaders’ comments on Germany’s ambitions on the 
Balkans actually served to poison the relations among the twelve. Finally, among the 
four republics applied -Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Badinter Commission recommended that only Slovenia and Macedonia be granted 
recognition. The EC, at the end, ignored the Commission’s conclusions. Croatia 
eventually got the recognition, Macedonia did not. Macedonia’s recognition was 
vetoed by Greece, who objected to the name of the country on the grounds that it
198 Edward Mortimer, “A Curious Role Reversal,” Financial Times, 18 December 1991.
199 Hella Pick, “A Ride on a Bulldozer,” The Guardian, 18 December 1991.
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implied territorial ambition towards Greece’s own northern province of the same
200name.
It, however, never became clear that, why the other two republics, Bosnia and 
Macedonia had to be treated in the same bowl when it came to the recognition. 
Actually, the EC, without any German pressure on recognition of these two republics, 
could have taken its time to make new and more stable arrangements about the status 
of these two republics. The most problematic one, however, was the position of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, where Badinter Commission decided that a referendum should be 
carried out to assess the public opinion before considering the matter further. Bosnian 
Government was in a very big dilemma; its choice was either to join Slovenia and 
Croatia in seeking independence, and by so doing risk provoking civil war against the 
Serbs living in its territories, or to stay inside rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia 
and, by so doing accept complete control of Belgrade over itself similar to Kosovo/a, 
Vojvodina and Montenegro. 20
200 Macedonia’s case is explained by James Gow briefly but very effectively. See James Gow, Triumph 
of the Lack o f Will, 78. About Greek attitude towards newly established Macedonian state, see Noel 
Malcolm, “The New Bully of the Balkans,” The Spectator, 15 August 1992,8-10.
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CHAPTER IV: THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN BOSNIA AND
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
4.1. Before the Deluge: Preparations for the Carve-up of Bosnia
4.1.1. Land of Three Peoples: The National Composition and Political 
Situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina
As in Yugoslav Federation, from the very beginning, the Serbian and Croatian 
nationalisms had already created serious danger for the unity of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Although Muslims were granted the status of a separate nation by Tito’s 
1974 Constitution, they were the only nation (naroda) in Yugoslavia which did not 
have an undisputed claim to a separate republic. Bosnia was the only homeland for the 
Slav Muslims and they were the republic’s largest ethnic group with forty-four percent 
of the 4.35 million population. Nevertheless, since the Bosnian Constitution made 
each of its three groups (Muslims, Serbs and Croats) ‘constituent nations’, the majority 
could not take any decisions without the consent of the other groups.201
After the disintegration of the Communist Party in Bosnia, as in most other republics in 
early 1990s, a set of ethnic parties emerged along ethnic lines. First the Muslims 
established their Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratska Akcije -SDA) in 
Sarajevo on May 26, 1990 under the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic, a prominent
201 According to the last census which was carried out in April 1991, 43.6 per cent of the 4,354,911 
population declared themselves Muslim, 31.3 per cent Serb, 17,3 per cent Croat and 5.2 per cent 
Yugoslav. Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, 180.
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Muslim intellectual and lawyer.202 Nearly two months after the creation of Muslim 
SDA, the Serbs established the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska 
Stranka -SDS), a branch of the Serbs’ nationalist party in Knin. Radovan Karadzic, a 
psychiatrist, was elected SDA president. Soon after the SDS was launched, the Croats 
followed suit, forming a Bosnian branch of the Tudjman’s Party, Croatian Democratic 
Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica -HDZ).
At the very beginning, despite growing tensions, the three national parties formed a 
united front against the Communists.203 Yet, during the December 1990 elections, 
most of Bosnia’s electorate voted according to ethnic lines: the Muslims, comprising 
forty-four per cent of Bosnia’s population, rallied behind the SDA; Serbs with thirty- 
one per cent of the population, solidly supported the SDS; Croats, at seventeen per 
cent, voted for the Bosnian branch of the HDZ (Map 3). The SDA won eighty-seven 
seats out of the 240 in the Assembly, the SDS seventy-one, and the HDZ forty-four. 
The nationalists had taken nearly ninety percent of the seats in the Assembly. 
Altogether there were 99 Muslims, 85 Serbs, 49 Croats and seven ‘Yugoslavs’. These 
proportions (41 per cent Muslim, 35 per cent Serb, 20 per cent Croat) roughly 
matched those of the population as a whole (44, 31 and 17 per cent respectively).204 A 
coalition government was formed in which three ethnically based parties were 
represented and SDA leader, Alija Izetbegovic became president. The government 
posts were shared out between them.
202 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 207-8. The Party of Democratic Action was established as 
a ‘political alliance of Yugoslav citizens belonging to Muslim cultural and historical traditions’. At 
that time SDA did not include a national attribute since it was forbidden.
203 Summary o f World Broadcasts (SWB), 4 October 1990.
204 Malcolm, Bosnia, 222-3. Also see Poulton, The Balkans, 44.
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Unfortunately, the neighbouring nationalisms of Serbia and Croatia had already 
disturbed the delicate balance with the ultimate ambitions of Milosevic and Tudjman 
barely concealed. Serb and Croat nationalists were able to play on the widely-held 
conviction that Muslims had never been a separate ethnic community, but were simply 
Serbs or Croats who, in the course of five centuries of Ottoman domination, had 
converted to Islam.205 Croatian President Tudjman was on record as saying that most 
of the Bosnian Muslims were ‘incontrovertibly of Croatian origin’ and that Bosnia and 
Croatia formed ‘an indivisible geographic and economic entity’. However, at that 
time, the official policy of Tudjman’s party, the HDZ, was against the idea of any 
alterations to borders; since it knew that if any such idea were admitted, Croatia’s own 
borders would be the first to suffer. Bosnian HDZ followed the same line and allied 
with the Muslim SDA, against the Bosnian Serb party (SDS).206
In the autumn of 1991, repeating the pattern which had occurred earlier in Croatia, 
groups of agitators and guerrillas began appearing in the Serbian villages in Bosnia. In 
the meantime, Izetbegovic, hoping to avoid a confrontation with the military, allowed 
the Federal Army to confiscate weapons from Bosnian Territorial Defence or national 
guard units. Already, in May 1991, the SDS in Bosnia began demanding the secession 
of large parts of northern and Western Bosnia, which would then join up with the 
Croatian ‘Krajina’ to form a new republic.207 Three areas of Bosnia with 
predominantly Serb populations were declared ‘Serb Autonomous Regions’ by the 
SDS, following exactly the same method that had been used in the previous summer in
205 See , Marc Pinson (ed). The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development From 
the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
206 See Malcolm, Bosnia, 218 and Z. T. Irwin, “The Fate of Islam in the Balkans: A Comparison of 
Four State Policies,” in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, ed. Sabrina 
Petra Ramet, (Durham, North Carolina, 1989), 392.
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MAP 3 ü-aecîsons: winning parties by municipality
Source: Oslobodenje
RU Boundary and Territory Briefing 1994c
Croatia. More alarmingly, by July 1991 there was clear evidence that regular secret 
deliveries of arms to the Bosnian Serbs were being arranged by Milosevic, the Serbian 
Minister of Interior, Mihalj Kertes, and the Bosnian SDS leader, Radovan Karadzic.207 08 
There was little doubt that Karadzic’s actions were being directed, step by step, by the 
Serbian President.
The initial phase of the military offensive against Bosnia and Hercegovina took place 
when the Serbian Autonomus Regions (SAOs) of Hercegovina, Bosnian Krajina, 
Romanija, and north-eastern Bosnia requested on 4 September and again in mid- 
September 1991 the JNA to protect Serbian communities. Federal Army troops were 
immediately moved in both from Serbia and Montenegro and from federal Yugoslav 
army bases in Bosnia and Hercegovina. By 26 September 1992, the borders of the 
‘Serb Autonomous Region of Hercegovina’ was established on the eastern bank of the 
Neretva River. It then began its offensive into the southern strip of Croatia, mainly to 
Dubrovnik, from Montenegro.209 Answering the questions raised in the Bosnian 
parliament and by the Bosnian government, the JNA claimed that it was ‘defending 
Yugoslavia’ and engaged in ‘peacekeeping.’ The army’s activities in Croatia prior to 
the declarations of independence and even during the sieges of Vukovar and 
Dubrovnik had also been designated as such. The JNA later strengthened its position 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina with the co-operation of Bosnian Internal Affairs Ministry, 
by having all arms placed under its control, including those of Bosnian Territorial
207 Malcolm, Bosnia, 224.
208 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 259. Confirmation of this came in August, when the 
outgoing federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, released a tape recording of a telephone 
conversation in which Milosevic could be heard informing Karadzic that his next delivery of arms 
would be supplied to him by General Nikola Uzelac, the Federal Army commander in Banja Luka. 
See Mark. Mazower, The War in Bosnia: An Analysis (London 1992), 4.
209 Gow, “One Year o f War,” 7- 8.
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¡Defence Force and some of Serbian paramilitary groups. As a result of these 
measures, the Serbs had succeeded in prepositioning their forces in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina as part of their strategy of securing the infrastructure that was to be part 
of ‘mini-Yugoslavia,’ carving up the new state in the process: the eastern part was to 
be attached to Serbia, the southern part to Montenegro, and western part to Serb- 
populated and occupied regions in Croatia.
With such actions by Bosnian Serbs, the possibility of any political solution to the crisis 
within Bosnia and Hercegovina was utterly remote. When Izetbegovic had expressed 
his criticisms about Karadzic’s party declaring large parts of the country ‘Serb 
Autonomous Regions’ and demanding their secession from Bosnia, the SDS 
representatives on the republican presidency took their opportunity to declare that they 
would boycott the presidency meetings from then on.210
Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs had rejected Alija Izetbegovic’s Presidency from the very 
beginning. Serbian claim in Croatia was that they were threatened by an Ustasha 
regime. In Bosnia no such claim seemed plausible; so, a different threat to the Serbs 
had to be devised. Instead of Ustasha, the Bosnian Serbs were told that they were 
threatened by ‘Islamic fundamentalists’.211 On a visit to Turkey in July 1991, when the 
war was nearly over in Slovenia and was about to begin in Croatia, Izetbegovic was 
asked to join the Organization of Islamic Countries. It was a move that was definitely 
going to antagonise the Serbs and Croats within Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Radovan 
Karadzic said that ‘even our gloomiest forecasts, which say that Izetbegovic wants
210 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 260.
211 Malcolm, Bosnia, 217.
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i Bosnia-Hercegovina to become an Islamic republic, are being fulfilled’.212 In fact, the 
Serbian propagandists were looking for a new opportunity to accuse him, since he had 
been convicted of counter-revolution and conspiring to create an Islamic state, and 
sentenced to fourteen years of jail in 1983. His treatise, the Islamic Declaration, was 
republished in Sarajevo in 1990 and had given Karadzic and his supporters perfect 
means to mobilise Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian government.213
Far from the ideas of establishing a fundamentalist Muslim state, Alija Izetbegovic, 
with his Macedonian counterpart, Kiro Gligorov, put forward a proposal for the future 
shape of the Yugoslav federation as Yugoslavia descended into war in the Spring of 
1991.214 On the other side, Milosevic and Tudjman had met in March 1991, in 
Karadjordjevo to carve up Bosnia and Hercegovina between Serbia and Croatia. As 
expected, Milosevic was playing double game, and he, in the summer of 1991, tried to 
strike a deal with the Muslims to remain in a new Yugoslavia -one without the Croats 
and Slovenes. He publicly announced that his offer was the only way to prevent war in 
Bosnia, because if the Muslims were to secede from Yugoslavia, the republic would 
have to be divided. Considering that, Serbs, Muslims and Croats lived cheek by jowl
212 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 213. About the ‘elements of Muslim nationalism in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’, see Malcolm, Bosnia, 218-22.
213 See Malcolm, Bosnia, 221-2. Malcolm clearly states that ‘the talk of a fundamentalist threat was 
in any case particularly inappropriate’ since, first, the Bosnian Muslims were by now among the most 
secularised Muslim populations in the world and second the absolute majority of two million Muslims 
did not think of themselves as religious believers and only followed some of the practices of Islam as a 
matter of culture and tradition. In addition, decades of secular education and Communist political 
culture had been reinforced, in this respect, by an ever increasing Westernisation of society. The 
growing urbanisation of Bosnia, though slow at first, had also had an effect; by the late 1980s 30 per 
cent of marriages in urban districts were mixed marriages. For many rural Muslims and the vast 
majority of urban ones being a Muslim was reduced to a set of cultural traditions and traditional 
practices, the origins of which are frequently unknown to those who practise them. No 
fundamentalist programme could ever have been pursued by a party which had first to gain the votes 
of these secularised Muslims, and then to function in government as part of an alliance with at least 
one of the other two national parties, 221-2.
214 Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 184.
91
and division of Bosnia into ethnic territories would inevitably be bloody and require 
massive population transfers, Izetbegovic, at first, indicated that the idea was worth 
considering.215 However, Izetbegovic also realised that, even had he accepted the 
Belgrade proposal, it might postpone the war only for a while and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina could not have avoided it altogether.
Since the situation was becoming intolerable for the Bosnian government, the Bosnian 
assembly was now beginning seriously to debate the idea of declaring Bosnian 
sovereignty. By this it meant not full independence but legislative sovereignty within 
Yugoslavia, so that it would be able, legally, to pass laws overriding the Federal 
Army’s rights to use its territory against the war in Croatia. On 14 October, Karadzic, 
before marching his deputies out of the assembly admonished the Muslims to take 
seriously the will of the Serbian people to remain in Yugoslavia:
“You want to take Bosnia-Hercegovina down the same highway o f  
hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not 
think that you will not lead Bosnia-Hercegovina into hell, and do not 
think that you will not perhaps make the M uslim  people disappear, 
because the Muslims can not defend themselves if  there is a war - 
How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina?.” 216
215 Of 109 municipalities in Bosnia, thirty-seven had and absolute Muslim majority, thirty-two had 
absolute Serb majority and thirteen had an absolute Croat majority. With the exception of Croat 
populated western Herzegovina, even in those municipalities where one nation did form an absolute 
majority it rarely accounted for more than seventy per cent of the population. Bennett, Yugoslavia’s 
Bloody Collapse, 180. About IzetbegoVic’s considerations, see Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 
213.
216 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 215.
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Although intended to intimidate Izetbegovic, Karadzic’s words convinced the former 
that Bosnia could not remain in a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs. The Bosnian 
parliament then voted in favour of Bosnian sovereignty. A few days later Karadzic and 
his party set up what they called a ‘Serb National Assembly’ in the Federal Army 
stronghold of Banja Luka, assuming all the trappings of a parliament, a government, 
and indeed a state.217 The borders of Bosnian Serb self-styled republic encompassed 
the autonomous regions and even places where the Serbs were a minority. As 
Karadzic claimed, if the Serbs wanted to, they could take control in sixty-six per cent 
of Bosnia. He had already given the ultimatum; ‘Bosnia-Hercegovina does not exist 
any more’.
“More than four months before the war broke out, the creation o f the 
Serb republic effectively destroyed Bosnia-Hercegovina. The steps 
taken by Karadzic and his party - Autonomous Regions, the arming 
o f  the Serb population, minor local incidents, non-stop propaganda, 
the request for the federal army protection, the Serb parliament - 
matched exactly what had been done in Croatia. Karadzic’s and 
M ilosevic’s plan was for a country which would be Yugoslavia in 
name but ‘Greater Serbia’ in reality.” 218
4.1.2. Bosnia and Hercegovina In Search of Recognition
When, in December, the EC offered each of the six republics recognition, (if they 
pledged to adopt the EC’s criteria for new states) Izetbegovic had faced a stark choice; 
either to seek recognition or remain in Serb dominated Yugoslavia. He hoped to avoid
217 Magas, Destruction o f Yugoslavia, xv.
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' the issue by putting his faith in the international community and accepting whatever it 
decided the republic’s future should be. He was afraid of the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) in the hands of the Serbian nationalists and believed that the US would help to 
defend Bosnia.218 19 With Croatia about to be recognised, transformation of Yugoslav 
federation obviously was out of the question. Izetbegovic had no choice but to seek 
independence. The Bosnian Serbs had already said that they would declare their own 
state if they could not stay in Yugoslavia.
On December 20, the Bosnian Presidency voted to seek the EC recognition. On 
Sarajevo television, Izetbegovic explained that for Bosnia there were two choices; 
either independence or being part of Greater Serbia. There was no more Yugoslavia 
and he expressed little hope for a ‘cantonised’ Bosnia-Hercegovina, because the 
demographic distribution would leave huge parts of each national group leaving 
outside its designated cantons. He also said, except for the Second World War, 
Bosnia’s ethnic communities had lived together peacefully for centuries and equality of 
the nations should be pursued.220 As a counter move, on 8 January 1992, the self- 
proclaimed assembly of Bosnian Serbs adopted a resolution threatening the 
independence of Serb controlled areas ‘when and if the independence of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina is recognised’.221
218 Malcolm, Bosnia, 229.
219 Washington denied ever giving such guarantees. See Warren Zimmermann, “The Last 
Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 
1995), 16.
220 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 217.
221 See BBC, SWB EE/1275, C l, 11 January 1992, 1-2.
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4.2. Before the Deluge: The Lisbon Conference and Plans for ‘Cantonisation’
With the EC’s decision to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the 
purpose and work of Lord Carrington -to negotiate an overall settlement of intra- 
Yugoslav disputes and the framework for future relations between the republics 
following the dissolution of old federation was obviated. Left with limited resources, 
he concentrated his efforts on Bosnia and Hercegovina. While visiting Sarajevo on 6 
January 1992, Carrington proposed the opening up a set of separate talks on the future 
of Bosnia within the framework of the EC Conference. With the EC presidency 
passing from the Netherlands to Portugal, Portugese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro was to 
take charge of these negotiations.
Cutilheiro held a preliminary meeting in Sarajevo, at the beginning of February with the 
leaders of the three political parties and then the sub-negotiations were started in 
Lisbon on 21-22 February. The sub-conference aimed to seek ways in which a 
constitutional future could be worked out for Bosnia. Cutilheiro made it clear to all 
parties that there could be no question of transformation of the borders of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, nor would there be any viable solution which did not take into account 
the existence of three communities in Bosnia. Discussions revolved around the idea of 
‘cantonisation’- although the actual term was not used in the Conference. The key 
element was that Bosnia would be divided into units along ethnic lines; various cantons 
would provide ‘self-government’ for local communities. However, taking the Bosnia’s
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i ethnic map into consideration that was a recipe for war; but, the EC believed that it 
lacked any other alternatives.222
Actually, when Izetbegovic had called for the referendum for independence to be held 
on 28 February and 1 March 1992 and after the Portugese presidency announced that 
the EC would recognise the republic if the referendum opted for independence, 
Bosnia’s fate was decided. On the one hand, the EC opted to accept a decision for 
independence arrived at by a simple majority, rather than the agreement of the 
republic’s constituent ethnic groups; an act which disregarded totally the 
constitutionally determined federal administrative structure of Bosnia-Hercegovina. On 
the other hand, the idea of ‘territorial units’ along ethnic lines was proposed. The only 
way to prevent bloodshed afterwards was the strong EC commitment for the 
protection of the independent entities after recognition.223 Unfortunately, with the 
political direction and backing from the EC and its member governments lacking, the 
mediators were propelled to entertain discussion on the basis of what was essentially a 
Serbian idea supported by some Croats.224
Indeed, throughout 1990 and 1991, all political parties in Serbia proper, as well as 
Karadzic’s SDS in Bosnia, had been arguing for the ‘cantonisation’ of Bosnia and
222 Gow, Triumph o f the Lack of Will, 79-81.
223 Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 61-2.
224 BBC, SWB EE/1285, C l, 23 January 1992. For the position of Croats before the referendum, see 
the proceedings of the discussions at Bosnia’s presidency on 31 January 1992, in BBC SWB/1293, C l, 
1 February 1992, 1. Croatia’s Foreign Minister at that time had already indicated that he was ready to 
accept pieces of Herzegovina, saying in January that concessions over Krajina could not be ‘one 
sided’, quoted in The Guardian, 17 January 1992. However, at this stage, the leader of the Bosnian 
branch of HDZ, Stjepan Kljuic, supported Bosnia’s integrity; see Milan Andrejevic, “The Future of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Sovereign Republic or Cantonisation?,” RFE/RL Report on Eastern 
Europe, 5 July 1991.
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i Hercegovina which was still within the Yugoslav federation.225 In December 1991, the 
SDS had published a plan and a map in which ‘national cantonisation’ would cover 
around seventy percent of Bosnia’s territory claimed by Bosnian Serbs.226 Later on, 
when Radovan Karadzic met Milosevic and Tudjman in Graz, Austria on 26 February, 
what they talked about was not ‘cantonal federation’ but partition of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina and massive population transfers.227 Karadzic also mentioned that they 
needed to have a ‘land-corridor across northern Bosnia’.228 The Serbs and the Croats 
might have been intent on a programme of ethnic purification in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, but the Lisbon Conference, admitting the principle of ethnically 
determined territorial units was the biggest mistake, since in effect it provided a 
‘charter for ethnic cleansing’.
On the Bosnian side, although, President Izetbegovic always favoured a unitary state, 
he was prepared to enter into talks on the basis of EC proposals in the interests of both 
co-operating with the EC, and, since, in any case, war seemed inevitable; if the war 
erupted he could put the blame on the EC member states and seek assistance. Stjepan 
Kljuic, the leader of the Bosnian Croat Party HDZ, also was a firm adherent of 
Bosnian unity whereas many other Croats were more extreme and favoured the 
partition of Bosnia between the Serbs and the Croats at the expense of the Muslims.
225 Andrejevich, ‘T he Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina,”, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 5 July 
1991, 28-34.
226 Robert Hayden, “The Partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990-93,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, 
no. 22 (28 May 1993), 4  ff.
227 Martin Woollacott, “Avoiding a Tragic Finale to the Slav Follies,” The Guardian, 7 March 1992.
228 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 220.
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1 When the fierce debates erupted in the party on the ‘cantonisation’ issue, Kljuic was
forced to resign and was replaced by an extremist Mate Boban.229
The referendum on the Bosnian independence, held on 28 February and 1 March 1992, 
asked ‘Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, a state 
of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs and Croats and others who live in 
it?’.230 Since, at the urging of Radovan Karadzic the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the 
referendum231 and SDS erected road blocks to prevent ballot boxes to enter into the 
areas it controlled,232 only 64 per cent of the electorate took part in the referendum of 
which 99.7 per cent voted ‘yes’.233
Immediately after the referendum tension grew and Serbs in Sarajevo erected 
barricades on 2 March after a shooting incident at a wedding the day before. The EC 
diplomacy came up with some recommendations in Lisbon on 7 March; there were 
some discussions on ‘constituent units’ but nothing was said about the territorial 
definition of the units and the discussions came to nothing after Serbian delegation 
refused to accept the plan.234 Between 16-18 March, Cutilheiro returning to Sarajevo 
brought with him a ‘Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for 
Bosnia-Hercegovina’. On 18 March, the Serbs, Croats and the Bosnian government 
signed the document, dividing Bosnia into ‘three constituent units, based on national
229 Mate Boban was also a close ally of Tudjman. See report by Judy Dempsey, The Financial Times, 
8 July 1992.
230 Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 7. Also see, Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, xviii.
231 Cviic notes that ‘...thousands of Serbs in the big cities ignored the call to boycott’. See Cviic, An 
Awjul Warning, 32.
232 Malcolm, Bosnia, 231.
233 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 237. Also see Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia 
(London: Vintage, 1992), 318.
234 John Palmer, The Guardian, 10 March 1992.
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principles and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria’. The 
country was to remain one, with a parliament comprising two chambers, one elected 
directly and the other formed by an equal number of representatives from each 
community. While the central government would have responsibility in a number of 
areas, such as defence and foreign policy, economic and financial policy, basic utilities 
and infrastructure, each of the communities would be able to veto in the parliament 
anything it judged to be against its interests. The ‘constituent units’ would be 
responsible for all the other matters which concerned them as long as their actions did 
not disrupt the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia. The whole structure 
would also be overseen by a constitutional court, which included foreign lawyers to 
provide non-partisan arbiters in any potential disputes. The provisions had also 
included the institution of a working group to ‘define the territory of the constituent 
units’.235
However, first the Croat HDZ on 24 March, then, a day later Izetbegovic’s party 
pulled out of the agreement. The plan gave only 17 per cent of the Bosnian territory 
to Croats and left 59 per cent of the Croat population in non-Croat cantons.236 It was 
a plan for the partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines and Izetbegovic and other SDA 
leaders were adamantly opposed to any such attempt to divide Bosnia-Hercegovina.237
235 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 85-6.
236 Hayden, “The Partition of Bosnia,” 7.
237 Fogelquist, Handbook of Facts, 21.
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It is argued that, the US ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, advised 
Izetbegovic that if he really did not like the agreement, he should not sign it.238 This 
was interpreted as a sign of partial American return to the scene. Having left the 
Yugoslav issue to the Europeans and not following the lead by not recognising 
Slovenia and Croatia in January, the US was seeking ways to compensate. This was 
partly the result of criticism that it had not been providing leadership for the Western 
world, partly the result of intensive lobbying in Washington by Bosnian 
representatives, especially the Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic and future Ambassador 
to the UN, Mohammed Sacirbey, which appeared to convince many in the American 
political elite of the need to act decisively to assist Bosnia.239 As a result, the US was 
preparing to recognise Bosnia, along with Slovenia and Croatia, on 7 April. Having 
missed the opportunity of decisive action in January by granting immediate 
recognition, the EC believed that recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina'might serve to 
deter war in Bosnia as, it thought, it had ended hostilities in Croatia.
4.3. The Outbreak of War in Bosnia-Hercegovina
After more than a year of unrest and violent incidents, Bosnia-Hercegovina entered a 
phase of widespread brutality at the end of February 1992 and a state of war just after 
the recognition on 7 April 1992. It seems that recognition of Bosnia had given the 
Serbs the pretext to start their large scale carve-up operations in Bosnia.
238 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 88. Zimmermann left Yugoslavia three months later when 
western embassies recalled their ambassadors. He later resigned from the State Department partly in 
protest against US policy in Bosnia.
239 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will,, 88.
100
1 As mentioned above, while the war in Croatia was intensifying, the Federal Army had 
begun movements in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The JNA had established itself in the 
Bosnian countryside, removing troops and equipment from the towns and leaving only 
a small force there. With a good strategic planning, it began to deploy units at major 
communications points in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Later, the army would construct 
heavy artillery emplacements around major towns in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
including Sarajevo, in the winter of 1991-92.240
Without a clear swathe of Bosnia and Hercegovina under their control, the Serb 
commanders in the occupied parts of Croatia would not have a secure rear or reliable 
communications with Serbia proper. As much as any local ambitions for a ‘Bosnian 
Serb Republic’ the strategic imperative was for the Serbs to break up any independent 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to guarantee their war gains in the war against Croatia. 
Without a corridor linking the Krajina’s rear across northern Bosnia via Banja Luka to 
Serbia and Serb occupied Slavonia, the Krajina would be economically and militarily 
unviable.241
By early 1992, as the fighting wound down in Croatia, the Serb army had withdrawn 
from Crotia with the approval of the UN, into Bosnia, where the bulk of the military 
industry was based. The presence of Yugoslav Federal Army on the side of the Serbs 
and the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on September 25 against 
all former Yugoslavia242 had helped the Bosnian Serbs to preserve huge military 
superiority against the Bosnian government forces from the very beginning of the war.
240 Gow, “One Year of War,” 7.
241 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 264.
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In addition, President Izetbegovic had allowed the army to confiscate the weapons 
supplies of the local territorial defence units to assure the army commanders of his own 
peaceful intentions.24 43
Irregular units, notably the ‘Tigers”, formerly known as the Serbian Volunteer Guard 
led by notorious Arkan (Zlejko Raznjatovic), were also involved in preparations for the 
conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.244 Other similar forces were the self-styled 
‘Chetnik’ army set up by the Serbian extremist Vojislav Seselj245 and the ‘White 
Eagles’ led by Mirko Jovic. These paramilitary groups provided the army with the 
‘professional,’ all volunteer infantry which were vital to the blitzkrieg terror campaign, 
during which the Federal Yugoslav Army seized large parts of northern and eastern 
Bosnia and Hercegovina in the spring of 1992.246 As one expert put it: Arkan’s men 
were necessary because despite the propaganda about ancient animosities between 
local Serbs and Muslims it was difficult to get local people to start the fighting.247
Arkan’s T igers’ had arrived in north-eastern Bosnian town of Bijeljina on April 1. 
These heavily armed men, most of them Serbians, not Bosnian Serbs, had pioneered 
the technique of ethnic cleansing by terror and recently finished their ‘clean-up’ 
operations in Vukovar. Some of them had moved into Banja Luka at the end of 
March, where they had taken control of the city, mounting road blocks and ‘roaming 
the streets with rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47s and Scorpion automatic
242 UNSCR 713, 25 September 1991.
243 Gow, “One Year of War,” 8.
244 See James Gow, “Political and Military Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict,” RFE/RL Research 
Report 1, No. 20 ,15  May 1992.
245 See Malcolm, Bosnia, 226.
246 James Gow, “One Year o f War,” 8.
247 Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 11.
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pistols’.248 Arkan ordered a campaign of harassment against the Muslim population of 
the town. His ‘Tigers’ took up sniper positions around the town, patrolled the streets 
and fired machine gun rounds into the air. They hunted down Muslim leaders, and 
carried out summary executions. Their aims, clearly, were first to terrify the local 
Muslims into flight and secondly to radicalise the local Serb population, recruiting 
some of its young men into a new occupation, in order to establish Serbian control 
over the area.
Bijeljina and Zvomik were of vital strategic importance to the Serb war effort. 
Together, they represented a hinge of territory that linked the two main chunks of 
Bosnian land that the Serb nationalists wanted to take over a broad strip of land across 
northern Bosnia, linking Serbia with the military base at Banja Luka, the Bosnian 
‘Krajina’ and the occupied areas of Croatia, and a swathe on the eastern side of 
Bosnia, running all the way down the Bosnian-Serbian border (thus including vital 
entry-points for supply lines from Serbia) to the ethnically Serb areas of eastern 
Hercegovina.249
Jose Maria Mendiluce, the UNHCR’s most senior official in former Yugoslavia, was 
visiting Milosevic in Belgrade and on his way back, he had to pass through Zvomik. It 
was just on the day when the town had surrendered to the Serbs and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
by ‘Tigers’ of Arkan had started. He had been detained by the Serb and JNA forces 
and he witnessed the ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign in Zvomik. In his words:
248 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (New York, 1992), 149.
249 Malcolm, Bosnia, 236.
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“I was detained for two hours. I realised that I was at serious risk. I 
could see trucks full of dead bodies. I could see militiamen taking 
more corpses of children, women and old people from their houses 
and putting them on trucks. I saw at least four or five trucks full of 
corpses. When I arrived the cleansing had been done. There were no 
people, no one on the streets. It was all finished. They were looting, 
cleaning up the city after the massacre. I was convinced they were 
going to kill me”.230
Mendiluce’s impression that both Serbian paramilitaries and the JNA units were taking 
part in the capture of Zvomik was corroborated by the account of the extreme 
nationalist paramilitary leader Vojislav Seselj, who went to Zvomik shortly after what 
he called its ‘liberation’: ‘The Zvomik operation was planned in Belgrade,” he said;
“The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the special units and 
the best combat units came from this side [Serbia]. These were 
police units - the so called Red Berets - special units of the Serbian 
Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army engaged itself to a small 
degree - it gave artillery support where it was needed. The operation 
had been prepared for a long time. It was not carried out in any kind 
of nervous fashion. Everything was well-organised and 
implemented.” 250 51
Within a few days, several more of the towns with large Muslim populations in that 
eastern swathe of Bosnia had been subjected to the same treatment. The psychology 
of terror which the paramilitary commanders introduced in these places worked well as
250 Quoted in Silber and Litde, Death of Yugoslavia, 223.
251 Ibid., 224.
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a means of frightening the local Muslims into flight. It was estimated that 95 per cent 
of the Muslims of Zvomik, Visegrad and Foca had fled their homes by the end of 
April.252 The terror was not confined to Muslims and Croats, since the Serbs who 
dared side with the Bosnian government or merely opposed the war were dealt with in 
an equally brutal fashion. Most rural Serbs were confused by the war but so 
indoctrinated with the fear of Islamic fundamentalism that they genuinely believed that 
they had to defend themselves against their Muslim neighbours. The ground had been 
prepared by the broadcasts of Radio Television Belgrade, warning Serbs of Ustasha 
pogroms and fundamentalist jihads.253
During the two month period from the beginning of April to the end of May 1992, the 
Federal Army and its paramilitary adjuncts captured 60 per cent of Bosnian territory, 
accelerating their program of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and driving out Muslim population 
through campaigns of terror. Some local Serb forces raised in the ‘Serb Autonomous 
Regions’ of Bosnia also joined these operations in several areas of the country. But it 
is quite clear that the conquest was mainly achieved by the Federal Army forces 
(including planes which were used to bomb the towns of Kupres, Doboj and Tuzla) 
directed by Belgrade, and paramilitary groups from Serbia. In other words, even 
though some of the soldiers serving in the Federal Army were Bosnian Serbs, and even 
though it was co-ordinated with elements of a Serb insurrection in some areas, this was 
predominantly an invasion of Bosnia planned and directed from Serbian soil. During 
the early weeks of the invasion, the official statements issued by Milosevic and the 
federal army commanders consisted of two claims, both of them were false: first, that
252 Malcolm, Bosnia, 237. Also see Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 13.
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the army was acting only as a peace-keeper to separate local fighters, and secondly
that no Serbian units were crossing the border into Bosnia.253 54
4.3.1. Bosnians and Croats Fighting Together: Serb Conquests Being 
Challenged
Since the Bosnian President had not allowed any defence preparations not to provoke 
the war and all the weapons in possession of Territorial Defence Force had already 
been taken by the JNA, Bosnian government was caught by the war in a state of 
extreme unpreparedness. Only defence preparations that had been made was almost 
notably in western Hercegovina by the radical Croat dominated local governments. 
They had ignored the army’s orders to return their weapons. Instead, they had formed 
what was to be known as the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). Elements of the 
Croatian Defence Union (HOS), the paramilitary wing of the extreme right Party of 
Rights in Croatia had also made preparations. In total, the Croatian forces in 
Hercegovina was around 15,000.255 Other forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina were small, 
irregular, largely Muslim groups, organised by local leaders in some areas and 
numbering perhaps 3,500 altogether.256 In contrast, the Federal Yugoslav Army and 
the Serbian irregulars together totalled well over 100,000 armed troops.257
253 See Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(Avon: The Bath Press, 1994).
254 See reports by Ian Traynor, The Guardian, 17 April 1992 and Anne McElvoy, The Times, 20 April
1992. Not only were paramilitary units crossing into the country, but also, as one eye-witness report 
from the border put it, ‘the federal army has this week strung a massive presence of men, artillery and 
tanks along the road from Serbia as it surges into Bosnia.’ Report by Philip Sherwell, Daily 
Telegraph, 16 April 1992.
255 See Milan Vego’s article, ‘The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina,” Jane's Intelligence 
Review 3, March 1993.
256 See Milan Vego, “The Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 2, February
1993.
257 Gow, “One Year of War”, 9.
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However, despite the huge gap between forces, the initial Serbian conquest had begun 
to be challenged by the end of May 1992. After a month of fighting, the Federal Army 
forces were pushed away from Mostar area. On 16 June, Presidents Izetbegovic and 
Tujman had signed a formal military alliance legitimising the use of both Croatian army 
troops and the local HVO forces.258 In part, this was related to a weakening of the 
Serbian forces, resulting from the decision to divide the federal Yugoslav army into the 
Serbian army in Bosnia and the Military of Yugoslavia, with Belgrade trying to 
persuade the world that it was not involved in the Bosnian war in order to avoid UN 
sanctions.259 UN Security Council had identified Serbia and Montenegro as 
responsible for the war in Bosnia and was taking action against them, demanding the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Bosnia in Resolution 743.260
On 27 April, President Milosevic and the Montenegrin government declared the 
creation of a new federal state of Yugoslavia consisting of their two republics alone. 
And in early May, Milosevic announced that he would withdraw those soldiers in the 
army in Bosnia who were citizens of the new two-republic Yugoslavia; those who 
were Bosnian Serbs would be transferred, together with all the armament and supplies, 
to the so-called ‘Serb Republic’, and the Army of the Serbian Republic (Vojska 
Republike Srpske - VRS) was placed under the command of General Ratko Mladic.261
It is apparent that the entire changeover was clearly a cosmetic exercise. As one 
expert argues “it is not possible to believe that the army which was fighting in Bosnia
Ibid., 9ff.
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from late May onwards consisted entirely of Bosnian Serbs”.260 162 There were no foreign 
observers to check whether all the Serbian or Montenegrin soldiers did in fact leave 
Bosnia by 20 May.263
4.4. Western Misperceptions About the Nature of the War in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina and Evolution of the International Policy
Milosevic’s plan in declaring its own republic, and announcing that New Yugoslavia 
had nothing to do with the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina soon produced the desired 
effect. Prominent Western politicians, such as Douglas Hurd were soon describing the 
fighting in Bosnia as ‘a civil war’. A distinguished former editor of The Times 
published a number of articles in which the fighting was described as a typical ‘civil 
war’.264 The BBC referred constantly to all sides in the conflict, including the Bosnian 
government, as ‘warring factions’; otherwise it described the war as ‘a breakdown in 
law and order’.265
In Britain there was one extra reason for this inability to understand what was 
happening, which was that in the crucial early days of April 1992 Britain was in the 
throes of a general election. Few commentators and certainly no politicians could 
devote any attention to what was happening in Bosnia; by the time they woke up to the
260 “Isolating Serbia”, The Editorial, Financial Times, 27 April 1992.
261 Malcolm, Bosnia, 238. See also Cviic, An Awful Warning, 36.
262 Malcolm, Bosnia, 239.
263 See, for details, Mazower, War in Bosnia, 15.
264 “Bosnia on the Brink,” The Times, 10 April 1992. The tone changed, however, on 23 April 1992; 
the Editorial wrote that ‘the Serbian offensive in Bosnia and Hercegovina is nothing less than the 
invasion of an independent country...There is ample evidence that the Serbian government of 
Slobodan Milosevic is giving tacit support to the irregulars in Bosnia...’, ‘The New Pariah,” The 
Times, 23 April 1992.
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existence of a war there, all they could see was a number of equally fierce-looking 
combatants fighting one another for equally incomprehensible reasons. In the US the 
presidential elections were not to happen for another seven months; but the Bush 
administration was already worried about making any policy commitments to Bosnia 
which might prove electorally damaging, and was content to accept the strangely 
possessive argument of EC leaders who had claimed from the start of the Yugoslav 
war that this was ‘a European Problem’.265 66
4.4,1. International Involvement in the Bosnian War: The EC and the UN
Immediately after the war began in Bosnia-Hercegovina, EC diplomats warned that if 
Milosevic did not order his commanders to stop the fighting, Yugoslavia was not to be 
recognised as a successor to the former state.267 That was an open admittance of 
Serbia’s guilt in conducting the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Finally, the Community duly identified Serbs as ‘primarily responsible’ for the 
Yugoslav conflict. At the same time, there was growing international indignation at 
the atrocious aggressive actions of the Serb irregulars and the JNA in Bosnia. The 
strategic programme of systemic murder and terror known as ‘ethnic cleansing’ was in 
full-swing. The EC member states decided collectively to withdraw their ambassadors 
from Belgrade. Serbia (or the new ‘Yugoslavia) was being diplomatically isolated in 
the hope that this coercive measure would force the Belgrade regime to stop the
265 Noel Malcolm, “Another Euro-Success,” The Spectator, 2 May 1992, 5.
266 Malcolm, Bosnia, 240.
267 The Guardian, 11 April 1992. However, at that time, Milosevic was in possession of the central 
bank, most of the country’s assets, much of the military hardware, a great deal of country’s industries 
and property of most of the embassies overseas. ‘Fight now, negotiate later’ was always his motto.
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fighting. By now, two things were understood about the situation by the international 
community: first, Serbia was overwhelmingly responsible for the gross violence carried 
out by the Federal Army, and secondly, that the Serbian leadership did not respond to 
reason, but only to coercion.268 The UN Security Council meanwhile also decided to 
adopt an entire array of economic sanctions in Resolution 757, adopted on 30 May.269 
But, even at that stage, British and French governments had, in fact, resisted the 
imposition of sanctions: they wanted Milosevic to be given ‘a further opportunity’ to 
halt the violence in Bosnia.270 Although the UN Resolution banned all trade, economic 
sanctions had very little effect on Serbia, since it was violated by shipments of oil and 
other supplies from Greece and up the Danube from Russia and the Ukraine.271
Having failed to stop the fighting from spreading, the EC transferred the problem to 
the UN. The UN had already had the quarters of UNPROFOR in Croatia established 
in Sarajevo - somehow optimistically aimed to deter the war spreading into Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. However, as soon as the fighting intensified in Bosnia, including 
skirmishes in Sarajevo, the UN came under pressure to expand its role to Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. In response to pressures, especially from the EC, Boutros Ghali sent 
Marrack Goulding, Deputy Under Secretary with responsibility for peacekeeping, to 
Bosnia in May 1992 to assess the conditions for mandating and creating a UN 
operation zone there. He concluded that the conditions were not appropriate for 
sending a peacekeeping force to Bosnia. He also indicated the levels of violence and 
noted the siege of Sarajevo, put emphasis on the issue that the Serbs were attempting
268 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 92-3.
269 UNSCR 757, 30 May 1992.
270 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia, 150-3.
271 Malcolm, Bosnia, 242.
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to create ethnically pure areas in line with negotiations carried out by Cutilheiro.272 In 
the week beginning 11 May, both the EC and the UN took decisions to withdraw their 
forces from Bosnia, thus accepting that there was nothing either the ECMM or 
UNPROFOR could do in the circumstances, forces that had earlier been earmarked for 
Croatia.273
4.5. Ethnic Cleansing in Summer 1992
While the European powers had still been discussing whether the war in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina was a civil war of which all the parties were guilty or simply a war of 
aggression,274 endless columns of refugees started pouring into Croatia in April and 
May 1992. These people actually were not fleeing the war zones. They had been 
driven from their homes on the grounds of their nationality. They were not the tragic 
by-product of the war; their expulsion was the whole point of war. In a systematic 
campaign, Serb paramilitary hit squads swept through northern and eastern Bosnia in 
the spring and summer months and, village by village, seized control of the region 
without, in most places, encountering real military opposition.
A common characteristic of the cleansing operation was the systematic elimination of 
Muslim community leaders - prominent people, intellectuals, members of the SDA and 
the wealthy. The existence of such lists of these people’s names was in itself an 
instrument of ethnic cleansing. The terror it instilled in neighbouring communities, 
once news of the atrocities spread, encouraged many of those who feared that they
272 UN Secretary General’s Report, UN Doc. S /23900 ,12 May 1992.
273 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 241.
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might be targeted to flee even before they were attacked. It was a destruction of a 
community from top down.274 75
However, in some places, the cleansing was violent and accompanied by mass killing. 
Detailed reports which emerged in the year later showed that women were being held 
in special buildings for the purpose of systematic rape.276 Karadzic had founded his 
new independent state on April 6, 1992. Ethic cleansing was the instrument which 
gave that state territorial definition. Rumours that the Serbs had several mass 
detention camps in northeastern Bosnia had been in the air for weeks, until the 
journalist Roy Gutman, of the New York paper Newsday, published a story about the 
camps on July 19. He had visited Manjaca; according to Serbs, a prisoner-of-war 
camp. But Gutman said it was clear that many of the men detained there were not 
combatants. Some said that they had never carried arms; others said that they had own 
rifles but had registered and surrendered them when the Serb irregulars entered their 
neighbourhood and issued the surrender ultimatum.277
When Gutman’s report was unleashed Karadzic was in London for EC sponsored 
talks. It was the turn of United Kingdom’s presidency of the EC. Karadzic 
comfortably admitted that there were prisoner-of-war camps, as was normal in any 
war. He invited any journalists to come to Bosnia and visit the alleged camps. On
274 For an assessment o f the making of international response to what was going on in Bosnia from 
April onwards, see, the following sub-chapters;
275 See for a detailed account of the genocidal ethnic cleansing, Roy Gutman, Witness to Genocide 
(Shaftesbury: Element Books Ltd, 1993) and Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 
Ethnic Cleansing, Texas: A & M University Press, 1995.
276 The issue of organised rape, at the very beginning, was viewed as contentious. The Bosnian 
government had assembled details of 13,000 rape victims; the EU Commission offered the very rough 
estimate of 20,000 in January 1993. What became clear was that rape was being used in many places
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August 2, Newsday carried a story on front page; ‘The Death Camps of Bosnia’.27 78 
For the first time, the Serbs were accused not just of mass detention, but of organised 
extermination.
On August 18, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee received a staff report 
suggesting the detailed accounts had been available to the governments of the western 
world and to the UN long before these were published in the newspapers. The main 
findings of the Report were that the ethnic cleansing campaign had substantially 
achieved its goals: there now existed an almost exclusively Serb-inhabited region, in 
territory contiguous to Serbia, and covering seventy percent of the territory in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina.
The international community, it is argued, knew about the scale and nature of the 
refugee crisis as early as May 1992. Muhamed Sacirbey, then Bosnia’s Ambassador to 
the UN, claimed to have told Boutros Boutros-Ghali personally about the 
concentration camps as early as the middle of May. In July 1992, they submitted a 
more precise list of camp locations. On July 3, the UNHCR circulated a report to the 
UNPROFOR and the EC Monitoring missions concerning abuses at four camps. On 
July 27, it also circulated a report specifically about Omarska. George Kenney, the US 
State Department Official who resigned in protest at American policy in Bosnia, later 
accused the US of a cover-up.279 Everybody pretended like nothing was happening.
as part of a general policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. It was not a matter of ‘by product of the war’ as 
individual acts by disorderly soldiers.
277 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 249.
278 See Roy Gutman, Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury: Element Books Ltd, 1993).
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At the end of April 1992, there were 286,000 refugees from Bosnia. Most of them 
tried to find shelter in Croatia. By the beginning of June this number had risen to three 
quarters of a million; and to 1.1 million by mid-July. By the end of the year 1992, 
almost two million Bosnians -nearly half of the population- had become refugees. At 
the end of July, Croatia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Mate Granic, announced that his 
country could take no more refugees. Croatia with a population of just 4.7 million, 
was now also a home to almost a million refugees, and was turning to a large refugee 
camp. He appealed to Western countries to start taking more.
The Twelve countries of the EC, chaired by Britain, held a one day conference in 
Geneva. Germany, with 200,000 former Yugoslavs living within its borders, many of 
them as refugees, argued for a quota system, each country accepting an agreed number 
of refugees according to its size, and ability to accommodate them. Britain’s Baroness 
Chalker, Minister of Overseas Development, argued that ‘the refugees should be 
accommodated as close as possible to their homes, so that their return could be made 
all the more readily once the fighting had died down. She won the support of the 
others saying that she was not speaking in the interests of the British or the EC tax 
payer but in the interests of the refugees themselves.280 Unfortunately, assuming that 
the refugees would be able to return after the fighting had ended was to miss the whole 
point of the war, which was being waged deliberately to ensure that they would never 
return. Obviously, in the meantime, the world had a humanitarian not a political, crisis 
on its hands, and therefore, it called for a humanitarian, not a political response.
280 Ibid., 247.
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4.5.1. Mitterand’s Visit and Opening of the Sarajevo Airport
During the summer months of 1992, while all the campaign of ethnic cleansing was 
taking place in the Bosnian countryside, the world’s attention almost exclusively 
concentrated on the siege and bombardment of Sarajevo. While all the world’s 
attention concentrated on Sarajevo, western governments had to make some efforts to 
alleviate the city’s suffering. Since they were not in favour of intervening militarily 
into the conflict and taking sides, the best option was to start humanitarian assistance. 
It became clear that if Sarajevo were not relieved soon, large numbers of people would 
starve to death. On June 8, the UN Security Council approved a plan to take control 
of Sarajevo airport and begin an airlift of humanitarian aid. In fact, it was Secretary- 
General’s recommendation to restrict the UN presence in Bosnia only to the capital 
city which was by then entering its third month under siege.
In the three weeks between Boutros Ghali’s announcement and the UN took control of 
Sarajevo airport, elements in the international community, led by France, had begun to 
threaten Serbs with the use of force. At the same time there had been arguments 
within the international community about Bosnia as to whether force should be used, 
and how much force was enough.
At the Lisbon Summit of the European Council on 27-28 June, some member states in 
the EC argued that it was too early and dangerous to open the Sarajevo airport. 
President Mitterand took a surprise visit to Bosnian capital to show the fellow leaders 
in the EC who were tending to wary their hands, counselling caution and displaying 
inhibition that it was time to take action. With all land routes into Sarajevo blocked by
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the Array of the Serbian Republic (VRS), the aerial lifeline was very important to 
Sarajevans. The siege of Sarajevo began to be broken immediately as the French 
military landed the first humanitarian aid flight into Bosnia, following the Act de 
Presence of their President, on the early hours of 29 June, even before the Serbs 
holding the airport relinquished control to the UN later on the same day.281
The consequences of President Mitterand’s surprise visit to Sarajevo seemed like 
having a real effect on British policy. Mitterand’s visit, as an act, demonstrated to the 
more cautious and faint-hearted that things could be made to happen with a little 
boldness. An assessment was, as General Morillon later pointed out, that politicians 
should be prepared to lead and be bold enough on occasion to ignore the cautious 
advice of officials.282
4.5.2. The Friction Between the EC and the UN
Mitterand’s unexpected visit was also directed to the UN Secretariat, in particular, to 
the Secretary General. There was a growing feeling that the Secretary-General was 
simply opposed outright to the UN involvement in Bosnia, which he regarded as a 
‘rich man’s war’. On a visit to Sarajevo in July 1992, Boutros Ghali made his 
infamous remark that there were other more deserving causes, and that the massive 
media attention given to Bosnia-Hercegovina was diverting resources away from the 
Third World.283 In the view of the Secretary-General, Bosnia was a European matter 
and it was only because it was in Europe that it was receiving so much attention, when
281 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 93-5.
282 Ibid., 94-5.
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there were numerous cases which he regarded as similar, some of which were arguably 
worse. He even warned that increased commitment in Bosnia could lead to a ‘kind of 
Vietnam for the United Nations’. 283 84
The friction between the UN Secretary-General and both his political masters on the 
Security Council and the EC came to a head in July. On 17 July the EC team, 
Carrington and Cutilheiro, at a meeting of sub-conference in London, gained 
agreement on a cease-fire around Sarajevo in which all Serbian heavy weaponry would 
be placed under the UN control. Boutros-Ghali, rather than welcoming this process, 
reacted by saying that the EC made agreements on behalf of the UN without speaking 
to the UN first On 22 July, he publicised a letter refusing openly to co-operate with 
Lord Carrington’s latest cease-fire which required another 1100 UN monitors to 
supervise the heavy weapons of all sides. In reality the EC negotiators had been trying 
to discuss the matter with him by telephone. Although he was understood to be there, 
he did not take Carrington’s calls. It is easy to conclude that Boutros-Ghali was 
sulking, feeling that if demands continued to be made on the UN, then this would only 
be done if the UN were involved from the outset in making arrangements for 
engagement. A cease-fire in a country where he felt the UN had little place, certainly 
as a surrogate for the EC when the latter could not deal with a problem itself, was of 
far less importance than the question of the UN’s status. Boutros-Ghali justified his 
objections by citing the UN Charter: ‘the UN could make use of the regional
283 Quoted in Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 195n.
284 Boutros Boutros Ghali, Quoted by Cohen, Broken Bonds, 242.
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organisations to help in its work; but there is no suggestion in the Charter that the
285opposite could apply. 285
285 Gow, Triumph of the Lack o f Will, 97-8. See Secretary General’s Report, UN Doc. S/24333, 21 
July 1992.
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CHAPTER V: BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
5.1. Britain’s Perception of the War in Bosnia and Hercegovina
By the beginning of July 1992, when news about atrocities against the civilians in 
Bosnia reached its peak and international attention was on the concentration camps in 
Bosnia, United Kingdom took over the EC Presidency. The debate on whether to 
intervene militarily in Bosnia-Hercegovina to stop the bloodshed or not had been on
■~s
the agenda for quite some time. Until that time within the EC, ‘there did seem to be a 
degree of consensus over Yugoslavia’ as the Community sought to bring palliative 
measures on the situation.286 It was hoped that these levers which, after November 
1991 including sanctions, would restrict Serbia in its actions against Bosnian Muslims. 
The failure of all the efforts, however, began to erode whatever consensus existed 
among the member states.
The key disagreement was over the issue of military intervention. British government 
was always publicly opposing the military involvement at any force level. The British 
highlighted all the difficulties and warned of the dangers of being drawn into a long­
term anti-insurgency operation’.287 In addition, proposals by Western commentators 
and leading public figures such as ex-British Prime Minister Lady Thatcher for a
286 Trevor Salmon, ‘Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 
1990-1992,” International Affairs 68, no. 2 (1992), 248.
287 Ibid.. 251.
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combination of air strikes against Serb military targets and the lifting of the arms
288embargo were dismissed by British ministers out of hand as unrealistic.
The main reason of this restrained and conservative approach by Britain from the very 
beginning of the conflict was interpreted as the failure of understanding the nature and 
underlying causes of the war in Yugoslavia. At no point during the entire Bosnian war 
had the pronouncements of British politicians shown any clear understanding of ‘who 
made this war happen and why’.28 89
First, the Yugoslav conflict was understood in terms of historic animosity and Britain 
originally saw the war in Yugoslavia through ethnic and historical glasses. Few days 
after the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence in June 1991, Douglas 
Hurd declared that ‘Yugoslavia was invented in 1919 to solve a problem of different 
peoples living in the same part of the Balkans with a long history of peoples fighting 
each other’.290 Basically, according to the British Foreign Secretary, the war in 
Yugoslavia was inevitable because the driving forces behind it were ‘ancient ethnic 
hatreds’.291 In fact, as a well known British expert on the Balkans points out, the 
examples of Yugoslav peoples fighting each other are only ‘untypical episodes’ in
288 Cviic, An Awful Warning, 36.
289 Noel Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure,” The National Interest 39 (Spring 
1995), 4.
290 Ibid., 4-5. Malcolm also quotes Sir Crispin Tickell, a high-ranking British Diplomat, announcing 
that the history of hatred between the Yugoslav peoples goes back to ‘thousand of years’. In fact, the 
Slav peoples are known to have settled in the Balkans only in the sixth and seventh centuries.
291 In fact, the fear of the ‘Croatian Ustashe’ were the main argument of the Serbs in Krajina to justify 
their actions. According to the minutes of evidence, Dr. Pavlowitch answers the question of the 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the November 27, 1992 session. Dr. Pavlowitch 
mentioned to the Committee that ‘it is simply reacting to the misapprehension that these tilings have 
always been like that and that they are hatreds that go back to centuries, millenia into history. It all 
goes back really, I suppose to the second world war and the tragic events on that war.’ See Evidence 
to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, Central and Eastern Europe: Problems 
of the Post-Communist Era, First Report, Vol. II, HMSO, London, 1992,83-4.
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Balkan history. And, although the killing was severe during the Second World War, it 
was not obvious why ‘nearly fifty years later people should rise up to re-enact these 
horrors’.292 293
The political strategy of the Serbian communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, since 
1988; the take over of the political machinery in Montenegro and Vojvodina, the illegal 
suppression of autonomy of Kosovo/a, the mobilisation of Serbian nationalist feelings 
(including massive media campaign) throughout Yugoslavia, the slow motion 
constitutional coup against the federal presidency, the theft by Serbia in 1990 billions 
of dinars from the federal budget, therefore destroying the federal economic program 
and arming of Serbian minorities during 1990 and 1991 in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina were all ignored by British policy-makers.
Holding to this theory of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ about Yugoslavia was in fact very 
convenient since it implied that ‘everybody is more or less equally guilty,’ and that 
there seemed no need to make a differentiation between aggressor and victim.29j 
‘Everybody is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia and Hercegovina’ declared 
Lord Carrington, there weeks after the initial Serbian attack there, ‘and ‘as soon as we 
get the cease-fire, there will be no need to blame anybody’.294 The military 
commanders who were sent into Bosnia and Hercegovina quickly adopted the same 
attitude. General Lewis MacKenzie, was later going to describe his views as ‘dealing
292 Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West,” 5.
293 Daniele Conversi considers this attitude as of ‘equidistance’ and a result of ‘moral relativism’ 
reflecting a belief in die non-universality of human values, including human rights. See Daniele 
Conversi, “Moral Relativism and Equidistance in Bridsh Attitudes to die War in die Former 
Yugoslavia,” in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. by. Thomas 
Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (New York and London, 1996), 244-81.
294 Quoted in Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West,” 6.
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with Bosnia is a bit like dealing with serial killers -one has killed fifteen, one has killed 
ten, one has killed five’, and asked ‘Do we help the one who has only killed five?’.293
The natural result of failure of understanding or initial misdiagnosis about the nature of 
the conflict led to the misleading conclusion about how to stop it. The best thing to do 
was considered as containing the conflict spreading to the other parts of the region and 
limit the level of violence, then sit back and let the ancient hatreds bum themselves out. 
Since it was perceived as an outbreak of sheer violence in terms of civil war rather than 
a concerted and planned attack to achieve a specific political aim (Greater Serbia), 
reducing the amount of violence and fighting by stopping the arms entering the war 
zone would be enough. Douglas Hurd said that ‘to allow arms into Bosnia is like 
putting petrol on the flames’.295 96
Obviously intervening in the conflict on behalf of one side was out of the question. 
Politicians who liked to describe their policy as ‘non intervention’ or their approach as 
‘impartial’ had, in fact, intervened decisively to determine the outcome of the conflict. 
Serbia and its proxy forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina had from the very beginning 
large stockpiles of the fourth largest army in Europe while the Bosnian government 
had let the JNA confiscate even the armaments of its police forces.297 The arms 
embargo was the ‘single most damaging instrument’ of the Western policy on Bosnia 
and Hercegovina.298
295 Quoted in Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 194n.
296 Quoted in Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West,” 6.
297 By September 1992, it was estimated that the Bosnian government forces had two tanks and two 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs), while the Serb forces had three hundred tanks and two hundred 
APCs. Malcolm, “Bosnia and the West,” 7.
298 See Albert Wholstetter. “Genocide by Embargo,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 May 1994.
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British government was insistent on not lifting the arms embargo since intensification 
of war might harm its humanitarian forces on the ground. In fact, the humanitarian 
mission was a real disaster. The UNPROFOR soldiers deployed in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina neither had the mandate nor the mechanisms to provide peace and 
security in the area. Their position in the war was basically ridiculous. There was no 
peace to keep on the ground and they did not want to intervene on behalf of any side 
and simply watched the powerful Bosnian Serb army and the irregulars to kill the 
civilian people in the towns and cities.299
5.1.1. Historical Dimensions of Pro-Serbian Sentiment in Britain
Some authors argue that, overall, British attitudes towards Yugoslavia have been 
characterised by a certain degree of Serbophilia.300 Obviously, Britain’s deep 
involvement with Yugoslavia went back before the Second World War. More than 
one hundred years ago, British policy was split about how to respond to the moral and 
political dilemma posed by the great revolts against the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, 
first in Bosnia and then Bulgaria. British political life was divided between the jingoist 
supporters of the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark of stability and a block to Russian 
influence, and proponents of the right to self-determination and sceptics of the viability 
of the decaying Empire as a guarantor of anything, least of all stability.301 As Norman 
Stone points out ‘the Serbs appeared to be both anti-Catholic and anti-Turkish -both
299 See the memoirs of British soldiers in Gorazde. First Battalion of Royal Welch Fusiliers, White 
Dragon, Royal Welch Fusiliers (Wrexham, 1995).
300 Conversi, “Moral Relativism and Equidistance,” 244-281.
301 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, xii-xii.
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of which appealed to the Liberals of the Gladstone’s vintage.302 William Ewart 
Gladstone (1809-1898) returned to political scene with his pamphlet, ‘The Bulgarian 
Horrors and the Question of the East” in September 1876, and declared his admiration 
for the nationalist rebellions shaking the Ottoman Empire.303 Although Serbian war of 
liberation began in 1804, it was the Greek revolt after 1821 that attracted the civilised 
world’s attention and sympathies. Nationalists all over Europe heralded the heroic 
struggle of the Serbs and the Greeks fighting against the Ottomans. In some cases, 
their struggle was represented as the defence of Western civilisation against Islamic, 
Eastern and other barbarian threats.304
In addition, among the historians, nearly anyone who knew about Central Europe was 
pro-Yugoslav or pro-Serbian and Foreign Office often consulted them as experts. The 
most popular of them was R. W. Seton Watson (1879-1951) and he actively 
participated in the ongoing debate on the shape of the Balkans during the first decade
302 Norman Stone, “British Policy Towards the Yugoslav Crisis/’ Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, organised by Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 1995, 6. 
The appreciation of the Protestant-Orthodox connection by the Anglican clerics stems from the image 
of Christian Orthodoxy conceived as being in opposition to Rome. The basic idea was that Eastern 
Christendom, by virtue of its Orthodoxy had kept intact the original sprit of Christianity and Post- 
Reformation Anglicans were exhorted to restore this purity on a world wide scale in alliance with 
Eastern Orthodoxy. Among the nineteenth century clergymen, the priest John Mason Neale 
translated several books from Balkan theologians and intellectuals, and published a book on the 
Orthodox Church in Serbia and other Balkan countries. See, Leon Litvack, John Mason Neale and 
the Quest for Sobomost (Oxford University Press, 1994).
303 See Almond, Europe's Backyard War, Chapter 4, ‘1876 and all that’ especially 96-7ff.
304 See, for example, book by Robert George Dalyrmple Laffan, The Guardians of the Gate: Historical 
Lectures on the Serbs (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1918); noted in Daniele Conversi, “Moral Relativism 
and Equidistance in British Attitudes to the War in Former Yugoslavia/’ in This Time We Knew: 
Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. by Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic, New 
York, London, 1996, 250-1. Similarly, Rebecca West praising the Serbian ultranationalists, points 
out that ‘without people like them the Eastern half of the Europe would have been Islamised, die 
tradition of liberty would have died forever under die Habsburgs, the Romanoffs and die Ottoman 
Empire, and Bolshevism would have become anarchy’. See Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey 
Falcon, 67.
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of the century.305 However, the best known and most influential British Serbophile 
was certainly Rebecca West (1892-1983). When she had travelled throughout 
Yugoslavia during the 1930s, she had picked up a great deal of pro-Serbian sentiment. 
Her book, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, was the first great public introduction to 
Yugoslavia in Britain and America and perhaps still remains the best-written of pro- 
Serbian accounts of Yugoslav history, politics and lifestyles.306 It is still read as a key 
source of information about Yugoslavia and shapes the British attitude towards that 
country.307 In fact, there is not a comparable book which argues a different view in the 
same quality. Although, there were some other Balkan specialists, they were not liked 
by the British government. The case of Mary Edith Durham (1863-1944) was quite 
remarkable; she was initially anti-Austrian and pro-Albanian, and favoured the creation 
of Yugoslavia, she turned increasingly anti-Serbian in the wake of Sarajevo 
assassination. She wrote many letters to newspapers, magazines and MPs in which she 
attacked Belgrade and Aleksandar Karadjordjevic’s dictatorship. Eventually, she was 
unsuccessful and abhorred by the Foreign Office.308
305 Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton 
Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981). For 
R. W. Seton-Watson’s initial Serbian sympathies, see Serbia, Yesterday, To-Day and To-Morrow: A 
School Address (London, Vacher and Sons, 1916); The Sprit of the Serb (London: Nisbet, 1915); and 
Serbia's War of Liberation (London: Women’s Printing Society, 1916); Absolutism in Croatia, 
(London: Constable, 1912); The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy, (New York: H. 
Fertig, 1969).
306 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: The Record of a Journey Through Yugoslavia in 
1937 (Edinburgh, Canongate Classics, 1993).
307 David Owen, in his memoirs, mentions how he had ‘dipped into, rather than re-read Rebecca 
West’s account of her travels through Yugoslavia in the late 1930s’. According to his account “on 
every page he found a labyrinth of history, weaving a complexity of human relations that seemed to 
bedevil the whole region”. David Owen also ‘glanced’ her book before an interview in BBC. David 
Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Indigo, 1996), 6.
308 See Mary Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle (London: Allan and Unwin, 1920); idem, 
The Sarajevo Crime (London, Allan and Unwin, 1925). An example of her previous work; Through 
the Land o f the Serb, Edward Arnold, 1904.
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Indeed, due to the works of Rebecca West and similar others, Serbophilia was 
conveniently complemented by Croato-phobia. Memories of the Ustasha atrocities 
during the Second World War undoubtedly played a crucial role in this perception. 
Milosevic and his nationalists rose to power by reviving a series of imaginary threats to 
the Serb nation in mobilising support for their campaign against the Tudjman 
Government in Zagreb. In Britain, the politicians, heavily affected by the Serbian 
propaganda or by pro-Serbian views of some senior advisers to the Foreign Office,309 
sympathising with the Serbian worries, concluded that ‘in those days, the beginnings of 
the fears among Serbs living in Croatia turned out to be all tragically justified in the 
Second World War’ and that, therefore, ‘we should put some weight on the central 
claim of the Serbian authorities certainly and Serbian opinion that Serbians in Croatia 
are in deadly danger today (like they had been during the Second World War) and 
therefore it follows that there must be either Federal Army activity or some other 
independent force acting as a buffer’.310
In addition, Serbian accusations of a new ‘Zagreb-Berlin Axis’ were reinforced by 
Germany’s increasing support for the Croatian and Slovenian independence in June 
1991. Even after the atrocities of the Serbian-led JNA in Croatia became evident,
309 Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Sir William Deakin and Julian Amery witnesses of the many sided war in 
Yugoslavia during the Second World War had a misleading impression of Croatia and certainly they 
were not in favour of Croatian nationalism. As Norman Stone points out. although ‘it was certainly 
true that Croatian nationalism in Bosnia, then as now, could be ugly, provincial, and silly; but die 
Croats in general were more strongly represented among the Partisans than the Serbs, then there was 
more resistance to Germans in Croatia than in Serbia’. See Stone, “British Policy,” 5.
310 See Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, Central and Eastern 
Europe: Problems of the Post-Communist Era, First Report, Vol. II, HMSO, London, 1992, 83.
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accusations of neo-fascism directed at Croatian nation as a whole became common
currency in Britain.311
Moreover, the Foreign Office was closely connected by ‘experts’ who were indeed 
Serbian lobbyists.312 The most notable of them were Nora Beloff and Jovan Omer 
Zametica (John Zametica).313 Echoing Belgrade’s views, in March 1992, journalist 
and part time historian Nora Beloff described the newly independent Croatian state as 
a ‘fascist laboratory’314 and wrote that “laws of citizenship favour patrial Croats, 
extortionate taxes are levied against Serb-owned properties, and no Serb can hope for 
redress in a Croat court against arson and assault. In these circumstances,
constitutional guarantees of minority rights should not be taken more seriously than the 
whole array of human rights promised in Stalin’s 1935 constitution, at the height of 
terror”.315 * Beloff also mentions its correspondence with Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd in which she argued against recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. According to
311 British politicians were not alone having anti-Croat sentiments; French President Mitterand told a 
German newspaper in November 1991, as Vukovar was about to fall, ‘Croatia belonged to the Nazi 
Bloc, not Serbia’. In fact, the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman never collaborated with the Ustasha 
Regime, instead fought against it and the Axis powers in the Partisan army, whereas Mitterand, as 
Mark Almond points out, rose rapidly in the civil service of Vichy France before 1943, even receiving 
a medal from Petain’s regime for his distinguished service. Then he changed sides when Allied 
victory was evident. See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. xii-xiii. British officials and press also 
ignored the relations between the Italian ultra-nationalists, anti-Croat, and Belgrade authorities. In 
May 1991, the new right leader Gianfranco Fini reclaimed the ‘return of Istria and Dalmatia in case 
of a break-up of Yugoslavia’. In August 1991, he visited Belgrade to meet key figures of the regime, 
whom he praised for unitary efforts. Conversi, “Moral Relativism and Equidistance,” 255-6.
312 See Noel Malcolm, “The Whole Lot of Them are Serbs,” The Spectator (June 10, 1995), 14-18.
313 Initially a British academic, Jovan Omer Zametica later became an adviser to the Bosnian Serb
presidency (to Karadzic) and official spokesman for the Serbs. He is of mixed parentage and his
father was a Muslim from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He initially changed his birth name Omer as 
Jovan, then adopted ‘John’ for the benefit of his English audiences and colleagues. Lecture Notes, 
Course ‘The Rise and Fall of Yugoslav State’, by Dr. James Gow, King’s College, London, March 
1998.
Nora Beloff, “The Third Way,” New Statesman and Society (March 27, 1992), 26-7 
Ibid
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Beloff, Hurd agreed with her, while contending that ‘he needed to placate Helmut
Kohl’.316
Noel Malcolm argues that ‘conspiracy theorists have often suggested to him that the 
British Ministry of Defence was penetrated by pro-Serb elements long ago’.317 
Belgrade bom, pro-Serb activist Jovan Gvozdenovic (calls himself John Kennedy) had 
been personally connected, via the Conservative Council on Eastern Europe, with 
Henry Bellingham MP.318 Kennedy, in his article in the nationalist Belgrade magazine 
Intervju, wrote, saying that ‘Bellingham says that John has had access to the highest 
levels of the Conservative Party’. As Noel Malcolm puts it ‘this statement gains a 
special significance from the fact that Bellingham is now parliamentary secretary to the 
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind’.319
Similarly, John ‘Jovan’ Zametica was giving lectures to British military training courses 
as an ‘independent’ expert long after the start of the Yugoslav war. His monograph, 
published by London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Adelphi Paper 
series was accorded the status of an objective and reliable account of events in 
Yugoslavia.320 Zametica identified the causes of the war in the ‘incompatible 
nationalist aspirations’ of the peoples of Yugoslavia just like Foreign Office describes 
it. He also blamed the Titoist politics and his division of Serbia in the 1974
317 Noel Malcolm, ‘The Whole Lot of Them are Serbs,” The Spectator (10 June 1995), 15.
318 John Kennedy himself, as a Tory candidate, conducted lobbying effort in conjunction with Ian 
Greer Associates (IAG). According to David Leigh and Ed Vulliamy, Kennedy was given 50 per cent 
of the Serb government contract with IAG. D. Leigh and Ed Vulliamy, “Blood Money: How Serbia 
Bought British Favours,” The Guardian, 16 January 1997.
319 Noel Malcolm, ‘The Whole Lot,” 16.
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Constitution creating ‘weak Serbia and strong Yugoslavia’ as responsible in the 
current bloodshed. Especially, the Albanian people and their revolt against Serbia 
‘provided the catalyst for the subsequent rise of Serbian nationalism’.320 21 Oddly 
enough, he later became advisor to the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.
Zametica’s ideas were used directly to justify Britain’s pro-Serbian line; Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina were scared because they were sure that, like it 
happened before, they were going to be exterminated by Croatian fascists or Muslim 
fundamentalists. So, it had been believed that the Federal Army had to intervene to 
protect them by all means. This propaganda deeply influenced the British academic 
and political circles. In fact, it was obvious that British politics had been moving in a 
vacuum that had been filled by the Serbs, who controlled the most sophisticated 
propaganda machine in Yugoslavia. Christopher Bennett regrets that;
“The greatest diplomatic error in Yugoslavia was made before the 
conflict degenerated into war. This was the failure to listen to 
anything but the Serbian point of view. Slovenian and Croatian 
envoys who went abroad to canvass international opinion were cold- 
shouldered by foreign ministries, while, astonishingly, foreign 
diplomats based in Belgrade were prepared to write weighty reports 
on Yugoslavia without visiting Zagreb or Ljubljana. Here Britain 
was the greatest offender. While other EC Countries were at least 
quick to dispatch diplomats to Croatia soon after war broke out,
Britain took pains not to hear the Croatian point of view and 
throughout six months of fighting the Foreign Office chose not to 
send a single diplomat to Zagreb. Given the amount of time and
320 John Zametica, “The Yugoslav Conflict: An Analysis of the Causes of the Yugoslav War: The 
Policies of the Republics and the Regional and International Implications of the Conflict,” Adelphi 
Papers, No. 270. London: Brassey’s for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992.
321 John Zametica, “The Yugoslav Conflict,” 75.
129
energy which would be devoted to Yugoslav matters in succeeding 
years and the gravity o f  the decisions the international community 
would be taking regarding Yugoslavia, the complacency was
322remarkable.
Obviously, with such a distinguished lineage of London-based authors ready to 
condone the Serbs’ worst atrocities, the Milosevic government and its allies in Bosnia 
and Hercegovina felt immensely protected in carrying out their project of creating 
‘Greater Serbia’.323
It seems that the deep economic depression John Major government found itself 
confronted with as soon as it came out of the elections at the beginning of April 1992 
was to affect the way in which British foreign policy was to be made. Indeed, the 
recession had begun much earlier and had been somewhat instrumental in forcing 
former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to leave office, and the election campaign 
was marred by large numbers of people being laid off on a daily basis. The problem 
was that in the months following the election from which John Major came out 
unexpectedly victorious, the economic situation got much worse. This made it difficult 
for the government to spare considerable amount of money and time for other matters 
like Bosnia. Indeed, a British expert articulated, ‘leaving aside any military scruples, 
neither Britain nor the US was willing to spend cash in a time of recession 
(compounded by President Bush by imminent elections). Whereas the Arab states had 
paid for Britain’s contingent in the Gulf, domestic recession seemed to rule out sending 32
322 Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 174.
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a force to Bosnia, particularly as the government deficit looked set to hit fifty billion 
pounds in 1993’.324 However, albeit understandable initially, this policy gradually 
became untenable not least because in the months ahead others appeared prepared to 
carry the burden, particularly the US, in financial and military terms, of a forward 
policy in Bosnia, but Britain remained unmoved and did all it could to ‘talk’ them out 
of taking action.
It also seems that the rift between Thatcher and Major which began following the 
latter’s endorsement of closer integration of the EC and deepened after the Danes 
rejected the Maastricht Treaty in March 1992 in a popular referendum contributed to 
the making of an anti-interventionist policy by Britain in Bosnia. The fact of the matter 
is that although John Major had been hand-picked the outgoing Prime Minister 
Thatcher, Major’s support for the Maastricht Treaty and deeper integration of the EC 
soon created divisions within the ranks of the Conservative Party. The Thatcherite 
members of the Conservative Party gave vent to their frustration with John Major in 
March 1992, only a month before the elections took place, when the Danes rejected 
the Maastricht. It was somehow expected that John Major’s endorsement of the 
Maastricht Treaty would harm the Conservative voters. Surprisingly, however, John 
Major won the elections. Yet, the internal quarrel within the party ranks over Europe 
was far from over: Baroness Thatcher started her salvo against John Major soon after 
the elections by criticising his support for the Maastricht in an interview which came 
out in Newsweek magazine. It was not only the content but also the derogatory tone 
of the interview which irked the Major wing of the Conservative Party. It, at the same 32
323 See Brad K. Blitz’s article “Serbia’s War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites,” in This 
Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, eds. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G.
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time, fanned the flames of the Euro-sceptics, by implication, Thatcherite section of the 
Party. From then onwards, John Major flanked by well-known anti-Thatcher figures 
like Douglas Hurd, Michael Heseltine, Foreign Secretary and Secretary of Trade and 
Industry respectively, appeared at pains to say or do more or less the opposite of what 
Baroness Thatcher suggested on policy matters. Therefore, when Baroness Thatcher 
came out very strongly for an active and pro-Bosnian policy, it looked as if John Major 
and Douglas Hurd would resist it. Indeed, during much of the carnage in Bosnia, each 
time Baroness Thatcher called for air strikes against Bosnian Serb gun emplacements, 
coupled with the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government, either John 
Major or his Cabinet Ministers seemed to have thought that Baroness Thatcher was 
using the Bosnian issue as an opportunity to attack John Major for his European 
policies.
It must be pointed out that, by the time John Major’s government came about 
following the election victory in early May 1992, the US Administration had almost 
formulated a non-interventionist attitude towards the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. 
Although Bush was the most popular US President in decades according to public 
opinion polls conducted on the wake of the Gulf War, his popularity was soon to 
plunge as a result of a deep recession the US economy was going through. The year 
1992 was the election year and his Democrat rival Clinton was critical of Bush 
Administration on the grounds that President Bush had acted like a ‘foreign minister’, 
that he had indulged only in foreign adventures, and that he had neglected economy. 
Moreover, Colin Powell was dead against any American military involvement in what 324
Mestrovic (New York, London, 1996), 187-243.
324 See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 252-3.
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he considered a place with no American interests. Therefore, President Bush appeared 
quite inhibited in his Yugoslav policy in general, and Bosnia in particular. When John 
Major’s government looked to the US for policy advice, they realised that the motto of 
the day was non-involvement. Under these circumstances, Britain, even if it wished, 
could not mount military intervention; nor could it necessarily argue for large scale 
military involvement on its own, or even together with its EC partners without the US. 
In a sense, the non-interventionist approach adopted by Britain at the early stages of 
the war in Bosnia, was perhaps the only act in town. In other words, Britain was 
constrained by Washington’s stance. However, what was peculiar was that when the 
US expressed willingness to use air power against Serb military targets and to lift the 
arms embargo on the Bosnian Government at the later stages of the genocidal war in 
Bosnia, it was Britain which continued to argue against outside military intervention.
Oddly enough, Britain’s policy which was shaped by Washington’s unwillingness to act 
at the inception of the war in Bosnia, gradually went through a change whereby it 
began to advocate a peace at any price. The argument frequently uttered by British 
officials was that the Bosnian Serbs had won the war through a Blitzkrieg and to roll 
back Serbian gains was impossible without massive military intervention both on the 
ground and from the air. British officials also uttered the view that even then it was by 
no means certain that Bosnia would be pieced together to its pre-war social structure. 
In a broader sense, it was too late to do anything. The best course of action would be 
to look for a peace of any sort rather than a just peace. If it required pressure on the 
Bosnian government side, the victim of aggression, to achieve a peace at any price, 
Britain was prepared to do that instead of taking up a stronger stance against the 
Serbs, the aggressor.
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5.1.2. British Actions in the War in Bosnia and Hercegovina
All these misperceptions obviously contributed to the making of British policy towards 
the Yugoslav war in general and Bosnian war, in particular. By the middle of July 
1992, Douglas Hurd set off following Mitterand’s footsteps in his capacity as President 
of the EC Council of Ministers for his own expedition around the Balkans. He 
declared ‘we have to do our utmost to stop this suffering continuing. It is not just a 
matter of relieving those who are already suffering, it is trying to prevent this going on 
in the future’.325 Two days later, on 17 July, Mr. Hurd said, in Sarajevo, that the EC 
would not accept the partition of Bosnia nor any alteration of its borders by force. 
Hurd told a press conference in Sarajevo, ‘I don’t believe Serbia will be able or will 
wish indefinitely to continue in a position without trade, without friends, without any 
position in the world.’326 Athough, even at the early stages, unlike some of his 
colleagues who still preferred to find responsibility for the conflict difficult to allocate, 
Douglas Hurd had no problem in clearly identifying the Serbian leadership as the 
source of war, or in advocating economic sanctions. However, the dominant tendency 
was to see the inter-communal element in the war, villages and neighbours mingled in 
fighting against each other.
Nevertheless, after his visit to Sarajevo, Hurd admitted, ‘I now have quite a different 
and much more vivid impression of what it’s all about. I’m bubbling over with 
impressions at the moment which will take a bit more time to sort out’.327 He sounded 
less certain about solving the Bosnian problem by increasing pressure on the Serbian
325 Quoted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 250. Mr Hurd was interviewed on Channel 4  News, 
15 July 1992.
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side. The UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, Lewis MacKenzie, who was later
openly to demand the appeasement of the Serbs might have played a role influencing 
Douglas Hurd’s perception of the conflict. While serving in the besieged city Sarajevo 
which was surrounded by the Serbian heavy artillery to suffocate the city till surrender, 
General MacKenzie was equally apportioning the blame to both sides, perhaps seeing 
the Muslims as provocative of the conflict.326 728
The relations between the Bosnian officials and General MacKenzie had never been 
good. As early as April 23, when Lord Carrington went to Sarajevo and met President 
Izetbegovic, he was also briefed by the UN Commander there. The Sector Sarajevo 
commander openly criticised the Bosnian army for impending his efforts to carry out 
his mission. He accused the Bosnian Presidency of coercing the international 
community into intervening militarily, and therefore being in no mood to be co­
operative about honouring the cease-fire agreements.329 He recommended that 
Carrington ‘advise the president that he would not receive military intervention and 
consequently should negotiate a solution with Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs’. 
MacKenzie agreed that the logical consequences of Serb and Croat territorial ambition 
was that Bosnia should be wiped off the map, and the republic’s two million Muslims 
should agree to live under either Serbian or Croatian domination.330 As a result, his 
relationship with the Bosnian authorities was irrevocably soured. Quickly he came to
326 Quoted in Ibid., 250. As reported on 6 pm News on BBC I, 17 July 1992.
327 Quoted in Ibid., 250-1. Interview with Channel 4 News, 20 July 1992.
328 Nevertheless, his opinion was going to be shared by many others soon afterwards; the most 
important of them being David Owen.
329 In fact, MacKenzie was right in his conclusion; Izetbegovic’s strategy was to try to force 
international military intervention. Izetbegovic, by the end of the summer 1992, was calling for an 
international policy that become known as ‘lift and strike’ -the lifting of the arms embargo against 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the use of NATO air-power to hit Serbs’ overwhelming firepower 
superiority.
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be regarded as pro-Serbian ‘Chetnik’ by the press and population in Sarajevo, as well 
as by others outside Bosnia.30 31 Actually, after retiring from the Canadian Army in 
1993, he confirmed this opinion by making a series of public appearances in the US 
organised by SerbNet, a Serb-American lobby group.332
On 20 July 1992, the thirty-ninth Bosnian cease-fire broke down with the hopes of the 
EC, its member states and the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. It was 
apparent that European mediation led nowhere and that Britain’s EC partners were 
tired of diplomatic attacks of the British Government with its ‘well-oiled diplomatic 
machine’ as the situation on the ground in Bosnia and Hercegovina went from bad to 
worse to catastrophic. There were real pressures for the use of coercive action against 
the Bosnian Serbs as the awful picture emerged of the ‘ethnic cleansing’, including the 
concentration camps, as well as systematic rape, killing and terrorisation. Lord Owen, 
writing as an individual commentator, at the time, called for air strikes against the 
Serbs. Even Lord Carrington felt that an international ‘military presence’ on the 
ground might assist in stopping the fighting. But Douglas Hurd remained firm and 
replied to all such calls for intervention, stating that: “there is ample justification for 
action. If we judged that a few days of sharp military action would bring the suffering 
to an end, the case would be overwhelming”.333
330 See Lewis MacKenzie’s memoirs, Peacekeeper (Vancouver: Douglas McIntyre, 1993).
331 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. p. 96. Also see Gutman, Witness to Genocide, 168-173.
332 Once on such an occasion, he told the House Armed Services Committee: ‘Dealing with Bosnia is 
a bit like dealing with serial killers -one has killed fifteen, one has killed ten, one has killed five’, and 
asked ‘Do we help the one who has only killed five?, Quoted in Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse, 194n.
333 Quoted in Malcolm, Bosnia, 245. Article by Douglas Hurd, Mail on Sunday, 9 August 1992.
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He was admitting for the first time that it might be right to ‘increase the level of 
fighting’ in the short term in order to end it in the long term. But he was still 
resolutely opposed to the idea of applying this principle by allowing the Bosnian 
government to defend itself using its own forces and an adequate supply of weapons. 
Since, he, like other most Western leaders, still viewed the fighting in terms of a civil 
war: ‘It is a war with no front line...village is divided against village’, he was reluctant 
to intervene with British troops on the ground.334
In the meantime, the French were attacking openly at Carrington’s ineffective role and 
calling for a new and grander peace conference, even hinting that the UN should 
replace Lord Carrington. French President Roland Dumas at the Munich summit of 
the G-7 openly called for enlargement of the EC conference which, it was felt, had 
become exhausted. In addition, tension between the EC and the UN had reached 
breaking point, Britain being in the forefront. In an interview, Boutros-Ghali had 
referred to himself as being seen as a ‘wog’, a British colonial term of 
disparagement.335 Therefore, establishment of a joint procedure was prerogative to 
soothe relations between the EC and UN. Serbia, also, from the very beginning 
declared its position unsafe dealing with a German dominated EC foreign policy and 
hinted that, in a UN directed Conference, it would feel itself in a position to make 
some concessions.
334 Malcolm, Bosnia, 245-46. Douglas Hurd’s perception of the war, as ‘this was a civil war between 
Bosnian villagers’ and the way he says them actually derives from Serbian propaganda. See Adrian 
Hastings, SOS Bosnia (London: United Kingdom Citizens’ Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
1993).
335 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 22. Owen tells that ‘although there were problems between the UN 
Secretary General and the UK Permanent Representative. David Hannay... it was kind of him to see 
Owen, a retired British politician.’
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Under these circumstances, John Major had to act as if Britain’s presidency was not to 
be marred by the loss of its chairmanship of the EC Yugoslav Peace Conference. 
Anxious to avoid the humiliation of seeing Britain’s hold on the peacemaker’s position 
snatched away by France, John Major, fresh from his election triumph, decided to 
trump any criticism of the Hague Conference and Lord Carrington’s approach by 
summoning a bigger and better conference to London at the end of August.
Unfortunately, at the end of July, as the Conference was being mooted, Douglas Hurd 
actually wiped off all the effectiveness of the Conference by telling the BBC: “I 
suppose all options will be discussed, but one option that I don’t think is feasible, and 
having been to Yugoslavia, I am even more clear about it, and that option is using 
military force against hostile opposition to impose a particular solution”. 336 Hurd was 
sure that the London Conference would not lead ‘to a solution which is imposed 
against force by force’. Ruling out the use of force against any resistant part to the 
war, of course, simply left it open to that side, particularly if it was winning, to attend 
the London Conference and still carry on with the war. Douglas Hurd’s public 
pronouncements in the run-up to the London Conference must count among the most 
contradictory series of diplomatic signals ever dispatched by a holder of his high 
office.337 Hurd had nothing to offer but talk. There were objectives -a cease-fire, 
political arrangements, etc. - ‘but you only reach them by talking.
In the run up to the Conference, the international atmosphere was heavy with both the 
prospects of strong coercive action and international capitulation to the realities of
336 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 261. Douglas Hurd was quoted on the 6 pm. News, BBC Radio 
4, 25 July 1992.
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Serbian territorial acquisition in Bosnia. These contradictory concerns had resulted in 
the UN Security Council Resolution 770 on 13 August 1992 authorising ‘all necessary 
measures’ to be taken in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.37 38 When 
those framing the policy felt unable to take more robust military action to stop the 
bloodshed in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they invented some form of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ instead of ‘military intervention’. Despite massive evidence by June 1992 
of Serb concentration camps in Northern Bosnia, in which women were systematically 
raped and men of military age executed, the UN refused to treat this as an inter-state 
war of aggression, but only as humanitarian crisis.
UNSCR 770 had authorised the use of all necessary measures to facilitate, in co­
ordination with the UN, the delivery of relief by reputable humanitarian organisations 
and agencies.339 Major Western governments, unable to establish the peace on the 
ground, named their new policy ‘comprehensive response’, and designated UNHCR as 
‘lead agency’ to define the international mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The aim of 
this very noble policy was to give ‘humanitarian aid’ to as many people as possible in 
isolated communities, under siege, thus enabling them to remain where they were and 
to avoid becoming refugees. This policy served two main purposes. First, it relieved 
the international community the burden of accommodating refugees out of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, mainly in their own countries as asylum seekers. Secondly, it confirmed 
that the international relief agencies would not any more find themselves the 
collaborators to ethnic cleansing.340
337 Ibid., 261.
338 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 225-6.
339 UN SCR 770, 13 August 1992.
340 Gow, Triumph o f the Lack of Will, 111. Also see, Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 247-8.
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Just after the London Conference, on 14 September the Security Council passed 
Resolution 776, carrying the concept further and representing a major extension of 
UNPROFOR’s mandate.341 This enabled UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia- 
Hercegovina to provide the type of protective support for UNHCR convoys which 
they had hitherto provided around Sarajevo.342 Glynn Evans, at the time in charge of 
the UN desk in the British Foreign Office, claims that, it was a British idea to extend 
the mandate of UNPROFOR to use force to protect the aid convoys.343 The first 
British commander in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Colonel Bob Stewart, nevertheless 
records that his mandate and the rules of engagement were far from clear.344 He 
recalls that;
“Summoned to a briefing at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), I knew 
that I had been singled out to lead the first British infantry battalion 
in Bosnia, where the security situation was deteriorating badly. The 
MoD briefing gave me very little useful information, however. 
Everything was very tentative and it was clear that several senior 
officials present had severe misgivings, the army having been 
committed to action by a political decision of the government. It 
seemed our purpose was simply to assist the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to get aid delivered -nothing 
more. It was all very vague."345
341 UN SCR 776, 14 September 1992. Paragraph 2 of Resolution 776 explicitly stated that the 
enlargement of UNPROFOR was to implement paragraph 2 of Resolution 770 which accorded the 
authorisation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter permitting ‘use of all necessary measures’ to 
secure the delivery o f humanitarian assistance.
342 Rather different in character than the mission in Croatia, the mandate for UNPROFOR in Bosnia 
was primarily humanitarian.
343 Sharp, Honest Broker, 17.
344 Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict (London: Harper Collins, 
1993).
345 Bob Stewart, “Love in a Cold Climate,” The Sunday Times, 12 October 1997.
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The only thing made clear was that, while escorting the aid convoys in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, UNPROFOR was to use its armaments only in self defence if fired upon 
first. In that sense, the restrictions put on the British contingent at Vitez was more 
strict than the rules of engagement the French government envisaged for the French 
force in Bihac.346 In order to avoid giving the impression that British decision to 
commit troops to UNPROFOR II might be seen as leading to more robust action, the 
British Ministry of Defence assured MPs that the British contingent would be 
withdrawn if fired upon.347
It was apparent that UNPROFOR’s deployment in Bosnia and Hercegovina was not a 
UN peace keeping force being deployed in the traditional static, conflict termination 
role of classic UN peace keeping. It was not a peace enforcement operation either. In 
fact, UNPROFOR’s de facto mandate was to create and maintain stalemate on the 
ground to allow international diplomacy to work.348 In fact, the decision to send 
peace-keepers to Bosnia and Hercegovina instead of robust forces to impose a peace 
guaranteed that no serious effort would be made to antagonise Serb forces or to 
reverse Serbian war gains.349 This was quite in line with Britain’s expectations that the 
Serbs had won war, and that it was only a question of this fact determining the peace 
treaty. And, therefore, any action likely to reverse Serbs’ gains or even to 
considerably slow down the Serbs’ war machinery was anathema to Britain at that 
time. As a British expert puts it boldly:
■ 346 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 112.
347 Jane M. O. Sharp, Bankrupt in the Balkans, 13-4.
348 Gow, Triumph of the Lack o f Will, 101-2.
349 Sharp, Bankrupt in the Balkans, 18.
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“A consensual non-combatant doctrine is advantageous and 
contributes to stability when peace keepers are maintaining a cease 
fire. But when passive peace keepers are maldeployed into the 
middle of an ongoing war, it is apparent that they encourage more 
offensive action from the strongest belligerent. Far from being 
impartial, peace keepers deployed in a war zone will always favour 
the party that has the most military success.”350
Obviously, sending soldiers without empowering them with necessary means to ensure 
the route was open for free passage of aid convoys has created problems throughout 
UNPROFOR’s mandate. UNPROFOR forces had to try means like bargaining and 
bribing the local militias to pass the aid convoys through. In some places, Bosnian 
Serbs were regularly receiving as much as a quarter of the deliveries which passed 
through the check points, and extorting large sums of money.351
As another British expert pointed out, it was not only a question of neglect, namely, 
the lack of mandate for soldiers on the ground, but it was perhaps because of the 
nature of British policy that Britain’s soldiers in Bosnia soon became friends of their 
Serb counterparts:
“psychological factors include the military camaraderie instinctively 
felt by the British officers for their Serb opposite numbers, many of 
whom had been full time soldiers in the old Yugoslav Federal Army. 
These were people with whom one could swap regimental cap badges 
and military anecdotes; General Rose, in a dismaying lapse of
350 Ibid.
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judgement, even accepted an elaborate painting of himself, 
surrounded with symbols representing the rebirth of Serbian 
nationhood. The Bosnian army on the other hand, was a makeshift 
thing to begin with, lacking a proper equipment and uniforms and 
staffed mainly by volunteers. Another psychological aspect of this is 
that, ‘when you have been sent to protect people and are unable 
properly to do so, it is only human that some of your feelings of 
frustration should turn into a kind of irritated resentment directed 
against those people themselves.”351 52
5.2. “Everyone is a Loser”353: The London Conference
London Conference, co-chaired by the British Prime Minister John Major as the 
President of the European Council, and the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali, was held on 26-7 August 1992. It created a jointly-run International 
Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to replace the European Community 
Conference on Yugoslavia (Carrington Conference).354 As a joint EC-UN initiative, 
the two would be working more closely together; the EC would pursue the diplomatic 
cause and the UN would primarily be responsible for operations on the ground. In 
sum, the London Conference would give new impetus and clarity to the international 
quest for peace and principle. Membership of the August 1992 London Conference
351 Ibid., 14.
352 Malcolm, “The Whole Lot,” 16.
353 The Financial Times, a reliable monitor of Foreign Office thinking, subtitled its montage of map 
and dramatis personae to illustrate its coverage of the London Peace Conference: ‘Yugoslavia: 
everyone's a loser'. However, as time went by the suspicion grew that some people in die Foreign 
Office had decided that on balance they wanted Serbia to win. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 258.
354 Prior to the set up of ICFY by the London Conference in August 1992, the UN and the EC’s 
peacemaking efforts in Former Yugoslavia had not been drawn together in one body: the UN’s had 
been entrusted to the Secretary General’s Envoy, Cyrus Vance, the EC’s to their Envoy, Lord 
Carrington.
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included, in addition to all international bodies, the Former Yugoslav parties and all the 
neighbouring states.
One immediate development at the Conference was the replacement of Lord 
Carrington as the EC Special Envoy with another former British Foreign Secretary, 
David Owen. Owen’s co-chairman was the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, 
Cyrus Vance.355 First signs were promising. Lord Owen told the Sunday Telegraph 
that he believed that the “London Conference was the turning point. Serbia learnt 
what it meant to be an international pariah -that the world was not prepared to sit back 
and shrug off its territorial acquisitions.” Turning to the fate of the Muslims in Bosnia, 
Owen insisted that “we have to convince them that they are not going to be the victims 
of Realpolitik...if we allow it to happen to the Muslims of Bosnia the whole of Islam 
will react and rightly so.”356
Appointment of Lord Owen had created an atmosphere of optimism among the 
Bosnian Muslims including the Bosnian Government officials and equally depressed 
the Serbian side. Lord Owen had previously made his presence felt in the Bosnian 
matter by demanding that NATO use its air power to halt the Serbs, just as Lady 
Thatcher had done. According to Lord Owen:
“Had NATO intervened from the air in the autumn o f  1991 against 
the Yugoslav JNA, it could have moderated the worst excesses o f  the 
w ar... If N A TO  forces had attempted to move in on the ground, in 
areas like Knin in the Krajina, a Serb stronghold, they would have 
found it hard to pacify them and would have risked being locked into
355 Unlike Lord Carrington, Lord Owen would go into full-time work in Geneva.
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a conflict -possibly a long one- with the Serbs. But NATO action 
from the air could probably have stopped the three-month Serb 
shelling of Vukovar, and NATO action from the sea the short spell of 
shelling of Dubrovnik.”356 57
Although Lord Owen made it clear that he was reluctant to see ‘British forces involved 
in a combatant role’; obviously, he was in favour of the British Government making a 
stark choice to stop the atrocities;
“At what point should we say enough was enough?. First we had 
watched the shelling by the JNA and Serb militias of Vukovar, then 
Dubrovnik; then the Serb shelling of Sarajevo; and now we were 
discovering what were being described not unreasonably, as Serb 
concentration camps... John Major, as Prime Minister, should call 
for an international threat of air strikes in relation to the Serbs in a 
fashion not dissimilar to the ‘safe haven’ initiative which I urged him 
to take over the Kurds that previous year”.358
Getting tougher on the issue, on 30 July 1992, in the BBC Today radio programme, 
David Owen called on John Major to act and to use NATO air power to impose a 
cease fire.359 He also sent a letter to Prime Minister, urging him not to accept the
356 See Sunday Telegraph, 27 September 1992, quoted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 260-1.
357 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 12-3. However, he also argued that the Europeans in NATO could not 
have acted militarily in 1991 without the US. The Germans were excluded from military 
participation, and Turkey and Greece, he added, were felt to be mutually excluded; Britain and France 
were never ready to put ground forces into a combatant role in what they felt was a civil war of far 
greater complexity than was presented on television news bulletins.
358 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 13.
359 He argued that, since the prison camps were in western and northern Bosnia, not in the mountains, 
the associated military installations could easily be reached from NATO airfields based in 
surrounding countries and, given the flat terrain, action from the air against Serb military targets 
could have been as surgical as in the desert Harness of Iraq. ‘About the military intervention’, he said
145
conventional wisdom that nothing can be done militarily to stop the escalation of 
ighting and the continuation of grotesque abuses of human rights’. Owen wrote that 
Lord Carrington’s mission on behalf of the European Community can not deliver the 
ort of peacemaking not just peacekeeping that is so urgent’. He suggested that ‘the 
irst essential step was to stop by threat of force the use or movement of any military 
lircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles, or artillery in the former territory of Yugoslavia. 
&nd NATO had the power to enforce such an immediate cease-fire’. Also mentioning 
current attacks on bigger cities such as Sarajevo and Gorazde, he advised 
‘reinforcements by air with troops acting under the authority of UN, if necessary 
initially parachuting men and materials in to secure air communications’. He added 
that ‘If these actions are taken within days, a peace settlement can be negotiated, 
otherwise, if no action is taken immediately, there will be virtually nothing left of 
Bosnia for the Muslim population to negotiate about’.360
David Owen’s opinion, at that time, was that London Conference was a defusing 
device, a diplomatic way of reducing pressure to act - a mere delaying tactic. Owen 
was right in considering the Conference as another tactic to calm down the public 
opinion demanding concrete action to stop the suffering of people in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. This was a recurring pattern, once television screens exhausted their 
materiel on ethnic cleansing and atrocities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, public opinion 
would forget about the situation in Bosnia thereby reducing pressure on the politicians
that ‘there, unlike Sarajevo, there was an opportunity for limited action for a humanitarian purpose 
which did not set NATO on an automatic escalator to putting in ground troops’. ‘Moreover’, he 
argued, ‘the UN was not yet involved on the ground except for a small contingent of 300 to keep 
Sarajevo airport open who would need to be removed or reinforced before any strike action, as would 
UNHCR and other aid workers’. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 13-4. BBC Radio Four, Today, 30 
July 1992.
146
or immediate and effective action. So, whenever, such a tide occurred with heavy 
»erbian attacks on civilians, western politicians were appearing on television screens 
vith promises to stop the violence and atrocities, taking firm action but at the end they 
vould end up only with face saving gestures.
in his replying letter to Lord Owen, Prime Minister, John Major stated the main aim of 
launching London Conference on 26 August, as ‘to mobilise international pressure on 
all the former Yugoslav parties and in particular the Serbs to abandon their wholly 
unacceptable use of force’. However, he specifically mentioned that ‘he does not 
believe that that was the right time to think in terms of a military solution’. John Major 
argued that, Britain ‘could not unite the international community behind such a policy’. 
To his view, ‘there are real difficulties over proposals to use either air power or 
ground forces. Air power would be unlikely to be enough. The number of forces 
involved, the likely length of the operations and the level of casualties (civilian as well 
as military) would be very high’. He also argued that ‘we are not dealing with an 
orthodox war, a single enemy, a front line, or clearly identifiable targets’. He 
continued ‘Nor do I detect any support in Parliament or in public opinion for 
operations which would tie down large numbers of British forces in difficult and 
dangerous terrain for a long period.361
Before he became co-chairman of the International Conference in Former Yugoslavia, 
David Owen disagreed with the government’s objections to any aggressive military 
response and ‘challenged the Whitehall mood that there was nothing that could be 360
360 Ibid., 15-6. Owen’s letter to Prime Minister dated 30 July, 1992, it was also published in the 
Evening Standard, 30 July 1992.
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done’.361 62 So, when the decision was announced at the end of August 1992 to appoint 
Lord Owen as EC negotiator on ex-Yugoslavia, it was seen as a clear warning that 
Europe was prepared to get tough with Serbia. Nevertheless, within weeks, the 
fragility of Owen’s decisiveness became apparent; by September 1992 he was arguing 
against tightening sanctions on Belgrade, and urging the world to give the ‘Yugoslav’ 
government what he called ‘the benefit of the doubt’.363 By February 1994, Lord 
Owen was telling the media, ‘Only a fool would support air strikes’.364
5.2.1. The Failure of the London Conference and Establishment of the 
Permanent Conference in Geneva
John Major, in his opening address to the London Conference as co-chairman, 
indicated that the need for a peace process that ‘should be coupled with necessary 
international pressures to bring success’.365 Others were more specific in describing 
the elements of coercion; the admission of observers in a number of places in the 
former Yugoslavia, especially Serbia and Montenegro, a tightening of the trade 
embargo, expulsion of Serbian representatives from international bodies, and the
361 Ibid., 19.
362 Ibid., 20. However, about lifting the arms embargo, Owen told Bosnian Government’s 
representative to UN, Muhamed Sacirbey that ‘He could not see any way in which the UN arms 
embargo would or should be lifted’. While Owen admitted that it was discriminatory against the 
Muslims, as it had been against the Croats, in that the Serbs in Bosnia had large supplies of 
equipment and ammunition’, ‘no Security Council’, he argued, ‘could be seen to fuel die fire by 
lifting the ban’. Ibid., 23.
363 Quoted in Noel Malcolm, “New Light on Owen,” Bosnia Report (Newsletter of die Alliance to 
Defend Bosnia-Hercegovina), Issue 2, December 1993,1-2.
364 Quoted in Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 261. Lord Owen’s statements, 8 February 
1994.
365 Opening Speech given by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon John Major MP, at the London 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 26 August 1992, 66. See The International Conference on 
Former Yugoslavia, Official Papers, Volume I, ed. B. G. Ramcbaran (The Hague, London, Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997), 64-68.
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setting up of an international tribunal to try those guilty of, or responsible for crimes 
against humanity.366
In addition, a specific military proposal came from French Foreign Minister Roland 
Dumas on ‘air-exclusion zone’ over Bosnia banning all military flights, other than 
authorised by the UN. He proposed surveillance and reconaissance flight over Bosnian 
territory and introduced the idea of controlling the Bosnian air space. That action 
would certainly ease humanitarian flights into Sarajevo and deny the Serbs its absolute 
military advantage in the air.367
During his address to the London Conference, Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic 
was very co-operative in his attitude and insistently opposing the use of force to 
change borders between republics. He also announced that Belgrade had officially 
recognised Slovenia and prepared to recognise the other republics.368 This meant that 
the new Yugoslavia had no territorial claims on any of its neighbours and that it 
rejected the ‘barbaric practice of ethnic cleansing in any form’.369 Panic even
366 Statement by Mr. Hans van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands at the 
London Conference on Yugoslavia (145-8). Others supporting further action in their interventions at 
the Conference included German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (94-7), Secretary of State for 
External Affairs of Canada; Barbara MacDougall (148-52), Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark 
Uffe Elleman-Jensen (84-7) and Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock. See “Final Documents,” in 
The International Conference on Former Yugoslavia,
367 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 226-7.
368 T he Speech of Mr. Milan Panic at the London Conference, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 26 
August 1992.
369 While the Federal Prime Minister (holding a higher position than that of a republican president) 
was making a number of agreements and, in some cases offers, Milosevic, Serbia’s President, was 
sitting behind and kept silence throughout the Conference. In fact, during the Conference Milosevic 
and Panic argued publicly and behind the scenes, Milosevic even threatened to punch him. Milosevic 
chose Panic, Belgrade born millionaire from California, to get his help to end Yugoslavia’s 
quarantine through Panic’s connections in Washington. However, after he became the Prime 
Minister of Yugoslavia, Panic had refused to follow orders from Milosevic. The enmity between two 
politicians erupted during London Conference. It is reported that, at the Conference, Milosevic asked 
to speak. Panic scribbled something on a piece of paper and held it up in front of Serbian President. 
It said ‘shut up’ in English. Panic then showed the paper to the Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence
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suggested that the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the two-thirds of the land 
occupied by Bosnian Serb forces.370
By the end of the Conference, it seemed much progress had been made; There was 
general agreement on principles and on a programme of action which would have 
immediate effect both on the ground and in Geneva where the International 
Conference on Yugoslavia would go into permanent session. Major hailed the 
Conference a success, providing a comprehensive framework for the first time since 
the conflict erupted. “We know now what needs to be done,” he said, “how it needs 
to be done and by whom it needs to be done”.371 However, the initial optimism was 
soon to fade as the international community pleased with what it achieved in London 
and western governments averted the wave of criticism and pressure from the public 
consciousness.
One of the key successes of the London Conference claimed by the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was an accord that the Serbian camp would notify the UN of all 
heavy weapons and their positions within 96 hours, and place the weapons under UN 
supervision within seven days. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic signed a 
special agreement with Douglas Hogg, the UK Deputy Foreign Minister. However, as 
Boutros-Ghali complained before, the UN was not equipped to implement these kind 
of agreements.372 As a British expert points out; ‘it later emerged that ‘supervision’ 
was to be interpreted in its original, etymological sense: the UN monitors were allowed
Eagleburger, former Ambassador to Belgrade and -once- a friend of Milosevic. See Silber and Little, 
Death o f Yugoslavia, Chapter 19, ‘We are the Winners, The London Conference’, 258-64.
370 The Speech of Mr. Milan Panic at the London Conference, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 26 
August 1992. “Final Documents,” in The International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.
371 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 260.
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to look over the artillery pieces above Sarajevo every day while they were being 
fired’.372 73
The ‘Statement of Principles’ agreed during the conference was important because it 
established the standard by which all the parties to the negotiations mostly the Serbs, 
agreed to be judged.374 These set of thirteen principles were:
1. cessation of the use of force
2. non-recognition of all advantages gained by force
3. negotiation by all parties on the basis of these principles
4. respect for human rights
5. guarantees of human rights for persons of ethnic and national minorities
6. condemnation of ethnic cleansing; closure of all detention camps; and return of all 
displaced persons
7. compliance with the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 codifying international 
humanitarian law for the protection of victims of war, and personal responsibility 
for any breaches of these conventions.
8. obligation to respect integrity of states and inviolability of frontiers
9. settlement of issues by consensus or arbitration not by force
10. full compliance with all UNSC Resolutions
11. provision for humanitarian aid to reach those in need, especially children
12. the co-operation in international monitoring, peace keeping and arms control 
operations
372 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 230.
373 Malcolm, Bosnia, 246.
151
13. need for international guarantees to ensure full implementation of agreements
reached within the framework of the International Conference.
A leading British expert argues that “if followed, the principles established during the 
London Conference would have produced a very different peace agreement that the 
one agreed at Dayton in November 1995”.374 75 However, in the final declaration, the 
Conference participants just urged the ‘warring parties’ to lay down their arms, or risk 
increasing isolation and tougher sanctions. It was stated that;
“If... Serbia and Montenegro do intend to fulfil these obligations in 
deed as well as word they will resume a respected position in the 
international community...If they do not comply the Security Council 
will be invited to apply stringent sanctions leading to their total 
international isolation.”376
At that time, no western government (least of all the British who hosted the 
Conference) was prepared to make the case to impose a settlement risking any kind of 
military involvement. At the end, the implementation of the principles agreed at the 
Conference had not been secured. As one senior American official admitted;
“History might have taken a different course if, the day after the 
London Conference, we had started insisting that all the terms of the 
London Conference agreement were upheld. There was a serious
374 The London Conference, LC/C2 (Final), 26 August 1992, in The International Conference on 
Former Yugoslavia, 33-4.
375 Sharp, Honest Broker, 19-20.
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debate and there was serious concern. We felt, even then, that the 
willingness to use force to enforce the terms of the London 
Conference was probably essential, that that was the only thing that 
the Serbs would respect.”376 77
In a sense the London Conference was typical of the international response to the war 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Unless the war came to threaten their own interests directly, 
Britain and France, the two countries with the military might to make a difference, 
were determined to stay out, and thus international involvement was restricted to 
measures aimed at ensuring that fighting did not come to threaten western European 
interests.
As a result, both the atmosphere at the London Conference and the attitudes of 
organisers mainly the British government was comforting rather than threatening for 
the Serbian camp to comply with the agreement. Although the text was harsh, for the 
Serbian President the outcome was much better than expected. The declaration did 
not mention the ‘use of force’ to punish the warring parties. This was an important 
victory for Serbia. Accusations and condemning words alone would not penalise the 
Serbs. As Dusan Mitevic, confidant of Milosevic and Chief of Belgrade television, 
said:
376 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 261-2.
377 This American official is David Gompert who was the Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia,
• National Security Council Staff with the Bush Administration. Quoted in Gow, Triumph of the Lack
of Will, 231. Also see David C. Gompert, ‘The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” in The World 
and Yugoslavia’s Wars, ed Richard H. Ullman (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 
1996), 122-44.
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“Looking at it cynically, the London Conference virtually endorsed 
all the effects of war... Until then, Serbia and Yugoslavia were being 
struck off the agenda everywhere... but all of a sudden, Cosic was at 
the conference table as president of Yugoslavia... and Panic was 
there as prime minister. You mustn’t forget that the Conference 
ended with John Major saying ‘God help us and Mr. Panic for a 
peaceful solution to the problem...’ Milosevic was also there -with 
all the cards in his pocket. And this was the first time the Bosnian 
Serbs with Karadzic appeared, not as official members of the 
conference, but there anyway.”378
Obviously, the agreement achieved at the end of the London Conference was far from 
addressing the fundamental causes of the conflict. The emphasis was put on two kinds 
of things: military solutions to military problems, and humanitarian solutions to 
humanitarian problems. Although the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was now in general j 
currency, there was still a tendency to assume that the essential problem was military, 
and that the flight of coerced and terrorised populations was merely a by-product of 
the fighting. It was then described as a humanitarian problem which could be solved 
by moving refugees into refugee camps outside Bosnia.379
Unfortunately, the London Conference had not changed the basic cause of the failure 
of the international peacemaking efforts; failure of understanding the underlying causes 
of war. Although in their statements during the summer months of 1992 and in the 
London Conference in August 1992, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and 
Prime Minister John Major both expressed views that suggested they understood the
378 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 262.
379 Malcolm, Bosnia, 246.
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difference between the Serb aggressors and the largely Muslim and Croat victims of 
the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, thereafter government spokesmen increasingly equated 
aggressors and victims as equally guilty for the war.380 This ‘evenhandedness’ might 
have been as a result of the ‘reelpolitik’ which says that it is more important to end the 
war quickly even if on Serb terms, than to seek with justice. British government, 
during the war in Bosnia, resorted to all kinds of possible means to justify its 
conviction that ‘this is a civil war and an eruption of hundreds of years of ethnic hatred 
among the Balkan peoples’.
380 Sharp, Honest Broker, 21.
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CHAPTER VI: BOSNIAN PEACE PROCESS:
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIFTS
5.1. International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and 
the Vance-Owen Plan
As a new stage of the EC’s diplomatic efforts, the International Conference on Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY) formally became the successor to the European Community 
Conference on Yugoslavia and convened for the first time on 3 September 1992 at the 
UN headquarters in Geneva. Although it was structured to handle negotiations on the 
future of post-Yugoslav states and their relationships, the main focus of international 
diplomacy and most of ICFY’s attention were on the war in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.381 While the terrors of Bosnia and Hercegovina were continuing, the 
officials at ICFY in Geneva were working on a plan for the constitutional settlement of 
the war. Previously, the EC plan which had been based on the adoption of an idea of 
ethnic territories or ‘cantons’ was rejected by the Bosnian Government. 
Unfortunately, it had served in reality as a ‘charter for ethnic cleansing’; ethnically 
designated cantons created the basis for ethnically pure territories.382
In early October 1992, the ‘Bosnia and Hercegovina Working Group’ in Geneva 
headed by Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari drafted a set of five options for the future 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina. These five options ranged from the Bosnian Government
381 Graham Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia: The Politico-Military 
Interface, London Defence Study No. 21 (London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, 
1994), 2-3.
382 See Chapter IV.
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preference -a centralised multi-ethnic, multi-confessional states with local functions 
assigned to some 4-10 communes and whose boundaries would not be set on ethnic 
lines -to the Serb and Croat preference for the three way partition of Bosnia into a 
Bosnian Muslim state, allowing the Bosnian Serbs an autonomous state closely 
associated with Serbia and the Bosnian Croats similar arrangement with Croatia. In 
between, there were three other options with varying degrees of autonomy for the 
three main ethnic groups, all within a single state of Bosnia and Hercegovina.383
The option which was presented as Vance-Owen Plan in late October 1992 was in the 
middle of the range; envisaging a set of 7-10 regions, most of which would have ethnic 
majorities, but which were to be constitutionally designed as multi-cultural.384 Rather 
than being divided into three ethnically created ‘cantons’, the country would be 
‘regionalised’ in a larger number of units and, most important, a single Bosnian state 
with a central government aimed to be retained.385 Negotiations continued throughout 
the autumn 1992, in the Working Group and with the Bosnian Government and 
Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders.386
383 The five options were; a centralised state; a centralised federal state with significant functions 
carried out by between four to ten regions; a loose federal state of three ethnic units, not 
geographically continuous; a loose confederation of three ethnically determined republics with 
significant independence, possibly even in the security field and finally; a Muslim state, with Serbs 
becoming part of FRY and Croats becoming part of Croatia. ICFY Working Paper on Constitutional 
Options, 4 October 1992. This was also the preliminary plan submitted to the parties in October 
1992. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 65.
384 The ‘Options for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ document was presented to the UN Security Council in 
a Report by Secretary General on 11 November 1992. See the Report of the UN Secretary General on 
the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/24795,11 November 1992.
385 The new model was described as the ‘Provincial Model’ as opposed to Carrington’s ‘Communal 
Model’.
386 As Graham Messervy-Whiting reported ‘channels were quickly opened up with all the local 
parties’ as he called them, including the Presidency, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat parties. Graham 
Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia, 3. At that time, the wartime Bosnian 
Presidency consisted of three Muslims (Izetbegovic, Abdic and General Delic), three Serbs (Pejanovic, 
Ljujic-Mijatovic, and Lazovic), three Croats (Lasic, Boras and Akmadzic) and one ‘other’ (Ganic, a 
Muslim). See Ibid., 37.
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Finally, after plenary discussions with the parties, co-chairman put before the Steering 
Committee on 30 January 1993 ‘Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina’ in 
two parts; the military agreement and the constitutional document with the provisional 
map as an annex.387 The core of the Vance-Owen plan was to create a highly ‘de­
centralised state’ in which the three ethnic groups would be recognised as the 
‘constituent units o f  Bosnia and Hercegovina. The state was going to be organised 
administratively into ten provinces with a substantial autonomy (Map 4). Each of the 
Provinces would have a mixture of the different ethnic groups, also containing a 
dominant majority from one particular group. In each province a Governor, Vice- 
Governor and ten other members were to be nominated by the local parties on the 
basis of the composition of the population of that province, as determined in the 1991 
census, that is, before the outbreak of war and ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina with the proviso that none of the three parties would be 
underrepresented.388 Three provinces were to be designated Serb majorities (Banja 
Luka, Bijeljina and Nevesinge), two with a Croat majority (Mostar and Bosanki Brod), 
four would have Muslim majorities but would retain their multi-ethnic character 
(Bihac, Tuzla, Zenica and Travnik). One province would be assigned to the multi­
ethnic central government in Sarajevo, which would be responsible for foreign policy, 
international commerce, citizenship rights, defence and taxation.
387 The Vance-Owen Plan was first published by the UNSC as Secretary General’s Report UN Doc. 
S/25221_dated 2 February 1992. On 2 January 1993, the First Plenary Session of Bosnian parties 
convened by the ICFY took place and January version of the plan was unveiled. That meeting was 
attended by five delegations, headed for the Bosnian Croats by Mate Boban, for the Bosnian 
government by President Izetbegovic and for the Bosnian Serbs by Karadzic, as well as by President 
Tudjman of Croatia and President Cosic for FRY. See, Opening Statements by the Parties and the 
ICYF Co-chairmen at plenary session, Geneva, 2 January 1992. Messervy-Whiting, Peace 
Conference, 8-11.
388 For full details, see Annex A, UN Doc. S/25221, 2 February 1993.
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MAP 4
THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN
SOURCE: The Guardian
January 1993 version of the Vance-Owen Plan was drastically different than the 
original October version, since it had put ethnic labels on the ‘regions’. Although 
David Owen argues in his book ‘Balkan Odyssey’ that they were careful ‘not to label 
any provinces Serb, Croat and Muslim contrary to the impression given by some 
newspapers and commentaries’, but they put ‘numbers and place names on the map’, 
basically implying who would get what.389
At a conference convened by the Royal Geographic Society in co-operation with the 
Institute of British Geographers on London, the view was put forward arguing that the 
Vance-Owen plan had distinctly harmful effects “by use of ethnic-terminology in its 
map and its imprecision in the drafting of its boundaries, which may have promoted 
aggression and further conflict”.390 The group of all distinguished geographers with 
long research experience in the region stated that “as one of the West’s major 
contributions to ‘solving’ the region’s problems, it is felt that the Vance-Owen Plan 
actually stimulated the civil war and may have encouraged further ethnic cleansing”.391
The insistence on ‘proportionality’ in constituting the Provincial political structures 
could have been considered as a principled step back from the idea of ethnic ‘cantons’. 
However, by the time, Vance-Owen Plan was on the negotiating table, ‘ethnic
389 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 95. Owen gives Noel Malcolm as an example of the critics of the plan 
since Noel Malcolm rightly criticised the January version of the plan, arguing that ‘in the January 
version, unlike the initial version proposed in October, the cantons were given ‘ethnic labels’ on the 
map, and at the same time the impression was given that the precise boundaries on the map were not 
yet final’ . Malcolm, Bosnia, 248.
390 Half a day conference titled ‘Interpreting the Balkans’ was held on 18 May 1995 by the Royal 
Geographic Society. See Press Release of the Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British 
Geographers), London, 18 May 1995.
159
cleansing’ had been underway for almost a year in Bosnia and this made the prospects
for fully implementing the Plan was marginal:
The merits of the Vance-Owen plan were its insistence that refugees 
should be allowed to return to their homes throughout Bosnia, and its 
provision that the cantons corresponding to Serb occupied areas 
would not be connected on the map in such a way as to make it easy 
for them to seek to join Serbia as a single territorial block. 
Unfortunately these two meritorious principles were flatly 
contradicted both by the rest of the plan, and by reality. The rest of 
the plan gave full legislative, judicial and executive powers 
(including policing) to the cantons, making it impossible to believe 
that Muslim refugees could safely return to Serb-ruled cantons. And 
the reality on the ground was that the Serb-held areas were already 
joined on the map; Serb military leaders would never sacrifice these 
links, which were a key element in their plans..391 92
Perhaps, it could be argued, as one British expert did, that, “although Lord Owen was 
talking about dealing with ostensible concerns of the Serbs’, the Vance-Owen Plan 
denied them their two cardinal war aims: ethnic purity and, yet more important, 
contiguous territories”.393 This was, as Lord Owen admitted, ‘nothing more than the 
best that could be achieved in poor circumstances’.394 Basically, Vance-Owen Plan 
was not a total rejection of Serbian policy and acquisition of territory by use of force 
but, still it deprived them of certain vital gains.
391 Press Release of the Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), 
London, 18 May 1995.
392 Malcolm, Bosnia, 248.
393 Gow, Triumph of the Lack o f Will, 241.
394 See Lord Owen’s speech to the United Kingdom Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Foreign 
Affairs Committee, The Expanding Role of the United Nations and Its Implications for UK Policy, 
Minutes of Evidence, HMSO, 1993,105.
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Bosnian Serb leaders (the famous triumvirate -Karadzic, Koljevic and Krajisnik) 
strongly opposed provisions that vested political sovereignty in a central Bosnian 
Governmental authority, and that would prevent the political association and territorial 
linkage of various areas under Serbian control.395 It also required the Serbs to 
relinquish control over a considerable amount of territory they presently controlled. In 
view of their successes on the battlefield, and the consequences of ethnic cleansing 
policy employed in much of the area under their control, Bosnian Serb leaders thought 
themselves in a position to reject ideas put forward by the ICFY in Geneva.396 
Karadzic claimed that the plan was ‘unacceptable to the Serbs’ since ‘it fragments the 
areas under Serbian control’. ‘What we want,’ Karadzic argued, ‘is to preserve our 
people’s unity... The Serbs do not want to accept being broken apart...We can not 
accept that’ ,397
The task of the co-chairmen was to obtain six signatures (in fact, it become nine, when 
the map came to be treated separately from the constitutional document) from what 
was considered to be the leaders of the ‘warring factions’. Initially, only the Bosnian 
Croat leader Mate Boban signed the whole package. Indeed, the proposed map of 
provincial boundaries granted them control not only of areas they had then occupied 
but also of additional territory where Muslims had been in majority. Moreover, in 
view of their de facto sovereignty over most of Western Hercegovina, the Croats had
395 The primary strategic aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to expand and secure the land corridor linking 
Serbia via Bijeljina in the east to the Krajina via Banja Luka in the West. The corridor was cut by 
Bosnian Croat Province (number 3) and the finger of largely Muslim Province (number 5). To 
reconcile these two positions, ICFY developed the concept of a ‘Northern Corridor’, a ‘super 
throughway’ with a demilitarised zone to a depth of five kilometres on either side (See Map 4).
396 Ian Traynor, “The Bottom Line for Bosnia,” The Guardian, 6 January 1993.
397 FBIS-EEU, 30 October 1992, 20.
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already had very close links with Zagreb, so at that moment it mattered very little 
whether Bosnia was regionalised into ten provinces or was subject of a three way 
cantonisation. Boban publicly rejected the constitutional division of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina along ethnic lines but still claimed that ‘within it the Croatian people are 
to have their own rights in a cultural, economic, political, and any other sense, so they 
can be a people with all those trappings of sovereignty that every people have’.398
The Bosnian Government, having already lost political control over most of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina and having suffered terribly as the principal target of the Serbian 
ethnic cleansing campaign, found little to be enthusiastic about the Vance-Owen Plan. 
In Bosnian Presidency’s view, the plan offered very little prospect for the creation of a 
viable centrally governed Bosnian state. In an interview with The Times during his 
visit to London, Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic complained about the stance 
adopted by Britain and its European partners saying that “had Lady Thatcher and not 
John Major been at the helm, the Belgrade government would not have been allowed 
to get away with ‘genocide’ against the Muslim Communities”.399 However, being 
unsuccessful in their attempts to call international community, especially the US, to 
either militarily intervene in Bosnia or lift the arms embargo so that the Muslim side 
could acquire heavy weapons, Bosnian leadership also weighed the political 
advantages of accepting a flawed plan. It would, at least, prevent the establishment of 
para-states as the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats advocated.400 In addition, the
398 FBIS-EEU, 27 October 1992, 26.
399 Reported by Nicholas Wood, “West Told There Must Be No Let-up in Pressure on Belgrade,” The 
Times, 14 January 1993.
400 Bosnian President Izetbegovic later remarked that ‘our goal during the negotiations was to 
eliminate the para-states, so we do not have states within a state. That’s why we went toward this 
compromise with the Provinces... even though we do not like the provinces.’ SWB, February 17, 
1993, Eastern Europe, C .l Special Supplement, EE/1615/C1.
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Bosnian Presidency calculated that if the plan was rejected by the Serbian side, who 
viewed it as even more unacceptable than did the Muslims, the international anger was 
going to be focused upon the Serbs.401
After obtaining Croatian agreement to the peace settlement, and with the expectation 
that the Bosnian Government would eventually accept the plan, Vance and Owen 
turned to the more difficult problem of obtaining Serbian signature. From August to 
December 1992, during the negotiations, they had hoped, along with most Western 
leaders, for the emergence of more flexible and moderate government in Belgrade. It 
was believed that such a government might encourage a peaceful solution of both the 
Bosnian and broader Balkan crisis and also end Serbia’s moral and materiel support for 
Bosnian Serbs. Optimism centred on Milan Panic who made a remarkable presence at 
the London Conference in August.402 Nevertheless, hopes for leadership change in 
Belgrade were destroyed with the electoral victory of Sloodan Milosevic in the 
December 1992 Presidential elections.403
After spending several hours face to face with Radovan Karadzic, confronted by strong 
opposition to their plan by the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale, Vance and Owen 
decided in early January 1993 to deal with realities at hand and asked for Milosevic’s 
assistance.404 Although Milosevic was considered as primarily responsible for all the
401 Vance-Owen had made it quite clear that whoever was perceived to be responsible for obstructing 
an agreement at Geneva would suffer the full consequences of their uncooperative behaviour. David 
Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Chapter 3; “The Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP),” 94-159.
402 During the London Conference, western states had introduced Milan Panic as Yugoslav Federal 
Minister who was ready to co-operate and die focus had turned to him. The baseless promises of 
Milan Panic were taken by die conference organisers as a cause for optimism and an example of what 
the concerted international pressure at die Conference could achieve.
403 Silber and Litde, Death of Yugoslavia, 263.
404 Frances Williams, “Milosevic Seen as Key to Peace Talks,” Financial Times, 8 January 1993.
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bloodshed in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Vance had developed a good relationship with 
him after having secured his support for the cease-fire in Croatia one year earlier. For 
his part, Milosevic had become more flexible concerning the situation in Bosnia for a 
number of reasons. Although, he had exercised considerable manipulation of media 
during the December 1992 Serbian Presidential elections, his margin of victory over 
Panic was not that impressive.405 Even more significant was the terrible state of 
Serbian economy as a result of international sanctions, isolating it from the rest of the 
world. Although Milsoevic was successful in exploiting the resulting conditions of 
country’s isolation and economic deterioration to legitimate his regime’s survival by 
appealing to Serbia people for ‘patriotic unity’ and sacrifice, the anger and anxiety 
were growing considering the seemingly open-ended military struggle in the Balkans.
In addition, by January 1993 the Bosnian Serb military situation had become even 
more precarious than it had been a few months earlier.406 Muslim and Croat forces 
were becoming stronger. Milosevic was also well aware that the soon-to-be installed 
Clinton administration in Washington was expected to take a more activist military
405 With considerable electoral manipulation and abuse of media, Milosevic took only fifty-six percent 
of the vote. Panic, with his slogan ‘Now or Never’, took thirty four percent. Of the 250-seat 
Parliament, Milosevic’s Socialist Party won 101 seats, and together with their natural ally, the 
Serbian Radicals -ultranationlists- who took 73, they had a comfortable majority. The main 
opposition coalition DEPOS, headed by Vuk Draskovic, took 49 seats, the Centrist Democratic Party 
took 7, and the remaining went to smaller minority parties. Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 
263-4.
406 Although the Bosnian Serb forces had an overwhelming superiority in terms of equipment over the 
Bosnian government forces, it was constrained by lack of manpower. In late 1992 and early 1993, 
Muslim guerrillas, organised and operating independently of the Bosnian Army, captured Serbian 
weapons with a series of hit and run tactics. With these weapons they were able to push the Serbian 
forces back to the Drina, the river that marks the boundary between Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia. At the same time, units of the Bosnian Army in eastern Bosnia around Srebrenica had similar 
successes. See James Gow, “One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 7-13, especially 9-10. 
Also see James Gow, “The Remains of the Yugoslav People’s Army,” Jane's Intelligence Review 8 
(August 1992), 363.
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stance against Serbia.407 Consequently, Milosevic seemed prepared to adopt a more 
flexible approach when Vance and Owen went to Belgrade during the first week of 
January 1993 to seek help with the Geneva negotiations.
On 8 January, Bosnia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Hakija Turajlic, was taken from the 
UN vehicle on its way from the Sarajevo airport to the city centre by Serbian para­
militaries and shot dead in front of UNPROFOR soldiers. The assassination occurred 
only one day after Izetbegovic had accepted the Vance-Owen plan in principle as the 
basis for further negotiations. This time Lord Owen made Karadzic aware of ‘brutal 
truths’ regarding a possible western military intervention ‘if the peace plan is 
rejected’.408 It was then reported that Milosevic warned Karadzic that ‘if the Bosnian 
Serbs were prepared to fight the whole world they could not count on Serbia to 
provide supplies’.409 Finally overwhelmed by the pressure of extended discussions, 
Karadzic had accepted the Plan with the provision that the plan would have to be
407 At the end of July 1992, during his campaign in the US Presidential elections against George 
Bush, Clinton had made a policy-statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina saying T he United States should 
take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorisation for air strikes against those who are 
attacking the relief effort. The United States should be prepared to lend appropriate military support 
to that operation. We should make clear that the economic blockade against Serbia will be tightened, 
not only on weapons but also on oil and other supplies that sustain that renegade regime of Slobodan 
Milosevic. European and US naval forces in the Adriatic should be given authority by the UN to stop 
and search ships that might be carrying contraband heading for Serbia, and her ally Montenegro’. 
Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 14. Later, in October 1992, Clinton told an interviewer: ‘I support a strong 
American role in the United Nations and with the EC to end Serbian aggression and provide a 
peaceful solution to this tragic conflict. I have supported the use of multilateral military force, if 
necessary, to ensure that UN relief efforts are protected. We can not ignore the human agony of what 
has been taking place in the very heart of modem Europe’. Europe. October 1992, 7. And just days 
before the December 20 Serbian elections, US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, named 
Slobodan Milosevic with several other Serbian and Croatian military and political leaders as possible 
war criminals. The New York Times, 17 December 1992.
408 Michael Sheridan, “Medicine Man Casts a Spell on Karadzic,” The Independent, 17 January 1993.
409 Alan Philips, “Karadzic Forced into Submission,” Daily Telegraph, 13 January 1993.
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ratified by the Bosnian Serb Parliament before detailed negotiations could begin on its 
implementation.410
On 20 January 1993, the same day Bill Clinton was inaugurated as President of the 
United States, the Bosnian Serbs legally ratified the agreement. However, Serbian 
leader Karadzic also announced that Bosnian Serb leaders had no intention of giving 
up any territory or of abandoning the vital corridor between Sarajevo and Serbia.411 412
He also claimed that ‘his ethnic constituency would never again tolerate being mixed 
with the Muslims or subjected to a central government that would impose Muslim 
domination’: ‘I don’t think we can live with each other, but we can live beside each 
other... we are like oil and water. When you shake us we mix, when we are left alone
, 412we separate .
6.2. Anglo-American Rifts: The US Opposition to Vance-Owen Plan
The biggest opposition to the Vance-Owen Plan, surprisingly, came from the US. 
Despite all the European propaganda, the Vance-Owen Plan was considered as 
continuation of Lord Carrington’s ‘cantonisation’ plan and it attracted sharp American 
criticism. As the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, stated in a press
410 Karadzic has presented the Vance-Owen Plan as a Serb triumph, even though he was rejecting the 
same document only a week ago. ‘We are on the threshold of achieving our goal’, he declared. ‘This 
is the protection of our rights -that was our basic goal, to protect Serbian rights, Serbian territories, 
Serbian integrity and personality’. Reported by Tim Judah, “Karadzic will Push Peace Plan as Best 
Path to Final Victory,” The Times, 15 January 1993.
411 As Ian Traynor reported “Karadzic never tires of explaining, the militants’ aim which is to unite 
‘tire historic Serbian lands’ in a new federation linking Serbia proper with tiny Montenegro, up to two 
thirds of Bosnia and the third of Croatia seized before”. Ian Traynor, “The Bottom Line for Bosnia,” 
The Guardian, 6 January 1993.
412 Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 260.
166
conference the plan amounted to ‘rewarding aggression and punishing the victims’.413 
In fact, the new US Administration soon appeared to be questioning the whole basis of 
the Vance-Owen Plan:
“Mr. Clinton’s main objection to the plan is that it rewards ethnic 
cleansing, and will involve the dissolution of the current Bosnian 
government, and its replacement by an arrangement that partitions 
Bosnia into 10 cantons...Clinton would like to see modification of 
the Bosnian peace plan...The modifications being cited by the White 
House staff call for an ‘International War Crimes Tribunal’, 
tightened economic sanctions against Serbia, and a US statement 
committing it to defend Macedonia and opposing any extension of 
Serbian ethnic cleansing to Kosovo”. 414
The new US Administration also appeared to be frustrated with the way the 
international mediators were handling the Serbs. President Clinton was reported as 
‘very concerned about the ethnic cleansing and abuses of human rights in Serbia and 
Bosnia and Hercegovina’.415 While Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance was molly-coddling 
the Bosnian Serb leaders and President Milosevic as useful partners in the peace 
process, the Clinton Administration seemed determined to prosecute those responsible 
for the war crimes in former Yugoslavia.416 In one of his first policy initiatives since
413 Quoted in Jan Willem Honig and Norbert North, Srebrenica: Record o f a War Crime (London: 
Penguin, 1996), 109.
414 Martin Walker, “Reluctant Clinton to Accept Bosnia Plan,” The Guardian, 10 February 1993. It 
was also argued at that time that President Ozal’s criticism of the Vance-Owen Plan, as ultimately not 
enforceable on the ground without a huge commitment of outside troops, might have sharpened 
President Clinton’s own doubts about committing US prestige behind the Vance-Owen Plan.
415 Simon Tisdall and Chris Stephen, “US Set on Prosecuting Yugoslav War Criminals,” The 
Guardian, 28 January 1993.
416 Seven men were listed by US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger as responsible for ‘crimes 
against humanity’ ranging from civilian deaths in Sarajevo to mass executions of Bosnian Muslims. 
These were Borislav Herak; Zeljko Raznjatovic -Arkan (accused of mass murder of up to 3000 
civilians); Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Chetniks (accused of atrocities at Brcko and other 
Muslim towns); Drago Pracac (Commander of the Serb-run Omarska detention camp); Adem Delic
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taking office, the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, instructed senior State 
Department advisers to investigate how to best organise an international war crimes 
tribunal.417
In its first foray into foreign policy crisis management, the Clinton administration was 
seeking ways to expand its consideration of potential offensive actions in the Balkans 
beyond the limited objectives pursued by the Bush Administration. The National 
Security Council had asked for an inter-agency study to assess what would happen in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina and other parts of the former Yugoslavia if the US policy 
remained unchanged. In fact, this study was ‘a comprehensive, wall to wall approach’ 
to every aspect of the Balkans conflict including taking a new look at ideas considered 
by the Bush administration.418 These included such options as shooting down Serbian 
aircraft invading the air-exclusion zone that the UN had decreed over Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, bombing Serbian airfields and artillery positions, modifying the UN arms 
embargo to enable the Bosnian government to obtain more weapons and tightening 
economic sanctions on Serbia.419
(Commander of the Croatian-run Celebici camp). Lawrence Eagleburger also declared that those 
with ‘political and command responsibility’ for these crimes should be tried under international law 
and named Serbia’s President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the 
Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army Ratko Mladic. “US Names Seven as Criminals in Balkan War: 
Eagleburger also Wants Serb Political Leaders to be Held Accountable,” International Herald 
Tribune, 17 December 1992.
417 Warren Christopher submitted a report to the United Nations on human rights violations in 
Bosnia, based on information gathered by US intelligence agencies, to be used by the Tribunal in the 
future. Simon Tisdall and Chris Stephen, “US Set on Prosecuting Yugoslav War Criminals,” The 
Guardian, 28 January 1992.
418 John M. Gosbko and Don Oberdorfer, “US Looks Closer At Taking Offensive to Halt Balkans 
War,” International Herald Tribune, 29 January 1993.
419 Reported by Robert Mauthner, “US May Reject Bosnia Proposals,” Financial Times, 1 February 
1993.
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Washington’s clear lack of support for Vance-Owen Plan had affected cross-Atlantic 
relations very badly.420 Lord Owen was furious about Americans trying to subvert his 
peace plan and remarked that ‘if only Americans put troops on the ground in Bosnia, 
they would have the right to veto or subvert the Vance-Owen Plan.421 Openly 
criticising the new Administration, he asked: ‘It’s all very well for the United States to 
criticise from the sidelines. Why don’t they come in? It would give the peace 
settlement a bigger chance’.422 He had been complaining that the Clinton 
Administration’s reluctance to back his efforts threatened to ‘scuttle the chances of 
ending the war’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina:
“Against all the odds, even against my own expectations, we have 
more or less got a settlement but w e have a problem. W e can’t get 
the Muslims on board. And that’s largely the fault o f Americans, 
because the Muslims won’t budge while they think Washington may 
come into it on their side any day now. What do they want down 
there, a war that goes on and on? This is not just the best act in 
town, it is the only act in town, It’s the best settlement you can get, 
and it’s a bitter irony to see the Clinton people block it”.423
British Government shared Lord Owen’s anger and US ambivalence was severely 
criticised as having a negative effect on the peace efforts since it encouraged Bosnia’s 
Muslims in their hope that the new US administration might exempt them from the
420 See F. Stephen Larrabee, “Implications for Transatlantic Relations,” in The Implications of The 
Yugoslav Crisis For Western Europe’s Foreign Relations, ed. Mathias Jopp, Institute For Security 
Studies, Western European Union, Challiot Papers, No. 17, October 1994, 17-34.
421 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 115.
422 Reported in the Chicago Tribune, “US Balks at Backing Peace Plan for Bosnia,” February 2, 1993. 
In Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 116.
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overall arms embargo on former Yugoslavia’.423 24 When the Americans and Germans 
expressed intention to lift the arms embargo as the only fair way of allowing the 
Bosnians to defend themselves, Douglas Hurd persuaded Germany repeating his the 
then famous phrase that ‘it would escalate the fighting’425 After the Germans, who 
were effectively persuaded by Douglas Hurd ‘not to lift the arms embargo’, the US 
followed the line and announced that it would continue the embargo on arms 
shipments to the region. It was reported that ‘Washington has been swayed by British 
and European criticism of any plan to ease the arms embargo. Insistence of the US 
government for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Hercegovina had 
also been put to the back burner’ 426
Finally, on 10 February 1993, Christopher announced that Washington supported the 
general approach of the Vance-Owen Plan on the condition of some modifications.427 
As Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger put it: “they (the Administration) 
feel that the Vance-Owen Plan has given too much to the Serbs and they would like to 
see it reduced”.428 Basically, some commentators put it as oscillating long between 
ideals and reality, ‘the US Administration left the tough campaign talk and decided to
423 “Mediator is Upset at US Reluctance over Bosnia Talks,” The New York Times, 3 February 1993. 
“Owen Prods US to Back Bosnia Plan as the ‘Only Act in Town’,” International Herald Tribune, 3 
February 1993.
424 Ian Traynor and Mark Tran, “US Impeding Bosnia Peace,” The Guardian, 3 February 1993.
425 Annika Savill, “Hurd to Press US Over Bosnia Plan,” The Independent, 6 February 1993.
426 Reported by Roger Boyes, “American Bluster Masks Qualified Approval for Peace Plan,” The 
Times, 9 February 1993.
427 For example, the Serbs required to give up some of the terrain allocated by the Geneva negotiators 
to Bosnian Muslims. The Clinton administration also wanted more robust guarantees for the Bosnian 
authorities, and for minorities in Serb or Croat dominated provinces. In addition, NATO should be 
brought in more actively to ensure that the Serb heavy guns were dismantled.
428 The Vance-Owen Plan gave the Serbs only 43 per cent of territory in a unified state, whereas by 
1994-5, the Contact Group were offering the Serbs 49 per cent in a state partitioned into two entities. 
Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 129.
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back Bosnian Peace Process’.429 The British were pleasantly surprised at the extent to 
which President Clinton had changed his policy since the election campaign, when he 
hinted at a more interventionist approach. One British official said that ‘it is an 
evolution -diplomatic speak for a change of policy tantamount to U-turn'.430 It was 
also argued that ‘after days of brainstorming in Washington, it has become plain that 
the country can not have a policy in the Balkans without committing some ground 
troops’.431
While the British diplomats were congratulating themselves on their success on 
persuading President Clinton to back their non-interventionist approach on Bosnia, the 
US had sort of conceded defeat at the hands of other NATO allies and agreed to 
appoint an envoy to participate in the negotiations. It also promised that if a viable 
agreement containing enforcement provisions was reached, the US would be prepared 
to join with the UN, NATO and others in implementing and enforcing it, including 
possible US military action.432
6.3. The Breaking of the Muslim-Croat Alliance
The January version of the Vance-Owen Plan, ethnically labelling the regions in Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, contributed to the suspicion and tension that had been mounting
429 Reported by Annika Savill, “UK Officials ‘Convert’ US on Bosnia Plan,” The Independent, 12 
February 1993. Also see Patrick Moore, “Bosnian Impasse Poses Dilemmas for Diplomacy,” RFE/RL 
Research Report 2, no. 14 (2 April 1993), 29.
430 Reported by Annika Savill, “UK Officials ‘Convert’ US on Bosnia Plan,” The Independent, 12 
February 1993.
431 Roger Boyes, “American Bluster Marks Qualified Approval for Peace Plan,” The Times, 9 
February 1993.
432 “US Backs Bosnian Peace Plan,” The New York Times, 10 February 1993.
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between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats for some time.433 The Bosnian side had long 
been suspicious of the Croatian designs to carve out their own territories with an aim 
of creating their own ‘Greater Croatia’; for example, Bosnian Croats refused to fight in 
certain areas such as Sarajevo and they had halted the arms supplies through Western 
Hercegovina, the principal route for imported weapons, to Bosnian Army units in 
central and northern Bosnia.434
After the unveiling of the January version of the Vance-Owen plan, the local HVO 
command gave the Bosnian Army an ultimatum to withdraw by 15 April from areas 
‘given’ to the Croats under the Vance-Owen Plan. What followed was a sudden 
outburst of horrific clashes between HVO forces and the Bosnian Army in central 
Bosnia and Hercegovina including the ‘cleansing’ of Bosnian villages. By early April 
there were outbreaks of heavy fighting between Muslims and Croats in the Travnik- 
Vitez-Zenica area of central Bosnia.435 On the other hand, while the pressure was 
growing on the Bosnian Serb side to accept the Vance-Owen plan, the Bosnian Serbs 
increased their efforts to accomplish the ‘cleansing’ of the Drina valley of the Muslims, 
creating a fait accompli before the Plan was signed. The UN investigator of atrocities 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, issued a report in the following 
month saying that ‘the Vance-Owen Plan had accelerated ethnic cleansing.436
433 In October 1992, there were some clashes between Muslim and Croat militias in Travnik and 
Prozor, and they accused each other for the fall of Jajce to the Serbs. But, at that time, there was no 
large scale fighting between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats and the alliance still held. See 
Malcolm, Bosnia, 248.
434 Gow, “One Year o f War,” 10.
435 Patrick Moore, “Endgame in Bosnia and Herzegovina?,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 32 (13 
August 1993), 20.
436 See the Report by Michael Binyon, “Vance-Owen Plan Blamed for Ethnic Cleansing,” The Times, 
20 May 1993.
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The combined effects of the arms embargo and the Vance-Owen plan resulting in the 
Muslim-Croat fighting had fatally weakened the Bosnian governments’ military 
resistance to the Serbs. Although Bosnian Serbs were pushed back especially in Drina 
valley at the beginning of 1993, later on Serb forces stepped up their campaign against 
a number of Muslim enclaves which remained within the Serb conquered area of 
eastern Bosnia. Without a serious international commitment for protection of these 
enclaves, the Bosnian government moved during March and April towards an 
acceptance of Vance-Owen Plan.
Run out of patience, in mid-April, over two days of television and radio interviews and 
in remarks in the House of Lords, former prime minister, Baroness Thatcher sharply 
condemned allied leaders, including her successor in Britain, for lacking the resolve to 
take stronger action on behalf of Bosnia’s embattled Muslims.437 She urged Britain 
and her allies not only to help arm Bosnian Muslims, but also to support what she 
described as ‘aggressive’ air strikes against Serb positions. On British television she 
described the members of the European Community as behaving ‘a little like 
accomplices to massacre’, because, she said, they had done nothing to stop the killing, 
the ‘ethnic cleansing’ or the forcible displacement of Muslims from the territory the 
Serbs claimed.438
6.4. The Fall of the Vance-Owen Plan
437 Baroness Thacher’s views on Bosnia were expressed in a BBC interview with Peter Sissons. The 
edited version appeared in The Times, “Europe Has Been Like an Accomplice to Massacre,” 14 April 
1993.
438 Peter Sissons, “Europe Has Been Like an Accomplice to Massacre,” The Times, 14 April 1993.
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In Britain, her fierce attack touched off a political dispute, as members of the Prime 
Minister John Major’s government moved quickly to the defensive to blunt the ferocity 
of their former leader’s attack.439 On her remarks, some Conservative Party members 
critical of Baroness Thatcher said that she appeared to be using Bosnia to attack Prime 
Minister Major, with whom she had been at odds in the previous months over his 
support for a ratification of the treaty on closer European political and economic co­
operation, which she had opposed. She, obviously, had become disenchanted with 
John Major, whom she had picked for her successor in November 1990, when a 
rebellion in Conservative Party ranks had forced her resignation. Defence Minister 
Malcolm Rifkind described her remarks as ‘emotional nonsense’. Before the House of 
Commons, he reiterated the British policy on Bosnia and Hercegovina, and rejected 
her plea that Britain and its allies lift an international arms embargo against the Bosnian 
Muslims.440 Baroness Thatcher challenged Britain’s refusal to lift the arms embargo on 
the Muslims arguing that it left them ‘defenceless in the path of a determined dictator 
aggressor’.441 Backing Baroness Thatcher’s call for western troops to halt the 
slaughter of civilians by the Bosnian Serbs, 14 Labour MPs signed a statement saying 
that;
“Sanctions alone will take too long to be effective. Serbian territorial 
aggression must be checked and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ stopped. If 
this can be achieved by the threat or use of air power alone, that 
would be preferable; but if it requires active engagement of troops on
439 William E. Schmidt, “The Flames Thacher Fuelled,” International Herald Tribune, 15 April 1993.
440 Ralph Atkins, “Tory Tensions Rise Over Bosnia,” Financial Times, 15 April 1993.
441 William E. Schmidt, “The Flames Thacher Fuelled,” International Herald Tribune, 15 April 1993.
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the ground, w e believe the crisis in Bosnia merits that scale o f
,,442commitment.
An opinion poll, carried out before Baroness Thatcher spoke, also suggested that there 
was widespread support among the British people for her views on the Bosnian 
conflict.42 43 A Gallup survey for The Daily Telegraph showed that 61 per cent of 
Gallup’s respondents believed that ‘it would be desirable to send an international force 
to Bosnia to try to enforce a peace settlement’. If an international peace force were 
sent, 67 per cent of people said British troops should form part of any such force.444
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Noel Malcolm, the British government’s policy did not 
change:
“Even outspoken intervention by Lady Thatcher on British and 
American television in mid-April did not shake the policies o f  
governments in those countries. The British government in particular 
was mesmerised by the Vance-Owen peace process, and would not 
contemplate any move that could be seen as jeopardising it -even 
though it required no clairvoyance at this stage to say that ‘a blind 
man can see that the Vance-Owen Plan is never going to be 
fulfilled”.445
442 The Labour MPs signing the statement were; Malcolm Wicks, Peter Mandelson (moderates); Tony 
Banks, Keith Vaz (Labour’s Front Bench); Peter Hain, Calum MacDonald, Chris Mullin, Angela 
Eagle, Max Madden, John Austin-Walker, Hugh Bayley, Mike Watson, John Gunnell and Frank 
Field. Patricia Wynn Davies, “Thatcher Right on Bosnia Say 14 Labour MPs,” The Independent, 17 
April 1993.
443 Anthony King, Telegraph Gallup, “61 Percent Would Back Use of Force to End the War,” The 
Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1995.
444 The degree of resolution among the 61 per cent prepared to send force is considerable. Nearly 
half, 47 per cent, believe it would still be desirable even if the force ‘would be likely to suffer heavy 
casualties’. Anthony King, Telegraph Gallup, “61 Percent Would Back Use of Force to End the 
War,” The Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1995.
445 Malcolm, Bosnia, 249.
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The British view remained that any limited military response should not alter the basic 
aim of securing Serbian support for Vance-Owen plan. On 29 April 1993, Douglas 
Hurd, delivered a passionate rejection of calls to send ground forces to Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and lift the arms embargo in the House of Commons. He warned the 
MPs that ‘anger and horror’ were not the basis for armed intervention by ground 
troops.446 Although Hurd squarely blamed Serbs for their aggression, stating that “we 
are witnessing a civil war in Bosnia which is encouraged and overwhelmingly fuelled 
by Belgrade’’,447 he added that no-one involved in the civil war had a monopoly of evil: 
and “this is not a war between the saints and heroes.”448 He ruled out the case for 
intervention by troops stating that:
“If w e accept as w e have argued, that military intervention on the 
ground is not an option, w e are faced with a choice o f lesser options 
to achieve that objective.. W e must keep in mind our overall 
objectives -to provide a framework for a political solution, to press 
the Serbs, in Bosnia and in Serbia, to abandon the pursuit o f their 
aims by use o f force, to relieve humanitarian suffering and to prevent 
the fighting from spreading -for example to Croatia, Kosovo,
M acedonia or, indeed, beyond.”449
Douglas Hurd told a hushed chamber that persuasion had to be matched by pressure. 
Rigorous implementation of sanctions would have an important impact on bringing the
446 House o f Commons Debates, Hansard, 29 April 1993, cols. 1169-1170.
447 Ibid., col. 1170.
448 Ibid., col. 1169.
449 Ibid., col. 1170.
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fighting to an end. The sanctions had pinned down the Serbs and limited their options, 
creating economic problems, soaring inflation, unemployment and shortages. There 
were signs that Serbian leaders in Belgrade were becoming increasingly impatient with 
the Bosnian Serbs.450. Douglas Hurd also vehemently stated that the British 
Government had ‘deep reservations’ over calls to lift the arms embargo: “We believe 
we should be in business of trying to stop the war not equipping the parties to fight it 
out”.451 He stated that
“The idea is understandably presented as giving the Muslims a 
chance to defend themselves against the more heavily armed and 
better equipped Serbs. It is possible that in that way Muslims would 
get better access to weapons, but the impact on the military situation 
would be neither quick nor decisive. The Serbs and possibly the 
Croats, might decide to attack before the M uslims came too strong. 
Far from tilting the balance towards the Bosnian Muslims, lifting the 
embargo could lead to an increase in the supply o f  weapons to the 
Serbs and the Croats. Violence could escalate and the humanitarian 
relief operations would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. 
If that were to happen, far from ending the suffering, it would 
aggravate it.” 452
At each stage, Britain had urged caution, warning against any action which could 
endanger the aid effort. In fact, this approach had had the backing of most MPs. 
Labour leaders confined themselves to small criticisms, and the only dissenters were
450
451
452
“Hurd Rules Out Use o f Troops in Bosnia Conflict,” The Timesx 30 April 1993.
House o f Commons Debates, Hansard, 29 April 1993, col. 1175.
Ibid.
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Baroness Thatcher, Paddy Ashdown -Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, a few 
independent minded Tories such as Patrick Cormack, and some Labour left-wingers.453
On the other hand, it was obvious that Serbs were unwilling to accept a plan that might 
require them to reduce the amount of territory they controlled from 70 per cent to 43 
per cent and give up control of their heavy weapons.454 Karadzic’s Deputy, Koljevic 
pointed out, for instance, that the only way in which the Vance-Owen plan could gain 
even token acceptance among the Serbs was on the clear assumption that it would be a 
temporary resting place to consolidate their gains:
“M ilosevic counted on the fact that the Vance-Owen plan couldn’t be 
implemented in the way it was devised and that the Serbs got enough 
o f  a political chance, so to speak, for further autonomy, for the 
further development o f  that process. H e rather looked at the Vance- 
Owen Plan as the first positive step, rather than the final form o f  it. 
And, o f course, he wanted to get rid o f  these sanctions as soon as 
possible.” 455
On that basis Radovan Karadzic was persuaded by Slobodan Milosevic to sign the 
Plan.456 Since 25 March 1993, when the Bosnian Muslims finally agreed to all the
453 “Hurd Rules Out Use of Troops in Bosnia Conflict.” The Times, 30 April 1993.
454 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 278-9.
455 Quoted in Ibid., 279. The basis of Serbian approach was also explained by Dragoslav Rancic, the 
confidant and spokesman of Dobrica Cosic. ‘It is just the first stage’, he said, ‘it is not going to last 
long. Not even Lord Owen believes in it’. He added that the Muslims would eventuall be left with a 
‘Balkan Lesotho’, and the Serbs would get everything they wanted. Report by Tim Judah, The Times, 
3 May 1993.
456 The centrepiece of Milosevic’s argument was that the Vance-Owen Plan was consistent with the 
main Serbian war aims. First of all it provided the Serbs with a state of their own. As Ian Traynor 
reported ‘the double act sees Milosevic pose as peacemonger battling against the odds to talk sense 
into the recalcitrant Karadzic and his followers’. Although Vance and Owen warned Milosevic that 
the world was ready to seal off Serbia unless he persuaded Karadzic to back the plan, there was little
178
terms of the Vance-Owen proposal after receiving US assurances that the international 
community would seriously implement cease-fire enforcement measures if the peace 
plan was concluded, immense diplomatic pressure was directed at persuading the 
Serbian side.457 But, it was not going to be easy; opposition on the Bosnian Serb side 
was quite strong from the beginning of negotiations and the Serbian Assembly meeting 
in Pale found acceptance of Vance-Own proposals impossible.458
Finally, at a meeting organised by Greek Prime Minister Konstantin Mitsotakis in 
Athens on 2 May 1993, Bosnian leader Karadzic signed the plan. However, he insisted 
that his acceptance would only be final when confirmed by the Assembly of the 
‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina’, scheduled to meet on 5 May 1993. At 
the end, the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan.459 Behind the scenes there was 
General Mladic, who appeared to have a strong disagreement with Milosevic over his 
tactics.460 For the first time, Milosevic realised that he had lost control over the war in
to suggest that that was the reason Milosevic wanted to put pressure on Karadzic. The embargo, 
imposed in May 1992 had little effect on stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysts 
stated that ‘there was going to be agreement because Milosevic had decided he had more to gain than 
to lose from a peace-settlement’. Ian Traynor, “Milosevic Warned of Tougher Sanctions,” The 
Guardian, 12 March 1993. For Milosevic’s concern about the Plan and his persuasion of Karadzic, 
Koljevic and Krajisnik, see Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, Chapter 21, “The Last Chance 
Café,” 276-90.
457 Robert Mauthner, “Clinton Steps up Pressure over Bosnia Peace Plan,” Financial Times, 27-28 
March, 1993. Within the Clinton Administration, a policy dispute persisted between those advocating 
continued diplomatic-economic measures to address the Bosnian crisis, and those favouring some sort 
of external military intervention.
458 In fact, Serb Parliament had rejected the Vance-Owen Plan since the beginning. Mrs. Biljana 
Plavsic, Vice-President of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic said in January, ‘Dr. Karadzic would 
have to back down before the Parliament’. ‘The Geneva Plan is unacceptable’ she said, ‘It is 
impossible to live with Croats and Muslims after what has happened. We don’t need support. We 
will go to the end’. See for details, “Returning Leader will Face Fury of Serb Hard Liners,” The Daily 
Telegraph, 13 January 1993.
459 Karadzic told the Serbian radio that ‘the deputies said that they would not be able to return their 
constituencies if they accepted the Vance-Owen Plan in its present shape. We hope that the entire 
Serbian nation will mobilise all its forces to survive’. Quoted in Silber and Little, Death of 
Yugoslavia, 281.
460 The Bosnian Serb military commander had made a blustering speech at the Bosnian Serb 
parliament prior to the voting. He showed a series of maps to illustrate how much land would have to 
be handed over to their Bosnian Muslim and Croat ‘enemies’. Exposing the dangers implicit in
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Bosnia and Hercegovina. For a few days Milosevic insisted publicly that he would 
close the border between Serbia and Bosnia; but he refused to allow international 
observers to monitor the border, and within a couple of weeks the flow of supplies 
were resumed.461
6.5. Creation of the UN ‘Safe Areas’
When Srebrenica was declared a ‘safe area’ on 16 April 1993 by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 819, it had been under siege for almost a year.462 For months the 
local Muslim defenders had been fighting a loosing battle as the Bosnian Serb army 
with heavy artillery had closed in. By mid-March 1993, they had run out of 
ammunition and it was apparent that they could not hold out much longer. At the 
beginning of April, the Serbs issued a surrender demand through the UNHCR: ‘Either 
they surrender and you’ll get all the Muslims out of Srebrenica’ the Serb Commander 
Ilic told the most senior UNHCR official in former Yugoslavia, Jose Maria Mendiluce, 
‘or we take the town in two days’. Without a choice, Mendiluce started making plans 
for the evacuation of 60,000 people. He was aware of the fact that it was going to be 
the single biggest act of ‘ethnic cleansing’ since the war began, and it was to be carried 
out by the UN.463
accepting the Vance-Owen Plan Mladic argued that ‘not only would the Bosnian Serbs have to hand 
over huge chunks of territory, but part of die Serb population would have to be left in isolated and 
vulnerable areas. Ibid., 285.
461 Ian Traynor and Yigal Chazan, “Milosevic was Outmanoeuvred by His Hand-Picked General,” The 
Guardian, 7 May 1993.
462 Srebrenica, in Drina Valley was like many Bosnian towns were surrounded by high mountains. 
Before the war, it had a population of 37,000, of whom seventy-percent were Muslim and twenty-five 
percent Serb. After the war had started it became an ‘island of territory’ in the heart of the ‘Republica 
Srpska’.
463 In die meantime, General Morillion ‘advised’ commander of the Bosnian Government forces, 
Halilovic to accept Mladic’s terms, since the situation was hopeless and there was an urgent need for 
the evacuations. Silber and Litde, Death of Yugoslavia, 268.
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The idea of ‘safe haven’ was first implemented to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq 
after the 1991 Gulf War. In October 1992, the President of the International Red 
Cross, Comelio Sommaruga, proposed the establishment of similar zones to protect 
the Muslim civilians from further genocidal practices by the Serbs. Although some 
smaller European States supported the proposal, at the beginning, France, Britain and 
Spain - the main troop contributors to UNPROFOR - rejected it.464 It was argued that 
there was a possibility that safe areas might increase the ethnic cleansing, since the 
Serbs might herd the Muslims into areas that the international community declared 
itself be obliged to protect. On the other hand, as Owen mentioned, the tough 
question remained ‘who was going to provide sufficient troops to protect the ‘safe 
areas’?’.465 Countries providing troops to UNPROFOR did not want to engage 
themselves into the protection of artificially created ‘safe areas’, because if the Serbs 
attacked a ‘safe area’ with ground troops, they might need to take a combatant role to 
defend the areas. The mandate for the humanitarian forces were carefully designed to 
avoid these kind of situations which might impair the impartiality of the UNPROFOR, 
and that was the main concern of the British government when opposing the idea of 
creating ‘safe havens’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, in December 1992, at the 
EC Summit meeting in Edinburgh that marked the end of British presidency, Britain
464 In 1992, the Netherlands and Austria were the main supporters of the ‘safe area’ concept. In an 
interview with an Austrian newspaper on 3 December 1992, Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock 
argued that ‘Sicherheitszonen’ or ‘security zones’, should be created around Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, 
Gorazde and Travnik. The job of protecting these zones, Mock said, would require perhaps 40,000 
UN soldiers -far fewer than die 100,000 soldiers quoted by Western military sources as the minimum 
for a successful military intervention. Mock, however, admitted diat, there was little support for the 
setting up of these secure zones. The French were cautious, the Bridsh remained aloof and the 
Germans were unable to commit themselves because of their constitution. Similarly, Joris Voorhoeve, 
who later became Minister of Defence and was the person politically responsible for the presence of 
Dutch troops in Srebrenica in 1995, said in an interview Uiat ‘...I just think diat with 50,000 to 
100,000 well-trained and well-armed troops protected areas for the civilians have to be created to end 
the slaughter’. See Honig and North, Srebrenica, 101.
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was condemned by the Germans for not carrying its fair share of the refugee burden. 
Participants at the meeting reported that John Major then began to sound more 
enthusiastic about the safe area concept as a way of keeping potential refugees in 
Bosnia rather than spilling them over into European Union countries’.465 66
Although the idea of safe areas seemed dead at the end of 1992, it was revived again in 
March 1993, when Mladic’s forces, having blocked the aid convoys for months, began 
to attack the Muslim town Srebrenica. The ultimatum of the Bosnian Serbs and the 
imminence of the danger of ethnic cleansing of the Muslims in Srebrenica provided the 
consensus in the Security Council that something needed to be done. On 16 April 
1993, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 819 and declared Srebrenica safe 
area, many, both in Bosnia and Hercegovina and elsewhere, believed that the UN from 
then on would protect the civilians in Srebrenica against the Serbs. In reality, 
however, the Resolution carefully avoided creating new military obligations for the 
UNPROFOR either to establish or protect the safe area. The Council firmly asked the 
Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims to make Srebrenica safe. UNPROFOR’s role 
would simply be to ‘monitor’ the humanitarian situation.467
On 18 April, a day after Srebrenica was declared ‘safe area’, UN Commanders on the 
ground, Generals Philip Morillion and Lars Eric Wahlgren met General Mladic and the 
Bosnian commander, General Halilovic to negotiate a cease fire. The agreement 
provided for the freezing of ‘all combat actions on the achieved lines of confrontation’. 
The Serbian forces were not required to pull back from their achieved lines. The
465 See Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 69-71.
466 Sharp. Honest Broker, 26.
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agreement disarmed the Bosnian Government forces and provided for the deployment 
of 140 Canadian troops to collect the weapons of the Muslim forces. When the 
Canadian troops arrived in Srebrenica, however, the local authorities were extremely 
worried since they did not look like capable of defending the city against Mladic’s 
forces.467 68 This situation had left Srebrenica virtually defenceless against the heavily 
armed Bosnian Serb forces and paved the way for the implementation of ‘final 
solution’ by the Serbs in July 1995.
6.6. The ‘Joint Action Group’ and the ‘Joint Action Plan’
Meanwhile, largely as a result of deep divisions within itself, the Clinton 
Administration was unable to develop a coherent policy for dealing with the war in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina.469 By mid-May, talking about the failed Vance-Owen Peace 
Plan, the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher had stated that a new peace 
process that took into account the ‘reality on the ground’ was needed.470 When the 
Americans had withdrawn their support for the Vance-Owen Plan altogether, the 
British government felt that it had no choice but to abandon it as well. The 
implementation of Vance-Owen Plan required close Euro-American co-operation to
467 Honig and North, Srebrenica, 103-4.
468 Ibid., 106-7.
469 The US Ambassador to UN, Madeleine Albright, reflected a strongly moralistic strand in the 
American debate on Bosnia and, with her adherents, she advocated a tough interventionist policy. 
However, they were challenged by another group in the Clinton administration who regarded Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as an intractable Vietnam like quagmire. General Colin Powell, one member of the 
‘sceptics group’, exploded in a policy-making meeting when Madeleine Albright asked him ‘What is 
the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it’. Powell 
replied that ‘American GIs are not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game 
board’. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), p. 561. Quoted in 
Honig and North, Srebrenica, 109.
470 After the Vance-Owen Plan was rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament, the US did not spend any 
time trying to back it. ‘Europeans Adopt Action Plan for Bosnia’, European Wireless File, News 
Alert, 25 May 1993.
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impose it on the unwilling parties. That necessitated substantial troop contribution and 
Americans had ruled that out. Britain followed the suit. They did not want to impose 
it only with the French. With both the American and British support for it withdrawn, 
the Vance-Owen Plan was effectively dead.471
Relations between Britain and US had already become strained. Clinton 
Administration was pressuring British government to be tougher with the Serbs while 
the British were accusing the American Administration of ‘not willing to put troops on 
the ground’. On the other hand, the proposals the US was prepared to back -such as 
‘lift and strike’ policy- the British found irresponsible and dangerous. For some time 
after the rejection of Vance-Owen Plan by the Bosnian Serbs, Warren Christopher, 
was trying to sell Washington’s policy of “lift and strike” to Europe.472 In talks with 
the leaders of ten NATO countries and Russia, Christopher met a very cool response 
to a plan which called for the supply of arms (lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia 
and Hercegovina) to the Muslims and the launching of strategic (surgical) air strikes at 
Bosnian Serb targets. This would be carried out in the hope that they would be able to 
achieve a stalemate on the battlefield which would then induce the Serbs to negotiate 
seriously.473 The other element, the ‘strike, was to hold out the threat of the use of air 
power against the Serbs, if they violated UN Resolutions. France and Britain 
vehemently objected to US proposals with the argument that they had troops on the 
ground who would be vulnerable in the face of possible retaliation by the Serbs. This 
would bring about military intervention by the Western powers, either by individually 
or by NATO in order to rescue the hostages taken and thereby sucking themselves into
471 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Chapter 4, “Ditching the VOPP,” 160-97.
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a full-scale war in Bosnia and Hercegovina.472 374 From the beginning of war in ex- 
Yugoslavia, the main British concern was to prevent the prolongation of the conflict by 
limiting the amount of armaments available to the parties and therefore contain it.
The allied rejection of ‘lift and strike’ policy was a serious setback for President 
Clinton and served no other purpose than to illustrate the deep divergence in approach 
between the US and its European allies in general, and Britain in particular over Bosnia 
and Hercegovina. As a Former Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, Richard 
Perle, stated, “Warren Christopher went to Europe with an American policy and came 
back with a European one”.475
6.7. Beyond Vance-Owen Plan: Debating Partition and British Attitude
After the Vance-Owen Plan collapsed in May 1993, the international community had 
given up trying to frame any scheme for an eventual settlement in Bosnia that would 
reflect either the integrity of the Bosnian state or the pre-war distribution of 
population. In view of the intensified Croat-Muslim fighting and realities on the 
ground, the new strategy of Lord Owen and Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, who had replaced Cyrus Vance as UN Envoy after Vance’s resignation, 
based on accommodating the long-standing preference of both Milosevic and Tudjman,
472 Marshall Freeman Harris, “Clinton’s European Policies,” Paper presented to the International 
Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, organised by Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 1995, 5.
473 CRS Report for the American Congress, 28 July 1993, 5.
474 Ibid., 6.
475 Marshall Freeman Harris, “Clinton’s Debacle in Bosnia”, Bosnia Report, Newsletter of the 
Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, London, Issue 16, July-October 1996, 2.
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for the partition of Bosnia and Hercegovina along ethnic lines, was launched.476 For 
the Bosnian Serbs who expected partition all along; final victory appeared nearer than 
at any point in the war. Radovan Karadzic said ‘the shift in western policy occurred 
when it became clear that the conflict was a civil war that could not be ended without 
separating the warring sides’.477
The ‘Union of Republics’ Plan was devised at a meeting in Geneva on 15-16 June 
between President Milosevic and President Tudjman and was further elaborated at a 
meeting between Karadzic and Boban, the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders, in 
Montenegro on 20 June 478 After rejecting the Vance-Owen Plan, the Bosnian Serbs 
declared themselves the victors in the war and indicated that they would be willing to 
give up a portion of their gains for the sake of creating ‘República Srpska’. Similarly, 
for Bosnian Croats, a Serbo-Croat accommodation was the key to achieving Greater 
Croatia.479
476 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had discussed the 
partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as in March 1991 at a meeting in Karadjordjevo. This 
political agreement was later supplemented by a military pact between Bosnian Croat leader Mate 
Boban and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic which was settled in the town of Graz, Austria, on 
April 27 th after the war in Bosnia begun. See Lee Bryant, The Betrayal of Bosnia, CDS Perspectives, 
Centre for the Study of Democracy Research Papers, No. 1 (London: University of Westminster Press, 
Autumn 1993). For the discussions of division of Bosnia and Hercegovina and population transfers 
discussed between Serbia and Croatia, see Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 306-8. Misha 
Glenny argues that ‘the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along the lines proposed by Serb and 
Croat Presidents, Milosevic and Tudjman are not new, but 54 years old. The contours of the Serb and 
Croat mini-states in Bosnia bears a striking resemblance to the maps created by the Sporazum 
(Agreement) of 1939. As Royal Yugoslavia was crumbling under pressure of the new forces in 
Europe, the Serb dominated government conceded considerable political powers leading to the 
formation of the Croatian Banovina’. Misha Glenny, “Muslims Bridle as Serbs and Croats Gloat 
Over Old Maps,” The Times, 18 June, 1993.
477 Michael Montgomery, “Serbs Celebrate Death of Muslim State,” The Daily Telegraph, 18 June 
1993.
478 Robert Mauthner, “Croatia and Serbia Propose Bosnia Deal,” Financial Times, 17 June 1993. The 
joint Serb-Croat proposals were first fully presented in Geneva on 28 June 1993 and published in the 
Secretary General’s Report, UN Doc. S/26066.
479 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 285-6.
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6.7.1. Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (Invincible Plan)
The new design outlined by Owen and Stoltenberg was essentially a return to 
‘cantonisation’.480 It was envisaging a ‘confederal republic’ composed of three
republics: a Serb Republic (República Srpska); a Croatian Republic (Herceg-Bosna) 
and a Muslim Republic (Map 5).481 Owen conceded that owing to the circumstances 
of Serb and Croat military strength and Muslim weaknesses on the battlefield, the new 
strategy would not require the Serbian side to relinquish as much territory as the 
proportion envisaged by the Vance-Owen Plan, but still the Serbian rollback was to be 
fairly significant.482 Whereas the Vance-Owen Plan focused on the regionalisation of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina into ten ethnically mixed provinces, under the new plan it 
would be constituted as a union of three constituent republics, each of which would 
have the character of an essentially semi-independent ethnically based state. Although 
Vance-Owen Plan provided the Muslim-led Bosnian government 43 percent of 
territory, new plan had given only 30 percent, while the Bosnian Serbs was allocated 
53 percent, leaving 17 percent to the Bosnian Croats. Although the new Bosnian 
‘Union of Republics’ was envisaged to become a member state in the UN, the three 
‘constituent republics’ were organised to express the interests of their own people. In 
addition, since each republic was based on a constitutionally designated people, all
480 The plan on the table was basically the Cutilheiro plan, which the Bosnian Government had 
rejected in March 1992, except that whereas in Lisbon the rump Bosnian Republic had been 
designated over 40 per cent of the territory, this time it was given just above 30 per cent.
481 FBIS-EEU-93-118 (June 22, 1993), 1.
482 However, Lord Owen admitted that it would be ‘quite dishonest’ to try to sell this as the Vance- 
Owen Plan which had provided for the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Robert 
Mauthner, “Reality Buries Vance-Owen Plan,” Financial Times, 18 June 1993.
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The Owen-Stoltenberg proposal of August 1993
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three constituent republics would have the implied right under international law to self- 
determination.483
Bosnian President Izetbegovic found the plan unacceptable and in conflict with the 
principles stated by the London Conference.484 Alarmed with the new proposal, he 
immediately demanded an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly ‘to prevent 
the dismemberment of a UN member’.485 Legal advisers to the Bosnian government 
argued that in view of the state-like competencies designated for each of the three 
constituent republics, it was extremely unlikely that such a weak union would endure 
as a unified state. Adding insult to injury, US President Clinton had signalled for the 
first time that “if the parties themselves agree, genuinely and honestly agree, the US 
would have to look very seriously ‘at the three way partition plan proposed by the 
Presidents of Serbia and Croatia”.486
In order to exert some pressure on the Bosnian Presidency to accept the Owen- 
Stoltenberg Plan, Owen attempted to shake what he called Izetbegovic’s 
‘intransigence’ by insisting that some strong anti-Izetbegovic members of the ten- 
person Bosnian Presidency were involved in the Geneva negotiations. Owen expected 
that the Muslim-Croat schism in Bosnian Presidency would motivate the Croat 
members to adopt more favourable attitude with regard to the confederal plan. In fact, 
his plan worked and Bosnia’s Collective Presidency gave President Alija Izetbegovic
483 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 287-8.
484 Roger Boyes and Tim Judah, “Bosnia Leader Calls on EC to Prevent Carve-Up of Republic,” The 
Times, 18 June 1993.
485 Ibid.
486 Thomas Friedman, “US Inches Towards Accepting Partition,” International Herald Tribune, 19- 
20 June 1993.
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an ultimatum telling him to choose between representing the state of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina or only its Muslim Community.487
Owen’s other plan was to gain help of Izetbegovic’s main challenger, Fikret Abdic, the 
Muslim leader of the Muslim enclave of Bihac (Cazinska Krajina) in north-western 
Bosnia to push through the new three-republic framework constituted along ethnic 
lines.488 At a meeting of the Bosnian presidency held in Geneva at the end of June 
1993, Owen’s tactics seemed to be successful by creating a split within the Bosnian 
Presidency between those who supported a federal Bosnia, and those who supported a 
more confederal concept. However, at the end, the majority view in the Bosnian 
Presidency was that Bosnia and Hercegovina should remain a ‘unitary state’.
In the meantime, the Bosnian government was fighting a two-front struggle against 
Serb and Croat forces in Bosnia, and the siege of Sarajevo had reached desperate 
proportions. Considering the humanitarian crisis in the city, particularly in view of the 
very little supply of water, food and electricity and also the fear that the city might not 
be able to survive another winter under siege, the Bosnian government was under 
enormous pressure to reach some kind of peace agreement. On 30 July, it was 
announced that Bosnian Government decided to back the constitutional agreement for
487 “Co-Rulers Pressure Bosnian President,” International Herald Tribune, 30 June 1993.
488 According to Mirza Hajric, London Correspondent of the Sarajevo Newspaper ‘Oslobodenje’; 
‘Abdic is a Muslim, but not a religious Muslim and he did save a lot of lives by doing a deal with 
Croats over his home territory of Bihac. He was very popular there and he was a Communist man 
who led a very simple life’. Quoted in The Times, “Force of History Condemns Bosnia to a Hostile 
Peace,” 23 June 1993. Fikret Abdic indeed kept very close ties with both the Serbs and Croats and he 
was adamantly opposed to the establishment of a strong central government administration in 
Sarajevo.
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a ‘Union of Republics’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina.489 Tired of calling international 
military intervention ‘in the name of peace’ and deprived of support, Izetbegovic 
reluctantly admitted that a tripartite partition of Bosnia was inevitable. It was so far 
apparent that international community did not have intention to take action. There 
were no lifting of the arms embargo or air strikes. Karadzic bluntly declared that “if a 
single bomb hits a Serb position there will be no more talks. We would have an all out 
war and catastrophe”.490 He easily played on the fears of countries, like Britain and 
France, with troops on the ground and vulnerable to any kind of escalation in 
fighting.491 On the other hand President Clinton conceded that limited action to 
protect UN peace-keepers might not be enough “to deter aggression, to stop the 
shelling of Sarajevo, and bring the parties to peace table”. He also stressed that any 
US action would only come in concert and agreement with its NATO allies.492
Different versions of Owen-Stoltenberg proposal were discussed during August and 
September 1993, both at Geneva and on the British warship Invincible in the 
Adriatic.493: The Bosnian Government disagreed with the Croats over the question of 
access to the sea for their land-locked mini-republic, and the Serbs put forward more 
and more impossible demands for the division of Sarajevo.494 No one, it seemed, could
489 Ian Traynor, “Bosnians Accept Partition: Muslims Forced Into Watershed Deal That Could End 
the War,” The Guardian, 31 July 1993.
490 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 304-305.
491 The NATO countries which had troops on Bosnia were: UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, Spain, Canada and France.
492 Rupert Cornwell, “Clinton Inclining Towards Greater Use of Air Power,” The Independent, 30 
July 1993.
493 The Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, called the Plan ’The Invisible'. Apparently, it was unclear 
whether he was misunderstood the name of the British aircraft carrier ‘HMS Invincible’ or was 
referring to the disappearing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 303.
494 The ‘Invincible Acquis’ would have given the predominantly Muslim Republic 30 per cent of the 
country, with access to the port at Brcko on the River Sava in the north, a navigable port for container 
ships on the River Neretva which would be linked to the Adriatic through guaranteed access via the 
port of Ploce in Croatia with a 99 year lease from Croatia. Sarajevo would be placed under UN
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be happy with the plan. Of course, the Serb leadership could be happier than the 
others, since it had gained 53 per cent of the country on behalf of the fewer than 25 per 
cent of its population.495 Finally, on 29 September 1993, the Bosnia’s Muslim 
dominated Parliament rejected the Plan, on the grounds that 30 per cent of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina was insufficient land for a viable Bosnian state. Surrounded by Serbia 
and Croatia, as one Serb delegate described it “the Turks (Bosnian Muslims) are going 
to be like walnuts in a Serbo-Croat nutcracker”.496
However, the fact that the Owen-Stoltenberg plan had conceded the basic principle of 
rewarding aggression, together with the fact that the international negotiators seemed 
willing to make more and more concessions and alterations to satisfy Serb demands, 
ensured that the Serb leadership would not regard these proposals as a final settlement 
either.497
At that stage, the British Foreign Secretary defending Britain’s policies on Bosnia and 
Hercegovina was still saying that wars such as that in Bosnia were usually “civil wars 
simmering with centuries of mutual hatred,” and that it had been “unrealistic” to 
suppose that Europe could do anything to solve the problems from outside.498 
Douglas Hurd noted that ‘British soldiers were “simply at daily risk to themselves
administration for a two year interim period and Mostar under provisional EU control. The 
agreement also called for the demilitarisation of the Union, but there was no plan to disarm Croatia 
and Serbia. See James Gow, Triumph of the Lack o f Will, 255.
495 The total number of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war had amounted to 31 per 
cent of the Bosnian population, but out of those, several hundred thousand had fled the territory 
controlled by Karadzic’s forces and nearly 200,000 continued to live on Bosnian Government 
controlled land.
496 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 303.
497 Malcolm, Bosnia, 253-4. Martin Wollacott described the peace plan as ‘a pitiful peace for 
Bosnia’. The UN brokered deal, he wrote, known as the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, aimed to punish 
those who were least responsible for the war and rewarded those who were the most responsible. 
Martin Wollacott, “A Pitiful Peace For Bosnia,” The Guardian, 23 August 1993.
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preventing massacres, escorting humanitarian supplies and saving Bosnian lives”. 
Although Hurd argued that politicians should not be “seduced by the apparent lure of 
favourable press comment,” and that they should be better equipped to think for the 
long term a here-today-gone-tomorrow commentators, the British governments own 
forward planning seemed quite limited.498 99
Previously, in a speech to the Travellers Club, replying to strong criticism the British 
government had faced in the British press over its policy in Bosnia, Hurd had accused 
the journalists of being selective in their coverage of tragedies, of concentrating on 
Bosnia to the exclusion of other wars and, of ‘letting their hearts rule their heads’ 
when it came to advocating a solution to the conflict.500 501 ‘There are some foreign 
policy subjects where absolute secrecy is possible,” Hurd said, pointing out that 
discretion had been crucial in Britain’s negotiations with Argentina after the 1982 
Falklands war, or the ‘two plus four’ discussions over the reunification of Germany.301 
Hurd admitted that ignoring the media as earlier British prime ministers had cheerfully 
done was no longer possible. His most direct criticism was specifically about coverage 
of the fighting in Bosnia and Hercegovina: “Most of those who report for the BBC, 
The Times, The Independent, The Guardian, have been all in different ways enthusiasts 
for pushing military intervention in Bosnia, whether by air or on the ground. They are 
founder members of the ‘something must be done’ school”.502
498 Steve Crawshaw, “Hurd Answers Critics in Bosnia,” The Independent, 11 September 1993.
499 Ibid.
500 Michael Leapman, “Do We Let Our Hearts Rule Our Headlines,” The Independent. 15 September 
1993.
501 Key Points of a Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, At the Travellers Club, 
London, 9 September 1993, ‘The Power of Comment- Government and the Media,” Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Verbatim Service VS18/93.
502 Ibid.
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It seemed that at that point in war in Bosnia, Britain’s insistence on humanitarian aid 
had shifted international interest from a just settlement to just ‘any settlement’. The 
Bosnian government was slowly forced to recognise the inevitable and accept partition 
on the basis of ethnic exclusivity. However, still the EC and the UN could not come 
up with a workable agreement for partition with space for Muslims. While it was clear 
that no cease-fire, let alone peace, was forthcoming, Britain adhered to its earlier 
opinion that the Muslims should not be encouraged into fighting. They should simply 
accept the verdict of the war: they were defeated and they should accept any solution. 
And, gradually this attitude led to war of words not only between British government 
and British public but also between British government and American and world 
public.
For instance, John Major continuing his transatlantic war of words over the West’s 
approach to Bosnia and Hercegovina rejected demands from Washington for a lifting 
of the arms embargo. He dismissed the recent public criticism by the US of Britain’s 
stance and denied that he had told President Clinton that he would find it impossible to 
sustain his government if he acceded to US requests to allow the resumption of arms 
sales to the Bosnian government. Instead, he had pointed out there was no political 
support for the idea in the United Kingdom.503 He added that “I believe the policy we 
are adopting in Bosnia is the right one. I know it is controversial. That does not mean
503 Colin Brown, “Major Rejects US Claims on Bosnia Arms Embargo,” The Independent, 25 October 
1993.
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it is wrong. We have done in Bosnia more than any other great nation and we will 
continue”.504
It soon reached a point where Bosnia’s United Nations Delegate Muhanuned Sacirbey 
officially announced on 15 November that Bosnian Government decided to sue Britain 
before the World Court for ‘failing the prevent genocide’ through its Bosnia policy. 
Citing the 1948 Genocide Convention, Sacirbey asserted that the UK opposition to 
lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and Hercegovina was responsible for massive 
loss of life.505 John Major was accused of opposing lifting the arms ban for domestic 
political reasons. Sacirbey said that the other nations were not blameless but that 
Britain was accused because it was “at the forefront” in maintaining the embargo.506 
British Foreign Office reacted sharply to the Bosnian government charge: the Foreign 
Office spokesman said that Britain was saddened that the Bosnian Muslims did not 
appreciate the efforts of British forces and aid workers in saving thousands of lives.507
6.7.2 The European Union ‘Action Plan’
The Foreign Ministers of France and Germany, Alain Juppe and Klaus Kinkel, tried to 
negotiate further revisions to the Owen-Stoltenberg proposals during November and 
December 1993. On 8 November 1993, they launched a fresh diplomatic initiative to 
end the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina with a plan to lift sanctions against Serbia 
gradually in return for their ceding more land to the Bosnian Muslims. The Franco-
504 Philip Stephens, “Major Rejects US View on Bosnia,” Financial Times, 25 October 1993.
505 Michael Littlejohns and Rachel Johnson, “Moslems to Sue Britain Over Arms,” Financial Times, 
16 November 1993.
506 Ibid.
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German plan suggested that the Bosnian Serbs should cede a further 3 % of the 
territory they controlled in central Bosnia to the Muslims. Thus, in the ‘European 
Union Action Plan’, it was suggested that the Muslims should be allowed 33.56 per 
cent of the land, and the Croats 17.5 per cent. The Serbs offered to give up their 
demand for the division of Sarajevo, but only in return for the eastern enclaves of 
Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde. Lord Owen greeted these proposals as a progressive 
move, saying: ‘It is not surprising that part of the land is not where the Muslims would 
like it, but still it is a map which offers them 33.3 per cent.’508
The Franco-German plan marked the first evidence of a shift in European tactics away 
from the total isolation of Serbia and more towards incentives for Slobodan Milosevic 
to end the war. On 29 November 1993, the EU convened a meeting in Geneva, 
chaired by Lord Owen for the EU and Thorvald Stoltenberg for the UN. The 
negotiations were based on the Franco-German plan: the Bosnian Serbs were asked to 
cede territorial concessions to the Muslims so that the Bosnian government could 
create a viable state, as well as accept a modus vivendi with Croatia for the Krajina. 
This modus vivendi consisted of an effective cease-fire, the withdrawal of Croatian 
forces from territories occupied in January 1993 and certain confidence restoring 
measures. After these conditions were to be fulfilled, the EU would ask the UN 
Security Council for the gradual lifting of the economic sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro. The sprit of the European Action plan was to use the lever of sanctions. 
On 18 April, Malcolm Rifkind told the House of Commons: “...o f course the 
imposition of economic sanctions is causing a great deal of economic hardship to the 507
507 Alan Philips, “UN Charge Puts Army Bosnia Role in Doubt,” The Daily Telegraph, 17 November 
1993.
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Belgrade Government, as well as to the Serbs in general; it is therefore an important 
weapon, which must be used to its maximum extent.”508 09
The Bosnian Government was naturally reluctant to accept these plans and on 22-23 
December at a meeting in Brussels between the three Bosnian ‘Parties’ and the foreign 
ministers of the Twelve, Izetbegovic rejected the 33 percent share. Karadzic also 
walked out, declaring that he would not agree to the UN administration of Sarajevo.
The international community was divided as ever and was “beginning to show its 
frustration” with the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina.510 While the chances of a 
just and lasting diplomatic solution were deteriorating in this way, the chances of 
political survival for the Bosnian state were also becoming weaker.
508 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 239-73.
509 House of Commons Debate, Hansard, 18 April 1994, col. 645.
510 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 251,
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CHAPTER VII: CHANGING OF THE TIDE IN WAR IN 1994 
AND BRITISH POLICY
7.1. Situation at the Beginning of 1994
The beginning of year 1994 did not offer much ground for optimism about the 
situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The UN mediator, Thorvald Stoltenberg, 
summed up the situation by saying that “the atmosphere for peace talks is more 
negative than at any time,” since he accepted the post in the spring of 1993. The 
fighting between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats were continuing. 
However, following some initial setbacks, the Bosnian government started to get some 
victories over the Bosnian Croat forces.511 Towards the end of 1993, the Bosnian 
Croats’ defeat by the Bosnian Muslims had become almost a certainty; Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman began to threaten the Bosnian government that Croatia 
would intervene in Bosnia to help the embattled Croat forces there.512 Indeed, on 1 
February 1994, when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali maintained that 
there were between 3,000 and 5,000 Croatian troops fighting in Bosnia, the UN 
Security Council voted on 3 February to warn Croatia that it would face ‘serious 
measures’ if it did not withdraw its troops.513
511 The military position of the Bosnian Muslims at the beginning of 1994 was described as ‘they can 
not win but they can set the terms for peace’. Ian Traynor, “Izetbegovic Ready to Reject Carve-Up at 
Geneva Talks,” The Guardian, 3 January 1994.
512 John Kifner, “Zagreb Threatens Bosnia Intervention,” International Herald Tribune, 4 January 
1994.
513 US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright had much earlier warned Tudjman that if Croatia 
intervened into the Bosnian conflict, it would immediately face economic sanctions. Laura Silber, 
“Croats are Warned They Face Economic Sanctions,” Financial Times, 6 January 1994.
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Another key military development in the course of the year 1993 was the expansion 
and consolidation of the Serbs’ position particularly in Eastern Bosnia. The Muslim 
presence there was left with little more than the enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazde and 
Zepa; and the UN’s efforts to make these and other embattled towns ‘safe areas’ did 
little to relieve the daily suffering of the inhabitants and refugees. The other key 
military development was the expansion of the Muslim’s position to the north of 
Mostar and especially in Central Bosnia at the expense of the Croats, who were 
increasingly forced back into their West Hercegovinan heartland. When Douglas Hurd 
arrived in Bosnia and Hercegovina to visit British troops; it was confirmed by all the 
aid agencies perhaps to his dismay that the UN’s humanitarian assistance had very little 
material effect.514 Larry Hollingworth, the UN official in charge of the main Bosnian 
supply depot in Zanica gave a message for the visiting British Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd saying that “come in very strong or get out”. The UN official said that 
“the UN feeding operation was very much behind the minimum target, and the 
difference between withdrawing and staying is marginal”515
In Serbia, although President Milosevic had emerged from the 19 December 1993 
general elections as the most powerful politician in former Yugoslavia, his room for 
manoeuvre was narrowing.516 The rebel Serb minority leadership in Croatia had 
slipped out of his control.517 It was doubtful whether he was still be able to strike a 
deal with Tudjman on the status of Serbs in Croatia. Likewise, in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, it was not certain that he could get the Bosnian Serb leadership to make
514 David Fairhall, Mark Tran and Ian Black, “UN Officials Tells Foreign Secretary: ‘Come in Very 
Strong or Get Out,” The Guardian, 20 January 1994.
515 Ibid.
516 Stan Markotich, “Post-Election Serbia,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 3 (21 January 1994), 8- 
12.
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territorial concession as required by the West for a comprehensive peace settlement. 
Inside Serbia, hyper-inflation had reached the highest level in the world since the 
Weimar Republic and economic collapse was almost total.517 18
Western policies seemed as bleak as ever and the would-be peace makers, the US, the 
EU and the UN were all quarrelling about which action to take. Britain and the other 
states with troops on the ground in Bosnia were being driven towards a joint decision 
to pull out their troops by mounting evidence that the UN relief operation could no 
longer fulfil its mandate, and by the realisation that the Geneva peace process was 
going nowhere.519
By late August 1993, NATO had committed itself to bombing Serb forces if they 
continued to strangle and shell Sarajevo and block relief convoys elsewhere. But, 
since then, although the Serbs continued to shell Sarajevo and block the relief supplies, 
nothing had been done. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had ruled out the threat 
of using NATO planes to force Serbs to give the UN humanitarian agencies access to 
the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica and open Tuzla airport to international aid flights.520
Meanwhile, world public anger at inaction by NATO was growing by leaps and bound. 
And general criticism of Britain for its foot dragging in Bosnia was becoming more 
visible and more vociferous than ever. For instance, at the beginning of 1994, a non­
517 Dusko Doder, “The Ringmaster is Losing Control,” The European, 11-17 March 1994.
518 Laura Silber, “Super Dinar Fails to Deliver,” Financial Times, 25 January 1994.
519 David Fairhall, Mark Tran and Ian Black, “UN Officials Tells Foreign Secretary: ‘Come in Very 
Strong or Get Out’,” The Guardian, 20 January 1994.
520 Later on, Boutros-Ghali asked his official representative in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Yasushi 
Akashi, to prepare a report on the feasibility of deploying NATO planes to force the Serbs to co-
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partisan Washington group of senior figures from politics and foreign policy in the 
Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, including Morton Abromowitz, a former US 
Ambassador who at that time headed the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, wrote President Clinton on the link between Bosnia and NATO’s role.521 The 
letter said:
The daily victimisation o f Bosnia puts into sharp relief the failure o f  
the United States and Europe to resist aggressive nationalism -a core 
test in post-Cold War Europe. N A TO ’s continuing refusal to act 
effectively in Bosnia calls into serious question its relevance to the 
challenges o f  the new Europe and the value o f  your proposal for a 
new Partnership for Peace’. "
The group proposed a new Western policy for Bosnia and Hercegovina. It called for 
replacing the present UN force which had been frustrated in its attempts to keep the 
relief routes open. Instead, NATO and the US would supply air cover if Serbian or 
Croatian forces tried to block the routes. To give the Bosnians the necessary military 
strength, the letter called on NATO and the US to end the embargo on arms for 
Bosnia. It argued that the embargo, though voted by the UN Security Council, had in 
fact no legal basis.523 The letter urged President Clinton that the US and NATO were 
therefore not bound by the UN embargo resolution. The letter basically suggested that *321
operate with the UN aid efforts. Roger Cohen, “On Bosnia, Allies Agree Only to Bicker,” 
international Herald Tribune, 22 January 1994.
321 The other signers of the letter include Max Kampelman, another former ambassador; Senator 
Joseph Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut; and Frank McCloskey, Democrat of Indiana.
5"  Anthony Lewis, “Eor Action on Bosnia; A Dual Test,” International Herald Tribune, 8 January 
1994.
323 The legal argument was based on Article 51 of the UN Charter which says nothing shall ‘impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an attack occurs against a member of the
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UN forces go home as Bosnians were able to protect relief supplies. That would have 
disposed of John Major’s argument that NATO military action would have exposed 
British and French troops in UNPROFOR to Serbian reprisals.
On the other hand, Washington’s policy of ‘benign neglect’, adopted after the rejection 
of the ‘lift and strike’ proposal by the Allies in May 1993, had provoked new strains 
with both France and Britain who sought to get the US to play a more active 
diplomatic role in the process. The British were particularly annoyed by the US refusal 
to put greater pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept the plans for partition, which 
they viewed as the main obstacle to a settlement. In turn, the US believed that the 
Europeans, especially the British, were all to ready to accept the ‘peace at any price’ 
and appease the Serbs.* 524
By the time of the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, roles had become so 
utterly reversed that France was assuming leadership in NATO by calling for air strikes 
to halt the continuous Serbian attacks in Sarajevo.525 The US administration followed 
France’s lead. To Owen’s view, as always throughout the conflict, ‘France’s 
motivation in seeking this threat was not to promote a just peace by reversing or even 
halting Serbian aggression, but rather to obtain a quick settlement’.526 However, he 
dismissed the idea that the threat of air strikes could force the Bosnian Serbs to be 
more flexible in the partition talks.527
United Nations’ until the Security Council has taken the measures for peace and security. Bosnia was 
a UN member. It had been attacked, and the Security Council measures did not protect it
524 Larrabee, “Implications for Transatlantic Relations,” 25.
525 Roger Cohen, “Paris Presses NATO Allies to Relieve 2 Bosnia Towns,” International Herald 
Tribune, 27 January 1994.
526 Harris, “Clinton’s ‘Debacle in Bosnia,” 2.
527 Edward Luce, “Bosnian Peace Prospects at the Lowest Ebb,” The Guardian, 19 January 1994.
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While the discussions on how to stop the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina were going 
on, on Saturday 5 February 1994, a mortar bomb fired on the Markale market place in 
Sarajevo killed 68 people and wounded 197. Although this was by no means the first 
such attack, it caused the largest death toll of any individual shelling to date and 
provoked another round of international indignation and outrage.528 This time, 
however, the international community was galvanised into action. Even those, like the 
politicians in Britain, who had always had deep reservations about the usefulness of 
military intervention changed attitude. John Major called for a more “muscular” 
approach to end the siege of Sarajevo. Douglas Hurd maintained that the massacre 
had been a turning point in attitudes towards the war, and that now “...the benefit of 
proceeding outweighed the risk of proceeding”.529
During the House of Commons Debates on 7 February 1994, two days after the 
Sarajevo massacre, the British government was severely accused of its lack of sense of 
responsibility and appeasement of the Serbs. David Winnick of Walsall asked that:
7.2. The Market Square Bomb and British Opposition to Air Strikes
“Is not it clear, even to this Government, that Saturday’s butchery, in 
which nearly 70 people were murdered, occurred because, as with the 
previous atrocities, the Serbian warlords believed, to a large extent, 
that they were secure from any form o f  western intervention and 
retaliation? Is the Minister (addressing to Alastair Goodlad, the
528 “Shell Kills 61 and Wounds 200 in Sarajevo Market,” New York Times International, 6 February 
1994.
529 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 10 February 1994, cols. 449-450.
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Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office) aware of 
the feeling of deep betrayal that is felt by people in Bosnia, who 
believe that they have been let down by the United Nations and by 
western Governments and are the innocent victims of aggression? 
Unlike what happened with the Gulf war, in which action was rightly 
taken, the Bosnian people are being allowed to be murdered without 
any intervention from the Western community and international 
organisations”.530
Andrew Faulds of Warley indicated that ‘Britain is the leader of the “don’t let’s do 
anythings’ and ‘there is increasing concern and anger throughout all the Muslim 
communities in the world at the appalling lack of decision of the European Union 
governments’ and that, more particularly, ‘there is considerable dismay at Britain’s 
craven conduct in these matters’.531 The MPs also asked for the ‘British Government 
to accept the moral and political responsibility to deal with the issues in the Balkans’ 
and also to accept that ‘Sarajevo is specifically under threat from the Serbs’.532
While the criticisms over government’s inaction mounting in Britain, the European 
Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 7 February issued a statement 
asserting that NATO and the United Nations should try to lift the siege of Sarajevo 
“using all means necessary, including the use of air power”.533 The focus of 
international action then shifted to the Atlantic Alliance; the EU Foreign Ministers 
insisting that there was no need for any decision about the use of force to be referred
530 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 7 February 1994, cols. 21-2.
531 Ibid., col. 22.
532 Ibid., col. 25.
533 Only last Spring, the Europeans had rejected a US proposal including the use of air strikes against 
Bosnian Serb artillery positions, as well as the selective lifting of the arms embargo against the
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back to the UN Security Council, since UNSC Resolution 836 already sanctioned the 
use of force.534 A day before, Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
wrote to his NATO counterpart, Manfred Woemer, asking the North Atlantic Council 
to authorise its military command to launch air strikes on request from the UN.535 The 
Atlantic Alliance had already taken the decision in August 1993 that it would be 
prepared to launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery pounding Sarajevo and this 
commitment had been reaffirmed at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10 and 
11 January 1994.536
NATO governments had considered the possibility of air strikes since May 1993. 
However, several NATO members, particularly Britain and Canada, had expressed 
great reluctance to take strong action, fearing that air strikes would put UN troops in 
jeopardy and intensify the conflict. Canada agreed to the ultimatum after securing 
guarantees for the safety of Canadian troops in Srebrenica and the British government 
agreed to the NATO ultimatum only after military commanders on the ground decided 
that limited use of air power was feasible and that the risk to British troops could be 
contained. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, who took office with the new 
conservative government in March 1993 and who played a central role in assuring 
NATO assent to an ultimatum, favoured a tougher line and, indeed, had a certain 
amount of bargaining power, given the numbers of the French troops on the ground.
Bosnian Government. Robert Mauthner, “Doubts Persists On Bosnia Air Strikes,” Financial Times, 9 
February 1994.
534 UN Security Council Resolution 836 was adopted on 4 June 1993. The Security Council then 
decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, 
Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica, and to use force in self-defence or in deterring attacks against 
the safe areas. The Council also authorised Member States to take all necessary measures, through 
the use of air power, to support UNPROFOR.
535 “Boutros Ghali Calls On NATO to Step In,” Financial Times, February 9, 1994.
536 Ibid.
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Not only did France have the largest national UNPROFOR contingent in Bosnia, it had 
also suffered a great loss of life: 18 French servicemen had been killed and an 
estimated 280 injured, and yet public opinion was still in favour of air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serb positions.537
Following the Markale massacre, the US also decided to pursue a more active policy 
towards the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina and had become more involved in the 
efforts of international community in Bosnia and Hercegovina at two levels: militarily 
by supporting the French calls for air strikes and an ultimatum in the North Atlantic 
Council, and politically by becoming more involved in the Geneva peace process.538 
The US had come to realise that its credibility as world leader was being affected by 
Western impotence in the Former Yugoslavia. President Clinton had surely had this in 
his mind when he said on 9 February that “NATO must remain a credible force on 
post-Cold War Europe”. It was also suggested that the visit to Sarajevo of Tansu 
Ciller and Benazir Butto, Prime Ministers of Turkey and Pakistan respectively, two 
large Muslim countries and important US allies, did not go unnoticed in Washington. 
It was perceived as demonstrating the resentment felt in the Muslim World towards the 
West, which was accused of double standards.
In Britain, it was continuously argued that Britain had bowed to US and French 
pressure. The ministers said that the shift in the French stance in favour of air strikes
537 David Buchan, “French Public Pressing For Action,” Financial Times, 12-13 February 1994.
538 Despite protestations in the past by Warren Christopher, that American foreign policy should not 
be formulated by the media, after the Markale massacre on 5 February, 60 per cent of Americans 
supported air strikes, as opposed to 65 per cent in December 1993 who thought the United Nations 
should not intervene in the Balkans. This turnaround has been widely attributed to the “CNN factor”. 
Ibid.
205
undercut British Prime Minister’s position that air strikes posed too serious a threat to 
the troops on the ground since France had committed more troops than Britain to 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. Conservative MPs, however, repeated their deep concern 
that the threat of NATO air strikes might draw the West into greater military 
involvement in Bosnia and Hercegovina. After a meeting with senior ministers, the 
MPs said that they would push for an immediate withdrawal of the 2,500 troops in 
Bosnia if the 10-day ultimatum brought about an escalation in the conflict.539 40 But, as 
the government temporarily suspended its aid convoys in Bosnia and Hercegovina for 
fear of retaliation by Serbian forces, ministers admitted that the choice had been 
between supporting the NATO plan and a damaging rift with the US. President 
Clinton made clear US determination to take action to end the siege of Sarajevo and 
senior ministers said that the President believed that the failure to act would strengthen 
the hand of those in Washington arguing for a much faster and bigger disengagement 
of US forces from Europe.541
One senior minister said that in such circumstances it would have been ‘disastrous’ for 
the future of the alliance to oppose the ultimatum. Already, John Major’s government 
was seriously at odds with President Clinton over the admission to the US of Gerry 
Adams, the Sinn Fein Leader. And, it was judged that Britain could not afford another 
damaging breach. At the end, the Cabinet had agreed to the ultimatum only after 
military commanders on the ground said that limited use of air power was feasible and 
that the risk to British troops could be contained. It was also agreed that if air strikes
539 About the growing uneasiness in Turkey about the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, see Hasan 
Unal, “Bosnia II: A Turkish Critique,” The World Today 51, no. 7 (July 1995), 128-9.
540 Philip Stephens, “Britain Bowed to US Pressure Over Bosnia Ultimatum,” Financial Times, 11 
February 1994.
541 Ibid.
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failed in their objective, there would be no further escalation in British military
involvement.542
In a statement to the House of Commons on 10 February 1994, Douglas Hurd alluded 
repeatedly to the tensions within the Western alliance when he said there was a need to 
preserve a united front within NATO;
“There is a strong British interest in maintaining the strength and 
solidarity of NATO. In Bosnia, our interest lies in preventing the 
war from spreading, in helping forward the work for a peace 
settlement and in relieving the suffering of the Bosnian people. We 
judged that these interests of ours are best sustained by supporting 
the NATO decision and working for its success.”543
During the debates in the House of Commons on the same day, several times, Douglas 
Hurd stressed the importance of the United Kingdom and its defence policy of the 
strength and solidarity of NATO.
“Anyone who has followed the discussions with our allies or is in the 
allied countries will know how many of us believe, especially the 
United States, that the action agreed yesterday was a crucial test for 
the Atlantic allies.”544
542 Ibid.
543 House o f Commons Debates, Hansard, 10 February 1994, col. 448.
544 Ibid., cols. 451-2.
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On 14 February, Baroness Chalker of Wallasay summed up the government’s position:
“We have consistently supported the use of air power provided that it 
would support and not undermine the peace process and the aid 
effort. I believe that it was the whole question of the margin of 
balance that was so difficult for many countries to achieve. But 
together with our NATO allies, we accept that there is absolutely no 
doubt that the shelling of Sarajevo demands the strongest response. 
That’s why the decision passed the test that to issue this ultimatum 
would do more good than harm.”545
When NATO decision was announced issuing an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs that 
‘they would face air strikes within ten days unless they removed their forces from 
around Sarajevo’, France and the US also confirmed the earlier NATO decision to help 
peace-keeping forces in Tuzla and Srebrenica and to examine other areas for similar 
action, like Mostar and Vitez. Furthermore, the threat of air strikes against Bosnian 
Serb positions around Sarajevo was being presented as the first component part of a 
wider strategy to secure a separate peace for Sarajevo, which it was hoped, would 
form a building block on which to construct a wider negotiated settlement. British 
government frequently stressed that the threat of air strikes did not signal a break with 
the international community’s commitment to a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.546
545 House o f Lords Debates, Hansard, 14 February 1994, cc. 71-72.
546 Indeed it was hoped that die threat of NATO air strikes would have moved die negotiations along. 
On 14 February 1994, Baroness Chalker of Wallasay told the House of Lords: “I believe that the 
NATO decision dovetails with the negotiating strategy being pursued by both co-chairmen in trying to 
secure ail overall setdement”. Ibid., col. 73.
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NATO did not consult Russia before issuing the ultimatum. Using this opportunity, 
Moscow’s nationalist and ultra-nationalist pro-Serb lobby, which had long thought that 
the Yeltsin regime had treated Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs unfairly, exerted strong 
pressure on Yeltsin. The nationalist leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, perceived the value 
of using the Balkan context as a springboard for influencing Russian domestic politics. 
When Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev appeared ready to approve NATO air 
strikes, Zhirinovsky blamed him for being anti-Serbian, anti-Slavic and anti-Russian.547 
It was at that time that Yeltsin and his foreign policy team took a bold initiative to 
assert Russia’s role as a major international player to counter domestic nationalist 
criticism, to help the Serbs and to stop bombardment of Sarajevo. Russia’s Balkan 
envoy Vitaly Churkin utilised what he called Moscow’s ‘special channel of 
communication’ with the Serbs and suggested to the Serbs that if they withdraw their 
heavy weaponry as NATO demanded, Russia was prepared to deploy troops under UN 
auspices between the Serb forces and those of the Bosnian government. The Serbs 
accepted the Russian offer within the UN framework.548
Meanwhile, at Sarajevo airport on 9 February, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, 
Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose brokered a verbal cease-fire agreement between the Bosnia 
Serb and Muslim military representatives, which was to come into effect at noon on 10 
February.549 Agreement was reached to place both Bosnian Serb and Muslim artillery 
under UNPROFOR control for the duration of the cease-fire, after which the UN 
forces were to be inter-positioned in sensitive places and key positions, which were to
547 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 299-300.
548 Ibid., 300.
549 After resignation of Belgium’s Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, who criticised the UN for 
not providing enough troops to do the job, the British Lieutenant General, Sir Michael Rose took
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be determined by a mixed commission to determine any violations of the cease-fire.550 
The Geneva peace talks reconvened on 10 February with the international mediators, 
Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg hoping to move the negotiations on the issue of 
demilitarising Sarajevo and placing the city under UN administration.
At the end of the day, Russia appeared to have achieved a diplomatic triumph 
launching the first successful Russian foreign policy initiative of the post-Soviet 
period.551 It was argued that the Russian initiative was driven more by the Kremlin’s 
perception of Russia’s status in international affairs and also the domestic power 
imperatives of the Yeltsin regime, than by any pro-Serb or pan-Slavic 
considerations.552 The Russian mediation at Sarajevo moved Russia to the centre of 
international attention and secured it a prominent role considering the future crises in 
the region. For Yeltsin, the challenge following the Sarajevo initiative was to built 
upon success and to consolidate Russia’s resurgent position as a putative ‘great 
power’.553
7.3. The Washington Accords: Creation of the Bosniak-Croat Federation
The other important development of this period which could also be considered as a 
new stage in the Bosnian conflict was the ending of Croat-Muslim war in central
command of the United Nations forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Andrew Hogg, “Can This Man 
Answer Bosnia’s Prayers?,” The Sunday Times, 9 January 1994.
550 John Palmer and Ian Traynor, “Serbs Bow to Air Raid Threat,” The Guardian, 10 February 1994.
551 FBIS-EEU-94-043 (March 4,1994), 44.
552 For the history of the Russian policy towards the Balkans, see Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan 
Entanglements, 1806-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Charles Jelavich, 
Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and 
Serbia, 1879-1886 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).
553 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 302.
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Bosnia. From the very beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, it seemed that the guiding 
principle of Serbian policy was to split the Croats and Muslims. Obviously, when the 
Muslim-Croat fighting began in Spring 1993, the main beneficiaries were the Serbs. 
Between the Spring 1993 and the beginning of 1994, the Croats of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina lost 40 per cent of their territory, most of it in central Bosnia, and most of 
it to the Muslims. Out of a pre-war Croatian population of 830,000 around 440,000 
had become refugees.554
Such large losses and the fact that Krajina were still being under Serbian occupation 
inevitably led to political troubles for Tudjman, who was regarded as the ultimate 
architect of Croatian policy in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and for Mate Boban the 
president of the self proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The majority of 
the Croatian public, public officials, political opposition and even the céntre and liberal 
wings of the HDZ believed that Tudjman had made a major strategic mistake in 
following the advice of the ‘Hercegovinian lobby’, led by Defence Minister Gojko 
Susak, and in effect ending the alliance with the Muslims in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.555
First, there was ample historical evidence that the Muslims and Croats could be 
effective against the more numerous Serbs only if they combined their forces. Second, 
Milosevic had already deceived Tudjman several times in recent years, and there was 
no reason to believe that any deal with him would be lasting. In fact, Serbian attitude 
suggested that Belgrade’s goal was to obtain a greater Serbia by dividing and
554 Patrick Moore, “Croatia and Bosnia: A Tale of Two Bridges,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 1 (7 
January 1994), 112.
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ethnically cleansing the Croats and Muslims. In fact, it would be foolish to collaborate 
with them to partition Bosnia and Hercegovina and give them large chunks of Western 
Bosnia that would provide a solid land link between Serbia proper and Krajina. Third 
and perhaps more important, Croatia could not join in the partition of a neighbouring 
sovereign state and expect its own territorial integrity to be respected, particularly 
where the Serbian occupied parts of Croatia was concerned.5 56
In the meantime, President Clinton’s special envoy Charles Redman visited Zagreb 
several times and there was US pressure on the Croat government to sign a peace 
agreement with the Bosnian Muslims. It was apparent that the US had adopted a 
carrot and stick approach to Croatia: one the one hand it threatened economic 
sanctions and diplomatic isolation, on the other, the US officials held out the hope of 
loan from international financial institutions, access to European and international 
institutions and programmes, Western reconstruction aid and diplomatic support and 
political backing for Croatia’s claims of sovereignty over Krajina. Given that Croatia 
wanted to improve its position in the eyes of the Western countries, in particular 
Germany, that was a good opportunity for President Tudjman to reverse its bad image 
in the West. On Croatian television, Tudjman stressed that the ‘agreement would 
restore Croatia to western favour and bring it a number of concrete political and 
economic rewards’.557
555 Ibid., 113.
556 Patrick Moore, “A New Stage in the Bosnian Conflict,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 9 (4 
March 1994), 33-6.
557 Patrick Moore, ‘T he Croatian-Muslim Agreements,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 13 (1 April 
1994), 20-21.
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In establishing the Croat-Muslim alliance, a crucial role was played by the ‘Council of 
Bosnian-Hercegovinan Croats’ led by Ivo Komsic (a member of the Presidency and 
President of the newly formed Croat Peasant Party).558 Meeting in Sarajevo on 6 
February, the Council declared itself in favour of preserving the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia, but with a decentralised system of administrative ‘cantons’. Under pressure 
from Tudjman, Mate Boban, the man associated with the partition of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, resigned on 8 February and was replaced by Mile Akmadzic.559 
Following this, discussions took place during the rest of February between Bosnian 
Government and Croatian Government ministers.560 A general cease-fire between the 
Bosnian Croats and Muslims signed on February 23 was to go into effect on February 
25, 1994.
With US assistance, a ‘Framework Agreement’ was worked out to create a Muslim 
(Bosniak)-Croat federation; it was signed in Washington on 1 March 1994. Further 
discussions, filling in matters of detail and setting out new relations between the 
Federation itself and the Republic of Croatia, took place during the month of March. 
On 18 March an agreement to enact a new constitution was signed by Alija 
Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman in Washington; and on 29 and 30 March the new 
constitution was ratified by the Bosnian Parliament.
558 Moore pointed out that “unlike ‘Hercegovinian Croats’ which are antagonistic toward Muslims 
and lived in closed communities contiguous to Croatia and prefer seceding from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and join their lands in Western Hercegovina to Croatia, the Bosnian Croats, living in 
central Bosnia, tended to support co-operation with Muslims, to live in mixed communities and 
favoured a common Bosnian identity.” See Moore, ‘The Croatian-Muslim Agreements,” 21-2.
559 Mile Akmadzic was Boban’s foreign minister and in place of Boban, he had represented Herceg- 
Bosna at the Tudjman-Izetbegovic talks in January in Bonn and Geneva. Since he had earlier served 
in the government of Izetbegovic’s Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina he was considered very 
suitable for opening of talks with the Muslims.
560 Malcolm, Bosnia, 256.
213
The basic principle of the new federation was a system of federal units (cantons), 
covering all areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina which had had a Muslim or Croat majority 
population before the war.561 While the central authority of the federation or 
‘Federation Government’ would have exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign 
affairs, defence policy, citizenship, economic and commercial policy, finance, energy 
policy and international policing, the cantons would have responsibility for all other 
areas of policy either exclusively (police, education policy, cultural policy, and 
housing) or in joint jurisdiction (human rights, health, the environment) with the 
Federation Government. A federal legislature was created, with a House of 
Representatives of 140 members, and a House of Peoples of 30 Muslim and 30 Croat 
members. A prominent part of the constitution was protection of human rights: it 
granted wide powers to three ‘Ombudsmen’ (one Muslim, one Croat and one ‘other’) 
and to a Human Rights court similarly composed of three judges.562
The vital achievement of this agreement was to end the war between Muslims and 
Croats. It now became possible for the two forces to co-operate militarily against the 
Serb army, and for the supply of weapons to the Bosnian Army to be improved. Thus,
562 ‘Others’; Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were effectively ruled out. According to the unofficial analysis 
prepared by Professor Francis Boyle, the legal adviser to the Bosnian government, in the long run 
proposed constitution might be highly disadvantageous to the Bosnian Muslims and might pave the 
way for the de-facto absorption of the federation to the Republic of Croatia. Moreover, leaving the 
Serbs out of the agreement, Boyle argued that the proposed federation actually ratified the results of 
ethnic cleansing and effectively ‘carved up Bosnia into two parts, i.e. the Bosniak-Croat Federation 
and the Bosnian Serb Republic. In Boyle’s opinion, the proposed constitution of the federation 
combined the worst features of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans. It “partitions the 
Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina in accordance with the principles of ethnicity ... and then 
cantonises the so-called Federation in accordance wit the principle of ethnicity... Perhaps the 
Washington agreements should most appropriately called the Vance-Owen-Stoltenberg Plan”. Francis 
Boyle, “Memorandum to the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” 24 March 1994, Champaign, 
Illinois, p. 3. Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 306.
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the large Bosnian Muslim army could now turn its full attention to the Serbian side. In 
addition, the US, though not manifestly taking sides in the war, had effectively 
engineered the Bosniak-Croat agreement, and thereafter had a vested interest in its 
successful implementation. As Izetbegovic pointed out “of course, we Bosnians were 
told that Western forces would come and help out in the implementation of what has 
been agreed”.563
One negative aspect of Bosniak-Croat Federation, however, was that it left no political 
space for those Serbs who disliked the Pale Serb regime of Karadzic and Mladic, were 
loyal to the Izetbegovic government and wanted to remain in a multi-ethnic Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Encouraging the close association of the newly established Federation 
with Croatia the agreement had also set an unfortunate precedent for Republica Srpska 
to claim similar association with Serbia.564
7.4. The Gorazde Debacle
At the beginning of March 1994, following the combination of diplomacy with credible 
military threat in Sarajevo (the ‘Sarajevo formula’) and securing a Muslim-Croat 
rapprochement in central Bosnia, hopes were high of exploiting this relative peace in 
the rest of Bosnia. The US and Russia between them took control of the peace 
process: the American envoy Charles Redman and his Russian counterpart, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, were determined not to let Bosnia and Hercegovina
563 FBIS-EEU-94-047 (10 March 1994), 36.
564 Moore, “The Croatian-Muslim Agreements,” 24.
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to create a new east-west division of Europe. Both statesmen were convinced that a 
comprehensive peace settlement was within their grasp.565
These hopes receded on 29 March, however, when the Bosnian Serbs began a new 
offensive against the Muslim enclave of Gorazde in Eastern Bosnia which had been 
under siege since July 1992.566 Since Gorazde became a ‘safe area’ on 6 May 1993 
through United Nations Security Council Resolution 824, the UN had only succeeded 
in sending 14 observers to the town, despite a call from the UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in July 1993 for an additional 7,500 troops to patrol the safe 
areas. This lack of additional troops combined with Bosnian Serb obstruction in 
allowing any UNPROFOR troops to get through meant that Gorazde had been left 
without any significant UNPROFOR presence.567
When the Serb assault in Gorazde gathered pace during the first week in April, UN 
Headquarters in Sarajevo played it down, dismissing it as a diversionary tactic to pull 
Bosnian troops away from other more important battle areas. The UN commander in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, General Rose, was due to visit Gorazde on 6 April to assess 
the seriousness of the situation, but this passage was blocked by Bosnian Serbs en
565 Judy Dempsey and Laura Silber, “Russia, US Say Bosnia Peace Deal is in Reach,” Financial 
Times. 17 March 17 1994.
566 Gorazde was strategically the most important of the three enclaves (the other two were Srebrenica 
and Zepa) in Eastern Bosnia. It straddled the main road between two large Serb-held towns in the 
Drina valley - Visegrad and Foca. Both had had the Muslim majorities before 1992, but had been 
cleansed. Gorazde where the local Muslims resisted were then separating the two chunks of Serb held 
territory, making communication between them impossible. Furthermore, Serbs wanted to cut 
Sarajevo’s link with Sandjak. a Muslim populated region of Southern Serbia lest they combine their 
forces to form a land link with Turkey. The ‘green transversal' as the ideologues of Greater Serbia 
called it, would be the land link through which the Muslims would push an Islamic arrowhead into 
the heart of Europe. Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 324-5.
567 800 Ukranian troops were supposed to arrive in April from Croatia, but their deployment was 
overtaken by recent events. Indeed, the strategy behind the Bosnian Serb offensive may have been to 
gain key ground before the additional troops arrived.
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route. Just as he did in Sarajevo in February, he still argued against the air strikes and 
played down reports of widespread death and destruction by Serb forces against 
Gorazde, whose pre-offensive population of 35,000 had been swollen by about 30,000 
refugees from neighbouring villages recently occupied by the Bosnian Serbs.
In line with his government’s long-standing policy, British General Rose was against 
the air strikes. He thought them inconsistent with his role as Commander of the UN 
peacekeeping force. He argued that resorting to air strikes would push UNOROFOR 
from peacekeeping to the peace enforcement. Peace enforcement required aligning 
oneself with one side in the conflict. Peace-keeping required strict neutrality. It was 
not the job of a peace-keeping force to intervene to alter the course of the war in 
favour of one side. Use of air strikes would turn NATO into the Bosnian Air Force 
and fatally compromise UNPROFOR’s neutrality. “You can not fight a war from 
white painted vehicles” he frequently asserted. In principle, he did not oppose military 
intervention but he insisted that if the international community opted to enter the war 
on the Bosnian side, it should pull UNPROFOR out and replace it with a force capable 
of fighting a war. He called the fine line between peace-keeping and peace- 
enforcement, the ‘Mogadishu line,’ after the disastrous consequences of US’s efforts 
to impose a peace settlement in Somalia.568 69
When General Rose had played down the seriousness of the Serb attack on Gorazde 
saying that “our own judgement was that the Bosnian Serbs were putting pressure at 
the tactical level and had no intention of taking the pocket’, he considered that a little
568 Sharp, Honest Broker, 33.
569 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, 326.
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local clash should not derail a peace plan which he believed was closer than ever to 
achieving a lasting solution. But his own military observers in Gorazde leaked a 
document on 7 April revealing that the accounts they had been sending to Rose’s 
headquarters were presented to the public in a distorted way. In the report it was 
stated that:
“It is very disquieting to hear radio reports from the international 
media that the situation is not serious. From the BBC World Service 
N ew s o f April 5 w e heard an ‘UNPROFOR assessment said that it 
was a minor attack into a limited area’...S ayin g  that it is a minor 
attack into a limited area is a bad assessment, incorrect and shows 
absolutely no understanding o f  what is going on here”.570
The UN monitors sent an urgent appeal to Sarajevo saying that “the death toll 
continues to rise and serious losses of territory are occurring”. Later on, grasping the 
seriousness of the situation and changing tack, Rose warned Mladic by phone and by 
fax, to stop the attacks on Gorazde or face NATO action.571 The attacks did not stop. 
After seeking and being granted approval from the UN Secretary General’s envoy 
Yasushi Akashi, General Rose gave the order on 10 April that led to the first NATO 
ground assault in the forty seven year history of the organisation. Two NATO US F- 
16 aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb positions on the hills surrounding Gorazde.572
570 Quoted in Ibid., 327.
571 “US Jets Hit Guns Firing on ‘Safe’ Area As UN Carries Out Warning to Serbs,” International 
Herald Tribune, 11 April 1994.
57_ The legal basis used to justify this NATO intervention in defence of UNPROFOR troops was UN 
Security Council Resolution 836 of 4  June 1993, which decides that states “...acting nationally or 
through regional organisations and arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security 
Council and subject to close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary 
measures, through the use of air power, in and around safe areas ...to support UNPROFOR in die 
performance of its mandate...”. S/RES/836, 4 June 1993, paragraph. 10.
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NATO made a second air strike in the early afternoon of 11 April after the 
bombardment had not ceased.573 The air strikes were directed from the ground by 
eight British forward air controllers whom Rose had sent to Gorazde under the guise 
of UN military observers. They were, in fact, all men of the British Special Service 
(SAS).
Following the air strikes, Russia protested at not having been consulted and Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that it had been a ‘big mistake’ to launch air attacks 
on the Serbs without prior consultation with Russia.574 In response to Russian 
protests, Manfred Woemer asserted:
“...close air support has to be very rapid. We have troops under 
fire. If we want to protect them, we have to strike quickly. I did not 
see how we could protect the personnel of the United Nations with a 
delay of several hours... If we had to put in place a consultation 
procedure that lasted hours, it would never be triggered”.575
The Serb reaction to NATO intervention was that the international community had 
now unequivocally compromised its neutrality and entered the conflict on the side of
573 Shortly after the second air strike, NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Womer, maintained: “For 
the second time in 24 hours, NATO air forces responded to a request from UNPROFOR commanders 
and provided close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel in Gorazde area. Serbs had resumed 
shelling from the south and the UN personnel trapped in the town were in acute danger. Today’s 
strike was carried out by a single US FA-18 A fighter attack jet”. Atlantic News, 13 April 1994.
574 Edward Mortimer and Laura Silber, “NATO Raids Strain Links With Russia,” Financial Times, 
12 April 1994.
575 According to NATO sources, only 25 minutes elapsed between the request by air support by 
General Rose and approval by Yasushi Akashi, Boutros-Ghali’s special envoy to tire former 
Yugoslavia. Atlantic News, 13 April 1994.
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Muslims.576 In a bid to drive a wedge between Russia and Western coalition, Serb 
leaders severed all relations with the UN, naming Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s special 
envoy to former Yugoslavia, as the only ‘channel of communication’.
At the end, NATO air strikes did little to slow the Bosnian Serb advance and by April 
15 their tanks had occupied the high ground overlooking Gorazde, from where they 
continued the bombardment of the town. General Mladic sealed off Sarajevo and took 
150 UN soldiers as hostages while his forces in the north of the republic launched a 
reprisal artillery and mortar attack against the government which held the city of Tuzla. 
Obviously, half-hearted air strikes which had no effect on the Serbs served only to 
confirm the arguments of those who had cautioned against the military intervention 
from the beginning. Under these circumstances, Rose declared the situation 
‘untenable’ and said it was too late for US bombing raids to try to deter the Bosnian 
Serbs.577 He also declared that he would withdraw all UN peace-keepers.
A cease-fire negotiated in Pale on 17 April which stipulated the cessation of hostilities, 
the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops and artillery from Gorazde and its surroundings 
and the deployment of interposition force, was breached shortly after its negotiation. 
On 21 April Bosnian Serb infantry entered Gorazde despite threats of NATO air 
strikes to force them to withdraw.578 Under intense pressure from the Americans and 
from NATO Secretary General Manfred Woemer, Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked
576 BBC, SWB, 13 April 1994.
577 “Serb Troops Surge Into Gorazde as Defenses Fall,” International Herald Tribune, April 16-17, 
1994.
578 It was reported that the hospital and the refugee centre were among the targets of the Bosnian 
Serbs. On 21 April UNHCR doctors in Gorazde said that 47 people had died and 143 were wounded 
in the past 24 hours, bringing the total dead to 436 and 1,467 wounded since the offensive began. 
Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1994.
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NATO to use its air power to deter further attack. The NATO Council met in 
Brussels were almost paralysed by internal division, with the Americans pushing for 
air-strikes and the British arguing that this was incompatible with the existing 
UNPROFOR mandate.579 US diplomats were contemptuous of the British position. 
But, the British blamed the Americans for lacking the courage to put troops on the 
ground. The North Atlantic Alliance- and the so-called ‘Special Relationship’ between 
Britain and the US was under strain as never before.
Finally, NATO reached a compromise, but one which exasperated the British, and 
delivered an ultimatum to the Serbs on 22 April threatening strikes unless the Bosnian 
Serb attacks against the safe area Gorazde immediately ceased, Bosnian Serb forces 
pulled back three kilometres from the centre of the city by 0001 GMT on 24 April 
1994, and from 0001 GMT on 24 April 1994 United Nations forces, humanitarian 
relief convoys and medical assistance teams are free to enter Gorazde unimpeded and 
medical evacuations were permitted.580
On 23 April, although the Serbs had not met the ‘condition one’ of the ultimatum and 
continued to fire, General Rose and Secretary General’s special representative in the 
former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi again blocked NATO action by claiming falsely 
that the Serbs were beginning to pull back.581 The UN Commander in Bosnia, General 
Sir Michael Rose was even filmed in Gorazde suggesting that the toll of 2000 injured 
and more than 700 dead claimed by the city authorities was deliberately exaggerated.
579 The British bowed to the pressure in the interests of the NATO unity. But to the British, who had 
from the beginning treated all sides equally, regardless of the role each side played in the war, this 
new ultimatum was, for the first time, singling the Serbs out as the enemy.
580 Gillian Tett, “NATO Air Strike Ultimatum to Serbs,” Financial Times, 23/24 April 1994. See also 
NATO Press Release (94) 31, 22 April 1994, 2.
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He implied that the Muslims had not defended the enclave vigorously enough against 
the Serbs and said: ‘The Muslim forces basically turned and ran and left the UN to try 
to pick up the bits’.581 82 Meanwhile, the UNPROFOR dispatched a company of 150 
Ukranians to prevent further air strikes. When Chris Mullins MP, raised this issue in 
the House of Commons, the Tory Minister for the Armed Forces admitted there were 
“instances that we greatly regret”.583 The British and Ukranians administered an 
agreement similar to that which had been carried out in Srebrenica the year before: 
demilitarisation of the pocket, cease-fire monitoring and the inter-positioning of UN 
troops between the Serb front line and the battered town. Once more General Mladic 
had achieved what he wanted; he encircled the town and could capture it whenever he 
wanted.
At the end, the Gorazde debacle left unresolved the dispute that had so nearly 
destroyed the NATO alliance. The British and French announced that if the Americans 
continued to push for the policy of ‘lift and strike’, they would withdraw their ground 
troops. They spent the months that followed persuading the Americans that they were 
serious, by drawing up detailed contingency plans for an emergency withdrawal. The 
Gorazde episode not only revealed divisions within the international community. It 
also isolated the Bosnian Serbs from their natural ally Belgrade and international 
supporter Russians. Milosevic, before the attacks on Gorazde believed that with the 
help of Russians he was about to have a deal that would have led to the lifting of the 
sanctions was furious with Karadzic. Lord Owen argues that the Gorazde crisis had 
driven Karadzic and Milosevic further apart than ever:
581 “Serbs Defying Ultimatum, Rain Shells on Gorazde,” The New York Times, 24 April 1994.
582 “Serbs Renew Threats as Alliance Fails to Heal the Rift,” The European, 29 April-5 May 1994.
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“I believe that relations between Karadzic and Milosevic were never 
the same after Gorazde. Bosnian Serbs were shown up to be bare­
faced liars, all the time saying that they were not after Gorazde when 
they were...They lost the support of Russians for quite a while after 
that. Which they deserved”..583 84 58
Russian President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the Balkan envoy Vitaly 
Churkin were totally embarrassed when the Bosnian Serbs simply ignored their 
promise to implement a fresh Russian initiative designed to halt NATO air strikes 
against the Serbs forces advancing on the ‘safe haven’ of Gorazde in exchange for
f O C
Serbian withdrawal from the city. Churkin had given NATO his personal assurances 
of Serbian agreement to the plan. Churkin warned the Bosnian Serbs that they “should 
understand that Russia is a great power not a banana republic,” and he asserted;
“When the Serbs claimed that the whole world was against them we 
agreed to help on the condition they followed out instructions.
Instead the Bosnian Serbs used the Russian policy as a shield... they 
only wasted our time... if someone plays with Russian policy, Russia 
will reply as a great power”.586
583 House o f Commons Debates, Hansard (Oral Answers), 21 June 1994, col. 417.
584 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 260.
585 “Russia Drops Its Objections to Air Strikes Against the Bosnian Serbs,” New York Times 
International, 24 April 1994.
586 Quoted in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 308.
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7.5. Britain, Russia, the US and the Contact Group
Throughout the conflict in Former Yugoslavia, both Britain and Russia appeared to be 
more sympathetic towards the Serbs interests than either the US or Germany which 
also brought them closer. In settling the crises in Former Yugoslavia in general and 
Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular, Russian and British officials enjoyed increasingly 
good relations while the relations between Britain and US deteriorated rapidly. For 
instance, it was reported that in Geneva, several British officials mentioned that they 
had better relations with the well-informed and perceptive Russian delegate to 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Vitaly Churkin than with the 
US representative Reginald Bartholomew.587
Not only diplomats but also British commanders of UNPROFOR were often on better 
terms with the Russians and Serbs than with their NATO allies. In mid-August 1993, 
for example, when the US was urging for NATO airstrikes to force General Mladic to 
pull back from Mount Igman and break the siege of Sarajevo, deputy commander of 
UNPROFOR, British Brigadier Andrew Vere Hayes was openly critical of US policy, 
saying “What does President Clinton think he is up to? Air power won’t defeat the 
Serbs”.588 Similarly, a month before that, Vere Hayes and UN Civil Affairs Boss in 
Sarajevo, Victor Andreyev had contacted Karadzic and Mladic with whom they had 
already very good relations and reached an agreement to station French UN peace­
keepers around Mount Igman to prevent possible US air strikes.589
587 Sharp, Honest Broker, 31.
588 J Bone and M. Evans, “Washington Orders to Muzzle Commanders,” The Times, 19 August 1993. 
In mid-1993 Brigadier Vere Hayes also claimed that Sarajevo was not “really under siege by the 
Serbs”. Noel Malcolm, “The Whole Lot,” 16.
589 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1995), 176.
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Another example of exceptionally good relations between the British and Russians was 
in early February 1994, after the Serb shelling of Sarajevo market place, British 
reaction was closer to the Russians than to Americans. Lieutenant General Sir Michael 
Rose, the new UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, was reluctant for NATO 
ultimatum to the Serbs. He preferred the Russian pressure on the Serbs to withdraw 
heavy weaponry rather than having to punish the Serbs with air strikes. He even 
claimed that the mortar shell had been fired by the Bosnian government troops to push 
for military intervention. Rose and many others welcomed the deployment of Russian 
troops to Sarajevo and British Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind lost no time in 
pointing out that Russian troops were compensating for the absence of American 
troops on the ground.590 591Douglas Hurd appreciated the Russian involvement as helpful 
in buttressing the NATO ultimatum and in reinforcing General Rose’s efforts to secure 
a cease-fire around Sarajevo.391 Also lamenting the lack of international co-ordination 
to reach a political solution on Bosnia and Hercegovina, Douglas Hurd praised the 
Russian efforts and the need for the West to help Russia to accept new responsibilities 
in the post-Cold War World.592
With British politicians on the lead, nearly all European officials were criticising the 
lack of American support and international co-ordination for a political solution in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. In a lecture to the Pescatore Foundation in Luxembourg on 
11 March 1994, David Owen warned that a lasting peace-settlement would require the
590 J. Dempsey, J. Lloyd and J. Ridding, “NATO Holds Serbs to Strict Deadline,” Financial Times, 
19-20 February 1994.
591 Douglas Hurd, “A World Role For a Great Power,” The Independent, 20 April 1994.
592 Ibid.
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co-operation of the EU, US and Russia.593 In mid-April, at the EU Foreign Ministers 
meeting in Luxembourg, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, said that three separate 
European, Russian and American diplomatic tracks on Bosnia made it easier for the 
Serbs to play ‘double games’ and urged “that all the little bits of diplomatic process 
should be pieced together”.594 Douglas Hurd agreed with Juppe that it made no sense 
to have three separate diplomatic efforts, and that more co-ordination was needed with 
Russia and the US.595
Similarly, the US did not want to have to deal with 12 different EU governments. In 
the eyes of the Americans, the EU Troika had been thoroughly discredited from the 
beginning of the crisis and was especially undesirable in 1994 because Greece which 
held the EU presidency in the first half of the year was totally at odds with Washington 
over its Balkan policy.
David Owen thought that one solution to make international efforts more effective 
would be to make Charles Redman and Vitaly Churkin the co-chairman of the ICFY, 
but the Americans were not content with the work of the ICFY and found it too 
clumsy to operate. A small group would be a better mechanism and Russia, 
increasingly exasperated with Bosnian Serbs, was ready for closer co-operation. Owen 
was convinced that ‘Contact Group’ would be worth pursuing because he had 
experienced similar mechanism worked well to resolve crisis in Namibia in the 1977.596
593 Sharp, Honest Broker, 35.
594 Atlantic News, No. 2606 ,16  March 1994,1.
595 L. Barber, “EU Tries to Patch Up Its Bosnia Policy,” Financial Times, 19 April 1994, and J. 
Palmer, “EU Seek Russian and US Backing for Peace Push,” The Guardian, 19 April 1994.
596 David Owen considered the Contact Group mechanism which was used in 1977 over Namibia 
comprising Germany, Canada, US, UK and France as very effective in maintaining unity around the 
negotiating table. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 298.
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The Contact Group, established in the early part of 1994, comprised of representatives 
of the US and Russia, who had been providing the main motive for international 
diplomacy, as well as three from ICFY representing the EU, the UN and the ICFY 
itself. The three representatives were being nominated by Germany, France, and 
Britain.
7.5.1. The Contact Group Plan: ‘Take It or Leave It’
The first meeting of the Contact Group officials was fixed to take place in London on 
26 April 1994. It was later agreed that the EU Troika would be invited to ministerial 
meetings. On 13 May, the Contact Group met at ministerial level for the first time and 
developed a two track approach; easing of sanctions on Belgrade depending on a 
peace settlement acceptable to all parties. Building directly on the EU Action Plan, the 
Contact Group agreed to propose a 51-49 per cent division of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
between the Bosniak-Croat Federation (the Muslims 34 per cent and Croats 17 per 
cent) and Bosnian Serbs (Map 6). There were serious differences among the group, 
however, about the details of the map and on when and whether to ease sanctions on 
the Serbs and the arms embargo on the Bosnians. In general, though not on every 
specific issue, the US and Germany defended the interests of the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation, while Russia, France and Britain remained more sensitive to Serb 
interests.597 For example, an early rift in the Contact Group came in May 1994 when
597 Sharp, Honest Broker, 36-7.
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MAP 6
The Contact Group plan
Russia accused the US of undermining the territorial plan by encouraging Bosnia to
C QQ
hold out for 58 per cent rather than the offered 51 per cent.
Most British and Russian observers thought that it would be difficult to persuade 
Karadzic and Mladic to give up 20 per cent of the territory they had taken by force of 
arms to meet the 51:49 partition. To their opinion encouraging Bosnian Government 
to ask for more territory was likely to further jeopardise the entire package. Tensions 
underlined this difference in views: Russia, Britain and France were saying that it was 
time to acknowledge that the Bosnian government had lost the war, and that it was 
also time to push through a compromise settlement. On the contrary American 
officials suggested lifting the embargo on arms so that the Bosnian Muslims could 
defend themselves against the Serbian attacks; otherwise the British and French 
suggestion about imposing a plan on Bosnia’s Muslim-led government, the victim of 
Serbian aggression, would be morally wrong.
The Contact Group presented its territorial plan to the relevant parties in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina in the form of a ‘take it or leave it’ offer in late June 1994 [Map 6].598 99 
The Muslim-led parliament in Sarajevo reluctantly voted to accept what Izetbegovic 
called “an unjust and unfair peace offer”. President Izetbegovic maintained, “we think
598 Roger Cohen, “US-Russia Shift Shakes Unity on Bosnia,” International Herald Tribune, 19 May 
1994.
599 The main territorial points o f the plan were:
-In the north, the divided town of Brcko would be demilitarised;
-The strategic Posavina corridor - which links eastern Serb territories to mainly Serb populated Banja 
Luka and to the Serb populated part of Croatia (Krajina) in the west -would be narrowed to three 
kilometres;
-The Serbs, in exchange, would get territory in Muslim controlled Bihac;
-Sarajevo would have special status under UN administration for two years;
-In the east, the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde would be connected to each other 
and to Sarajevo in a link which will be under EU protection;
-In the south west, Mostar would come under EU administration for two years.
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it is a bad plan, but all our options are w orse... we realised that time is working against 
us, that war is destroying all the prospects of such a multinational Bosnia that peace 
could save”.600 Croats also accepted the plan.
The Bosnian Serbs dithered, no doubt encouraged by the comments of General Rose 
and others that the plan was impractical.601 The Bosnian Serbs laid down several 
conditions that must be met before they could sign: a sovereign Bosnian Serb state 
fully independent of the Bosniak-Croat Federation (with a seat at the UN); access to 
the Adriatic, partition of Sarajevo, and the lifting of sanctions against all Serbs.602
Although the Contact Group had presented the package as a ‘take-it-or-Ieave-it’ offer, 
they started to amend the proposal to meet the Bosnian Serb demands. Because of the 
differences between the US and Germany, on the one hand, and Russia, Britain and 
France, on the other, reaching an agreement within the Contact Group on how to 
sweeten the package was very difficult. Initially, in their rhetoric at least, Bonn and 
Washington took a high moral tone in the Contact Group, calling for a policy that 
should punish the war crimes of the Serbs and protect the multi-ethnic character of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. American and German views, however, tended to carry less 
weight than those of the three states with troops on the ground in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Since, Britain, France and Russia were unwilling to use force against 
General Mladic’s forces that might trigger off retaliation and put their troops at risk,
600 Some commentators interpreted this endorsement as a tactical manoeuvre raUier than acceptance 
of the plan itself, hoping to achieve diplomatic gains should the Bosnian Serbs turn the plan down. 
Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 340.
601 J. Bran, “Partition Plan Puts NATO on Collision Course With Serbs,” The Times, 19 July 1994; 
Roger Cohen, “British Officers Voice Serb Fears Over Territorial Map,” International Herald 
Tribune, November 8, 1994.
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by late 1994, Germany and the US had backed away from pressuring the Bosnian 
Serbs to accept a settlement which would be favourable to the Bosnian Muslims.
In August 1994, after Karadzic repeatedly refused to accept the 51:49 territorial map 
and peace plan602 03, Slobodan Milosevic carried out his threat to impose a blockade on 
trade with the Bosnian Serbs.604 Without mentioning the Bosnian Serb leader by name, 
the Serbian president slammed “the mad political ambitions and greed of [the Bosnian 
Serb] leadership., which includes war profiteers... and people whose conscience is not 
clear and who are afraid of peace, in the event of which all their wrong doings would 
come to light”.605 Although Milosevic’s sincerity was still in doubt and his intentions 
in going public with what was presented in the state controlled Belgrade media as a 
long-standing feud between a peace-loving Milosevic and warmongering Karadzic 
were not clear, the Contact Group claimed this as a victory for their strategy of 
separating Belgrade from Pale. Given the Serbian president’s central role in the 
destruction of both Yugoslavia and of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Contact Group 
rewarded him for his break with Pale by pressing the UN to lighten the sanctions 
imposed on Belgrade in 1992. The ICFY assigned a team of 135 observers to monitor 
the blockade although it appeared that that amount would not be sufficient for the
602 Patrick Moore, “Bosnian Partition Plan Rejected,” RFE/RL Research Report 3, no. 33 (26 August 
1994), 1-5.
603 On August 3 the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the Contact Group plan for the third time and 
called for a referendum to be held three weeks later. In the referendum held on August 27-28, the 90 
per cent of the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group plan. See Silber and Little, Death of 
Yugoslavia, 335-44.
604 J Brand and E Prentice, “Belgrade Bows to Moscow and Cuts Its Protégé Adrift,” The Times, 5 
August 1994; G. Graham and M. Kaminski, “Belgrade to Cut Ties With Bosnia Serbs Over Peace 
Plan,” Financial Times, 5 August 1994.
605 Quoted in Moore, “Bosnian Partition Plan,” 3.
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task.606 Despite a number of reports that war material continued to flow from Serbia 
to Bosnia, on 23 September the UN Security Council voted 11 to 2 to ease sanctions 
on Serbia and Montenegro for a 100 day trial period.607 In fact, “the sanctions were 
not effective anyway”.608
7.6. “Lift and Strike”: The Big Line of Confrontation between the US and 
Britain
During the rest of 1994, it became more apparent that the most severe rifts in the 
Contact Group were between London and Washington and had revolved around two 
issues; US pressure to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and to 
use NATO air power to pressure the Serbs to the negotiating table. Moreover, the 
refusal of the Clinton Administration to deploy ground troops in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina was the biggest bone of contention as the alliance relations deteriorated 
steadily through the war. As a well known British journalist put it:
“As on the territorial issue the W est Europeans and Russians are at 
odds with Washington on every other key point o f  Bosnia policy. 
The Americans want to lift the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government. The others do not. The Americans want to keep up UN  
sanctions on the Serbs. The others want to relax them. The 
Americans periodically argue for air strikes. The others resist. The
606 P. Adams, “Observer Team Moves on to Serbia’s Borders,” Financial Times, 16 September 1994; 
“Serbian Words Are Not Enough,” Editorial, The Independent, 8 August 1994 and “Is Milosevic 
Serious,” The Economist, 13 August 1994.
607 UN SCR 943 adopted on September 23, 1994 reopened the Belgrade airport to civilian passenger 
flights, allowed Yugoslavia to participate in international sporting events and allowed ferry traffic 
between Montenegro and Italy. A second resolution reinforced sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and a 
third one condemned the renewed ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka, Bijeljina and 
other areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
608 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 289-94.
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Americans refuse to send ground troops to Bosnia, to the 
exasperation o f the British, the French and the Russians, all with 
forces in Bosnia.”609
There was a substantial debate in this context between the US, on the one side, and 
Canada and major European troop contributors, on the other. According to the 
private comments of many alliance officials, the view prevalent in the alliance was that;
“The Americans were run out o f Haiti by a gang o f  thugs on the dock 
because they did not want to soul their hands. They were run out o f  
Som alia because they took casualties and could not stand the heat. 
N ow  they want to bomb Bosnia to the last Canadian, British and 
French peace-keeper”.610
In this context, the ensuing events showed that this difference in views influenced the 
outcome of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Bosnian Serbs had quickly 
learned how to exploit the differences between the UN and NATO. Without a clear, 
efficient and rapid decision-making chain, backed by political commitment to the 
approach adopted, all the efforts went into drain.
609 Ian Traynor, “International ‘Community’ Finds Little in Common Over Bosnia,” The Guardian, 
20 May 1994.
610 Anne Swardson cited Alex Morrison (Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies) in “Canada, With Troops in Bosnia, Stands Firm Against Airstrikes,” Washington Post, 14 
January 1994.
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7.6.1. The US Opposition to the Arms Embargo
In the face of continuing tough talk from the Bosnian Serb leadership and refusal of the 
Contact Group plan, the US Defence Secretary William Perry said that the 
international community had reached “a fork in the road” and ‘the US and NATO can 
be expected to deepen their involvement in the Bosnian crisis regardless of the fate of 
the peace plan.611 Under congressional pressure, the US President Bill Clinton 
endorsed, to some extent, lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims when he said: “It 
had been my long held view that the arms embargo had unfairly and unintentionally 
penalised the victim in the conflict, and the Security Council should act to remedy this 
injustice”.612 In a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, Clinton 
said that if the separatist Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the internationally brokered 
peace plan for Bosnia by October 15, he would go to the UN before the end of 
October to ask that the embargo against the Muslims be lifted.
Countries with UNPROFOR forces on the ground, however, continued to view the 
lifting of the arms embargo in favour of the Bosnian Government as the policy of last 
resort. Both Britain and France argued that, in addition to fears for their troops on the 
ground, if the Bosnian government were to receive heavy artillery, this material would 
go to Croatia, thus persuading President Tudjman to fight rather than negotiate with 
the Serbs in Krajina.613 Not in close touch with reality, their view was that ‘arming the
611 Bruce Clark, “US and NATO Likely to Expand Role in Bosnia,” Financial Times, 19 July 1994.
612 Ruth Marcus and Daniel Williams, “Clinton Sets October 15 Deadline to Act on Bosnia 
Embargo,” International Herald Tribune, August 12,1994.
613 In fact, according to articles in various issues of Jane’s Intelligence Review, Croatia had been 
conducting a major covert arms buying campaign, purchasing mainly former Soviet military 
equipment from sympathetic eastern European countries, Iran and corrupt elements in the Russian
233
Muslims would be to take sides in a civil war’,614 in which NATO and the UN had all 
along insisted that they were neutral. In fact, by imposing the arms embargo, 
international actors decisively intervened in the war on the side of the Serbs leaving the 
victim totally defenceless. This was in a sense a policy called ‘Genocide by Embargo,’ 
because “since June 1991, the US has used its own diplomacy and the UN Security 
Council in a grim charade of ‘neutral mediation’ between a Serbian genocidal 
aggressor and his victims. France and Britain have done likewise using the Security 
Council and the European Community/Union”.615
As the latest fightings had illustrated, Bosnian Government forces had both the 
strengths and the weaknesses. In manpower and morale they were superior to the 
Serb army; if they were fully supported by the Croat heavy weaponry, they could make 
significant gains against Serbs.616 Paul Beaver, who was analysing the Balkan military 
matters for the Jane’s Defence Weekly, agreed that “the Bosnians have changed from 
a ragtag collection of militias at the start of the war onto a proper army”.617 There was 
also a growing confidence, born of better arms and fuel supplies and new uniforms. 
The Bosnian Army’s strength mainly lied in infantry, estimated at 110,000 men against 
the Serbs’ 80,000, and in motivation, since many were refugees fighting to go home. 
They could operate from within compact territory and defeat the Serbs with hit-and- 
run tactics. The Bosnian Serbs, by contrast were over-stretched, covering 1,000 miles
and Ukranian armed forces. Jane’s Intelligence Review 1, no. 1, 29-31 and Jane’s Intelligence 
Review 6, no. 9,404-409.
614 Both Britain’s shadow foreign secretary Robin Cook and the Conservative MP who chaired the 
foreign affairs select committee, David Howell, however had long challenged the view that the 
conflict was a kind of civil war. See “Peace Moves in Bosnia,” Editorial, The Guardian, May 15, 
1994.
615 Albert Wholstetter, “Genocide by Embargo,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 May 1994.
616 Malcolm, Bosnia, 260.
617 Ian Traynor, “Thick Red Line Holds in War of Attrition,” The Guardian, 1 September 1994.
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of front line. But the overall superiority of the Serbs in tanks and artillery was still 
very great.618 Paul Beaver estimated also that in the two years to April 1994, military 
equipment worth more that £ 6.7 billion was smuggled through the UN arms embargo 
into former Yugoslavia. The Croats got more than half of it, the Serbs about a third, 
and the Bosnian government, already outgunned, only about a ninth.619
Although the Muslim-Croat peace since March 1994 had shifted the balance, opening 
up supply routes for the land-locked Bosnian Muslims allowing them plenty of assault 
rifles, ammunition and anti-tank missiles, the truth was that the embargo was very 
effective in the crucial area of heavy weaponry.
From the very beginning of the war, despite the calls for surrender since there was no 
prospect of an international military intervention and the Bosnian government forces 
were too weak to counter the Bosnian Serbs, Izetbegovic refused and instead called on 
the international community to adopt a policy of ‘lift and strike’.620 Responding to 
Izetbegovic’s calls, President Clinton decided to support the ’lift and strike’ option in 
April 1993. Yet, Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s attempts to sell the idea 
were resisted and stopped throughout 1993 by strenuous British and French objections 
and Clinton facing a dilemma ‘to do something’ but not to get ‘too involved in Bosnia’ 
spent not a lot of effort to counter these objections.
618 They were estimated to have nine times as many tanks as the government. For example, the 
Croatian General Karl Gorinsek estimated in October 1994 that the Bosnian Army had 45 tanks, 
while Bosnian Serbs had 400. Malcolm, Bosnia, 260.
619 Ian Traynor, “Thick Red Line Holds in War of Attrition”, The Guardian, 1 September 1994.
620 Sharp, Honest Broker, 40-1.
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From May 1994 onwards, the relations between the President and the Congress 
became strained on US policy in Bosnia and Hercegovina. On 12 May, the Senate 
demanded that the President breaks the UN embargo on arms supplies to Bosnian 
government, even if it meant taking action alone. Though many of those who backed 
this change had been vocal opponents of sending US ground troops and even of 
authorising US air strikes, they supported lifting the embargo so that the Bosnians 
themselves rather than the Americans could defend Bosnia and Hercegovina.
When, on 1 July 1994, the US Senate narrowly defeated an amendment that would 
have forced the unilateral lifting of the embargo, France, Britain and Russia again 
viewed this prospect of the Senate forcing an arms lift to the Bosnians with alarm.621 
British officials were quick to emphasise that even if it was accepted, the Senate 
decision would not be binding on the President. But, President Clinton had long 
realised that his powers to stick to his ‘European-led policy’ on Bosnia had eroded, 
and that he had run out of explanations why he still bowed to the European, especially 
British, pressure not to take appropriate measures to stop the carnage when the 
European implication in the whole war had already been revealed. Confronted with 
that, the President said that he favoured lifting the arms embargo but he did not want 
to act unilaterally in defiance of the wishes of the European countries which provided 
the bulk of the UN peace-keeping force in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Finally, President 
Clinton announced that ‘unless the Bosnian Serbs accepted the Contact Group’s 6 July 
proposal by October 15, he would formally introduce and support a resolution in the 
UN Security Council to terminate the international arms embargo. ‘If he fails to win
621 Helen Dewar, “Senate Keeps Weapons Ban on Muslims in Bosnia,” International Herald Tribune, 
July 2-3, 1994.
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worldwide support by November 15”, he had told the Congress, he would break the 
embargo on his own.622 All the hopes for unilateral US action were dashed, however, 
when in September, President Izetbegovic had announced at the UN that he was not 
seeking an immediate lifting of the arms embargo: he feared that a sudden change of 
policy on this issue would bring with it the abandonment by the UN forces of the 
eastern enclaves, and a new heavy offensive by the Serbs.623
7.6.2. British Opposition to NATO Air Strikes
During the second half of 1994 it was evident for the Bosnian Government that real 
progress would only be made on the battlefield, not in the negotiating chamber. 
During August, a strong offensive by the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army succeeded 
in defeating the forces of Fikret Abdic and driving them out of the Bihac pocket, into 
neighbouring Serb-held areas of the Croatian ‘Krajina’.624 625This was a blow to the Serb 
military leaders, who had thereby lost their proxy forces in the Bihac area. Responding 
to this, angry with the Muslims attacking from the safe area, General Michael Rose 
said “these attacks certainly aren’t very helpful to the peace process,”. He added that 
“they are one of the reasons why the Serbs feel quite justified in closing off 
Sarajevo”.623
622 Douglas Jehl, “Bosnian Crisis Hangs Over Clinton Like a Darkening Cloud,” International Herald 
Tribune, September 9, 1994.
623 See Dilek Eryilmaz, The US and the Bosnian War: An Analytical Survey on the Formulation of US 
Policy From the Yugoslav Dissolution to the Dayton Accords, 1991-1995. Unpublished Master’s 
Thesis, Bilkent University (Ankara, March 1997).
624 John Pomfret, “Bosnian Muslims Rout Rebel Force,” international Herald Tribune, August 10, 
1994.
625 John Pomfret, “Bosnia Muslims Launch a New Offensive,” International Herald Tribune, August 
9, 1994.
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In September, General Mladic began his own offensive against the Bihac pocket, using 
not only Bosnian Serb forces but also Croatian Serbs. Although the town of Bihac had 
been declared a ‘safe area’ by the UN in May 1993, it now appeared that Mladic 
intended eventually to capture the town, with its important road and rail links. A 
massive blockade of the Bihac pocket was also operated by the Serbs, with the aim of 
starving the civilian population into submission: between May and November, 131 
convoys were turned back by Serb roadblocks even though the UN forces had a 
mandate to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, if necessary by force.
At the end of October 1994, when the Bosnian Fifth Corps began an offensive from its 
position near Bihac and seized back more than hundred square kilometres, a new joint 
offensive of the Bosnian Army Seventh Corps and Croat forces against the Serbs in 
central Bosnia led to the capture of town Kupres on 4 November. The Serb forces 
seemed to be suffering from logistical problems, and lacked the fuel supplies for rapid 
re-deployments of their forces. However, during the rest of November they mounted 
an increasingly strong counter-attack against the Bihac pocket, using not only their 
own forces with their still large stocks of heavy weaponry, but also so-called 
‘volunteers’ from Serbia, re-equipped members of Fikret Abdic’s force, and roughly 
10,000 well-armed Krajina Serbs from the occupied area of Croatia, an area which the 
UN was, theoretically, in the process of ‘demilitarising’.
During the attack, Serbian fighter jets on a bombing raid through a NATO patrolled 
no-fly-zone, dropped napalm and cluster bombs on the ‘safe area’ of Bihac.626 In 
Washington the Clinton administration responded by proposing a kind of heavy
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weapons exclusion zone around Bihac that was imposed around Sarajevo in February 
1994. The US also urged NATO air strikes on Serb missile sites around Bihac. 
Britain and France refused, as usual, to go along with this proposal; Both General Sir 
Michael Rose and General Bertrand de Lapresle, then Commander of UNPROFOR in 
Zagreb, were against the air strikes. Although previous UN Security Council 
Resolutions authorised member states to ‘take the necessary measures, including the 
use of force’ to deter attacks against the safe areas’ and to ensure compliance with the 
no-fly zone (Resolutions 836 and 816 respectively), while Serb artillery bombarded the 
‘safe area’ of Bihac, General Rose declared that it was impossible to do anything about 
it.62 27 Senator Dole, the Republican leader in Congress expressed frustration with UN’s 
response: “the UN should get off NATO’s back and let NATO take care of Serbian 
aggression”.628
On November 21, NATO aircraft carried out an attack on Udbina airfield in the Serb 
held area of Croatia from where the Serbs had launched their assaults against Bihac.629. 
However, NATO attack and the threats for further attacks did little to stop Serbian
626 Ian Traynor, “Serbs Mock West With Bomb Raids,” The Guardian, 19 November 1994.
627 The UN Security Council established a ban on military flights on Bosnian airspace in resolution 
781 of 9 October 1992, although with no enforcement provisions. The idea of enforcing the no-fly 
zone came into force when Security Council adopted Resolution 816 after 465 violations to the no-tly- 
zone were detected. Resolution 816 authorises UN members ‘acting nationally or through regional 
organisations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to 
close co-ordination with the Secretary General and the UN Protection Force, all necessary measures in 
the airspace of Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure 
compliance with the ban on flights”. Operation ‘Deny R ight’ came into force on 12 April 1993. 
Participating countries were France, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
operation is run by NATO’s Fifth Allied Tactical Airforce HQ in Vicenza in northern Italy and co­
ordinated NATO AW ACS high flying radar aircraft, already monitoring the airspace in the former 
Yugoslavia.
628 Bruce Clark, Laura Silber and Nancy Dunne, “UN Force High Alert As Serbs Near Safe Area,” 
Financial Times, 21 November 1994.
629 The planes attacked the air base from which they had flown, causing a certain amount of damage 
to the runway. Of 39 aircraft which took part in the sortie, four were from United Kingdom: two RAF 
Jaguar aircraft took part in reconnaissance and two further aircraft attacked the runway. The other
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forces moving towards Bihac. In retaliation, Bosnian Serbs took more than 250 
peace-keepers from Canada, France, Russia and Ukraine hostages in Sarajevo at 
weapons collection sites.630
In response, as one NATO official put it “the US wanted to be able to hit the Serbs 
much, much harder without warning and in many places at once. They believe this is 
the only way that the Bosnian Serbs can be persuaded to back off from the complete 
occupation of Bihac”.631 But Britain again expressed its fear that such a huge 
expansion of NATO airpower might be seen by the Serbs as full scale participation in 
the war on the Bosnian government side which could leave the UN peace-keeping 
forces open to the danger of Serb retaliation. Senator Dole, the Republican Leader in 
the Senate, then blamed Britain and France for “a complete breakdown”of the Atlantic 
Alliance and called on the UN to withdraw their forces from Bosnia and Hercegovina 
since the European states always cited the safety of their troops in Bosnia as an 
argument against tougher military intervention.632 On the other hand, Britain and 
France argued that if the US wanted to find a solution to the problem, instead of 
arguing for lifting of the arms embargo or futile air strikes, it should be ready to 
commit its ground troops to fight for Bosnian Muslims. At this point, the US-British 
relations reached the lowest ebb since the Suez crisis of 1956.
aircraft involved in the attack were from the United States, the Netherlands and France. Laura Silber 
and Bruce Clark, “NATO Bombs Serb Held Airfield,” Financial Times, 22 November 1994.
630 Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, “Squabbling NATO Fails to Contain Serb Thrust,” Financial Times, 
25 November 1994.
631 John Palmer, “NATO Crisis Over US Plan For Bihac,” The Guardian, 25 November 1994.
632 George Graham, “Dole Blames UK and France For NATO Bosnia Rift,” Financial Times, 28 
November 1994.
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Behind the scenes the UN manipulation of NATO actions were on full-swing. When 
the Serb tanks were heading for Bihac, the US Ambassador in Sarajevo, Viktor 
Rackovic, asked Rose for further air strikes. After Rose’s refusal, Rackovic called 
Washington and this time Rose appeared to agree. CIA interceptions of SAS 
communications were later revealed, however, as NATO planes took off from Aviano 
airbase in Italy, Rose was ordering his SAS spotters on the field not to identify any 
Serb targets for the planes to bomb.633 Similarly, during NATO bombing attacks on 
Udbina airbase on November 21, General Lapresle instructed NATO forces to avoid 
hitting approximately 15 Serbian planes kept there.634 Even worse was the fact that, 
after Bihac fell to the Serbs, upon requests from General Mladic, with whom General 
Sir Michael Rose had been a good drinking partner, Rose and Lapresle managed to 
halt NATO flights for a week.635
7,7. Converging Different Approaches to Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina
For months, Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Adviser, had been 
talking about the need to combine the threat of force with diplomacy to protect towns 
designated by the UN as ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Then, when Bihac 
was on the verge of falling to the Serbs, in his three page note to the President, he 
admitted that ‘Washington had failed to persuade Britain and France to support NATO 
air strikes to try to save the town’. Instead of pressuring for further bombings, Lake
633 Ed Vulliamy. “How the CIA Intercepted SAS Signals,” The Guardian, 29 January 1996.
634 Article by Michael Gordon, Douglas Jehl and Elaine Sciolino, “US and Bosnia: How a Policy 
Changed,” The New York Times, 4 December 1994.
635 J Pomfiret, “UN General Blocks Strikes on Serbian Missile Sites,” International Herald Tribune, 
December 3-4,1994.
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recommended that the US concentrate on trying to secure a cease-fire and on stepping 
up its diplomacy:
“Bihac’s fall has exposed the inherent contradictions in trying to use 
NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs when our 
allies have troops on the ground attempting to maintain impartiality 
in performing a humanitarian m ission ... The stick o f military 
pressure seem s no longer viable”.636
After a meeting of President’s top advisers, American policy on the 32-month old war 
in Bosnia reached an important milestone. Finally deciding that the Atlantic Alliance 
takes precedence over the fate of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Clinton Administration 
radically altered its Bosnia policy to fall into line with France and Britain. The change 
was driven by the US Defence Department which took the initiative, as Jane Sharp 
argues, ‘to move US policy in the direction of what they called ‘the pragmatic peace’ 
rather than ‘peace with honour’.637 William Perry made it clear that the Pentagon had 
washed its hands over the fate of Bihac and of Bosnia when he said that “it seems that 
the Serbs have demonstrated military superiority on the ground and that the Bosnian 
government had no prospect of winning back any of the 70 per cent of territory held by 
Serb forces”.638 Obviously, this was a dead end actually reached by policies of the US 
and the EU which rewarded aggression and ethnic cleansing.
636 Article by Michael Gordon, Douglas Jehl and Elaine Sciolino, “US and Bosnia: How a Policy 
Changed,” The New York Times, 4 December 1994.
637 Sharp, Honest Broker, 47.
638 “The End of Cruel Illusions,” Review and Outlook, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 29 November 
1994.
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The major shift in the American policy in Bosnia and Hercegovina upset many 
Americans and some people in Britain. Professor Stanley Hoffman, Director of the 
Centre for European Studies at Harvard, condemned the American capitulation to the 
Anglo-French sacrificing spirit of Munich and compared the UN policy towards Bosnia 
to the League of Nation’s inaction over the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s.639 
Similarly, well-known British experts, Adrian Hastings, Norman Stone, Mark Almond, 
Noel Malcolm and Branka Magas expressed their disappointment by the new US 
stance: “it is time that the US government ceased to allow either its own policy or that 
of the United Nations to be hijacked by London and Paris, and more to serve a 
strategy wholly inconsistent with the ideals of democracy and pluralism on which the 
United States itself was built” .640
Following the American turnover, Germany also agreed to toe line on Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that he would continue to restrain 
his ‘moral’ sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims in the interest of maintaining a show of 
European unity for the arms embargo and support for new peace efforts.641 Content to 
bring back the Americans to their line, at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 1 
December 1994, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, reiterated Malcolm Rifkind’s 
views that deterring the Serb campaign in Bihac by air strikes was an “inoperable and 
impossible strategy”. On 7 December, Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons that 
there was a long history of over-optimism about air power. Although he admitted that
639 Sharp, Honest Broker, 48. See Stanley Hoffmann, “Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for 
European Institutions,” in The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: A 
Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996), 97-121.
640 Adrian Hastings, Norman Stone, Mark Almond, Noel Malcolm, Branka Magas, “On Bosnia, 
Washington Should Stop Deferring to London and Paris,” International Herald Tribune, November 
29, 1994.
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air power had its role, emphasising that NATO and the UN had worked out together 
ways in which NATO air power could be used to protect UN forces, to deal with 
heavy weapons in and around the safe areas and to enforce the no-fly zone, he 
maintained “the idea, however, that one can use air power to alter the policy of a 
Government to bring recalcitrant people to the conference table is misguided”.641 42 
Malcolm Rifkind also struck a similar tone in his statement to the House of Commons 
on 21 November 1994 after the NATO air strikes over Bihac “Breaching the no-fly 
zone was an important part of the justification for today’s attack.”643 However, he 
repeated his opposition to air attacks saying that “the events of the past few days have 
shown how improbable is a military solution to this conflict.”644
In Brussels, Warren Christopher joined the other Foreign Ministers of the Contact 
Group in an endorsement of the equal treatment of all three warring factions in Former 
Yugoslavia, putting aggressors and victims in the same category and essentially 
accepting ethnic cleansing and territorial gains by the aggressor as the starting point for 
a settlement. The outcome was a shift from the military back to the political sphere 
and two ‘clarifications’ were made to the Contact Group’s peace proposals which had 
been presented at the beginning as final and unalterable:
“The territorial proposal o f the Contact Group with its 51/49  
parameter and its commitment to the integrity and sovereignty o f  
Bosnia and Hercegovina remains the basis for a settlement. This 
territorial proposal can be adjusted by mutual agreement between the
641 David Buchan and Michael Lindemann, “Germany Agrees to Toe Line on Bosnia,” Financial 
Times, 1 December 1994.
642 House o f Commons Debates, Hansard, 7 December 1994, col. 316.
643 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 21 November 1994, col. 343
644 Ibid., col. 346
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parties. Constitutional arrangements agreeable to the parties will 
need to be drawn up which preserve the integrity o f  Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and allow equitable and balanced arrangements for the 
Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities. The Contact Group will 
facilitate discussion between the parties looking toward a 
settlement.”645
other words, the Contact Group was allowing ‘land swaps’ as long as these were to 
agreed by all the parties and retained the 51-49 ratio. Secondly, it was allowing the 
ssibility of constitutional arrangements for the Bosnian Serbs similar to those 
ovided for the Muslims and Croats. There had been various press reports which 
erpreted ‘constitutional arrangements’ as permission for the Bosnian Serbs to form 
nfederal links with Serbia proper. In his statement to the House of Commons on 7 
tcember 1994, however, Douglas Hurd attempted to dispel this assumption:
“As for the constitutional arrangements ..it has already been agreed 
in principle that th e... Muslims and Croats could have a special link 
with Croatia. W e are saying that it may be possible for the parties to 
agree that there should be a fair, balanced and equal relationship 
between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia... . W e are talking not about 
a confederation but about constitutional arrangements within the 
integrity o f  Bosnia and Hercegovina.”646
Contact Group Ministerial Communique, Brussels, 2 December 1994.
House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 7 December 1994, col. 315.
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As the year 1994 was approaching to the end, the appeasement of the Serbs by the 
international community were more clear than ever. As a well known British journalist 
put it:
“It is 56 years since Britain and France took the initiative in Munich 
to allow Germany to carve up Czechoslovakia in an attempt to 
appease Hitler. Four months later, when the Nazi forces occupied 
Poland, they recognised the paradox- that peace can only be secured 
through war”.647
Similarly, in the Bosnian case, under increasing pressure to accept defeat and settle 
quietly for peace, Bosnian Government’s hopes for a just peace were razed to the 
ground. In his address to the CSCE summit in Budapest on 5 December, President 
Izetbegovic bitterly castigated Britain and France for appeasement in the face of 
Serbian aggression: “Paris and London from the very beginning have taken the role of 
Serbia’s protectors; they have blocked the Security Council and NATO and prevented 
all attempts at stopping Serbia’s aggressive war”.648
On the other hand, around 350 UN personnel were still hostages at the hands of the 
Serbs and some of them were used as ‘human shields’ against expected air strikes in 
certain areas. Some others were trapped in so-called ‘safe areas’ and could not be 
reached. Acknowledging the apparent uselessness of the aid mission, the policy debate 
had become dominated by arguments over withdrawing UN troops under these 
circumstances. First, Douglas Hurd, warned his colleagues at the EU summit in Essen
647 Maggie O’Kane, “When the Talking Has to Stop,” The Guardian, 5 December 1994.
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that the 23,000 strong UN peace-keeping force could be forced to withdraw in ‘a 
matter of weeks’ unless the Bosnian Serbs accepted the UN-EU plan. President 
Clinton even agreed in principle to send US troops to help evacuate UN peace-keepers 
from Bosnia and Hercegovina. That decision was a turnaround in policy for the US, 
which had so far been reluctant to commit ground forces in Bosnia. Then, Britain held 
back from the idea of withdrawing the troops and insisted that a diplomatic solution be 
found in Bosnia.648 49
When everything was in a deadlock; neither the UN, NATO, nor any of the major 
powers showed any overall vision for solving the Bosnian crisis, the surprise came with 
the Carter Peace initiative in the last week of 1994 upon the invitation of Bosnian Serb 
leader Radovan Karadzic. The former US president Jimmy Carter quickly brokered a 
deal between Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs for a four month cessation of 
hostilities beginning January 1, 1995.650
648 “Alija Izetbegovic Addresses the CSCE Summit,” Bosnia Report, Issue 8, January 1995, 5.
649 Lionel Barber, “Britain and France Firm on Bosnia,” Financial Times, 10-11 December 1994.
650 Laura Silber, “Bosnia Signs Interim Cease-Fire,” Financial Times, 24 December 1994.
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CHAPTER VIII: TOWARDS THE ENDGAME: BRITISH POLICY
ON THE ROAD TO DAYTON
8.1. Reversal of the Tide: Bosnia and Croatia on the Offensive
By the beginning of 1995, it was obvious that international diplomacy towards former 
Yugoslavia had been stripped of all credibility. Lacking an overall vision, the 
international community did not muster a credible threat of force that would bring the 
Serbs to serious negotiations. The main problem was that the Serbs continued to set 
the agenda and neither the UN, NATO, nor any of the major powers had shown 
overall vision for solving the Bosnian crisis. As even the US officials admitted, there 
were only few months, at best, before resumption and probably worsening of the 
fighting. The problem remained: the Serbs were still setting the agenda and the West 
had run out of ideas”.631
The EU negotiator Lord Owen approached 1995 with trepidation since there was no 
Contact Group peacemaking to match the UN peacemaking, and the UNPROFOR’s 
authority was running out.651 52 The Serbs had refused to accept the Contact Group plan 
and it was obvious that no one would force them to sign it unless the situation changed 
radically. However, the year 1995 was going to bring forward all the changes 
necessary to force the Bosnian Serbs to sign a settlement that would end the four years 
of war.
651 Roger Cohen, “No Trace of Peace in Bosnia’s Cease-Fire,” International Herald Tribune, 20 
January 1995.
652 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 336.
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8.1.1. Tudjman’s Decision to Expel UNPROFOR
From the beginning of 1995, attention increasingly focused on the situation in Croatia, 
when President Tudjman sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali on 12 January, saying that “Croatia would not renew the mandate of the 14,000 
strong UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) when it expired on 31 March and the 
peace-keepers would leave by late June 1995”.653
Calculating that there was no prospect of Milosevic and his proxies in Serb-held 
Croatia negotiating seriously a settlement while the UN provided a shield, behind 
which the Serbs could build their mini-state, President Tudjman had decided to get rid 
of the UN presence in Croatia.654 As one observer writing from the regions at the time 
put it:
“In fact, the UN mission in Croatia has had effectively frozen the 
territorial outcome o f  the 1991 war, patrolling the frontlines and 
enabling the 12 per cent Serb rebel minority, with Belgrade’s 
backing, to entrench its hold on a quarter o f the country with a view  
to merging with “Greater Serbia”. The UN mission has had in 
practice helped the Serbs”.655
653 In the letter, Tudjman praised the original January 1992 decision to station UN forces all along the 
front lines separating the Croatian army from the Krajina Serb rebels, who controlled between 25 to 
30 per cent of Croatia’s territory. He also uttered kind words for the foreign soldiers and the 
sacrifices many of them had made in keeping the often fragile peace. But he argued that the 
UNPROFOR had not managed to fulfil any of its original objectives and that the only purpose it had 
served was to preserve the status-quo, which was helping the Serbs to consolidate their ‘conquests’.
654 The peacekeeping force had been unable to disarm the UNPAs; to establish an ethnically mixed 
local police force; to enable refugees to return or to ensure control of the Croat-Bosnian border. See 
Alan James, ‘T he UN in Croatia: An Exercise in Futility?,” The World Today 49, no. 5 (May 1993), 
93-5.
655 Ian Traynor, “Croats Give UN Marching Orders on a Dangerous Battle of Wits,” The Guardian, 
14 January 1995.
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The fear that the UNPROFOR’s continued presence supported the partition of Croatia 
was the domestic political reason for Tudjman’s decision. Tudjman’s governing 
Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) had lost most of its popularity and its 
parliamentary majority had been weakened by defections. The HDZ could not have 
afforded to be seen as tolerating the de facto partition of Croatia, and there was a hard 
line element within the party which never approved the Vance Plan.656 As one 
Croatian official put it, “Tudjman had to end UNPROFOR’s mandate in order to stay 
in power; it is as simple as that”.657
In fact, several additional factors aggravated domestic opposition to the peace keeping 
operation. First, 300,000 Croatian refugees were unable to return their homes in Serb- 
held areas. The Vance Plan had promised that they could go back, but in practice that 
never happened and the refugees were growing increasingly impatient. The funding 
for refugees from Krajina and Bosnia was the second largest item in the state budget, 
after defence. Second, the unintegrated territories put a heavy burden on Croatian 
economy. Krajina’s capital Knin, as a major railway junction, now, in rebel Serb 
hands, was blocking the rail traffic between Zagreb and Split. Third, the UNPROFOR 
itself had been unpopular; it appeared to protect the Serb conquests and it became 
known among the Croats as SERB-PROFOR (i.e. protecting the Serbs). The 
government-controlled media also promoted the negative image of the peace-keepers 
often showing them in company with the Serbs.658
656 Patrick Moore, “The Winds o f War Return,” Transition 1, no. 5 (14 April 1995), 33.
657 Reuters, January 15,1995.
658 Moore, “The Winds of War Return,” 33.
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,ast but not the least, recent developments in the international mediation on Bosnia 
ad persuaded the Croats of the urgency of taking immediate action. In December 
994, when the US fell in with Britain, France and Russia on Bosnia, opting a “peace 
.t all costs” strategy and recognising the Serbs as the military victors, the alarm bells 
vere sounded in Zagreb.659
J.1.2. International Reaction to Tudjman’s Decision and The Zagreb-4 
Project
Fudjman’s determination to get rid of UN presence in Crotaia led the international 
community to re-launch diplomatic efforts to head off a conflict. Especially the troop- 
contributing states, mainly Britain and France were concerned that the departure of the 
UNPROFOR from Croatia would increase the tension in the United Nations Protected 
Areas (UNPAs) and could lead to a renewal of the war in Croatia, which in turn could 
provoke a wider war.660 The question also arose whether the UNPROFOR could 
maintain its presence in Bosnia without strong UN presence in Croatia to guarantee 
supplies and logistical support; on 6 March, Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko 
Mladic warned that the UNPROFOR would also have to leave Bosnia if Tudjman 
evicted it from Croatia.661
The co-chairmen of the ICFY, Lord Owen and Stoltenberg, and the Ambassadors of 
the US and Russia- the Zagreb Four (Z-4)- began in late January to seek a lasting 
solution to the Krajina issue. The goal was to give the Krajina Serbs a broad measure
659 Ian Traynor, “Croats Give UN Marching Orders on a Dangerous Battle of Wits,” The Guardian, 
14 January 1995.
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of self-rule while maintaining the formal unity of Croatia and permitting the refugees to 
return home.60 162 On 30 January 1995, the Z-4 Ambassadors presented a ‘Draft 
Agreement on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium’ but was 
rejected by both sides.663 Zagreb rejected the package because it created a ‘state 
within a state’ and thus violated the Croatian constitution. The Croatian Serbs also 
rejected the plan arguing that ‘Krajina Serbs could not accept to turn to Croatian 
sovereignty, and Milosevic apparently did not wish to recognise Croatian frontiers and 
leave his long-standing project for creating a ‘Greater Serbia’.
The Z-4 project was not the only plan on the table on the wake of Tudjman’s 
announcement to expel the UNPROFOR. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, in an 
interview with Le Monde on 31 January, offered a ‘last chance scenario’ by calling for 
an international conference on the former Yugoslavia. This conference was to have 
included Tudjman, Milosevic and their Bosnian counterpart Alija Izetbegovic, but 
Karadjic would not be invited unless he accepted the Contact Group division plan. 
Juppe’s proposal stipulated that all former Yugoslav republics must recognise each 
other and endorse both the Contact Group and Z-4 plans, and that sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro would be suspended. The plan was later amended to include 
implementation in stages as well as at one time. Similarly, Andrei Kozyrev stated that
660 House o f Commons Debates, Hansard, 2 March 1995, col. 65 lw .
661 Reuters, 7 March 1995.
662 Moore, “The Winds of War Return,” 36.
663 Z-4 Plan was seeking a compromise by emphasising Croatia’s territorial integrity, while seeking to 
assure the Serbian minority of its rights. It offered the rebel Serbs a broad measure of autonomy in 
two parts of the territory where they form a majority. Serbs living in other parts of the self-declared 
Republic of Serbian Krajina would be expected to reintegrate into Croatia and the government in 
Zagreb would be forced to observe strict human rights legislation to protect the Serbian minority. In 
the autonomous Serbian region, the Serbs would have control over taxation, the police, education, 
tourism, housing and public services and Zagreb would act for foreign affairs, defence, trade, 
transport and communications. Krajina would be demilitarised and the border with Bosnia 
monitored. Reuterst1 February 1995 and 9 February 1995.
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“if we recognise Milosevic as a key factor, we must help him” by ending sanctions.664 
Nevertheless, all the proposals were given a cold shoulder by Belgrade. The prevalent 
view was that ‘sanctions must first be lifted and the constitutional relationship between 
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia regulated locally before Milosevic will consider 
recognition of Bosnia and Croatia’. Extending ‘early’ recognition to Croatia would be 
a very difficult step for Milosevic, who would be seen as leaving his Serbian brethren 
and their dream of Greater Serbia, which would provoke a politically dangerous 
backlash from ultra-nationalists within Serbia.665
Despite all the efforts, by early March, Croatia’s position on the UNPROFOR did not 
change much; President Tudjman proposed to negotiate a new mandate which would 
put the peace-keepers not on the frontlines partitioning Croatia, but on Croatia’s 
internationally recognised borders,666 as the Croatian Defence and National Security 
Council announced:
“...  The mandate will not be extended. As proof o f its determination 
to achieve a peaceful solution and the reintegration o f occupied 
areas, Croatia is willing to accept the presence o f international 
monitors on its internationally recognised borders with Serbia and 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croatia will not accept a new  
UNPROFOR or the deployment o f  any forces in the disengagement 
zone along the battle lines in Krajina”.667
664 Reuters, 20 February 1995.
665 Stan Markotich, “Milosevic’s New Strategy,” Transition 1, no. 19 (20 October 1995), 60-62.
666 Drozdiak W., “Croatia Chief Drops Plan to Push Out UN Troops,” International Herald Tribune, 
13 March 1995.
667 The declaration was made on 1 March 1995. Quoted in Moore, “The Winds of War Return.” 37.
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On 6 March 1995, Croatia also announced the formation of a military alliance with the 
Muslim-Croat front of Bosnia which further strengthened the already recovered 
Muslim-Croat forces. Generals Janko Bobetko, Rasim Delic, and Tihomir Blaskic, the 
commanders of the Croat and Bosnian government armies and the Bosnian Croat 
militia respectively, agreed in Zagreb to set up joint military headquarters.668 “I have 
been waiting for this moment for two years -uniting our forces for the anti-fascist 
battle,” said Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnian government. The support from 
Croatia added muscle to the anti-Serb front which resulted in a stronger position for 
the Federation both on the battlefield as well as on the negotiation table. According to 
General Bobetko, the pact was to strengthen the Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia 
forged with the encouragement of the US in 1994 and to which both parties had by 
then paid little more than lip service.669 In the meantime, Bosnia’s Foreign Minister, 
on a visit to London, again called for a lifting of the arms embargo, and in Washington 
Senator Dole was still searching for a majority for such a move.670
8.1.3. Croatia’s Recapture of Western Slavonia and Its Implications
On May 1, Croatian forces launched ‘Operation Flush’, ostensibly a limited police 
operation in retaliation to the latest Serb attack on the highway E-70, but it turned out 
to be the beginning of a sustained effort to claim territory lost to the Serbs since the 
1991 war.671 By 2 May, the Croatian army units had seized all strategic points in the 
Serb held areas of Western Slavonia, and the fall of Okucani restored Croatian control
668 The move was interpreted as a response to a military pact formed a month ago by the leaders of the 
Bosnian-Croatian Serbs, who had established a joint defence council in the Bosnian town of Banja 
Luka.
669 Julian Borger, “Pact Increases Balkan Tension,” The Guardian, 7 March 1995.
670 “Running Out of Ideas,” Leading Article, The Guardian, 8 March 1995.
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over segments of the economically vital Zagreb-Belgrade highway (E-70 motorway) 
and parallel railway.671 72 By 6 May the entire area was fully restored to the Croatian 
Government control. The majority of the Serb inhabitants had already fled to Bosnia 
and Hercegovina and some of them to Serbia. The Croatian Serbs retaliated by firing 
missiles armed with cluster bombs on Zagreb, killing five and wounding 121.673 In 
addition, Croatian Serbs took over 100 UN peace-keepers in the area hostage to use as 
human shields against Croatian bombardments. All this indicated that the tide in the 
war was certainly tilting towards Croatia.
The significance of the recapture of Western Slavonia was threefold: it demonstrated 
the new strength and tactical skills of the Croatian army; it revealed the underlying 
weaknesses of the Serb forces; and it showed that neither Serbian and Montenegrin 
army nor even the Bosnian Serb military was prepared to come to the rescue of the 
Croatian Serbs.674 Although in the past, Milosevic pledged to defend the Serbs 
everywhere, he sought to distance himself from the fighting in Croatia since his 
primary concern at that time was to secure the lifting of the sanctions.675 He only 
condemned the Croatian attack in spite of the mounting pressure within Serbia’s 
military and political establishment.676
671 Sharp, “Honest Broker,” 49.
672 Patrick Moore, “Waiting and Watching in the Wake of Western Slavonia,” Transition 1, no. 10 
(23 June 1995), 28.
673 Reuters, May 2, 1995.
674 Malcolm, Bosnia, 261.
675 Stan Markotich, “New Image, Same Old Goals,” Transition 1, no. 12 (14 July 1995), 7.
676 For example, Vojislav Seselj, leader of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, accused Serbian 
President Milosevic of betraying the Croatian Serbs in Western Slavonia and warned Radovan 
Karadzic that Milosevic was similarly planning to betray the Bosnian Serbs.
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Tudjman’s military offensives changed the regional balance of power. It was argued 
that, in Washington’s view, this provided a useful substitute for Western action against
the Serbs, which in tum more than justified covert military assistance to Tudjman.677 *
Croatian President announced that “after this lesson the Serbs will accept a peaceful
678solution at the end...If not...they had a lesson from Okucani”.
After such radical changes on the ground in Croatia, alarmed that renewed fighting 
could spread to other areas of former Yugoslavia, the House of Commons debated the 
situation in former Yugoslavia on 9 May 1995.679 Still, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Douglas Hurd was arguing in favour of 
peacekeeping operation which in his view had saved many lives and prevented a wider 
war. The Foreign Secretary also clearly put that Britain had no intention of imposing a 
settlement from outside by force meaning abandoning its ‘neutrality’.68” He repeated, 
what he had earlier said constantly to the House, that he still regarded the war in 
Bosnia in terms of a civil war: ‘the main responsibility for starting the war rests with 
the Serbs, but in essence these have always been civil wars’.681 Therefore, no military 
intervention on behalf of one side or lifting of the arms embargo which, in his view, 
would escalate the fighting could and should be considered seriously. He took the 
view that both options would likely to create dangerous situations because they might 
range the US and Russia on different sides. Obviously, British policy had not changed 
much from the beginning of the war: it still had three objectives: containing the fighting 
with the arms embargo; softening the war’s effect on civilians with peacekeeping
677
678
679
680 
681
Sharp, Honest Broker, 50.
Quoted in Patrick Moore, “Waiting and Watching,” 56.
House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 9 May 1995, cols. 582-650.
Ibid., col. 583.
Ibid.
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operations and creating the conditions for peace which involved soldiers on the ground 
mediating local disputes, brokering local cease fires.
Meanwhile, the UN’s confusion as to what to do was increasing on a daily basis. For 
instance, the soldiers were trying to do the politicians’ job by negotiating with both 
sides local ceasefires, and the UN civil officials were deciding about the military 
actions. When the UN Commander in Bosnia, General Rupert Smith requested air 
strikes to protect the safe area in Sarajevo from further shelling, he was overruled by 
the UN at the political level. That showed that something was really wrong with the 
UN chain of command, which was oddly partly military, partly civilian and operated 
with the dual key system. As Sir Patrick Cormack stated, until Yasushi Akashi was 
removed, there would be little credibility for the UN operations in Bosnia.682
8.1.4. End of the Carter Cease-Fire and the Bosnian Offensive
Another important issue which complicated the Contact Group’s diplomatic efforts in 
the first half of the 1995 was the refusal of both the Bosnian government and the 
Bosnian Serbs to renew the four month cease fire that was to expire on 1 May. Many 
signs had already indicated that the parties involved regarded the December cease-fire 
simply as a welcome opportunity to prepare for more war in the spring.683 The cease­
fire itself was never fully effective; in the Bihac pocket, Abdic and Krajina Serbs had 
refused to sign the documents.684 On 18 January, Serbs flew 20 helicopter sorties to 
resupply positions just west of Bihac, where the Bosnian government’s mainly Muslim
682 Ibid.
683 Patrick Moore, “January in Bosnia: Bizarre Diplomacy,” Transition 1, no. 3 (15 March 1995), 20.
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Fifth Corps had retaken the strategically important villages of Vedro Polje and Klokot
685in a counter offensive begun after the cease-fire took effect on January 1.
Neither Yasushi Akashi nor the members of the Contact Group were able to persuade 
either Bosnian government forces, or the Pale Serbs, to extend the four month cease­
fire that ran out at the end of April.684 586 Obviously, in the absence of any diplomatic 
breakthrough, the Bosnian government did not want to prolong a truce that allowed 
the Serbs to tighten their grip on the 70 per cent of Bosnia they held. In his speech to 
the House of Commons, Robin Cook, the new shadow Foreign Secretary pointed out 
that the Bosnian government made it perfectly clear to him when he visited them that 
‘they had no intention of extending the ceasefire, if there were no agreement on the 
Contact Group peace plan by the time that the ceasefire came to an end’ and he 
considered this position as ‘understandable’.687
Elements in the Bosnian political and military leadership wanted to fight, having long 
since concluded that might was the determining factor in present situation.688 The 
Contact Group’s failure to put any pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the terms 
of the Contact Group Plan was annoying. It seemed to everyone that the European 
Powers were no longer interested in what was happening inside Bosnia, and that they 
were congratulating each other because the war had not spread outside Bosnia and
684 Adrian Brown, “Biliac Action Puts Cease-Fire at Risk,” The Daily Telegraph, 16 January 1995.
685 The Serbian sorties were ‘a clear violation of the no-fly zone over Bosnia’. The helicopters took 
off from the Udbina airfield in the Krajina. NATO had bombed the runways at the Udbina airfield in 
November 1994, but spared the Serbian aircraft at the insistence of the UN Commander Sir Michael 
Rose. Roger Cohen, “No Trace of Peace in Bosnia’s Cease-Fire,” International Herald Tribune, 20 
January 1995.
,86 Emma Daly, “Bosnians and the Serbs Refuse to Renew Truce,” The Independent, 1 May 1995.
,87 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 9 May 1995, col. 591.
,88 Laura Silber, “Bosnian Rivals See No Alternative to War,” Financial Times, 22 March 1995.
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Hercegovina. As Bosnian foreign minister Haris Slajdzic noted, the only concern of 
the Contact Group was that the war did not spill out of Bosnia, “Whatever spills into 
Bosnia seems to be OK”.689
Prepared during the winter truce, the Bosnian government troops launched a twin 
offensive on Serb-held strategic heights in the third week of March. The sudden 
assaults on the Majevica peak above the government stronghold of Tuzla and on 
Vlasic mountain across the front line in Travnik failed to dislodge the entrenched 
Serbs, but triggered statements of alarm in Western capitals.690 Prime Minister John 
Major was quick to urge the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs to stop violating 
the ceasefire, and said that ‘the Bosnian parties were quite literally playing with fire. If 
they rekindle all out war’ he said T don’t believe any of the participants will be able to 
make lasting gains’.691
8.2. The Changing Phase of the International Involvement
8.2.1. General Rupert Smith and the Rapid Reaction Force
Following the upsurge in Serb attacks, which forced the closure of Sarajevo airport to 
humanitarian aid flights, The UN commander in Bosnia, British Lieutenant-General 
Rupert Smith warned the Bosnian Serbs that they risked NATO air strikes if they 
continued to shell civilian targets and violate the heavy weapons exclusion zone around 
Sarajevo.692 However, the UN had refused to authorise NATO air strikes against
689 Julian Borger, “UN Appeals on Truce Fail,” The Guardian, 1 May 1995.
690 Ian Traynor, “Peace Moves On Ice As Melting Snows Herald Return to Fighting in Bosnia,” The 
Guardian, 23 March 1995.
691 Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, “Major Appeal for Bosnia Truce,” Financial Times, 11 April 1995.
692 Ibid.
259
Serbian artillery around Sarajevo which had then completed its third year under siege. 
The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe was furious over the lack of response to 
Serbian shelling of Sarajevo and the UN’s failure to prevent increasing casualties 
among the 4,800 French peace keepers.693 All this cautious approach had prompted a 
steady build-up of pressure for the UN to toughen its stance -particularly after May 8, 
when the UN headquarters in Zagreb irritated the US and other western governments 
by deciding against punitive air raids even after a mortar attack in Sarajevo which 
killed eleven people.694 However, the British government remained unmoved. It 
simply held to its much criticised line of policy that outside military intervention or 
lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnians would not advance matter. If anything, 
according to British officials, either option would make things worse. But in the 
House of Commons there were critical voices coming up. For instance, sharing the 
feelings of quite a few British MPs, in his speech to the House of Commons Menzies- 
Campbell of Fife pointed out that:
“The whole sorry episode is perhaps illustrated by the quotation 
ascribed to a United Nations spokesman, who is widely reported as 
having said, ‘W e’ll do nothing’. If this is the response o f the United 
Nations to a gross and severe provocation, it is hardly surprising that 
the deterrent effect o f threats made by the United Nations had been 
rather less forceful than many o f us in the House would have 
preferred”.695
693 Michael Sheridan, “Pressure on UN for Tougher Bosnia Role,” The Independent, 17 May 1995.
694 Bruce Clark, “West Shows Frustration With Serbs,” Financial Times, 26 May 1995. The request 
for air strikes went up the UN chain of command and finally it reached Boutros Ghali in Moscow. He 
said no to the air strikes because, as David Owen argues ‘what had been requested was not close air 
support but wider air strikes’. The US protested the decision and even Britain expressed 
disagreement, and Douglas Hurd wrote to Boutros Ghali challenging the decision. See Owen, Balkan 
Odyssey, 346-7.
695 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 9 May 1995, col. 609.
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i the other hand, the UN had always been reluctant to exercise the option of calling 
NATO air power mainly because of the vulnerability of its scattered and lightly 
med UNPROFOR to Serb retaliation.696 Since Rupert Smith succeeded Michael 
ase as UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo in January 1995, however, he urged 
deployment of UN troops out of vulnerable areas so that NATO air strikes would 
Dt be opposed by any troop contributing countries. As a result, when the 
itemational community decided to take more robust action against the Bosnian Serbs, 
ley found a willing ally at the head of the UNPROFOR forces. In fact, Smith was one 
f  the five men who made difference in international response to Bosnia in the second 
alf of 1995.697
Hhe whole episode began on 22 May, when Bosnian Serbs seized heavy weapons from 
UN depot near Sarajevo and a day later they began to fire on the city. On 24 May, 
general Rupert Smith issued an ultimatum to both the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
¡overnment to cease firing heavy weapons by noon on 25 May. He also ordered the 
losnian Serbs to return the seized weapons within the same deadline and to remove all 
leavy artillery from a 20 km exclusion zone by noon, 26 May. The Serbs complied 
vith the cease-fire by noon on 25 May, but did not return the heavy weapons. They 
ivere convinced that there would not be any air strikes, even if there were, they would 
only be pinprick attacks here and there without seriously damaging Bosnian Serbs’ 
fighting capability. Then, however, they were immediately attacked from the air; 
NATO planes struck an ammunition depot near the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. The
696 In his briefing to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali on 16 May said that to date 162 peace 
keepers had been killed and 1,412 injured.
697 See Bruce Clark, “Five Key Men Who Helped to Break the Deadlock,” The Financial Times, 17 
December 1995. The other four were Jacques Chirac, Robert Dole, Franjo Tudjman and Richard 
Holbrooke.
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Bosnian Serb reaction to the NATO air strikes was swift and severe; that evening, they 
shelled civilians in all the UN-declared safe areas except Zepa, killing 71 in Tuzla. 
They surrounded about 200 peace-keepers as potential hostages. Then followed the 
second round of air strikes. The Serb response was to shell Sarajevo and to seize more 
hostages.
As it became clearer later, NATO strikes were more than just response to Bosnian 
Serb violations. Air strikes came to be seen as the litmus test of the UN’s and 
NATO’s willingness to get totally involved in this war. 698 Two weeks before, when 
Rupert Smith had applied to Yasushi Akashi, the UN envoy in Zagreb with a request 
for NATO raids, he was turned down. To the outside world, this was an admission 
that the Serbs could get away with anything. NATO’s deterrence capability was dealt 
a serious blow. The raid on 25 May was aimed to restore NATO’s pride, despite the 
retaliatory Serb shelling of five ‘safe areas’, including Sarajevo. As a senior American 
diplomat said:
“The warring parties in Bosnia have to believe that a threat to launch 
air strikes will lead to an attack Otherwise the policy o f  deterrence 
has no credibility. There has to be a place for the application o f  
military force. The trouble with the policy towards Bosnia is that w e  
have never been able to apply enough military pressure, political 
pressure or econom ic pressure to stop the fighting”.699
698 Michael Evans, “Airstrike Gamble Meant as Warning to Warring Sides,” The Times, 26 May 
1995.
699 Ibid.
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vo days later, however, NATO and UN commanders called off further air strikes in 
)snia after the Serbs began showing television pictures of UN peace-keeping soldiers 
chains at an ammunition bunker which had been the target of previous bombing 
ids. The Bosnian Serbs held prisoner nearly 300 UN soldiers and military observers, 
ireatening to shoot them if NATO were to launch further air attacks.700 It seemed 
lat, once more, the international community was hostage to Bosnian Serb leadership’s 
ictics.
o r the British Government, the chief concern was Gorazde where 336 members of the 
Loyal Welch Fusiliers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Riley, were 
iased.701 In the other ‘safe areas’ there were, 1,250 Norwegian, Danish and Swedish 
oldiers in Tuzla; 4,900 French, Russian, Egyptian, Ukranians in Sarajevo in addition 
d General Smith’s headquarters staff; 780 Dutch troops in Srebrenica; and 1240 
fengladeshis in Bihac.702
jeneral Smith realised that the Serbs did not know what to do next. They were 
inlikely to kill the hostages because that would lead to stiffening of the resolve of the 
ntemational community to such an extent that massive military response might be 
contemplated. If the UN and NATO continued to escalate, General Smith believed 
that the Serbs might just be forced to back down and the deterrent effect of the air 
power saved. But Smith also realised that there was an element of bluff in his threat.
700 Robert Fox and Jim Muir, “Bosnia Serbs Take UN Hostages as Human Shield,” The Daily 
Telegraph, 27 May 1995.
701 First Battalion of Royal Welch Fusiliers, White Dragon, The Royal Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia 
(Wrexham, 1995). Also see the article by former Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, “The British Army in Bosnia: Facing up to New 
Challenges,” Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 125, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 134-7.
702 Michael Evans, “Fears for British Troops in Gorazde,” The Times, 27 May 1995.
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The international community might lack the will to escalate to success. In that case, 
though, he would break the machine and force the international community to end the 
pretence that the UNPROFOR was a peace-keeping force.703
At the moment, it was important for the troop contributing countries to remain united 
in standing up to the defiance of the Serbs. There was no question of withdrawing the 
soldiers from the dangerous Muslim enclaves, since that would have been seen by the 
Serbs as an example of weakness which would have been exploited. Already, with the 
latest events, the UN had lost credibility, making unavoidable a choice between 
toughening its stance or scaling down its mission.
All this meant that Britain’s policy of moly-coddling the Serbs had clearly failed to the 
extent of endangering the credibility of the United Nations and Atlantic Alliance. 
Then, the British government had made it clear that it would fully support a get-though 
policy by General Smith. John Major warned the Bosnian Serbs to ‘drop their hostage 
tactics in Bosnia’: “I hope there are no more attacks against the UN personnel either 
direct, or with the intention of taking hostages”.704
On 28 May John Major convened the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet with the Chief of Defence Staff in attendance and, with a decisive move in the 
direction of former option, Britain announced to send up to 6,000 extra troops (more 
than doubling its military presence) to Bosnia in a dramatic get-tough policy with the 
Bosnian Serbs after they had taken hostage 33 members of Royal Welch Fusiliers in
703 Gow, Triumph of the Lack o f Will, 265-71.
704 Roger Boyes, “Crisis Call to Russia by Major and Kohl,” The Times, 27 May 1995.
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Gorazde earlier that day.705 With the number of UNPROFOR soldiers taken hostage 
by the Bosnian Serbs, Britain and France agreed to seek to change the rules of 
engagement in Bosnia to allow their troops to fire first in self-defence. 706 David 
Howell MP, the Tory chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 
said, “the Bosnian Serbs should be in no doubt that Britain and her allies mean business 
in the most intensive way”.707
“As the Serbs think about their next step they may have reason to 
wonder whether a short-term tactical advantage may come at the 
expense of a strategic catastrophe. They have, in effect, declared 
war on the UN. The UN slogans of neutrality, impartiality and 
avoidance of combat have been stripped of whatever meaning they 
had. For Britain and France, the issue is no longer whether the 
humanitarian mission is working but the direct threat to their own 
personnel.”708
Under these circumstances, the British Parliament was immediately recalled from 
national holiday for an extraordinary session, suggesting a level of national emergency 
not seen in Britain since the Gulf War. In one of the longest debates which the House 
experienced for many years, Major’s plea for the work of the UN peace keepers in 
Bosnia to continue without the threat of hostage taking or a full-scale war won the 
overwhelming support of MPs.
705 Robert Peston, “UK Poised to Double Troops Levels in Bosnia,” Financial Times, 29 May 1995.
706 Julian Borger, “Major Pledges 6,000 More Bosnia Troops,” The Guardian, 29 May 1995.
707 Robert Peston, “UK Poised to Double Troops Levels in Bosnia,” Financial Times, 29 May 1995.
708 Lawrence Freedman, “Perils of Rising the Stakes,” The Times, 30 May 1995.
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Opening the emergency debate on the Bosnian crisis on 31 May, John Major told a 
House of Commons that the taking of UN peace keepers as hostages was a despicable 
and outrageous breach of international law.709 He outlined the new British forces and 
material being sent or put on stand by for Bosnia and made clear that they had two 
objectives: to protect British troops already on the ground and provide support for a 
possible withdrawal. “Our troops have not gone to Bosnia to wage war”, he said. 
“But even on humanitarian duties we have seen they need protection. If they are 
attacked they must be able to defend themselves robustly”.710 He also said that the 
situation in Bosnia had reached the ‘turning point’. For the opposition, Tony Blau- 
said that the Labour fully supported the Government’s line, but he emphasised that 
there should be a clear chain of command with clear rules of engagement: “I believe 
that talk of withdrawal in Bosnia in response to the taking of hostages is deeply 
unhelpful at this time,” he said. “It is hardly a message of firm resolve in what is 
effectively an act of coercive blackmail”.711 At the end of the debate, the Defence 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced that British troops would be taking part in a 
new, mobile ‘theatre reserve force’ set up at the instigation of Rupert Smith, the UN 
Commander in Bosnia, to counter potential attacks on UNPROFOR troops.712
In the meantime, General Smith was in touch both with the UN and the British Joint 
Commander, General Sir John Wilsey, at his headquarters at Wilton, Wiltshire. 
General Wilsey was in command of the ‘Operation Grapple’- the British contribution
709 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 31 May 1995, col. 1002.
710 Ibid., col. 1004
711 Ibid., col. 1007.
712 Ibid., cols. 1097-1100.
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in Bosnia, and although General Smith reported to the UN, he was also talking to
71 3General Wilsey about twice a day.
What eventually came out of weeks of discussions was the NATO and West European 
Union (WEU) Defence Ministers’ decision on 3 June to set up a Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF), consisting of one self-supporting British brigade and one French-led 
multinational brigade operating under the existing mandate.713 14 This meant that the two 
senior UN commanders to be in charge of the two brigades, Lieutenant-General 
Bernard Janvier in Zagreb and Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith in Sarajevo could 
dispatch elements of the RRF to protect the six ‘safe areas’ against attack; counter any 
attempt to stop the flow of supplies to UN troops, and rescue peace-keepers held 
hostage. The RRF would consist of Britain’s 24 Airmobile Brigade -at least 5,500 
men- and a multinational brigade that would include 1,500 French troops equipped 
with armoured personnel carriers and combat helicopters, and the new British Theatre 
Reserve Force, also known as ‘Task Force Alpha’.715 Both forces would be under UN 
control but with green vehicles. Malcolm Rifkind, the British Defence Minister, 
stressed that tough “this is the first time in the history of the UN that such a Rapid 
Reaction Force had been created... It would not change the nature of the UN 
presence... since the force’s creation would not bring the UN any closer to being a 
combatant in a crisis which still requires a political solution”.716 Trying to show that
713 Patricia Wynn Davies, “Downing Street,” The Independent, 29 May 1995. However, it appears that 
General Rupert Smith had disconnected the direct phone line to London. See Sharp, Honest Broker, 
51.
714 The decision was then approved by the UNSCR 998 on 15 June 1995. Michael Evans, “Extra 
Firepower Will Allow UN to Take Initiative,” The Times, 5 June 1995.
715 David Rodhe, “Europe’s Enforcers in Bosnia Brace for Battle,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 June 
1995.
716 Bruce Clark, David Buchan and Harriet Martin, “West Sets Tough Military Goals in Bosnia,” 
Financial Tunes, 5 June 1995.
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Britain still keeps its neutrality in the war, Douglas Hurd said that the ‘Rapid Reaction 
Force is certainly giving the UN force greater clout than they have had before for then- 
own protection... and so that they can have a better chance of carrying out then- 
mandate. It is not turning them into a force which is going to fight on one side or 
another.. .717
Despite British insistence on preserving its neutrality towards what British officials 
called the ‘warring parties’, it was argued that, the decision at the end of May 1995 to 
strengthen UNPROFOR by providing a combat-capable Rapid Reaction Force 
represented an important breakthrough. It was always likely that General Smith, 
described as an individual of great character, intuition and intellect, would seek ways 
to make the force more effective.718 At least, at the end, it was apparent that 
UNPROFOR was placed in a position to be more effective and less vulnerable to 
possible air strikes. With the new re-configuration, the troops gave a crucial element 
of credibility to any international diplomatic initiatives to coerce the Serbs into 
upholding the agreements already made or even into making new agreements.719
While Britain and other Western countries were debating policy options for Bosnia and 
trying to figure out what the nature of Rapid Reaction Force would be, the Serb siege 
of the Bosnian capital, which included preventing any food or medical aid from 
arriving by air, had been in effect for months. Left without choice, the Bosnian Army 
moved in mid-June to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo, forcing the Serbs to fight 
in fifteen different places and the Serbs retaliated by shelling civilian areas, including
717 Ian Black and David Fairhall, “Britain Confirms It Will not Take Sides in the Conflict,” The 
Guardian, 5 June 1995.
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the main hospital.718 920 Although, some new territory was taken by the Bosnian army, 
including high ground overlooking important Serb supply routes to the north east and 
south of Sarajevo, the situation remained largely unchanged on the ground. However, 
the offensive was a sign of the way in which the tide of the Bosnian war had turned. 
As a result, the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale found itself not only diplomatically but 
also militarily in a weak position, as well as under pressure from Belgrade.721
Not surprisingly, new Bosnian government offensive worsened the policy differences 
between the US and its European allies, particularly, Britain. ‘The problem today is 
that the United States backs military action by the Bosnians (referring to Bosnian 
government), whereas we are neutral . If the Europeans are on one side and the 
Americans are on the other, it would be like an earthquake in the Atlantic Alliance” 
one British official said.722 He also warned that if President Bill Clinton was unable to 
stop Congress from lifting an arms embargo on the Bosnian government, French and 
British peace-keeping forces might pull out of the region. On the other hand, the US 
believed that the European neutrality in the war had had the effect of consolidating 
Bosnian Serb gains, while the Europeans, especially Britain criticised the US for 
advocating support for the Muslims without regard to the possibility that this could 
spark a wider war.723
718 Gow, Triumph o f the Lack of Will, 265.
719 Ibid., 266-68.
720 Bruce Clark and Bernard Gray, “At the Mercy of Military Logic,” Financial Times, 17-18 June 
1995.
721 On 3 June, Montenegro announced that it recognised Bosnia and Hercegovina within its 
international frontiers. An essential part of Belgrade’s economic and diplomatic strategy since 
January was the removal o f sanctions by the summer of 1995. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 269.
722 Barry James, “US and Allies Set on Collision Course Over Bosnia Policy,” International Herald 
Tribune, 1-2 July 1995.
723 Tony Barber and David Usbome, “France Accuses US of Arming the Muslims,” The Independent, 
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8.3. The Fall of the UN ‘Safe Areas’: Srebrenica Massacre
On 11 July Bosnian Serb forces overran the safe area of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia. 
Strategically located in the Drina valley running along the border with Serbia, 
Srebrenica was the first ‘safe area’ established by the United Nations in April 1993.724 725
The reasons for this attack, and for the similar move against the enclave of Zepa later 
that month, were several; the Pale leadership no doubt wished to weaken the morale of 
the Bosnian Government, pushing it more rapidly towards a diplomatic acceptance of 
defeat; it probably also wanted to free several thousands of its troops, who had been 
encircling these enclaves, in order to supplement its depleted manpower elsewhere. Its 
calculations about UN intentions must also have played an important part. On the one 
hand, the impending arrival of the ‘Reaction Force’ was a reason for moving against 
Srebrenica and Zepa before that force was actually deployed. '  But, the crucial 
element in the Serb’s leadership’s decision-making must have been the report 
presented to the Security Council by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 
31 May, in which he had recommended pulling back from positions which could not be 
properly defended, such as the eastern enclaves. This public display of a lack of will to 
protect those ‘safe areas’, coming on top of so many earlier demonstrations of the 
UN’s reluctance to carry out its mandate, may well have been the deciding factor.726
724 UNSCR 819, 16 April 1993. Resolution demanded that ‘...all parties and others concerned treat 
Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any 
other hostile act’. Resolution also demanded the free passage for the wounded and permission from 
Serbs to allow 150 Canadian peace-keepers into the town to monitor a cease-fire. Shortly after the 
passage of Resolution 819, agreement was reached between the Bosnian Serb and government 
commanders to demilitarise Srebrenica.
725 It was announced that Rapid Reaction Force’s 3,500 strong Anglo-French-Dutch Brigade was 
going to be fully operational in the area by July 13. Julian Borger, “Waiting Alone to Test the Mettle 
of West and the Serbs,” The Guardian, 22 July 1995.
726 Malcolm, Bosnia, 263-4.
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On 9 July Serb tanks entered the ‘defenceless’ Srebrenica ‘safe area’ overrunning 
several UN outposts manned by Dutch soldiers and taking 32 of them hostage. 
According to several later reports, the Dutch commanding officer in Srebrenica had 
urgently requested NATO air strikes; this request was transmitted to Zagreb, where 
senior UN officials spent several days considering it. On 11 July NATO planes were 
finally authorised to take action; but after hitting two Serb tanks they were ordered to 
cease their attack, because the Serbs were now threatening to kill the 32 Dutch 
soldiers. The original policy of placing small units of UN forces in these enclaves had 
been based on the idea that, while they themselves would not be able to defend the safe 
areas on the ground, they would act as a ‘tripwire’ for the use of air power. It now 
became clear that the reality was the precise opposite: instead of being a tripwire for 
attacks on the Serb army, they had become a human shield that rendered it 
vulnerable.727
Within a fortnight, the Muslim population of Srebrenica area had been virtually 
eliminated, in circumstances of unimaginable savagery. Between 11-13 July 1995, 
while blue-helmeted Dutch soldiers looked on, the Serbs had separated-out all male 
inhabitants of the town from their families and taken them away.728 Most of the Dutch 
knew that they were being forced to witness and even co-operate in an ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ operation. Later, the Dutch Army Doctor, Colonel Kremer described the 
situation as a ‘combination of Schindler's List and Sophie's Choice’.729 Women, 
children, the aged and the sick were expelled from the region; more than 13,000 of 
them eventually gathered in a makeshift refugee camp at Tuzla airport. The majority
727 Ibid., 264.
728 Honig and North, Srebrenica, 28-47.
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of the Muslim men met a gruesome fate; they were executed and buried in mass graves 
at the nearby town of Bratunac, many were tortured before being killed, a small 
number were put in prisons and only very few managed to escape.729 30 731 Srebrenica was a 
scene “from hell written on the darkest pages of human history”. " Aerial 
photographs later released by the US indicated that four mass graves had been dug 
near Srebrenica; these were estimated to hold the bodies of at least 2,700, and possibly 
as many as 4,000 men and boys.732
The fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 has been described by many as the darkest 
moment in the history of the UN’s involvement in Bosnia.733 Others count the 
massacre following the take-over of Srebrenica as the largest single war crime in 
Europe since the Second World War.734 735 UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki called the Serb action ‘a very serious violation of human rights on an 
enormous scale that can be described only as barbarous: attacks on the civilian 
population, killings and rapes’ and he resigned from his job in protest soon after filling 
his report.733 In his letter of resignation he severely accused international community 
and its leaders of lack of consistency and courage.736
729 Ibid., xvii.
730 Ibid., 48-67.
731 Words of Judge Fouad Riad, ‘The Prosecutor vs. Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Review of the 
Indictment’, International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, quoted on the front page of book 
by Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: The Record of A War Crime (London: 1996).
732 Malcolm, Bosnia, 264. By 16 August 1996, however, the Red Cross had registered 6,546 tracing 
requests for people missing from Srebrenica 6,513 of them were men. Honig and North, Srebrenica, 
xviii.
733 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia, 264.
734 Honig and North, Srebrenica, xix.
735 Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s Letter of Resignation reprinted in The New York Review of Books 42, no. 
14 (September 21, 1995), 39.
736 A Letter of Resignation, The New York Review of Books 42, no. 14 (September 21, 1995), 39.
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The new British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, who replaced Douglas Hurd 
when the latter resigned from his post, was still at pains to apportion the blame equally 
to the ones who massacred and those who were brutally massacred. He identified the 
failure of both sides to comply with the demilitarisation agreement as the root of recent 
events in Srebrenica. According to him, the failure of the UN member states to 
contribute troops to ensure implementation of the safe areas concept was another root 
cause. Rifkind told the House of Commons:
“In June 1993, the UN suggested that up to 36,000 troops could be 
necessary to implement the safe areas concept. The United 
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands responded well, but many 
others did not. The total committed amounted to only 7,500 -a 
significant shortfall. This has had substantial implications for the 
safe areas policy”.737
In fact, this was not true. The Resolution adopted by Security Council on 16 April 
1993 declaring Srebrenica a safe area was dangerously inconsistent.738 In fact, the 
Council agreed on creating a safe area without specifying how its safety could be 
ensured. Although some members of the Security Council, in particular Venezuela, 
Pakistan and Morocco proposed the Resolution to lead to UN military intervention on 
the side of the Bosnian Muslims, the member states whose troops were most likely to 
implement such a decision such as Britain, France and Spain remained nervous. As a 
result, the Resolution carefully avoided creating new military obligations for 
UNPROFOR either to establish or even to protect the safe area. The Council firmly
737 House of Commons Debates,.Hansard, 12 July 1995, col. 947.
738 UNSCR 819,16 April 1993.'
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♦ ♦ 739UNPROFOR’s role would simply be to ‘monitor’ the humanitarian situation.
With a striking difference in approach, on the eve of the Bastille Day speech, on 13 
July, French President Jacques Chirac accused Western allies of abandoning the 
Bosnian ‘safe haven’ of Srebrenica to a Serb incursion as they had Czechoslovakia to 
Hitler in 1938, and he warned Britain and the US against becoming ‘passive witnesses 
or accomplices in the unacceptable’.739 40 However, it later appeared that British 
‘realism’ again persuaded the French government to abandon President Jacques 
Chirac’s talk of recapturing Srebrenica. In the meantime, Senator Dole in Washington 
said that the UN mission had failed and that the protection force should be withdrawn 
and the arms embargo lifted so that the Bosnian government could get the weapons: ‘it 
is a little late to strengthen UNPROFOR. I ’d tell them to get out’.741
placed the burden on the Serbs and the Muslims to make Srebrenica safe.
Immediately after Srebrenica, the ‘safe area’ of Zepa, meanwhile, which was protected 
by 79 Ukranian soldiers, was attacked by overconfident Serb forces on 14 July and fell 
eleven days later. Assault was led by the Bosnian Serb military leader General Mladic 
and anticipating London Conference’s warning by Western governments of NATO 
strikes to protect Gorazde, he said: ‘The West must come to realise that it can not 
continue bombing the Serbs without punishment, that it can not draw maps for us
739 Britain and France made sure that Srebrenica was turned into a ‘safe area’, as opposed to a ‘safe 
haven’, the latter being what was created for the Kurds in Iraq. The difference under international 
law was that safe havens need not depend on consent of warring parties and their safety could be 
enforced, while safe areas were based on consent.
740 Alex Duval Smith, “Chirac Rhetoric on ‘New Holocaust’ Plays to Neo-Gaullist Patriots,” The 
Guardian, 17 July 1995.
741 On the other hand, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher insisted that lifting the arms 
embargo would be ‘a serious mistake’ and that it is an easy gesture which would eventually force the
274
which will carve up the ancient land of the Serbs’.742 At the same time, a heavy attack 
on the Bihac pocket suggested that the Serb strategy now was to take all the most 
vulnerable ‘safe areas’ as quickly as possible. In stark contrast to the determination of 
Mladic the international community was still in the midst of a chaos.743
Even under these circumstances, the British government’s response was to convene 
another conference in London. The subtext of the scene had all the echoes of 28 
February 1992, when John Major, with the world threatening to get tough on the 
Serbs, had said: “Let’s talk about it”. “What’s new Mr. Rifkind,” asked a journalist 
from CNN.744. With the UNPROFOR’s credibility reached the lowest ebb, both John 
Major and Warren Christopher said that Bosnia was ‘at a turning point’ and that 
Gorazde marked a limit to Bosnian Serb aggression’.745 In fact, the contrasts between 
detailed American aspirations and adaptable British pragmatism were tried to be solved 
before the Conference, when the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind visited 
Washington a week earlier. The questions of cohesion and will had effectively become 
alternatives: it was either international cohesion that included the Russians, or the will 
of the West. Although at the London meeting, the Russian Federation blocked the 
issuing of a clear ultimatum, and for a few days it appeared to many sceptics that the 
apparent Western will and cohesion emerging in the run-up to the meeting would be 
neutralised by Russian reservations, France, Britain and the US had decided to give a
US to supply arms to the Bosnian government, effectively forcing the US to take sides in the war. 
Bernard Gray, “Reinforce or Pull Out, US Urges,” Financial Times, 17 July 1995.
742 Peter Beamont and John Sweeney, “Serbs Scorn Warning With New Zepa Attack,” The Observer, 
23 July 1995.
743 Bernard Osser and Patrick de Saint Exupery, “The UN’s Failure: An Interview with Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki,” The New York Review of Books 42, no. 14 (September 21, 1995), 39.
744 Maggie O’Kane, “Fine Words Deft Delivery But the Song Remains the Same,” The Guardian, 22 
July 1995.
745 Michael Sheridan, “US Clarity Eclipses Britain’s Caution,” The Independent, 22 July 1995.
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visible demonstration of will at an early opportunity to ensure the credibility of the 
threats made. As a result, within days, elements of the RRF were deployed to secure 
the Igman route overlooking Sarajevo, while a senior officer from each of the three 
key Western countries was present in Belgrade to deliver a joint ultimatum on the use 
of massive air power, specifically in response to any attack on Gorazde and generally 
to protect other ‘safe areas’.
The Islamic Conference’s own ‘Contact Group’ meeting, held in Geneva on the same 
day with the London meeting, was also a serious blow to Britain and France which had 
resisted the arming of the Bosnian Muslims depriving them its right of self-defence. 
They issued a Declaration calling for a lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
promising military help, should UNPROFOR withdraw. In their declaration, the OIC 
Member States also warned that ‘the policy of appeasement, on the part of the certain 
Security Council members, of the Serbian policy of aggression and genocide will have 
serious consequences, further endangering international peace and security, and will 
also be counterproductive in the efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement’. 746
Nevertheless, Britain’s new Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo’s words, saying that 
the ‘deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force near Sarajevo did not signal a change in 
the UN mission’ proved the ongoing confusion: ‘There is no shift in any sense from 
peace-keeping to war fighting,” he said. “We wish to provide protection to peace­
746 Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference Contact Group 
on Bosnia and Hercegovina, Geneva, 21 July 1995, was reprinted in Bosnia Report, Issue 11, June- 
August 1995, p. 5. On 23 July, Turkish Grand National Assembly also issued a declaration calling 
for the embargo imposed on Bosnia to be immediately lifted and saying that in case it was not done 
Turkey would not comply with it. Declaration of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was 
reprinted in Bosnia Report, Issue 11 (June-August 1995), 8.
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keepers who are trying to save lives”.747 It was obvious that, rather than a combat 
force to fight against the Serbs, the Rapid Reaction Force was considered as 
UNPROFOR-PROFOR by British politicians. While, however, the British officials 
were still talking about the ‘warring factions’, most Britons, at the time, favoured 
decisive military action to protect the Bosnian Muslims, including the use of the 
ground troops and air attacks, even if the lives of British troops were put at risk. The 
poll for ITV found that 65 per cent were dissatisfied with the Government’s handling 
of the crisis and 67 per cent were unhappy with the UN’s performance. Fifty-nine per 
cent supported the air strikes against the Serbs.748 Clearly, on the political front, while 
the British wavering was still going on, the US was beginning to reassess its role.
8.4. Croatian August Offensive and the Fall of Serb Krajina
While the Bosnian Serb offensives against the safe areas were in full-swing, on 22 July 
the Presidents of Bosnia and Croatia met at Split and signed a new agreement on 
military co-operation.749 The US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith was present 
as a private guest in the signing of the ‘Split Declaration’, demonstrating the clear 
support of the US administration.750 Since the fall of the Bihac enclave would 
enormously strengthen the position of the rebel Serb forces in the Croatian Krajina,
747 Edward Mortimer, “Serbs are the Enemy,” Financial Times, 26 July 1995.
748 The survey of 1,104 adults in 54 constituencies, carried out by Mori on 20 July 1995, showed 59 
per cent of Britons favouring air strikes against the Serbs, with 52 per cent supporting the 
involvement of British troops. The results contrast sharply with those from a poll conducted in the 
United States for CNN and Newsweek, in which two thirds of Americans opposed the deployment of 
US ground troops except to rescue the UN mission, while almost the same number felt that America 
had done enough to stop the war. Peter Beamont and John Sweeney, “Serbs Scorn Warning With 
New Zepa Attack,” The Observer, 23 July 1995.
749 The ‘Split Declaration’ was also signed by the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Haris 
Silajdic and the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kresimir Zubak. The 
Declaration was reprinted in Bosnia Report, Issue 11 (June-August 1995), 5.
750 Patrick Moore, “An End Game in Croatia and Bosnia,” Transition 1, no. 20 (3 November 1995), 6.
277
President Tudjman had a clear interest in aiding the Bosnian forces there. On 28 July, 
with support from the Croatian Army, Bosnian Croat forces quickly pushed 
northwards from Livno along the Bosnian side of the Bosnian-Croatian border, seizing 
the town of Bosansko Grahovo and thereby cutting off an important supply-route to 
the rebel stronghold of Knin. President Tudjman now had the opportunity to fulfil one 
of the most important of his own strategic goals: the recapture of the entire ‘Krajina’ 
region.751
A well-planned Croatian Army offensive ‘Operation Storm’, beginning on 4 August, 
achieved this aim with extraordinary speed. The capital of the self-styled Republic of 
Serbian Krajina, Knin, was taken on 5 August, and within 72 hours the Croatian forces 
were in almost complete control of the entire territory. The myth of Serbian military 
invincibility had been shattered.752 Even before the arrival of the Croatian troops, the 
local Serb population was instructed by its own political and military leaders to 
withdraw into Bosnia. At least 150,000 of these people moved into Serb-held 
northern Bosnia, and some of them continued their flight all the way into Serbia 
itself.753 While not on the same scale as the butchery directed by Mladic in Srebrenica, 
Croatian troops were also reported guilty of appalling acts of murder against unarmed 
elderly civilians in Krajina.754
751 According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, over the last two and half years, the Croatian armed 
forces (HV) had been systematically reorganising and strengthening their forces with the eventual 
ambition of fielding forces capable of regaining Krajina from the Serbs. See Jane’s Intelligence 
Review 7, no. 1, (January 1995), 29.
752 Hasan Unal, “Hirvatlar Krajina’da Hangi Efsaneleri Yikti?” Milhyet, 22 August 1995.
753 Tony Barber, “Alliance Shatters Pan-Serb Dream,” The Independent, 1 September 1995.
754 Sharp, Honest Broker, 57. Also see Moore, “An End Game,” 6.
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Recapture of whole Krajina region by Croat forces only within three days shattered the 
myth of Serbian invincibility which was one of the main arguments of the British 
Conservative government not to intervene into the war in Bosnia. The case against 
militarily intervening into Bosnian war was supported by the British argument that the 
defeat of Serbian militias in Bosnia and the subsequent military occupation of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina would require something in the order of 500,000 men, still without 
any prospect of victory.755 The first UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo Lewis 
MacKenzie, famous of misunderstanding the nature and origins of the Serb attack in 
Bosnia, uttered the famous words that western countries should deploy as much force 
as had been deployed in Iraq during the Gulf War and up to 800,000 forces would be 
needed for a successful operation. Since it was obvious that none of the countries 
would be willing to deploy so many number of soldiers just to defend Bosnian 
Muslims, the British government’s suggestion seemed the most logical one: concluding 
an agreement on Serbian terms as soon as possible. In addition, all kinds of historically 
mispresented data were used to prove the British inactivity against the Serbian 
atrocities. The British media were constantly told by Douglas Hurd and his assistant 
Douglas Hogg, that the Serbs had pinned down some ‘twenty one’ (or more) first class 
German divisions during the Second World War. This was quite untrue: there were 
only seven divisions in the whole Yugoslav area, and only one of these were first 
class. Therefore, the swift Croat victory not only changed the military balance in the 
region, but is strengthened the hands of those who has all along favoured air strikes 
against Serb targets coupled with the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
government.
755 Michael Dewar, “Intervention in Bosnia: the Case Against,” The World Today 49, no. 2 (February
1993), 33.
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Indeed, more than turning a blind eye to Croatian offensive, Bill Clinton said, he was 
“hopeful that the Croatian offensive will turn out to be something that will give us an 
avenue to quicker diplomatic resolution”.756 57 Warren Christopher struck a similar note, 
though at the same time denied that Washington had even tacitly encouraged the 
Croatian offensive.
8.5. US Diplomatic Engagement: the ‘Holbrooke Plan’
Although very careful, from the very beginning, not to be involved militarily, the US 
had been politically engaged in the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Charles Redman, 
Charles Thomas and Robert Frasure all made serious contributions as US 
representatives on the Contact Group during 1994-1995, and the US Ambassador in 
Zagreb, Peter Galbraith played a proactive role in arming and training the Croatian 
army as well as the Croat-Muslim Federation from April 1994.758 However, it was not 
until late spring 1995 that the US seemed truly engaged and took over the principal 
role in co-ordinating Western policy.759
The events occurred as part of a series of developments which made UNPROFOR’s 
position untenable within little more than a month were the main motors driving US 
policy in mid-1995. Britain and France had repeatedly warned, in 1995, that a policy
756 Stone, “British Policy,” 5-6.
757 Martin Fletcher, “Washington Gives Tacit Support to Croat Attack,” The Times, 4 August 1995.
758 For example, a photograph printed in the government-controlled press showed that the US 
ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith was present as a private guest in the signing of the ‘Split 
Declaration’ on 22 July 1995, see Moore, “An End Game,” 6.
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of lifting the arms embargo and air-strikes, without any corresponding commitment by 
the US administration to work towards a political solution, would lead to the 
withdrawal of their troops.759 60 The US Congress had just voted by large majorities for 
Senator Dole’s bill to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government.761 Following 
the imposition of President Clinton’s veto and amid rumours that Congressmen would 
proceed regardless, President Clinton embarked on a diplomatic marathon to try and 
pave the way for a negotiated settlement before the Congress reconvened in mid- 
September since the impact of such a decision on UNPROFOR’s standing could not be 
avoided. There was also the prospect that further Bosnian Serb humiliations would 
make the UN mission untenable in troop contributing capitals, and that Britain and 
France might have carried out their threats to withdraw their troops from 
UNPROFOR. The State Department’s 1996 official study of the process leading to 
the Dayton Accords of November 1995 confirms that most senior foreign policy 
officials, most notably the President himself was surprised to learn in June 1995 that 
US troops might soon be on their way to Bosnia whether the US administration liked it
759 Maynard Glitman, “US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach,” Survival 38, no. 4  
(Winter 1996-97), 66-83.
760 The newly elected president Jacques Chirac had publicly indicated that French troops would not 
remain in Bosnia for another winter without a more positive role. Quoted in Gow, Triumph of the 
Lack of Will, 276.
761 On 26 July 1995, the US Senate voted 69 to 29 to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
government unilaterally. This was followed in the House of Representatives on 1 August with a vote 
of 298 to 128 in favour of lifting the arms embargo. The vote was on a proposal introduced by the 
Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole who argued that UNPROFOR could defend neither itself nor the 
Bosnian Muslims, so the arms embargo should be lifted to allow the Muslims to defend themselves. 
The proposal would direct President Clinton to cease US participation in the UN arms embargo if 
Bosnia requested such action, if UN peace-keeping forces withdrew from Bosnia or 12 weeks after 
Bosnian government asked UN forces to leave. The votes in favour exceeded by eight the two thirds 
majority required theoretically to override a presidential veto. President Clinton imposed his 
presidential veto nonetheless on 11 August saying that ending the arms embargo was the “wrong step 
at the wrong time” because it would “intensify the fighting, jeopardise diplomacy, and make the 
outcome of the war in Bosnia an American responsibility”. George Graham, “Clinton Vetoes Bill to 
Break Arms Embargo,” Financial Times, 12-13 August 1995.
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or not.762 President Clinton had, in December 1994, pledged that, should the 
European forces withdraw from UNPROFOR, the US would provide a NATO force 
of 45-50,000 man to facilitate the evacuation of UN troops.763 In fact, after President 
Clinton’s confirmation, NATO planners had begun to work on Op-Plan 40104 
(codenamed ‘Determined Effort’), which called for using 20,000 US troops as part of 
a 60,000 person evacuation force.764 Then, NATO approved this mission in the Spring 
of 1995 with the consent of American NATO Ambassador Robert E. Hunter and US 
military planners in Brussels, Clinton Administration trapped itself. Several senior 
officials, including UN Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright and National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake advised began arguing that since American troops would have 
to go to Bosnia sooner or later, why not send them on Washington’s terms.765
The US wanted to use the after-shock created by Croatia’s attack' on Krajina to 
generate momentum for a negotiated settlement hoping to reap diplomatic dividends 
from the creation of a new balance of power on the ground. Obviously, the fall of 
Krajina led to a complete shift in the balance of power in Bosnia, favouring the Croats 
and Muslims against the Serbs.766 William Perry was now speaking of a window of 
opportunity that had been created with the Serb leadership divided and psychologically 
weakened.
762 Warren Bass, ‘The Triage of Dayton,’ Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998), 99- 
100.
763 M. Rogers, “Bolster or Withdraw,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 1995, p. 8. H. J. Adams, “US 
Troops Set for Bosnia,” The Sunday Times, 4 December 1994.
764 Julie Kim, “Bosnia: Potential Withdrawal of UN Forces, Questions and Answers,” CRS Report For 
Congress (30 August 1995) 14-16.
765 Lenard C. Cohen, ‘Bosnia and Hercegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State,’ Current History 
95, no. 599 (March 1996), 105.
766 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 361.
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On 11-12 August US envoys, led by Robert Frasure made a shuttle tour to Europe to 
discuss various peace initiatives with their Contact Group counterparts. US ideas were 
premised on three points: first, seeking a negotiated settlement based on the mutual 
recognition of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina; second, using the fruits of 
negotiations over the past three years in a ‘flexible’ manner, that is, not excluding 
modifications to the Contact Group map; third, using a system of incentives and 
disincentives to make the parties involved accept the peace proposals. One of the 
incentives envisaged by the US was the possibility of a reconstruction plan for the 
region and the suspension of economic sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia. 
Among the disincentives the US envisaged was the unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo in favour of the Bosnian government accompanied by the possible use of air 
strikes, or the dispatch of a multilateral intervention force to fight alongside the 
Bosnian government forces.
Special Envoy Erasure’s shuttle diplomacy mission was making good progress. He 
had certainly eclipsed the EU-UN efforts of ICFY, where Owen had resigned at the 
end of May to be replaced as EU mediator by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl 
Bildt on 9 June. However, the American diplomatic race was broken on 19 August as 
a result of a tragic accident on Mount Igman which killed Robert Frasure of the State 
Department, along with two other US officials: Joseph Kruzel of Defence Department 
and S. Nelson Drew of the National Security Council.767 Within ten days, the mission 
was taken over by Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke who led the 
American mission from late August onwards. His work was significantly assisted by 
the extensive use of NATO air power.
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The shell that killed 37 people in Sarajevo market on 28 August provided the trigger 
for long overdue retaliatory action against the Bosnian Serbs.76 68 Already, at a meeting 
held on 25 July, NATO members had decided for air strikes to be authorised solely by 
UN and NATO commanders, cutting out the involvement of UN civilians.769 General 
Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo authorised air strikes without 
hesitation and NATO launched ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ on 30 August to demolish 
Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps and anti-aircraft guns.770 Air strikes paused after 72 
hours to issue a set of demands that Mladic must meet to avoid further air strikes.771 
Mladic refused to pull back his heavy weapons, but agreed to stop attacking safe areas. 
NATO bombing resumed on 5 September with the full support of Slobodan Milosevic 
who was at the time engaged in peace talks with Richard Holbrooke in Belgrade. By 
September 14, when NATO paused to allow Mladic to withdraw his forces, NATO 
had conducted over 3,500 sorties, including 750 attack missions against 56 ground 
targets in a two week campaign.772 The turning point on the road to Dayton was the 
decision to take a more robust approach towards the Bosnian Serbs making the threat 
to use force credible.
767 Richard Holbrooke, ‘The Road to Sarajevo,” The New Yorker (October 21-28, 1995), 88-104.
768 Christopher Bellamy, “How the Peace-Keepers Became Enforcers,” The Independent, 31 August 
1995.
769 It was stated that air strikes would be used to “deter attacks, or threat of attacks, against a safe area 
and to be ready, should deterrence fail, to conduct operations to eliminate any threat, or defeat any 
force engaged in an attack on a safe area”. Wording of the UN/NATO Agreement, Atlantic News, 
August 17, 1995.
770 The air attacks were in part made possible by the completion of a reconfiguration of UNPROFOR 
which removed UN troops from isolated locations. In particular, final withdrawal of UN troops from 
Gorazde took place on 29th August.
771 These three demands were withdrawing the weapons, ending attacks on safe areas, and 
guaranteeing free movement for UN personnel, including unrestricted access to Sarajevo airport. 
Michael Evans, “How West Closed Ranks Against Milosevic,” The Times, 5 September 1995.
772 Operation Deliberate Force was the largest of such operations in the history of the Atlantic 
Alliance. It also involved artillery strikes by French, British and Dutch units of the recently formed 
UN Rapid Reaction Force on Mount Igman near Sarajevo. See Ian Urban, “Sarajevo to NATO: 
JET’aime,” Transition 1, no. 20 (3 November 1995), 27.
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8.6. The ‘Endgame’ and the Beginning of the Peace Process
In the middle of NATO onslaught, talks resumed in Geneva after more than 18 months 
of deadlock. Bosnian Serbs had already agreed to form a six member delegation, led 
by Serbian President Milosevic and empowered him to cast the decisive vote.773 In a 
phase called the ‘diplomatic endgame’ by some commentators, foreign ministers of 
Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and the joint Serb delegation met in Geneva on 8 
September and agreed on a number of ‘Basic Principles’ as a basis for further 
discussions: Bosnia and Hercegovina would continue its legal existence within its 
present borders and continuing international recognition; but it would be comprised of 
two distinct entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as established by the 
Washington agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS), and the territorial split 
between them would be 51 percent to 40 percent respectively.774 In reality, however, 
this was the recognition that Bosnia and Hercegovina had been partitioned into ethnic 
statelets by the war; a concession to the Serbs who, for the first time, secured an 
agreement which formally recognised Republica Srpska as a separate entity.
And since it also allowed for the Serb half of Bosnia to enjoy a ‘special relationship’ 
with Serbia, to parallel any confederal relationship between the Federation and the 
Republic of Croatia, it seemed inevitable that this plan would lead sooner or later not
773 As the NATO planes were attacking the Bosnian Serb targets, Milosevic convened a meeting of the
Serb leadership in Belgrade, attended by President Momir Bulatovic of Montenegro, the Bosnian Serb 
leadership, and the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church. During this meeting, Milosevic got 
the opportunity to win his political war against the Bosnian Serb leaders. He wanted to be declared in 
charge to mediate between the Bosnian Serbs and the outside world. The US administration had also 
made this a precondition for future negotiations. Radovan Karadzic was, by then, along with Ratko 
Mladic, indicted by the International Tribunal in The Hague on suspicion of war crimes. The Bosnian 
Serb leaders had little choice but to agree to allow Milosevic to represent them at the peace 
negotiations in the future. Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 366-7
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only to secession of the Serb territory but also to its final absorption into a Greater 
Serbian state.775 The original aims of Slobodan Milosevic, although seriously curtailed 
and thwarted in Croatia itself, would thus achieve at least partial fulfilment. Bosnia, a 
country with one of the longest and most continuous histories, as a distinct geo­
political entity, in the whole of Europe, would undergo an irrevocable division.
In the meantime, although international community warned the allies not to try to take 
advantage of air strikes, Croatian, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian government troops were 
keeping up the pressure on the battlefield in northwest of Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Voguca, Dojni Vakuf, Drvar, Jajce and other towns fell in rapid succession, and by 
mid September, Croatian and Bosnian government had taken roughly 3,000 square 
kilometres from the Serbs.776 By the end of September, the offensive had run out of 
steam. Bosnian government army’s attempts to capture Banja Luka were thwarted, 
partly by reorganised Bosnian Serb resistance and partly due to the withdrawal of the 
heavy weapons under US pressure.777 Washington feared that the fall of Banja Luka to 
Bosnian government forces might lead to direct involvement of Serbia proper and thus 
to a wider escalation of the Bosnian conflict.
After a significant tilt in the war against the Serbs, the parties was nearing the point at 
which they all deemed their interests could be better defended at the negotiating table
Malcolm, Bosnia, 267.
775 Tony Barber, “The Grinding Out of An Ignominious Peace,” The Independent, 13 September 
1995.
776 Noel Malcolm argues, however, that, these successes were not directly caused by the NATO air 
strikes, since these had targeted almost nothing except air defences in that part of Bosnia. But, he 
adds that, of course the Bosnian government and Croatian forces had benefited indirectly both from 
the collapse of Serb morale and from the damage inflicted on Serb communications and logistics. 
Malcolm, Bosnia, 267.
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than on the battlefield. On 26 September, all three sides agreed on a future 
constitutional framework in New York, perceived as a ‘landmark’ accord, although 
diplomats warned that it was not a legal document in itself, and that there was still a 
great deal of work to be done, including the negotiation of a cease-fire and a division 
of territory.778 The main provisions of the agreement called for the holding of free and 
direct elections throughout the country with international monitors, who would be sent 
to the country immediately, on the account that there was a peace. A federal 
parliament and presidency would be elected on the basis of two thirds from the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and one third from the Serb entity (reflecting the current 
population distribution). A constitutional court would also be created.779 The New 
York agreement was based on the territorial division proposed by the Contact Group 
Plan in July 1994, namely that the Croat-Muslim Federation would cover 51 percent of 
Bosnian territory and the República Srpska would be allocated 49 per cent of territory. 
Previously, the Bosnian Serbs had refused to negotiate on the basis of this territorial 
division. However, the latest Muslim and Croat offensives in northern and western 
Bosnia left them in control of roughly the amount of territory allocated to them by the 
international peace plan.
On 5 October President Clinton announced that the parties had reached agreement on 
a cease-fire to come into force on 12 October. The agreement included a proviso that 
gas and electricity had to be restored to Sarajevo before the cease-fire would come 
into effect. The cease-fire was due to last 60 days or until the completion of further 
‘proximity talks’ to be held in the US and compliance was to be monitored by the 7
777 Stephen Kinzer, “Croats and Bosnians Agree to Halt Attack on Serbian Stronghold,” International 
Herald Tribune, 20 September 1995.
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UNPROFOR. The accord called for an end to all offensive operations, sniper fire and 
the lying of mines. It also included a provision for the opening of a route to Gorazde 
for civilian and UN traffic and arrangements for the exchange of prisoners of war.
Although there were some unresolved points -for example there was no agreement on 
formal recognition of Bosnia and Hercegovina by rump Yugoslavia -the New York 
Agreement was no doubt an important achievement by the US.78 980 Within 30 days, 
Richard Holbrooke and his team visited 11 countries which shifted the momentum 
towards peace.781 ‘The lesson of Bosnia” he said, ‘‘is that when the NATO is united 
behind a policy and determined to carry it out, everything works. But NATO only 
works when we give full-hearted American leadership and American commitment”.782
By November 1995, the situation on the ground was radically different from that which 
it had been at the beginning of the year in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina: 
Croatian Serb control of territory had been reduced from 23 percent to 5 percent; 
Bosnian Serb controlled land had been reduced from around 70 percent to under 50 
percent. Most significant of all, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the 
use of air power and, the RRF artillery around Sarajevo had put the Bosnian Serbs on 
the receiving end of the fire.
It was apparent from the beginning of the war in former Yugoslavia that peace would 
most likely be the result of developments on the battlefield. Croatian Foreign Minister
778 David Usbome, “Bosnia Peace Deal Signed by All Sides,” The Independent, 27 September 1995.
779 Moore, “An End Game,” 8-9.
780 “Pax Americana... Almost Certainly,” Editorial, The Guardian, 6 October 1995.
781 Martin Walker, “Holbrooke: A Hero’s Hour,” The Guardian, 6 October 1995.
782 Ibid.
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Mate Granic told the UN: “Croatia is of the opinion that the joint effects of ‘Operation 
Storm’, the co-ordinated activities of the army of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the 
Bosnian Croat forces, and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force actions against the 
Bosnian Serbs, coupled with diplomatic efforts, have finally opened the way to serious 
and comprehensive peace negotiations which will eventually lead to a ... solution”.783 
When the 51:49 division was achieved as a result of the latest gains of Bosnian 
government forces, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said that “we stand more 
chance with peace”.784 Muhammed Sacirbey, Bosnian Foreign Minister, said that 
Bosnian government’s military successes proved that ‘the best diplomacy is created on 
the ground’.785
8.7. The Proximity Talks and the Dayton Peace Agreement
Although there were still ups and downs in the peace process, with intense US 
diplomatic efforts, ‘proximity talks’ started in Dayton, Ohio, by the beginning of 
November 1995. Present, along with delegations from the Contact Group countries, 
the EU and the UN, were the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Although a Bosnian Serb contingent was included in Milosevic 
delegation, it did not include either Karadzic and Mladic.786 At the end of three weeks,
783 Quoted in Moore, “An End Game,” 10.
784 Ian Traynor, “Carrion Country,” The Guardian, 18 September 1995.
785 Foreign Staff, “Serbs Given Three More Days to Withdraw Heavy Weapons,” Financial Times, 18 
September 1995.
786 Republica Srpska was represented by former speaker of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and recently 
designated President, Momcilo Krajisnik and included more moderate Deputy President, Nikola 
Koljevic.
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on 21 November, a peace deal was initialled by the presidents of Bosnia and
787Hercegovina, Croatia and Serbia.
The most important part of the Dayton process was to build the elements which would 
create the context for an agreement. The negotiations were marked by three distinct 
phases. The first, eight day phase, focused on strengthening the ties between the 
Bosnia Croats and Muslims, in order to present the Serbs with a unified front. First of 
all, the Muslim-Croat Federation was too weak to provide a basis for any overall 
settlement. Resolving the differences between the Muslims and Croats, Ambassador 
Michael Steiner of Germany secured an agreement reaffirming the Federation. 
According to the Agreement on ‘Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina,’ signed by Croatia, Bosnia and Federation Governments on 10 
November, the Croats had agreed to abandon Herceg-Bosna within the Federation and 
the Bosnian government consented to devolve powers to the Federation government. 
The new agreement also called for the reunification of Mostar, the return of refugees 
and a customs union, points on which there had previously been no progress despite 
nearly two years of peace between the Croats and Muslims.788
Three days were then devoted to resolving the Croat-Serb dispute over Eastern 
Slavonia, the territory of Croatia which remained under Serbian control at the time of 
the talks.. In fact, one of the most significant Serb concessions was over Eastern 
Slavonia. An Agreement on Eastern Slavonia was signed on 12 November between 
Croat government and local Serb representatives in Erdut (Eastern Slavonia) and 78
787 On details, see Editor’s Special Report on Dayton, “How the Bosnians Were Broken,” War Report 
39 (February/March 1996), 26-42.
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Zagreb. The agreement provided for the setting up of a ‘Transitional Administration’ 
to govern the region for a period of twelve months (with possible extension for 
another twelve months); demilitarisation; an international military force to implement 
the Agreement, and; displaced peoples to return to their homes. In return for 
agreement on restoring full control in eastern Slavonia, Zagreb agreed to the ceding of 
territory by the Bosnian Croats in the Posavina corridor. Key points of negotiation 
concerning the capital Sarajevo, Gorazde and Drina Valley and north-western Bosnia 
were dealt with in the last period. Although the principle of sharing out the land 
according to 51-49 basis was adopted from the Contact Group proposal, the Bosnian 
government could not persuade anybody that the territorial disposition proposed in the 
Contact Group map should be adhered to at Dayton; something which would have 
meant the return of Srebrenica, Zepa and a number of other places to government 
control. The Bosnian government could not take any land on the Drina or on the 
Sava. It, however, secured an agreement on the control of whole of Sarajevo, as well 
as the establishment of a corridor to Gorazde (Map 7).
The Dayton accords which were initialled on 21 November, formally signed as a peace 
agreement in Paris on 14 December. The Dayton Accord’s ten main points were 
supplemented with eleven annexes, as well as one hundred and two maps. The main 
points of the agreement were as follows: A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) 
was going to establish demilitarised zone of separation between the warring parties; 
Bosnia would be an internationally recognised state within its present borders; the state 
was to be composed of two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat 78
788 Silber and Little, Death o f Yugoslavia, 370.
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MAP 7
The Dayton Accords
Federation; the capital, Sarajevo would remain united under the Muslim-Croat 
Federation; the central government was to include a parliament, presidency and 
constitutional court; free and democratic elections would take place under international 
supervision; refugees were to be allowed to return their homes or seek equitable 
compensation; human rights would be monitored by an independent commission and 
people indicted for war crimes were to be excluded from political life.789 90
Although, international attention at the end of 1995 seemed only to treat the military 
aspects of the agreement and the imminent deployment of a new NATO force to 
implement the agreement (IFOR), the bulk of the Dayton accords, nearly five sixths of 
the documentation, concerned civilian aspects of the settlement.791 It was in the 
implementation of the civilian aspects that the real test of the Dayton process was to 
come.
8.7.1. Tensions in the Dayton Agreement and British Position
The US success in brokering the Bosnia peace accord caused remorse and 
embarrassment in the EU, shattering its superpower illusions and underscoring its 
failure to achieve a cohesive security policy that could resolve conflicts in its own
789 This decision which led to the announcement of resignation of the Bosnian Croat leader and Prime 
Minister of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak. He was, as a moderate, very important for the 
credibility o f the Federation.
790 “Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina,” 
last revised November 22, 1995. FCO Spokesman: Notes For Editors, Tuesday, 21 November 1995, 
17.30 hrs.
791 Annexes 1A and IB dealt with military matters. Annex 1A established the arrangements and 
timetable for separation of forces and the deployment of IFOR, the NATO organised military peace 
implementation force, which would be responsible for ensuring the military parts of the Dayton 
Agreement. The primary task of 60,000 troops was to enforce the line of separation. IFOR’s rules of 
engagement were robust, permitting prompt and comprehensive military action to suppress any 
breach of cease-fire.
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backyard.792 To add insult to injury, the Europeans were shut out of the negotiating 
process entirely in Dayton. As one European diplomat put it:
“The Europeans were there because it was important to have the 
outcome endorsed by the Contact Group governments. I don’t suffer 
any illusions as to whether the Americans actually wanted any active 
European participation. They were not even willing to let us discuss 
or advise behind the scenes.”793
The European states in the Contact Group complained of being kept barely abreast of 
what was going on and stated that the Dayton Accords were not much different from 
the plan they had put forth a year ago.794 Jonathan Eyal, Director of Studies at the 
Royal United Services Institute in London, suggested that “Richard Holbrooke, the 
chief negotiator, should win Greenpeace’s top recycling prize” since the deal he 
brokered rested on ideas which had been put forward for years.795 In fact, it was true 
that the plan was not much different than the previous ones. As Lord Owen, the 
former British foreign secretary who spent a good deal of time trying to reach a 
settlement on behalf of the EU, aptly observed that once the idea of maintaining the 
pre-April 1992 Bosnia and Hercegovina was abandoned, one necessarily left with 
‘shades of partition’. What caused the breakthrough was the decisive operation of the 
US and Holbrooke’s diplomatic approach.796
792 William Dzordiak, “EU Absorbs Embarrassing Lessons in Bosnia Accord,” International Herald 
Tribune, 23 November 1995.
793 Quoted in James Petras and Steve Vieux, “Bosnia and the Revival of US Hegemony,” New Left 
Review 218 (July/August 1996), 23.
794 Martin Walker, “Dirty Dick Edges Europe Off Map”, The Guardian, 24 November 1995.
795 Jonathan Eyal, “A Step in the Balkan Quicksand,” The Times, 12 October 1995.
796 Michael Williams, “The Best Chance for Peace in Bosnia,” The World Today 52, no. 1 (January 
1996), 4.
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British delegates admitted that they were not privy to all aspects of the Proximity Talks 
in Dayton either.797 Pauline Neville-Jones, Political Director at the Foreign Office at 
the time, was Britain’s key player in the delicate game of peacekeeping with the 
Americans and ensuring that British interests were not swept aside. Her confidential 
telegrams to the Foreign Office -according to one who has read them already- reflected 
a continuous tension between the Europeans and a high-powered team of American 
negotiators who were forcing the pace.798
The British delegation were also not involved in discussions on the maps during the 
third and final week of the talks, nor were they as active as the Germans during the 
first week which was devoted mostly to issues surrounding Zagreb’s relations with the 
Federation between the Muslims and Croats inside Bosnia. The British contingent 
claim, however, that they made substantial contribution to the negotiations on the 
Constitution during the second week at Dayton. Apparently, the initial American 
drafts did not provide for strong constitution for the central government in Sarajevo.799 
Instead the original US draff gave all significant powers to the two entities within 
Bosnia and Hercegovina: the Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat Federation. This 
suited the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats but obviously distressed the central 
government in Sarajevo, because it confirmed their fears that the US really did have 
partition in mind, and that talk of a unified Bosnia and Hercegovina had been a mere
797 Sharp, Honest Broker, 60.
798 The telegrams will be open to vintage reading in 30 years time. Michael Sheridan, “Muslims 
Leam to Fear Tudjman’s Embrace,” The Independent, 25 November 1995.
799 Pauline Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” Survival 38, no. 4  
(Winter 1996-97), 49. Jane Sharp argues that ‘this was unexpected since in the run-up to the talks 
most Europeans assumed Washington would be fighting Izetbegovic’s comer on most issues’. Sharp, 
Honest Broker, p. 60.
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figleaf.800 Surprisingly it was the head of British delegation at Dayton who emphasised 
that central structures must be firmly established. This was in fact critical practically 
for channelling assistance according to the programme of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.801
From the very beginning, Holbrooke had criticised the Europeans, above all Britain, 
for hand wringing timidity. Six months after signing the Dayton Peace Treaty and with 
eight months remaining in the year that NATO was planning to stay in Bosnia, 
Holbrooke accused the Europeans of ‘backsliding,’ and said that ‘it is distressing that 
some important European officials are privately writing off Dayton’s political 
provisions and preparing ground for de facto partition next year’.802 He added that 
‘the agreements will certainly fail if those responsible for carrying them out are not 
completely committed to them’.803 Further to the point, he claimed:
American leadership, headed by President Clinton, achieved both 
Dayton and the successful military phase o f implementation. But on 
the civilian side, a messy ineffective arrangement, insisted on by the 
Europeans, created multiple chains o f  command and little 
enforcement authority.804
In return, Pauline-Neville Jones -also talking on behalf of the heads of the German and 
French delegations at Dayton- replied that ‘claims from the US that Europe is moving
800
801
802
803
804
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Richard Holbrooke, “Backsliding in Bosnia/’ Time Magazine, 20 May 1996, 26.
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towards partition in Bosnia were offensive and that there was no evidence to support 
that thesis’.805 On the contrary, she claimed:
Europeans want the Dayton agreement to succeed on its own terms 
and are making very considerable efforts to this end. These range 
from bearing our share of the costs of the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) -of the 55,000 troops involved in Bosnia, roughly 28,000 
came from European countries (excluding Russia) and 18, 000 from 
the US. Europeans bear, by far, the largest share of the cost of 
economic construction. According to the World Bank, of the £1.2 
billion pledged so far in economic aid about half comes from 
European sources, compared with £185 million from the US’.806
Basically, according to the British officials, the problem stemmed from the separation 
of the military and civilian aspects of Dayton. Effective co-ordination of aid projects 
was impossible since there was no way to make use of carrots and sticks. Moreover, 
there was also a law enforcement gap, which meant conditions were not safe for the 
return of refugees and displaced persons.807
In fact, it later became apparent that, consistent with British even-handed behaviour to 
both victims and aggressors during the entire Bosnian war, in implementing the peace, 
Britain was unwilling to abide by the rules of conditionality and that British officials 
transmitted aid to Bosnian Serb communities regardless of whether or not they were in 
compliance with Dayton agreements and the International Criminal Tribunal for
805 Pauline Neville-Jones, “Don’t Blame the Europeans,” Financial Times, 17 May 1996.
806 Ibid.
807 Sharp, Honest Broker, 66.
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Yugoslavia.808 Human Rights Watch reported in late January 1997 that the funds for 
Republika Srpska from Britain’s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) were 
being distributed by the same individuals in Prijedor who had run the Serb 
concentration camps in the same area in the spring and summer of 1992.809
Another piece of news was also disturbing about British officials’ deals with Serbian 
President Milosevic who was considered as the architect of the carnage in former 
Yugoslavia. Britain’s Former Foreign Secretary, since he left the cabinet in July 1995, 
had become the director of the National Westminster Bank and deputy chairman of its 
subsidiary NatWest markets. It was reported in 1996 that ‘the latter has recently 
secured lucrative contracts both to advise on Serbia’s debt and to help prepare the 
PTT, Serbia’s telephone system for privatisation’.810 Douglas Hurd, British 
Ambassador Sir Ivor Roberts and Pauline Neville-Jones (also a senior NatWest 
employee after retirement from the Foreign Office) met Milosevic in Belgrade on 24 
July to thank him for the business.811
“Hurd who is supposed to be respected for his ‘diplomatic’ skills, is 
being very undiplomatic in running to make money with M ilosevic 
even as the graves o f M ilosevic’s victims are being unearthed by 
investigators for the International Tribunal on War Crimes in the 
Former Y ugoslavia...A nd the question remains: what can decent 
people do about the direct complicity o f their political and economic 
leaders in genocide. National Westminster Bank and NatW est
808 Other main donors, like EU, Japan, The US and the World Bank were trying to make 
reconstruction aid conditional on compliance with the provisions of Daytou and bring to justice of war 
criminals.
809 Ed Vulliamy, “UK Aid to Bosnia Under Fire,” The Guardian, 24 January 1997.
810 Tim Judah, “Banker Hurd to Fund Butcher of Belgrade,” The Sunday Telegraph, 1 September
1996.
811 Ibid.
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Markets are now, if  the reports are true, fully cooperating with the 
man whose victims are being excavated throughout Eastern Bosnia, 
and their major link is a former British Foreign Secretary who spent 
three years providing diplomatic cover for M ilosevic’s crimes, 
including concentration camps, massacres, organised rape, 
systematic annihilation o f cultural heritage, and a network o f  killing- 
centres.” 812
Even before that John Major Government’s apparent support for Milosevic was 
visible. In July 1996, Serbia hired Lowe Bell Financial, owned by Tim Bell, the 
Conservative Party’s public relations expert, to advise on acquiring a democratic image 
and gaining access to Western financial markets.813
In another article appeared in the British daily, The Guardian, in December 1996, it 
was argued that shortly before 1992 general election, Serbs close to the regime had 
secretly sent more than £96,000 to Britain and some of it was understood to have 
found its way into the Conservative Party funds.814 The Opposition’s campaign 
spokesman, Brian Wilson MP, wrote to the parliament ombudsman, Sir Gordon 
Downey, seeking an inquiry into the Serbian funding allegations.815 The implications 
of the affair transcended domestic politics because of charges that British Foreign 
Policy during the war was biased in Serbia’s favour.
812 Michael Sells, “National Westminster Bank, Hurd and Genocide,” The Sunday Telegraph, 1 
September 1996.
813 Bruce Clark, “Belgrade Turns to UK For Advice on Image,” Financial Times, 29 July 1996.
814 Richard Norton-Taylor and Michael White, “MI6 Told Butler of Tories’ Serb Link,” The 
Guardian, 23 December 1996.
815 Ibid.
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION
Britain’s diplomatic and military role in former Yugoslavia from 1991-95 has been 
severely criticised as a policy of appeasement. In general, Britain’s Conservative 
Government took a pragmatic rather than a principled approach to Bosnia, seeking a 
settlement based on Serbian war gains and the de facto partition of Bosnia rather than 
on any kind of justice. Then, when John Major’s government was replaced by Tony 
Blair’s Labour Government, with its principled commitment to human rights, both the 
American and British governments stopped tacitly supporting the acceptance of the 
partition and began to emphasise long term goal of the Dayton Agreement as a multi­
ethnic, multi-confessional, integrated Bosnia. Under Foreign Secretaries Douglas 
Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind, British policy towards Bosnia was more in tune with 
Russia than with the US. Tony Blair and Robin Cook, by contrast, have put Britain 
back on the right track, the Atlanticist camp.
During the course of Yugoslav wars of dissolution, Britain used all its diplomatic skills 
in international institutions to counter international community’s more robust stance 
against Serbian expansionism. Instead of attempting to lead the international 
community to persuade, in particular, the US to take action (that would have been the 
case, as it was frequently supposed by the commentators, had Margaret Thatcher still 
been Prime Minister), British officials reacted swiftly to subdue discussion of using 
force whenever the issue arose.
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In Autumn 1991, although it was obvious then that if the EC recognised Croatia and 
Slovenia, pressure for an independent Bosnia would follow which would eventually 
trigger military attack from Milosevic’s well-armed proxies there, the repeated 
requests from the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic for preventive troop 
deployments were refused by British government. Obviously, later on, the EC’s 
recognition of Bosnia and Hercegovina in April 1992 without offering help to 
administer and protect the new state, or to lift the arms embargo to allow Bosnia to 
defend itself was highly irresponsible an action on the part of Britain as one of five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Although British strongly argued, on each occasion, for caution and impartiality as 
between what it called ‘the warring factions,’ and opposition to German pressure for 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was framed in principled terms, with the British 
claiming recognition would fan the flames of war, when Germany, for various reasons, 
urged for the recognition of Croatia, the anti-recognition stance was dropped for a 
diplomatic bargaining. London basically used the Yugoslav crisis as an opportunity to 
strike a bargain over ‘Europe’. In 1991-2, the British government did not wish to sign 
up for the European Union’s Social Chapter. This, at Franco-German behest, was 
necessary to be included in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The British 
concluded a trade-off with the Germans: an opt-out for the British on the social and 
financial sides, as against immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
One of the most important criticisms was related to the way in which the British 
government handled the war in Yugoslavia during its presidency of the EC in the 
second half of 1992. When Britain assumed the EC Presidency on July 1, 1992, the
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Serb genocide in Bosnia was in full-swing. Reports from Helsinki Watch of Serb 
concentration camps in northern Bosnia had been circulating since late May. Far from 
using the presidency to build a consensus in favour of action to end the war, however, 
Britain continued to block all such initiatives, notably from France and Netherlands.816 
Not only did Britain continue to argue against the deployment of a European (WEU) 
peace-keeping force in Bosnia, but, it also blocked a German plan to share the growing 
refugee problem among the member states. As a result, Britain as the EC President 
was accused of taking up a negative rather than positive attitude and of pursuing a 
reactive rather than proactive policy. Early in the British presidency of the EC in 
August 1992, John Major hosted an EC-UN Conference in London, which launched 
the International Conference in Former Yugoslavia in the midst of a thick-hot war.
The reluctance of Britain to take military action to protect the victims of aggression in 
Bosnia led to increasingly blatant acts of appeasement. These included acceptance of 
the Serb euphemism of ethnic cleansing to describe deliberate genocide, and the 
redefinition of what was manifestly a war of aggression as a humanitarian crisis. This 
justified the deployment of passive peace-keeping troops rather than forces capable of 
curbing the aggression. Britain and France sent troops to Bosnia and Hercegovina not 
because they knew what these were meant to be achieving, but because the 
governments in London and Paris wanted to do something in order to appease their 
enraged public opinion at home, without doing anything in particular. Since the 
deployment of peace-keeping troops, it was the Britain’s obvious reluctance to agree 
to air strikes while it had troops on the ground and its support for the commitment of 
ground forces of UNPROFOR, rather than withdrawal in favour of allowing arms to
816 Jane M. O. Sharp, “Will Britain Lead Europe?,” The World Today 12 (December 1997), 316.
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the Bosnian Government forces, which led to most criticism of the Britain. Despite the 
naked Serbian aggression and volumes of evidence on genocide, there was never a 
clear response from Britain with regard to the use of force. Since Britain was at the
817heart of the debate, this attitude played a pivotal role in determining the outcome.
The clash between British public and media, with their high assessment of the efficacy 
of force, and the majority of the political and military establishment came to a head 
over Bosnia in 1992 and 1993. The public was in favour not just of humanitarian aid 
to Bosnia, which the government and armed forces provided, but of military 
intervention to impose peace on the combatants (peace enforcement). The political 
parties were also deeply divided on the Bosnian issue, but the Labour and Liberal 
Democratic parties, as well as the Thacherite Tories, eventually came out in favour of 
peace enforcement. The Left was divided between the non-pacifists, who took a 
highly moralistic view of international affairs and thus called for massive intervention in 
Bosnia and those, who placed their priority on the avoidance of war. The 
interventionist Right led by Margaret Thatcher stressed the importance of avoiding 
appeasement of aggression.
The British press was generally in favour of peace enforcement though not without 
divisions and doubts. The Times' leaders stridently advocated this policy. Many of 
the paper’s columnists, led by Simon Jenkins, were as hostile to intervention as the 
editorials were in favour. The Daily Telegraph called for ‘all or nothing’ and argued 
that if Western governments were not going to support peace enforcement, it was 
better to make this perfectly clear. Some of its columnists, such as Robert Fox, argued 817
817 Ibid.
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for greater involvement and its Defence Editor, distinguished military historian John 
Keegan, contended that there were two realistic courses of action which would be 
worthwhile; to bomb Belgrade with precision guided munitions in the way the 
Baghdad had been attacked in the Gulf War, or to send an air assault division to attack 
the Serbs besieging Sarajevo and to destroy as many as possible.818
The Guardian writers were also generally in favour of intervention with many more 
troops sent under the UN banner to impose peace, though, like The Times, it was 
generally unspecific about how this was to be achieved. Its columnists, Maggie 
O’Kane, Tihomir Loza and Martin Woollacott called for intervention and it also 
published articles by Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democratic Leader , and George 
Kenney, formerly with the State Department, who strongly advocated greater use of 
force. The Independent bitterly attacked the Western appeasement and devoted its 
front page on two occasions to the names of the members of the public who wanted to 
impose peace on Serbs by using force.819
Despite all protestations from various circles within the country, why then did the 
British government constantly reject to impose peace on the Serbs? Indeed, the 
official British position on the use of force issue was predominantly determined by its 
perception of the nature of the Yugoslav conflict in general, and Bosnian war, in 
particular. The nature of the Yugoslav conflict was understood less in terms of the 
modern dynamics of disintegration, grab for power and more in terms of historic 
animosity. Throughout the war, general tendency of the British officials was to
818 John Keegan, “Only a Short, Sharp Attack Will End Their Defiance,” The Daily Telegraph, 10 
August 1993.
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describe the war as an inter-communal violence; neighbours and villages fighting one 
another. Holding this theory of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ about Yugoslavia was, in fact, 
very convenient, since it connoted that ‘everybody is equally guilty’ and there was no 
need to make a differentiation between the aggressor and victim. Consequently, the 
main British argument against the lifting of the arms embargo was that lifting it would 
lead to a ‘level killing field’, Douglas Hurd’s favourite metaphor. Consequently, the 
best thing to do was considered as containing the conflict spreading to other parts of 
the region and limit the level of violence then sit back and let the ancient hatreds burn 
themselves out. British politicians who described their policy as ‘non-intervention’ or 
their approach as ‘impartial’ in fact, intervened decisively on the Serbian side, since the 
Serbian forces had from the very beginning large stockpiles of the fourth largest army 
in Europe.
The motives for leaving Bosnia to its fate were, undoubtedly, reinforced by other 
considerations. There was an instinctive reluctance within the government and armed 
forces to become too deeply involved in ‘immedicable inter-ethnic’ conflicts; strong 
parallels were drawn between Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland in that sense. By 
rejecting to get involved militarily, Britain wanted to avoid a second experience like 
Northern Ireland. British army officials believed that defeating Serbian guerrillas 
would be very costly, since they had shown their capacity for guerrilla warfare in the 
Second World War, and that they had been trained for 40 years by Tito’s regime to 
fight in the same way if the country were to be invaded by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. 
However, Milosevic was not Tito and the Serbian forces attacking the civilians were 
far from being a credible force to stand up against well-trained NATO forces. In 819
819 The Folly of Betraying Bosnia,” The Independent, 26 July 1993.
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addition, it was never taken into account that, if the West really wanted to save 
Bosnia, army of the Bosnian government were quite capable of defeating the Serbian 
guerrillas, had they been equipped with adequate armament. Another concern of 
British government about Northern Ireland was to seek to avoid diplomatic 
developments which might have adverse implications for the situation there. Although 
not very prominent concern in British thinking, any international role in the dissolution 
of the Yugoslav state had to be weighed against the possibility of parties or 
organisation outside Britain which might try to take role in resolving the troubles in 
Northern Ireland.820
An equally effective factor limiting the British commitment was the objective of not 
doing anything which would call into question the 1994 Ministry of Defence’s White 
Paper entitled ‘Options for Change’. This important treasury-driven programme 
derived from the government’s programme to cut public expenditure, including that on 
defence. Under ‘Options’ various cuts were being made in the UK armed forces. An 
unstated imperative guiding action was the requirement not to do anything which 
might reverse these decisions. Britain already had troops in many parts of the world; 
14,000 troops were still maintained in Northern Ireland and there were already UN 
contingents scattered from Cyprus, to Cambodia via Kuwait. However, this proved 
not to be an absolute, as, first the decision was taken in September 1992, to deploy 
2400 troops in Bosnia and Hercegovina with UNPROFOR, then, later in the summer
820 James Gow, “British Perspectives,” in International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, ed. 
Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (London: 1996), 89-90.
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of 1994, the UK contribution to UNPROFOR was more than doubled (totalling 
3688).821
As a result, throughout the war in former Yugoslavia, Britain took a pragmatic rather 
than a moral attitude to the search for peace. It tended to discount the viability of a 
multi-ethnic community in Bosnia and Hercegovina after the horrors o f . ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and increasingly as the war progressed to regard the three main ethnic 
groups as equally guilty warring factions. While not totally blind to the genocidal 
nature of ethnic cleansing, Britain tended to play down the need to deal with the 
Serbian and Croatian war crimes and to focus on pragmatic ways to end the war, even 
if it meant acquiescing in Serbian war gains. Peace-now prevailed over peace-with- 
justice. As a result, while the US and Germany considered any military success of 
Croat and Bosnian government forces to regain the territories previously occupied by 
Bosnian Serb militias as necessary to reach a just peace, Britain tended to see it as a 
prolongation of war and consequently slowing down the peace process.822
Indeed, no other country was well-placed as Britain to be statesmanlike in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. It had the job, as European Community’s president in the second half of 
1992 of setting the EC’s agenda and co-ordinating its policies. It also faced none of 
the inhibitions distracting the other big western players -the presidential campaign in 
the United States, the imminent referendum on the Maastricht treaty in France, 
Germany’s constitutional qualms about sending any forces abroad. John Major’s 
government was fresh from election victory. The British might have reasonably be
821
822
Ibid.
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expected to be making the running in the Bosnian imbroglio. However, backed by 
credible military power, it was the US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke 
who was able to broker a peace agreement in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 ending 
the Bosnian part of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. Only when Washington was 
fully engaged, it was possible to force a policy which was broadly accepted by other 
significant players in the international management of the Yugoslav war.
Dayton agreement was signed in Paris in December by the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia 
and Croatia and guaranteed by the five power Contact Group (US, UK, France, 
Germany and Russia), Japan and a number of Islamic states in the form of a Peace 
Implementation Council. It consolidated the October 1995 cease-fire between the 
warring parties, guaranteed the rights of refugees and displaced people to return home 
in safety, and established federal institutions designed to reintegrate Bosnia as a multi­
ethnic society. But, the agreement suffered from structural problems. First, it had an 
unrealistically short term schedule, especially for the NATO implementation forces. 
Second, it embraced two sets of contradictory goals: partition of Bosnia into two 
political entities with separate armies (a Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republica 
Srpska) while also seeking a single integrated state with central institutions. Thirdly, 
the military and civilian aspects of the agreement are separately controlled and 
administered. This produced a dangerous law enforcement gap and a fragmented aid 
program with little opportunity to exert economic leverage on recalcitrant parties. 
Both before and after the agreement, the EU governments poured enormous military 
and economic resources into Bosnia, but three years on, the peace remains fragile, not 
least because appeasement still characterises western policy.
307
Many on both sides of the Atlantic hold Major government in Britain responsible for 
the complete failure of European and American policies in Bosnia from 1991-1995. 
When Britain had the chance to take lead in the world’s response to the war in former 
Yugoslavia, it made the worst of it. Its involvement in Bosnia was disastrous both for 
Bosnia’s well-being and Britain’s reputation. Unfortunately, in the end, Dayton 
Agreement reinforced Britain’s image of being a perfidious Albion rather than an 
honest broker and thus did have important political implications both in Britain and the 
world. For example, although the long term cost of the British opposition to US 
policy could not be easily assessed, it is for certain that there had been damage to the 
so-called special relationship between the two and where that left the Britain’s tuck- 
under-the American-wing policy remained to be judged.
The new Labour government, which came to power in May 1997, however, 
recognised all the faults of the previous government and took genuine steps to repair 
the damage done to Britain’s international standing so far. Once installed as Foreign 
Secretary Cook emphasised that British foreign policy would now be ethically based 
and ‘support for the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we 
insist for ourselves.’823 This change of policy was reflected in new government’s 
support to Germany and the US in implementing the peace in Bosnia. But, the 
consequences of previous government’s policies for Britain’s standing in the post-Cold 
War world will not be easy to shake off.
823 Ian Traynor, “Cook Reads Bosnia Riot Act,” The Guardian, 25 July 1997.
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